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ABSTRACT 
and comprehensive .study of the 
Red Sea region. Background studies 
environment, and resources are 
The thesis is especially concerned with three basic 
American interests in the Red Sea. Firstly, energy interest: 
United States deep concern about uninterrupted flow of oil 
supplies from the Gulf to the former as well as to its Western 
allies creates an increasing American interest in the Red Sea 
r·oute, particularly since the Gulf tanker war in 1982. Such 
interest is clearly seen in United States political, 
technical, and finaricial involvement in the Suez Canal (1975) 
and in the current laying of pipelines from the Gulf to the 
Red Sea. Disruption of those supplies to the US or its allies 
may r0sult in American use of force. 
Secondly, ship~ing interest: such concern is clearly 
shown in United States involvement in matters relating to the 
Suez Canal, the Straits of Bab al Mandeb and Tiran. Freedom of 
navigation through the Red Sea, especially for· Israeli ships, 
is a major American interest in this respect. United States 
refusal to sign the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 
may involve the former into conflict with some Red Sea States, 
pat~ticularly when American nuclear-powered vessels sail from 
the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean or vice versa. 
Thirdly, Soviet involvement in Afghanistan,. the Gulf war 
and the resurgence of Islam are becoming increasingly worrying 
to the US, becau~~ such developments are feared as a 
destabilizing factor to the stability of the oil producing 
states of the Arabian peninsula, with particular reference to 
Saudi Arabia, the most important Red Sea state. 
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PREFACE 
The influence of geography on politics can be 
conspicuously seen in the Red Sea region. The location of the 
latter at the crossroad of Africa, Asia and Europe has 
enabled it to be an important highway between these land-
masses for centuries. Throughout time there has been a 
co~ellation between development of trade through the Red Sea 
and the stability of its coastal states. 
The emergence of Islam in Arabia and the existence of 
the most two important Muslim shrines on the Eastern Coast of 
the Red Sea have further enhanced the significance of the 
latter which played a vital role, especially before the 
advent of air navigation, as a means of communication through 
which Muslims used to travel to Makka to perform their Annual 
Hajj (Pilgimage). 
By the close of the 19th century the · Red Sea became a 
contested battleground between the colonial powers of Great 
Britain, France and Italy. The emergence of the superpowers 
of the United States and the Soviet Union and their 
supplanting of those traditional powers bestowed a new 
dimension on the Red Sea, since the 1960s when it has become 
an arena for competition between the original land-power of 
the Soviet Union and the sea-power of the United States. The 
discovery of oil in the 1930s in the Gulf and the increasing 
(xvii) 
dependence of the industrial West on those resources have 
added to the strategic significance of the Red Sea, which 
until 1966 was the chief artery of oil transportation to the 
West. 
Following the closure of the canal in 1967, after the 
2nd Israeli-Arab war, the Red Sea lost its significance, 
because oil transportation was shifted to the Cape route. 
Since the re-opening of the Suez Canal and the increasing 
involvement of the United States in the Middle East, the Red 
Sea has begun to regain its importance. 
The preoccupation of the United States with the Soviet 
Union and other radical States in the Middle East as sources 
of threat to United States interests there, has also added a 
strategic and geopolitical importance to the Red Sea, hence 
throughout the 1970s the Red Sea region has attracted 
American interest. Such American concern about the region 
must concern its people because of the repercussions of such 
foreign interference on their interests, not least their 
national security and sovereignty. Therefore, this issue has 
constituted the substance of this thesis. 
Chapter one discusses various definitions of 
geopolitics, regional and global geopolitical perspectives, 
and the position of the Red Sea with regard to these views. 
Also Red Sea social and political diversities as well as its 
global location are underlined by the former 1 s geographical 
linkages with other regions; all these issues have been 
(xviii) 
investigated. 
Chapter two deals with the environmental features of the 
region; these include the formation of the Red Sea, coasts, 
islands, climate, and pollution. Most important here is the 
strategic significance of those physical assets with regard 
to American interests. 
Chapter three handles the issue of Red Sea resources and 
assesses their importance regionally and in relation to 
United States interests. 
In Chapter four United States shipping interests in the 
Red Sea have been investigated extensively through American 
concern about, and involvement in matters relating to the 
Suez Canal, Red Sea waterways, and major ports. In this 
chapter, the United States' particular concern about Israel's 
right to navigate the Red Sea is highlighted. 
Chapter five discusses the issue of the United States 
energy supply and transportation, which is the central 
subject of the thesis. It has been intensively researched. 
This part of the thesis discusses United States strategy of 
occupying the Gulf oilfields if oil supplies are denied to 
them. Here, the creation of the former RDF and its 
replacement by the USCENTCOM is assessed. 
Chapter six deals with the security of shipping which 
includes physical and legal threats to the United States' 
shipping interests in the Red Sea. Here, United States' 
refusal to sign the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(xix) 
and the possible repercussions on such a position are shown 
to be most important. 
United States 1 concern about the stability of the oil 
states of the Arabian peninsula, with special reference to 
Saudi Arabia, is the subject of Chapter seven. This issue is 
expansively investigated. Political and military threats to 
the peninsula states, as perceived by the US, are also 
examined. Differences between Saudi Arabia and the US over 
the actual threat to the security of the peninsula is an 
important theme in this chapter. 
Chapter eight concludes the thesis by discussing United 
States 1 geopolitical behaviour in the region. Prospects for 
geopolitical development in the region and their impact in 
the United States receive attention. Finally, the author 
concludes with recommendations he sees as worthy of 
consideration. 
PART I: 
THE RED SEA REGION 
l 
CHAPTER 1 
GEOPOLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE AND REGIONAL LINKAGES 
OF THE RED SEA REGION 
1.1 Definitions 
1.1.1 Geopolitics 
Since its inception, the term 'geopolitics' has 
undergone many interpretations, some of which are clearly in 
conflict. The historical development of these changes has 
been adequately presented elsewhere, and will not be 
discussed here. ( 1 ) The term 'geopolitics' was probably first 
coined in 1899 by Kjellen to mean "the science of the state 
as a realm in space". ( 2 ) According to Muir (1975) the German 
Journal The Mouthpiece depicted the word as 
Pound 
" the science which deals with the dependence of 
political events upon soil (i.e. the physical 
setting)." (3) 
(1972) insists that 'geopolitics' must be 
"geographical conscience of the state" involving 
the 
the 
"geographically oriented study of politics". ( 4 ) Muir (19 7 5) 
states that the term includes 11 studies of dynamic political 
processes" acting at levels "broader than that of the 
individual state and within global perspectives". ( 5 ) To Cohen 
(1973) the essence of geopolitics is "the relation of 
international political power to the geographical 
~~ f 
. 
~ 
2 
setting". ( 6 ) Gray (1977) is in agreement with Cohen's 
t . (7) I perspec 1 ve. n a United States Senate report, Geopolitics 
of Energy, Conant ( 19 7 7) maintains that in relation to the 
study of international affairs 
"geopolitics 
locational factors 
among nations." (8) 
stresses the 
1n influencing 
importance of 
the relations 
Boyce ( 19 8 2) states that geopolitics concerns the political 
situation of a nation in relation to geographical conditions, 
with the 
"underlying geographical features of each nation or 
group of nations, as these are reflected in the 
political character and policies of the area." (9) 
In the United States today 'geopolitics' is widely used 
to denote "the geographical facts regarded in terms of their 
political relevance 1n a global context. " ( 10 ) To the 
Russians, however, the subject is a 
"bourgeois reactionary 
selectively interpreted 
nomic geography for the 
the aggressive policies 
conception, which uses 
facts of physical and eco-
formation and propagation of 
of imperialist states." (11) 
For our purposes a useful definition of geopolitics is the 
influence of geographical factors, whether real or perceived, 
in shaping international relations at the regional, 
continental and global scales. 
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1.1.2 The Red Sea Region 
For the purpose of this study, the Red Sea region is 
defined as the Red Sea proper and its ramifications (the Gulf 
of Suez, the Gulf of Aqaba, and the Suez Canal to the north; 
and the Gulf of Aden to the south), and the coastal states 
thereof. This zone embraces ten riparian states, equally 
divided between eastern and western shores: Somalia, 
Djibouti, Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt on the African shore and 
The People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY), The Yemen 
Arab Republic (YAR), the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and 
Israel on the Asian shore (figure 1.1). The location of the 
Horn of Africa on the southern approaches to the Red Sea, 
Somalia's fronting on the Gulf of Aden and Somalia's 
involvement in the security affairs of the Red Sea, are all 
strong reasons for the inclusion of the Horn into the Red Sea 
geopolitical region. Its inclusion has been both recognized 
and considered appropriate by various scholars. ( 12 ) The logic 
of this definition will appear clearer later, and especially 
when the shipping and energy interests of the United States 
and its allies are discussed in chapters 4 and 5, and also 
when threats to these interests are investigated in chapters 
6 and 7. 
1.2 Geopolitical Perspectives 
1.2.1 Global Views 
Twentieth century global geopolitical views are many and 
• 
Tho Heartland asde~~2t~~ & 
in 1904 (Pivot areal 
The Heartland as revised 
in 1919 
The Heartland in 1943 
(U.S.S.R. except Lenaland) 
The Arctic ice 
U.S. military presence 
5 
FIG. 1.2 WORLD GEOPOLITICAL VIEWS ACCORDING TO H.J. MACKINDER 
(1904, 1919 and 1943) 
6 
varied, and naturally enough, contrasting geopolitical per-
spectives of the world have emerged, ( 13 ) often differing in 
particular over the relative significance of land and sea. 
There are perhaps four dominant views regarding the earth's 
political-patterns, advocated by Mahan (1900), Mackinder 
(1904, 1919 and 1943), Spykman (1944) and Cohen (1964, 1973 
and 1982). ( 14) The American Admiral Alfred Mahan (1900), who 
became one of the most influential proponents of sea-power, 
predicted that world dominance could be achieved by an 
Anglo-American alliance from key land bases surrounding 
Eurasia, because of the "inherent advantage of sea-movement 
over land movement". ( 1 5) Mahan's thesis of sea-power as the 
key to world mastery convinced him that an alliance of 
maritime powers could contain the land-power based on the 
Eurasian land-based. ( 16 ) 
The views of the British political geographer, Sir 
Halford Mackinder (1904, 1919, 1943) are probably still among 
the most influential ideas in the field of geopolitics ( 17 ) 
(figure 1. 2). Contrary to Mahan, and in reaction to his 
ideas, Mackinder emphasized the advantages of land-power over 
sea-power. ( 18 ) After World War One his thesis was summarized 
as: 
"Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland: 
Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island: 
Who rules the World-Island commands the World." (19) 
Nicholas Spykman (1944) largely agreed with Mackinder's 
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view of potential competition between Russian land-power 
based on the Heartland and sea-power, but he put more 
emphasis on the role of the "tier of states which encircled 
the Heartland 11 • He called this tier the 'Rimland' (figure 
1.3), which corresponds very closely to Mackinder's "Inner or 
(20) Marginal Crescent 11 • Spykman suggested that the rimland 
states have certain important features that make them the key 
to world domination, including large populations, rich 
resources, for instance oil, and the use of maritime 
communications. He argued that control of the rimland states 
was the major objective of the contest between USSR and Great 
Britain before World War One when the latter was the 
. ( 21 ) 
envelop1ng power. 
Spykman strongly advocated that the United States should 
attempt to influence the rimland states and the prevention of 
their control by the Soviet Union should be the foremost 
task. ( 22 ) He believed that: 
"Who controls the Rimland rules Eurasia; 
Who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the 
World." (23) 
Parker (1982) indicates that Spykman was influenced by 
Mackinder's 'Heartland' and 'World Island' thesis concluding 
that the United States should "organize and reinforce the 
'rimland' in order to imprison the 'heartland' within its 
(24) bounds ... 11 Parker has no doubt that the entrenchment of 
geopolitics in the United States has contributed to the rapid 
9 
rise of the latter to superpower status. He maintains that 
after World War Two opposition between the continental powers 
of Britain and Germany had been replaced by a global 
confrontation between the US the biggest and strongest 
'island' state in the 'marginal crescent' and the Soviet 
Union - the first power to command the 'Heartland' of the 
'World I 1 d l (25) s an . This development seemed to confirm 
Mackinder's prophecy of an age land-power versus sea-power, 
in which the former struggles to break out and challenge its 
opponent while the latter makes every effort to "keep it out 
of the oceanic border lands", as seen by Cochram (1972). ( 26 ) 
Frank Barnett (1977), President of the US National 
Strategy Information Center indicates that there is an 
inherent struggle between the 'Heartland' power of the Soviet 
Union and the maritime alliance led by the US for 
effective defence of the 'Rimlands' of Eurasia and Africa, 
and "maintenance of relatively free access to the Rimland 
resources and their adjacent seas". ( 2 7 ) He considers those 
resources and sea lanes as vital security interests of the 
United States. ( 2 S) Aligning himself with the previously 
mentioned generation of geopolitical thinkers, Gray ( 19 7 7) 
typifies this view as follows: 
Control of the World-Island of Eurasia Africa by a 
single power would, in the long term, mean control of 
the world. 
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Land-power and sea-power confront each other in the 
Eurasian-African Rimlands and marginal seas. 
Control of those Rimlands and marginal seas by an 
insular power is not synonymous with the control of the 
World-Island, but it does mean the denial of eventual 
global hegemony to the Heartland power that is the 
Soviet U . (29) n1on. 
After World War Two, the most important global geo-
political ideas to have appeared are probably those of Saul 
Cohen (1964, 1973 and 1982). Before 1982, Cohen argued that 
the rise of the European Imperial powers and their struggle 
for acquisition of "key islands and coastal enclaves" as a 
means for uniting ocean basins, 
concepts of 'geostrategic and 
led to the emergence of the 
geopolitical' regions. (30) 
However, Parker (1982) views Cohen's thesis of geostrategic 
regions as a "modern form to Mackinder 's hypothesis". ( 3 1 ) 
Cohen divided the world into two major geostrategic regions: 
the Trade-Dependent Maritime World and the Eurasian 
Continental World (figure 1. 4) • Then he broke these into 
geopolitical regions; and saw the areas that lie between the 
two geostrategic regions, the Middle East and Southeast Asia 
as "shatterbelts". (3 2 ) For two reasons the 'shatterbelts' 
have been considered crucial to the interests of both 
geostrategic regions. To the Western maritime powers, their 
importance is derived from their control of "strategic narrow 
seas" and in their specialization in the production of 
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certain agricultural and mineral products. The significance 
of shatterbelts to the Eurasian Continental powers emanates 
from the fact that the land avenues of the former protrude 
toward significant parts of the latter ( 33 ) 
' 
representing an 
endemic security concern (chapters 5 and 7). 
In the early 1980s Cohen reflected that the 1960s and 
1970s shaped a geopolitical world fundamentally different to 
that of Mackinder and Spykman. Most important of these 
changes were the transformation of the USSR into a major 
maritime power and the emergence of new states after the 
liquidation of the European Imperial domains and the drastic 
sweeping away of traditional rule in some pro-Western 
epicentres of the world, as in the Middle East and Africa. 
Also, among these important changes, Cohen mentioned the 
ascendency of the power of the oil states of the Middle 
East ( 3 4 ) especially Saudi Arabia (chapter 7). Moreover, he 
identified a third 1 shatterbelt 1 when he added sub-Saharan 
Africa to the Middle East and Southeast Asia, the former 
"shifting from the role of a component of the Maritime World 
to that of a shatterbel t" ( 3 5 ) (figure 1. 5). 
By all measures, the political, economic and security 
fate of all three shatterbelts have become of vital concern 
to the Trade-Dependent Maritime World in modern geopolitical 
thinking. It will be noted that the Red Sea region is located 
in a key position in relation to such global geopolitical 
perspectives. This will become clearer when we discuss later 
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in this chapter such issues as the definition of the Red Sea 
region, its social and political diversities, its global 
location, and the growing American contest with the Soviet 
Union there. Meanwhile, it will be clear that all the 
preceding global geopolitical perceptions have embraced the 
Red Sea region. Whether in Mackinder 's 'Inner' or 'Marginal 
Crescent' view, Spykman's 'Rimland' concept or Cohen's 
'shatterbelts', the Red Sea region clearly occupies a crucial 
position. Regarding Cohen's 'shatterbelt' concept, the region 
comprises most of the characteristics of a 'shatterbelt' and 
it may not be an exaggeration to argue that the Red Sea 
region is the only Middle Eastern sub-region that displays 
the characteristics of the Middle East 'shatterbelt' as being 
"fragmentized and caught up in major power conflicts". ( 36 ) 
The Red Sea region is, in fact, a crucial part of the 
most sensitive area of superpower contest for strategic and 
geopolitical gains. The geopolitical importance of this 
region resides in its being part of both Eurasian and African 
'Rimlands', and one of the marginal seas which penetrate into 
the 'Riml and' , together with the Mediterranean, Gulf and 
Black Sea. According to Gray (1977) those 'rimlands' and 
their marginal seas constitute the interface between the 
power of the 'Heartland' and the Maritime imperium of North 
America. ( 37 ) Therefore, as one of the strategically located 
marginal seas, as a crucial part of the Middle East and 
Sub-Saharan 
significant 
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1 shatterbelts 1 the 
to the superpowers, 
Red Sea must be highly 
especially to American 
economic and politico-military interests. Thus, since the 
late 1960s the undeniable Soviet-American struggle for 
control over the Red Sea region may reflect their wider 
geopolitical contest for hegemony over the Middle East and 
Africa. This may be especially true since neighbouring 
sub-Saharan Africa has assumed 1 shatterbelt 1 status. An 
important part of the greater Red Sea region, the Horn of 
Africa, is strategically situated in this new 1 shatterbelt 1 
(figure 4). 
1. 2. 2. Regional Perspectives 
(i) Arabization of the Red Sea 
Since the early 1950s contemporary Arab geopolitical 
interests in the Red Sea have begun with manoeuvres for the 
1 Arabization 1 of the Red Sea. The concept was initiated and 
promoted by President Nasser until 1970 when he died. It was 
then revived by the Saudis in the early 1970s. Since the 
Israeli-Arab war of 1973, Arab geopolitical concern about the 
Red Sea has increased considerably, especially from the 
security point of view. Superpower presence, noticeably 
Russian, has enhanced the manoeuvres of the conservative Arab 
leaders, such as the Saudis, towards the idea of the 
Arabization of the Red Sea. 
As a recognition of the strategic role of the Red Sea in 
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the Israeli-Arab war of 1973 Haykal (then editor of Al Ahram) 
indicated the 
( 3 8 ) 
"urgent need for a common Arab Red Sea 
strategy". Since then, coordination and conferences 
between several Red Sea riparians have taken place. Some 
non-Red Sea states have also participated in these 
conferences, such as Syria in the Khartoum conference 1976. 
At such conferences, issues of Arabizing the Red Sea or its 
transference into an 1 Arab Lake 1 or 1 Lake of Peace 1 were 
discussed. Legum (1978) does not attribute the Saudi call for 
an Arab Red Sea strategy to an established Arab policy; he 
argues that the Saudis adopted the issue of converting the 
Red Sea into an 1 Arab Sea 1 only in reaction to the Russian 
establishment of naval facilities 1n Berbera (Somalia) during 
the 1970s. ( 39 ) He adds that Arab support to Somalia, 
especially after the eviction of the Soviets from Egypt in 
1972 - and to the Eritreans as well, has been part of an Arab 
effort to support the forces controlling all of Ethiopia 1 s 
corridors to the Sea. ( 40 ) Thus, Legum sees Arab attitudes 
toward the Horn disputes as an extension of threat to both 
Israeli and Ethiopian national interests in the Red Sea; a 
threat which originally emanated from Arab aspirations of 
Arabizing the Red Sea. 
Interestingly, the call for Arabizing the Red Sea has 
been linked by some Arab leaders to the common Arab interest 
of preserving the Arab character of the Gulf. Those leaders 
believe that it was this interest which made Red Sea security 
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11 a comprehensive pan-Arab responsibility 11 .( 4 l) In this wider 
Arab perspective, we find non-Red Sea states involved in the 
Red Sea issue. The Iraqis also view the Red Sea as Arab 
territory; Berzan Al-Tikriti, for example, considers the Red 
Sea 11 a vi tal part of Arab terri tory 11 • ( 42 ) Both the Iraqi 
Deputy Premier, Na'im Haddad and Al-Thawra (the Ba'ath Party 
Newspaper) have denounced American manoeuvres and activities 
the Red Sea area. (43) ln 
To sum up, Arab jockeying for influence over the Red Sea 
could be considered as an attempt to prevent its inter-
nationalization, which might increase the Red Sea's potential 
as a threat to Arab security. This security might equally be 
jeopardized by superpower confrontation in the region, or by 
Israel's perennial hostility towards the Arabs. In view of 
these diverse and conflicting interests over the Red Sea and 
its littorals, what would the US do to safeguard its 
11 strategic interests 
and the Red Sea open 
shipping, especially 
North America? 11 • (44) 
1n keeping Bab el Mandeb 
to free flow of international 
to Israel, Western Europe and 
Various counter measures (chapter 6) have been considered by 
the United States to guarantee this and other interests 
(chapters 3 and 4). 
(ii) The Red Sea and Muslim Shrines 
Apart from trade, oil and military interests, the inter-
nationality of the Red Sea region was established 1400 years 
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ago by the existence of the Muslim Holy Shrines in Makka and 
Madina located some 40km northeast of the former. The global 
location of the region is associated with the annual Islamic 
pilgrimage (the Hajj) to Makka and Madina, which are the two 
most Holy places for over 800 million Muslims. ( 45 ) Muslims 
turn daily in prayer towards the Ka 1 aba in Makka. In fact, 
before the discovery of oil in the 1930s, the Hajj provided 
the Saudi Kingdom with most of its revenue. In 1983, the 
number of pilgrims to Makka was over one million; of this 
number 62,483 pilgrims came by sea via the Red Sea. (4 6 ) 
Since the 12th century Muslim leaders have used the Red 
Sea militarily to defend their sacred shrines. For example, 
hearing that Crusader Prince Arnold threatened to invade the 
two holy cities, Salahuddin the Ayyubid (1138-93), the Muslim 
ruler of Egypt and Syria, built a fleet in the Red Sea, and 
was able to defeat and kill Arnold, and save the Muslim holy 
shrines. ( 4 'i) Until 1860, the Turkish empire was the only 
authority that ruled the Red Sea region south of Sawakin as 
far as the Abyssinian coastal borders. According to Marston 
(1939) the Egyptian officers who administered those parts on 
behalf of the Turkish Sultan were religiously inspired 
because their antagonists were Christian. The officers were 
instructed to make all possible difficulties for Christians 
in the Red Sea district to protect the Holy cities from their 
. fl ( 48 ) H . b . . f 1n uence. ere, 1t may e 1nterest1ng to re er to 
Colonel Qaddafi's denunciation of the deployment of the 
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American AWACS aircraft in Saudi Arabia in 1980, the event 
which he saw as an "occupation" and desecration of the Holy 
cities, and consequently called upon the two million Muslim 
pilgrims to launch a holy war to "free" the cities. ( 49 ) 
(iii) Socio-political Diversity of the Red Sea Region 
Although not vast as a body of water, the Red Sea is 
surrounded by a geopolitical region of great diversity. 
Ethnically, the region includes Asians, Africans, Arabs and 
Jews. However, Arabs clearly dominate the region. Culturally, 
it is mostly Muslim with minority groups of Christians, Jews, 
animists and pagans. Arabic is the most widely spoken 
language. Apart from Saudi Arabia, and to some extent Israel, 
the current economic outlook of the region seems bleak. 
Political diversity appears in the different types of 
political regimesin the region as well as 1n the external 
orientations of the littoral states (chapter 7 and figure 5). 
Here the regimes are either pro-East or pro-West. 
Conservative systems of government are represented in 
monarchical Saudi Arabia and Jordan. Marxist/Socialist 
systems are represented in Ethiopia, PDR Yemen, Somalia and 
Yemen AR. 
Sudan and 
There are authoritarian governments 1n 
,~(jJ.. t. ~ ~·\ I . . 
a multi-party /1"rdem6crac'y in Israel. 
Egypt and 
Generally 
speaking, rapid population growth, economic underdevelop-
ment, cultural and political diversities, territorial claims 
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and large numbers of refugees, have aggravated local 
instability in the region and contributed to the escalation 
of bilateral and regional disputes (chapter 7). No state in 
the Red Sea region can be considered free of some of these 
pressures. Moreover, the superpowers cannot easily remain 
neutral in local conflicts which often induce them to become 
involved. Consequently, superpower rivalry in the region and 
their presence 1n the littoral states since the late 1960s 
have intensified hostility among 
_[_')Lt·, 
some riparian states 
(chapter 7). Indeed, ~~~e' conflicting interests can be said 
to be operating in the Red Sea region. These are Arab, 
Israeli, .A.f~i;~·P;h, Soviet, and Western ' especially American ;; 
interests. The interplay of these conflicts has undisputedly 
intensified the fragmented character of the region. This 
fragmentation and the alignment of its states into pro-East 
and pro-West (figure 5.1) bear considerably upon US economic 
strategy and military interests. On the other hand, American 
pursuit of these interests could have a serious impact on the 
region, as well as on US-Soviet relations (chapter 8). 
Since the early 1970s, two important factors have 
contributed to the increasing significance of the Red Sea: 
first, the Arab concern about the security of the Sea and the 
economic interest of the littorals, and secondly, Soviet-
American rivalry over the Sea and its riparian states. The 
first issue has been clearly demonstrated in the call by most 
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Red Sea Arab littorals for the transforamtion of the Red Sea 
into an 'Arab Lake' , because the sea is claimed to be Arab 
territory (chapter 7). The other issue can be seen most 
obviously in the superpower struggle over the Red Sea region 
in search of naval facilities and bases (chapter 5 and figure 
5. 1) . 
1.3 Global Location of the Red Sea Region 
1. 3. 1 Introduction 
Several geopoliticians have greatly emphasized the 
crucial significance of 'position'. In this respect, the Red 
Sea region enjoys a significant strategic location which is 
widely acknowledged. It is the only Middle Eastern sub-region 
endowed with geographical contiguity with four world 
geopolitical areas, Africa, Asia, the Indian Ocean and the 
Mediterranean. Its northern approaches are 1n clear control 
of routes to Jordan, Israel and, most important, to the Suez 
Canal, the key to the Mediterranean. Its southern approaches 
govern access to the Indian Ocean. It also controls certain 
peripheral regions of Africa and Asia regarded as politically 
vi tal to the future of large parts of the Middle East and 
North Africa. 
Situated at the crossroads of the old world, between 
Africa, Asia and Europe, the Red Sea constitutes a 
water-bridge between East and West; or as Boyce ( 1982) puts 
it, the Red Sea will remain "a strategic crossroads of 
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east-west connections", at "the heart of the earth". The Red 
Sea region occupies a central position in a central region 
which extends from the northern rim of Africa to the 
southwest corner of Asia. Viewed as the sensitive world 
centre, the Middle East is also described as "the critical 
nexus of the globe". (SO) Africa is just 20km from the Arabian 
peninsula at the narrowest point at Bab al-Mandeb, and 380km 
at the widest point, between Massawa and Jizan (figure 2.1). 
Owing to its location at the interface between Africa and 
Asia, the Red Sea overlooks the northwest quadrant of the 
Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea and therefore commands vital 
sea lanes. 
Throughout its history, the Red Sea served as an 
essential link between East and West. Its geographic location 
astride trade routes between Europe, East Africa and the Far 
East have ensured its commercial, as well as its strategic 
significance. Although its importance declined somewhat after 
the discovery of the direct sea route to India round the Cape 
of Good Hope, by Vasco da Gama in 149 8, still the Red Sea 
retained its importance as a significant focus for transit 
trade and continued to yield large commercial benefits. (S 1 ) 
European competition 1n the 18th and 19th centuries 
highlighted the significance of the Red Sea as a crucial 
commercial and military link between East and West. European, 
especially British, interests in the Red Sea have increased 
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considerably since the early 19th century and particularly 
after the breaching of the Suez Canal in 1860. ( 52 ) In pursuit 
of their commercial and cultural interests, European powers 
have fully realized the importance of the global location of 
the Red Sea. Being a leading maritime power between the 19th 
and early 20th centuries, Great Britain was aware of its need 
for overseas naval bases to protect its commercial interests 
in the East. ( 5J) It was attracted by the location of the Red 
Sea with special reference to such important passages as Bab 
al-Mandeb. The Napoleonic conquest of Egypt in 1798 was seen 
by Great Britain as a serious threat to British communication 
with India. From then on, British policy toward southern 
Arabia began to change, for example in 1799 the British 
occupied Perim Island (chapter 2) for a short time. In 1839 
they occupied Aden, whose important location had already been 
officially reported. ( 54 ) This report claimed that possession 
of Aden would give power and consequent commercial advantages 
in Arabia, Abyssinia, and northeast Africa apart from its 
connection with India. It would also be a key means of 
extending British knowledge and religion over other countries 
and amongst supposedly ignorant peoples. Thus the area's 
significance was clear a generation before the cutting of the 
Suez Canal completed in November 1869. (54) The importance of 
the location of the Red Sea did not escape the attention of 
either France or Italy. The French established themselves on 
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the other side of Bab al Mandeb in 1859, in what was known as 
French Somaliland until 1976 and the State of Djibouti 
thereafter. Italy established itself in Ethiopia 1 s Red Sea 
coastal zone of Eritrea between 1936 and 1941, when it was 
defeated by Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, with British 
help. ( 5S) 
The importance of the Red Sea appears to be well 
recognised in the modern world, and many sources, especially 
Western, continue to emphasize its global significance. The 
International Herald Tribune ( 19 84) indicates that the Red 
Sea 1 s commercial and strategic maritime role renders it one 
of the world 1 s major waterways and vi tal passages. It adds 
that "dozens of ships go through this vi tal passage" and 
consequently an "unusually large number of countries share an 
interest in keeping it open", because it is truly an 
"international jugular". ( 56 ) A Congressional view stressing 
the global importance of the Red Sea has been given by 
Congressman, William Gray (1984) who led a trade mission to 
Cairo. He declared that the Red Sea is an important artery 
which concerns the whole world. He emphasized that 
"any threat to shipping in the Red Sea is a threat 
to the security of the region and the world as 
well." (57) 
To The Guardian, ( 19 84) the Red Sea has an international 
importance as a navigational route attracting the interests 
of both Western and Eastern blocs. ( 58 ) The clearing of the 
25 
Suez Canal ten years ago (1975) by the Western powers as well 
as by the Soviet Union, reflected the universal significance 
of the Red Sea. Again, this importance has been recently 
confirmed (1984) by the quick response of the United States, 
Britain, France and Italy to the calls by Egypt and Saudi 
Arabia to give help in mine clearing in the Red Sea. 
According to the Kuwaiti newspaper, Al-Ray Al-Aam (1984), the 
Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs indicated to President 
Reagan that scouring the Red Sea for mines 
"should reflect international solidarity through the 
participation of the largest possible number of 
countries." (59) 
Although the Minister's views reflect his interest in 
avoiding anti-Western reactions in the region (chapter 6) yet 
the Western moves are a clear indication of the global role 
of the region. To the London-based Arabic newspaper Asharq 
Al-Awsat ( 19 84) the clearing of mines from the Red Sea by 
those four powers in addition to the Soviet Union, and the 
Dutch - who joined in later, has dramatized the international 
status of the waterway. The newspaper concludes that several 
problems and a number of international strategies and 
regional interests and sensitivities intersect each other in 
. (60) 
the reg1on. However, recognition of the internationality 
of the Red Sea has also been declared by some Red Sea 
littorals important to the US, such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt 
and Sudan, as will be shown later (chapter 6) • Such 
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recognition could be helpful to the West when one considers 
regional Arab claims to the Red Sea (chapters 1, 3 and 7). 
1.3.2 Great Power Access 
(i) The United States 
Although the foregoing overview has clearly demonstrated 
the crucial significance of the global location of the Red 
Sea region, the 12,000 miles distance between the United· 
States and the region creates a geographical reality which 
could be disadvantageous for the US in case an emergency 
arises in the region, or in the Gulf when quick response is 
needed. Such distance precludes an immediate American naval 
response, particularly if the Soviet Union which is 
geographically closer to these areas - becomes involved. For 
this reason Moodie and Cottrell (1981) point out that in time 
of crisis in these areas, the US navy would find it 
"difficult to maintain a 
crisis management mission 
globe." (61) 
presence or conduct a 
in far corners of the 
Consequently, they call for permanent military presence in an 
area adjacent to the Gulf (chapter 6) • Vice-Admiral Crowe 
( 197 8) who became Commander in Chief of NATO Forces for 
Southern Europe (1982)( 62 ) emphasizes the US need for such a 
permanent military presence in a nearby area, especially the 
northwest Indian Ocean( 63) which embraces the Red Sea region. 
Needless to say, this region is a crucial part of an area 
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where the United States has two strategic problems: the 
protection of petroleum source areas and the guarding of oil 
supply routes. ( 64 ) 
(ii) The Soviet Union 
"The further one is away from the sea, the less is 
one's grief." 
"Beyond the sea, there is gaiety, but it is foreign, 
here we have sorrow, but it is ours." 
"Praise the sea, but in a foreign country." 
(Ancient Russian proverbs) 
The Russians clearly no longer adhere to such traditional 
proverbs. Since the late 1960s they have been unable to 
resist an overriding interest in discovering the 'gaiety' of 
the sea, despite its remoteness and its being 'in a foreign 
country 1 • 
It has been argued that one of the factors that brought 
the Soviet Union into the Middle East was the American 
11 attempt to draw the line of containment just south of 
Russia 1 s borders". ( 6 S) One of the reasons for Soviet support 
for 'Liberation' of the Middle East from Western 'domination' 
or greater 'influence' can legitimately be seen 1n Moscow's 
perception of the area as its 'backyard 1 located just next to 
its southern flank. Consequently, Russia's strategic and 
national security would be directly threatened if the Middle 
East comes into the American political and military orbit. US 
ballistic submarine missiles in the northwest quadrant of the 
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Indian Ocean, specifically in the Arabian Sea, can already 
hit targets in the heart of Eurasian R . ( 67) USS1a. For this 
reason alone the Red Sea must be of interest to the Soviet 
Union. The Soviet Union started to enter the region in the 
early 1950s and by the close of the 1970s it had consolidated 
its presence in several critically strategic spots. 
Parker (1982) argues that if the Soviets were to be in 
need of overseas oil, then the Middle East would be a theatre 
for a practical test of Mackinder 's prophecy of sea-power 
versus land power. (68) The Indian Ocean constitutes an 
essential link between Soviet territories 1n Europe and the 
Far East. 
If Moscow was ever denied the use of the Red Sea route, 
the Cape route would substantially lengthen the voyages of 
Societ vessels. The distance between a Soviet Black Sea port 
and the Red Sea, via the Suez Canal is only 2, OOOnm while 
circumnavigation of the Cape route takes Russian vessels 
about 12, OOOnm, in addition to the nuisance of having to 
round the Cape under the "electronic surveillance of the 
South African Republic, an utterly hostile power". ( 7 1 ) 
Equally, the Soviet-Cuban presence in the southern Red Sea 
region has greatly alarmed the West which fears a potential 
Soviet threat across the Red Sea to the oil producing states 
of the Arabian . (72) pen1nsula. Recognition of the crucial 
global location of the Red Sea also comes from the second 
Eurasian power, China: 
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11 The Red Sea, together with the Suez Canal, is a 
vi tal sea passage leading to the Atlantic, Indian 
and Pacific oceans, and a strategic point linking 
Asia and Africa with Europe." (73) 
1.3.3 Red Sea- Gulf Connections 
Suffice it to say that the major American concern about 
the Middle East stems from US interest in guaranteed and 
uninterrupted flow of oil, especially from the Gulf, to 
Western Europe, Japan and the United States itself. There is 
clear geographical contiguity of the Red Sea region with the 
Gulf where over 60 per cent of the world's proven oil 
reserves exist. The two most obvious indications of Red 
Sea-Gulf connections are Saudi Arabia, owing to its dual 
location on the Red Sea and on the Gulf, and the commanding 
position of the region over vi tal sea lanes, through which 
Gulf oil supplies are shipped to the industrial West; for 
example in 1983 more than 114 million tons of Gulf oil were 
carried through the Red Sea route to Western Europe and North 
America. ( 74 ) Therefore, the presence and shipment of Gulf oil 
must be viewed as an essential dimension of Red Sea-Gulf 
relations. 
By concentrating too much on the influence of the Indian 
Ocean, the Soviet Union, Iran and Afghanistan on the 
geopolitics of the Gulf, scholars have tended to overlook 
pertinent geographical relationships between the Red Sea and 
Gulf. ( 7 5) This significant interplay between the two areas 
has had considerable impact upon various Gulf issues that 
30 
concern the United States. These include economic (chapter 5) 
and politico-strategic factors (chapters 5 and 7), as well as 
issues of superpower rivalry in the Middle East in general. 
According to Blake ( 1981) Red Sea-Gulf connections are 
basically associated with three fundamental factors: trans-
portation, domestic communication in Saudi Arabia, inter-
t . 1 "1 t d d "l"t 1 . t" (7 6 ) na 1ona 01 ra e, an superpower m1 1 ary og1s 1cs. 
However, apart from oil transportation and military concerns, 
links between the two important geopolitical regions can also 
be seen in the great number of expatriates from the former to 
the latter, for example numerous workers from Egypt, Sudan, 
Yemen AR and Jordan migrate to the oil rich states of the 
Gulf seeking work (chapter 7). 
Strategically speaking, with regard to the five-year old 
Gulf war, Red Sea geographical assets have been used to help 
Iraq against Iran. The great quantities of arms and supplies 
that reached Iraq through the Jordanian Red Sea port of 
Aqaba, ( 77 ) and the planned oil pipeline from Iraq's oil 
fields to Aqaba( 7S) (chapter 5), establish a clear example of 
Red Sea-Gulf security interplay. Saudi financial support for 
Iraq( 79 ) is an additional important indication of this 
strategic relation. 
A crucial example of Red Sea-Gulf political interaction 
may be seen through the financial help that some poorer Red 
Sea states, for example, the Yemens, Somalia and Sudan used 
to get from the rich states of the Gulf - particularly from 
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Saudi Arabia to assist in development programmes and to 
resist communist . fl ( 80 ) A . 1 t 1.n uence. s a cruc1.a par of the 
Middle East 'shatter- belt' where constant unrest is 
characteristic, the Red Sea region includes "highly volatile 
parts of the Horn of Africa at one end, and the Arab-Israeli 
interface at the other". ( 81 ) These features of instability 
associated with the Red Sea region, must have an important 
influence upon the transportation of Gulf oil, and the 
security of the epicentre of American interests in the 
latter, ie Saudi Arabia. However, the global strategic 
location of the region, and its being part of the "energy 
heartland" of the Middle East have increased American concern 
about it since the early 19 70s. ( 8 2 ) Strategically speaking, 
the presence of the Soviet Union, or of any anti-American 
power strong enough in the region, could bear on Western 
interests in the Gulf, which is 1.n clear proximity to the 
main sources of Soviet power. According to Schlesinger (1981) 
the Gulf is especially "susceptible to political-military 
pressures from the north 11 ( 8 3) 
From the Gulf regional viewpoint, the significance of 
the Red Sea-Gulf interplay is demonstrated by the reliance of 
the Gulf states on the Red Sea for exports and imports. This 
fact has been voiced by the Kuwaiti Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Shaikh Sabah Al-Ahmed (1984) when he emphasized that 
the Gulf states depend on the Red Sea and the Suez Canal as 
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much as the rest of the world. ( 84 ) As an example of the 
importance of the Red Sea to the states of the Arabian 
peninsula, the Kuwaiti newspaper, Al-Watan, has pointed out 
that fifteen commercial vessels transit the Suez Canal daily 
en route to K "t (85) uwa1 . The Saudis view the Red Sea as 
constituting strategic complimentarity to the Gulf and the 
01.1 routes.( 86 ) However, · d t t · 1" k b t econom1c an s ra eg1c 1n s e ween 
the Red Sea and the Gulf were demonstrated well before 1970. 
While the Israeli-Arab wars of 1967 and 1973 have shown the 
economic link (chapter 5), the Iraq-Iran war (since September 
1980) has indicated the strategic link. The laying of mines 
in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Suez - in July/ August, 19 84 -
which damaged about 19 ships (chapter 6) has exemplified this 
strategic connection because one of the various inter-
pretations of the mining is that it is a ramification or 
regionalization of the Gulf War. ( 87 ) According to Al-Ray 
Al-Aam (1984) the French Press has agreed that the planting 
of mines in the Red Sea has demonstrated to the West the 
extent of relations between the Gulf and the Red Sea with 
regard to the Iraq-Iran war. ( 8 8) One of the most important 
Red Sea voices about the link between this war and the mining 
of the Red Sea comes from Egypt; Mr Abu-Gazala, the Egyptian 
Defence Minister has indicated that the mining of the Red Sea 
could be in "retaliation for what is happening in the 
Gulf". ( 89) 
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1.3.4 Red Sea - Indian Ocean Linkage 
Twenty years ago, Cohen (1964) anticipated the eventual 
emergence of the Indian Ocean as a "third geostrategic 
region", beside the Trade Dependent Maritime World (Western 
Europe and the United States) and the Eurasian Continental 
Power (the USSR and China). ( 9 0) When the recent emergence of 
the Indian Ocean realm as a critical arena of superpower 
t "t" (91) compe 1 1on is considered, this gives evidence of the 
materialization of Cohen's prophecy. According to the French 
Major General, Andre Courie ( 1984), the importance of the 
Indian Ocean becomes clear when one considers that 9, 000 
vessels - apart from warships - transit the ocean annually. 
Moreover, it includes 37 states comprising one third of the 
world population ,-- and its territories embrace the major oil 
reserves of the world, ( 92 ) while it shares with the Red Sea 
the monopoly of the major oil routes to the West. 
The contiguity of the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean has 
endowed the former with a strategic significance (chapter 6) 
since the Red Sea is a major point of entry into the Indian 
Ocean. In fact, the Red Sea is the only short-cut between the 
Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean. According to Cottrell and 
Burrell (1972), access to the Indian Ocean from the Red Sea 
and the River Nile was the most important historical event; 
they add that a 16th century Portuguese navigator, Alfonso 
d'Albuquerue spoke of the Red Sea as one of 'three keys' to 
the Indian Ocean, ( 9 3 ) the other two being the Straits of 
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Malacca and Singapore in the east, and the Strait of Hormuz. 
Vali (1976) maintained that the northern part of the Indian 
Ocean which includes the Red Sea and the Gulf as part of its 
oceanic system, has been historically and geostrategically 
important. He points out that after the breaching of the Suez 
Canal in 1869, the Red Sea ceased to be a cul-de-sac, unlike 
the Gulf; and since then it has constituted a crucial link 
between the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean. ( 94 ) According 
to him, the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs (1973) 
has perceived the Indian Ocean as having four divisions: ( 1) 
East Africa and the ocean region east of it; ( 2) the 
northwest from Somalia around to Iran, including the Red Sea, 
the Gulf of Aden, and the Gulf; ( 3) the Asian subcontinent 
and the sea 
Australia. ( 9S) 
south of 
Obviously, 
it; and ( 4) southeast Asia and 
the second division is by far the 
most important in American perspectives, primarily due to the 
existence of vast Middle Eastern oil resources, sea lines of 
communications and vitally strategic narrow waterways such as 
the Straits of Hormuz, Bab al-Mandeb and the Suez Canal. 
Several other views of scholars and strategists have 
emphasized the important interface between the Red Sea and 
the Indian Ocean Vice-Admiral Crowe (1978) cites Saudi Arabia 
as an example of this relationship. ( 96 ) House ( 1984) treats 
the entire Red Sea area as part of the Indian Ocean realm, 
particularly in his discussion and maps of Western-Soviet 
spheres of influence, arms transfer, trade etc. ( 97 ) To Kumar 
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(1984) a freelance writer on international affairs the 
Red Sea region is also an integral part of the Indian Ocean. 
He considers the Suez Canal and Bab al-Mandeb as two of the 
five strategic narrow waters that guard the eastern and 
western entrances of the ocean. The Cape of Good Hope, Hormuz 
and Malacca are the other three; he attributes great 
strategic significance to these water-passages. (98) 
Halliday and Molyneux (1981) point out that since 1945 
the conjunction of the Red Sea region with the Indian Ocean 
has been a prime concern among military strategists of both 
(99) 
superpowers. During the decade 'of the 1970s the Indian 
Ocean became a battleground of superpower contention. Since 
early 1970 the United States had begun to realize the 
~ 
critical compljmentarity of the Red Sea region with the 
Indian Ocean. The conference on the Indian Ocean region held 
on March 18-19, 1971 at the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, Georgetown University, clearly 
fl t d th . 1" t" (100) re ec e 1s rea 1za 10n. US linkage between its 
military presence on the western shores of the Red Sea - at 
Kagnew in Ethiopia from 1953 to 1976, and that on the 
western coasts of the Indian Ocean 1n Kenya clearly 
demonstrated an American functional strategic link with the 
Red Sea region and the Indian Ocean realm. In fact, 
throughout its 24 years service the Kagnew Communication base 
provided "efficient communication facilities for US forces in 
the Indian Ocean". ( 101 ) To Barry Buzan (1978), Soviet-
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American military presence in the Red Sea region is evidence 
of the interests of both superpowers to improve their naval 
facilities 1n the Indian Ocean. The obvious and primary 
objective of both powers in maintaining military build-up 
there, has been concerned with shipping routes. (102) Whether 
commercially or militarily, the Red Sea is clearly seen by 
the Saudis as crucial to the interests of both Eastern and 
Western blocs. Both wish to use the Sea and its strategic 
water-passages to support their Indian Ocean fleets. ( 103 ) The 
increasing Soviet-American rivalry over the Indian Ocean must 
have both political and military repercussions on the Red Sea 
region because of the evident strategic linkages between the 
two areas. 
1.3.5 Red Sea- African Links 
The western waters of the Red Sea lap the eastern shores 
of the African riparians of Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, Djibouti 
and Somalia. The five States represent the interface between 
Africa and the Red Sea. The location of these Red Sea 
African states is politically and strategically significant; 
they create a strategic springboard into the heart of Africa, 
as well as into its northern and southern extremities. If an 
anti-Western power exploits this strategic position, Western 
interests could be in jeopardy. In fact, according to Legum 
( 197 8)' the West fears that such a situation could 
materialize from a Soviet-Cuban stronghold in Ethiopia. This 
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could endanger Kenya and push further down into East 
Af . (104) r1ca. Also, if the USSR were able to win support ln 
Sudan, it could achieve a breakthrough into Uganda and Zaire 
(with its mineral riches), and thus create an "international 
revolutionary front link-up with Angola". ( 1 0S) The fact that 
Sudan, Egypt and Ethiopia are also Nile Valley states may 
significantly count in relation to superpower competition in 
Africa. The joint Sudanese-Egyptian call 1n 1981 for a 
meeting of the Nile-basin countries, has been criticized by 
radical forces in the area, and depicted as an intention to 
create a pro-American geopolitical bloc to intercept growing 
S . t . fl . Af . ( 106 ) ov1e 1n uence 1n r1ca. 
In sum, we have seen how geography has especially 
endowed the Red Sea region with a matchless global position 
because of the region 1 s economic, political and strategic 
complimentari ty with other vi tal areas. This inter-regional 
function is reflected in the effect of events 1n these 
regions on the Red Sea region. The perennial Israeli-Arab 
conflict, the Gulf war, the endemic Horn conflicts and 
superpower rivalry over the Indian Ocean, all demonstrate 
examples of feed and feed-back situations which involve the 
previously mentioned areas. This interdependent reiationship 
has made the region int;egral to superpower strategic concerns 
over adjacent regions. In other words, one cannot overlook or 
dismiss the repercussions on neighbouring regions of 
instability in one region. 
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Hence, the preceding pages have underlined the 
geopolitical importance of the Red Sea to US economic, 
strategic and security interests. Further elaboration on 
these issues will follow in chapters 5-7. Also, it has been 
made clear that the Red Sea region enjoys a quadripartite 
characteristic that connects it economically, politically, 
and strategically with the Gulf, the Indian Ocean, the 
Mediterranean and Africa. These significant global linkages 
have endowed the Red Sea region with an important inter-
national position which could bestow on some of the region's 
environmental features considerable economic and strategic 
value. Therefore, the following two chapters will deal with 
such important issues: the environmental characteristics of 
the Red Sea (chapter 2) and Red Sea resources (chapter 3). 
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CHAPTER 2 
ENVIRONMENTAL CHARACTERISTICS 
2.1 Geographical Characteristics 
2.1.1 Geological Formation 
The Red Sea will be taken to include the Gulfs of Suez 
and Aqaba in the north, and for our purposes, the Gulf of 
Aden in the south. It is a semi-enclosed sea formed out of 
the large rift in the continental crust of Africa and Arabia 
(figure 2.1). This split is part of a complex rift system 
that includes the East African Rift - which extends southward 
for about 3,520km, and comprises parts of Ethiopia, Kenya and 
Tanzania and the Central African Lakes. The rift extends 
northwards for 448km from the Gulf of Aqaba to form the great 
Aqaba-Dead Sea-Jordan Rift. From the southern end of the Red 
Sea, the rift extends eastward for 960km to form the Gulf of 
Aden. ( 1 ) 
According to Fisher (1978) before their drift apart, the 
two major platforms of Arabia and Africa formed a single 
large continent. Extensive fracturing of the area of the Red 
Sea, the Gulf of Aden and East Africa, detached Arabia from 
northeast Africa. It also led to the tilting of the Arabian 
block, uplifting the western Red Sea coast and downwarping 
the Gulf. The African side of the Red Sea has buckled and 
impacted to form the Red Sea hills of Egypt and the Sudan. 
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With reference to the process of plate tectonics operating in 
the Middle East, two of these plates were forced westward. 
They produced, first, the narrow Red Sea through which 
reached its present size through rapid enlargement by 
spreading along its seafloor; the second, a more southerly 
plate, moved southward and westward to form the Gulf of 
Aden. ( 2 ) Regarding the age of the Red Sea, marine scientists 
describe it as an 'embryonic' ocean, compaJed with the old 
major ocean basins of the Atlantic, Pacific, Indian and the 
Arctic. As a relatively new sea, its development is 
proceeding because the motion which created it is still 
continuing. The process of drifting apart still continues 
with the African continent continuing its drift away south 
and west from Arabia. These movements are estimated as 
amounting to a yearly 0.59 to 0.62 inches, and its operation 
has been shown by extensive volcanism, and by the flow of hot 
brines in the Red Sea's trough. David Ross (1976) argues that 
"if the theory of sea floor spreading is valid, it 
is probable that the Red Sea today resembles the 
Atlantic Ocean of about 200 million years ago". 
Moreover, if the Red Sea 
" continues to spread at its present rate, and 
there seems to be no reason why it should not, in a 
couple of hundred million years be as wide as 
the Atlantic Ocean today". (3) 
Two principal features dominate the topography of the 
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Red Sea; first a narrow, smooth continental shelf; second, a 
deep axial trough split by an even deeper axial trough 
10, OOOft deep, both of which have implications for offshore 
jurisdiction. Beneath the continental shelf, records indicate 
a distinct acoustic reflecting layer, covered by several 
hundred metres of sediment. In 1972, the drilling of the 
layer showed it to be a mixture of salt and minerals commonly 
deposited in shallow waters, characterized by high 
evaporation rates. (4) 
Seabed photographs from oceanographic survey vessels 
have shown fresh volcanic features, including cracks, 
fissures and recent lava flows. The entire Red Sea coasts and 
waters are major earthquake zones, notably the area just 
southwest of Djibouti, between Ethiopia and Somalia, which 
witnessed a series of major earthquakes between 1968 and 
1977. Such volcanic phenomena are also found near al Wajh on 
the Saudi Red Sea coast. It is worth noting the recent 
earthquake that occurred in Sanaa (Y.emaw A::&) in 19 8 3 causing 
considerable damage. 
2.1.2 Dimensions 
Since the Gulf of Aden between Bab al Mandeb and 
50 °E ( 6 ) - borders the Red Sea states of PDR Yemen, Somalia 
and Djibouti, and because it constitutes the only natural 
inlet to the Red Sea from the Indian Ocean one must consider 
the Gulf of Aden functionally as a branch of the Red Sea 
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(figure 2. 1). Hence, if measured from Suez to the Gulf of 
Aden at 50°E the Red Sea is 3200km long. Breadths vary 
associated with geological formation. In its northern part 
where it branches into the Gulfs of Suez and Aqaba, the Red 
Sea is only about 200km wide; and its maximum width is at the 
southern sector, where it reaches 3 SOkm between Massawa on 
the Eritrean coast and Jizan on the Saudi coast. On average 
the Red Sea is 2 7 2km wide. ( 7 ) Narrowing at both ends is an 
important feature of the Red Sea. This characteristic lessens 
the breadth of international waters which affects shipping 
activity in a water body that has become, especially since 
the early 1970s, an arena of regional and global rivalry. 
In many peripheral waters the average depth is 480m. The 
innermost central trough, however, which extends nearly the 
whole length of the Red Sea - has depths of 1, 800m, and at 
some points over 2,000m. The maximum depths - falling between 
latitudes 26° and 20°N - range from 1, 800m to 2, 556m. This 
deepest area is located approximately midway between Port 
Sudan and Al Lith ( 8 ) (figure 2. 2). Some sources state that 
north of Ras Banas the central trough widens to a shallower 
and irregular surface where depths rarely exceed 2,000m. But 
naval authorities indicate greater depths, more than 200nm 
northeast of Ras Banas; this depth of 2, 277m lies about 
latitude 25°25'N nearly abreast of Sheibara on the 
Arabian coast. Depths of more than 1,440m extend south as far 
as latitude 16 °N. ( 9 ) One of the unique physical character-
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Table 2.1 
Area/Coastline Relations of the Red Sea States 
Country Land area Red Sea Number of sq.km. of 
(sq.km) coastline land per km of Red 
km Sea coastline-:*" 
Saudi Arabia 2,150,000 1889 1138 
Egypt 1,001,000 1424 703 
PDRY 288,000 1211 238 
Ethiopia 1,222,000 1011 1209 
Somalia 638,000 925 690 
Sudan 2,506,000 717 3495 
YAR 195,000 452 431 
Djibouti 22,000 245 90 
Jordan 98,000 28 3500 
Israel 21,000 7 3000 
Source: 1 - Area: The Geographical Digest, George Philip and 
Son Ltd, London 1981, pp.9, 11-12, Coastline. 
2 - Except for Somalia, the length of coastline is 
taken from: Bureau of Intelligence and Research: 
US Department of State Geographical Bulletin 
No.3, Sovereignty of the Sea, Washington D.C. 
1969, p.19-22. 
- The length of the Somalia coast (fronting the 
Gulf of Aden) is calculated. 
* Land area divided by the coastline. 
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istics of the Red Sea is the depth 1n relation to its 
breadth. Owing to the growth of coral banks south of 16 ° N, 
silt has been accumulated and the depth of water at the Gulf 
of Aden and Bab el Mandeb is only about 114m. Several sources 
agree that the area of the Red Sea without the Gulf of Aden 
is 438,000sq.km, but in other publications it is quoted 
( 1 0 ) between 456,000 and 453,000sq.km. The latter figure will 
be adopted in this work. 
2.1.3 Coasts 
The total length of the Red Sea, including the Gulfs of 
Suez, Aqaba, and Aden, is 7, 909km, though estimates differ 
somewhat. The Arab littoral states own some 6,891km, which is 
over 87 per cent of the total (table 2.1). Figure 2.2 shows 
the topography of the Red Sea hinterlands and coasts. The 
4, 322km of coastline on the western side of the Red Sea is 
shared by Egypt, Sudan, Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Somalia; the 
Egyptian coast is predominantly a desert area. The Red Sea 
hills lie between the River Nile and the Red Sea. The highest 
of these mountains is close to the coast - 16km inland; here 
the greatest height is 2,184m. The land between the coast and 
the mountains is low and sandy, and the coast is bordered by 
reefs, which also exist in great quantity some distance 
off shire, especially at the mouth of the gulfs 
Aqaba. ( 11 ) Thus, for long stretches of Egypt's 
of Suez and 
coast there 
has been little or no penetration inland, and interior-
coastal interaction. Wadis dissect the highlands between the 
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Nile and the Red Sea (Fisher, 197 8). The nearest approach of 
the Nile to the Red Sea is at Qena, only 128km away; Qena is 
linked by road to Port Safaga on the Red Sea. Also from Suez, 
first class roads run to the south and close to the shores of 
the sea until Egypt's frontier with Sudan. There are villages 
and mining colonies on this shore and an oil industry in the 
north east uplands of Hurgada (27°15'N, 33°50'E); production 
of phosphates in great quantities occurs at El Quseir and 
( 12) Safaga. 
Generally, Sudan's coast is bordered by reefs, rocks and 
barren sands. The Red Sea hills dominate the eastern part of 
the Sudan, and form a mountainous range that lies 32km west 
of the coast. This range of mountains is the most elevated 
part of the Sudan. Their height ranges between 1500 and 
2000m; and Jebel Asoteriba - 2,200m - is the greatest peak, 
while the high edge of the hills drops to a generally narrow 
coastal plain fronting the Red Sea. West of these mountains 
the land slopes gradually to the Nile Valley. ( 1 3) 
The coasts along the Horn of Africa are part of the 
mountainous chain extending from the Red Sea coasts to the 
northern borders of the East African plateau near Lake 
Rudolf. The narrow coastal strip of Ethiopia's Eritrean 
province gets wider in the north to include part of the 
Ethiopian plateau; and it extends west to encompass a western 
lowland bordering the Sudan. The coast is mostly coral; and 
the country is mountainous and essentially volcanic, with 
many peaks attaining an elevation of about 4, 200m. ( 14 ) The 
desert steppe lands that surround the Ethiopian plateau 
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separate the country from its Red Sea coasts. Also, a 
mountainous hogsback range is interposed between the coast 
and the Sudan, and the height of this range is just over 
3,000m. ( 1 S) The coastline of the pocket state of Djibouti is 
composed of coral and high cliffs. The inland 1s featured by 
a desert of broken and dry valleys with scattered thorn 
scrub. The Somali coast is characterized by desolate beaches 
with a backdrop of low cliffs of scrub bush; and it lacks 
natural harbours of the type found in Europe and other 
. (16) 
countr1es. 
The length of the eastern coast of the Red Sea is 
3,589km. This coast belongs to Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, 
AR Yemen and PDR Yemen. Lapidoth (1982) describes the coasts 
of Israel and Jordan as extremely abrupt and bordered by a 
narrow plain with steep mountains rising at several places 
from the water. Whereas on the Israeli side, the coast, and 
along to the south, 1s fringed by reefs, on the Jordanian 
side the coast is encumbered by rocks, and it has sandy 
beaches. ( 17 ) 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has a coastal belt composed 
of steppe, with oases here and there. Fisher ( 19 7 8) points 
out that from the Gulf of Aqaba and along the Rijaz region 
(up to 24°N) ranges of steppe-faults slope west rapidly to a 
very narrow coastal plain which is interrupted at some places 
by narrow deep inlets from the sea. The Hijaz peaks attain an 
elevation of 2, 000-3, OOOm, and although coral reefs render 
access for shipping difficult along much of the coast, some 
openings are free of such reefs and thus they offer good 
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harbours. In the Tihama region - between 24° and 27°N - the 
mountain margin decreases substantially in height, 1n many 
places to only 1,000m; 1n this region the coast reaches its 
maximum width of 50-100km. ( 18 ) Owing to its central position 
in Arabia, Tihama is viewed by Fisher ( 197 8) as a 1 gateway 1 
to central Arabia; and due to its general lower altitude and 
its location at the 1 waist 1 of Arabia, Tihama makes the 
shortest distance between the Gulf and the Red Sea. South of 
latitude 20°N, lies the region of Asir where the re-emergence 
of highlands takes place, the greater part of which lies 
( 19) 
above 1,500m. 
A high plateau, with volcanic vents, characterizes the 
topography of AR Yemen. The coast is described as largely 
regular, low and coralline. It is of different breadths, from 
about 48km wide in the north, to a few hundred metres in the 
south. In a long, even slope, the coast rises to a height of 
about 200m to the base of the coastal range. In a number of 
places, this coastal range reaches a height of about 2,700m. 
Interposed uplands between the coastal range and the main 
range reach an elevation of about 1, 200m. The coastal plain 
of Tihama and Asir continues south between latitudes 18° and 
12°N, due to the steep falling of the Yemeni plateau which 
attains an altitude from 2,000 to 3,000m above sea level with 
some peaks of almost 4, OOOm high. The greatest height is 
represented by Ben Sheiba - 80km west of 
at a height of 2,200m. ( 20) Fisher 
Sanaa, 
(1978) 
which stands 
notes the 
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resemblance between the Yemeni and the Ethiopean plateaux 
because of the breaking in the fault system of the Red Sea 
and the Gulf of Aden. ( 21 ) 
Until the Khaur mountains about 100km east of Aden the 
coast of PDR Yemen is a continuation of the AR Yemen's 
coastlands. There is a fall 1n altitude from the Khaur 
mountains toward the east, along the western half of PDR 
Yemen's coast, the land drops away sharply into deep waters. 
However, the country is mostly mountain and desert, with the 
Gulf of Aden forming part of the southern borders of the 
Arabian desert. ( 22 ) 
The Red Sea is surrounded by ten states; eight of these 
are Arab. Israel, on the most northeastern tip the Gulf of 
Aqaba, and Ethiopia on the southern sector of the Red Sea, 
are the only non-Arab littorals. This situation must yield 
very important consequences with regard to Western and 
Israeli shipping interests especially when the perennial 
Israeli-Arab dispute is considered. Essentially, Jordan is 
the only Red Sea inland state. The boundaries of Israel and 
Jordan converge at the tip of the Gulf of Aqaba. 
Owing to the longitudinal character of the Red Sea, its 
coasts are long compared with area. According to Mahmoud 
( 1979) for each coastal mile there are 57. 9sq.m of surface 
water. To him, this means potential for coastal mastery and a 
strong connection between the Red Sea and its littorals with 
particular reference to states with no other outlet to the 
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high seas, for example Jordan, Yemen AR, Sudan and Ethiopia, 
and states with very important economic and religious 
interests essentially tied with the Red Sea, for example 
Egypt and Saudi Arabia. However, Mahmoud realizes that the 
length of coasts is not a sufficient factor to establish 
control over the sea. He refers to the uneven coastal 
population density, the few urban centres, lack of roads and 
especially railways to connect the inland with coast. ( 2 J) To 
Al-Sayed Alewah ( 19 8 0) these coastal areas are deserted. He 
thinks that they could solve the problems of those Red Sea 
states with large populations because such states could carry 
out urban settlement schemes on these coasts. Although these 
coasts have some tourist potential, if compared to their 
counter- parts in the Gulf, Red Sea coasts are less populated 
(24) 
and with no matching industrial development. However, the 
industrial and port development taking place at Yanbu and the 
Islamic port of Jeddah (chapter 4) are significant signs of 
development on the eastern shore of the Red Sea. In the 
maritime field, sea coasts are essential for harbours, ports 
and repair facilities. The lack of coastal development and 
population is attributed to physical characteristics; because 
these coasts are faulted and somewhat regular, with few 
natural harbours that could be developed into major ports. 
The aridity of the coasts and the range of mountains 
extending along them, with an elevation of 600-900m on the 
African shore and 900-2, lOOm on the Asian side also hinder 
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development. Such high rocky ranges render the building of 
inland railways very difficult, but the following three 
railway lines are exceptional in overcoming such difficulty. 
First, the Dj ibouti-Addis line, which is indebted to the 
African Rift Valley for making it easier for the line to 
ascend over the Ethiopian plateau. ( 2 5 ) This line was first 
initiated 1n the agreement signed by Emperor Menlik of 
Ethiopia in 1896 when he recognized French sovereignty over 
French Somaliland (now Djibouti). One year later the first 
rails of this line were laid; and it was finally completed in 
1917. Second, the Italian line which extends from Massawa to 
a height of 2, 400m on the Ethiopian plateau. According to 
Stamp and Morgan (1972), the Italians extended the line as 
far as Asmara their colonial capital and then they 
stretched it further to Agordat 128km further west of 
Asmara; this line is still working. ( 26 ) Third, the Port 
Sudan-Atbara line was built by the British after their 
re-conquest of the Sudan in 1898. However, both Mahmoud and 
Alewah consider that schemes for developing urban population 
and communication along the Red Sea coasts are costly 
undertakings which could not be carried out by most Red Sea 
states. To populate these long coasts, however, could be 
important from the security point of view. 
The dependence of Jordan, Yemen AR, Ethiopia and the 
Sudan on the Red Sea as the sole outlet to the sea renders 
these states vulnerable to such actions as a blockade of 
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choke-points by a hostile state. However, such vulnerability 
could also be critical for Egypt because of the Suez Canal's 
revenues, for Saudi Arabia, because of the presence of Muslim 
shrines near to the coast, the massive Yanbu industrial 
complex and the development of pipelines from the Gulf to the 
Red Sea. For Djibouti, the survival of the city-state 
virtually depends on its port activity and continuing 
security. The Eritrean shoreline is obviously significant to 
Ethiopia since the coast is the country's only maritime 
outlet to the outside world. Therefore, the independence of 
Eritrea:::. would leave Ethiopia land-locked, depending solely 
on Djibouti as an outlet. And if the latter were ever to be 
annexed by Somalia, Ethiopia would be totally cut off from 
the sea. 
Following the ideas of the American naval historian 
Alfred Mahan, Pounds (1972) stresses the vulnerability of a 
long coastline, and that such vulnerability increases a 
state's need for sea-power. ( 27 ) Alewah points out that the 
coastlines of PDR Yemen, Djibouti, AR Yemen and Ethiopia are 
all strategically suitable for air, artillery and naval 
operations. Thus, when the Italian Fascists consolidated 
their hold on their Eri trean colony between 1890 and 19 3 5, 
Benito Mussolini decided to invade Ethiopia and add it to the 
Italian Empire. In 1936 the Italians used their bases on the 
Eritrean coast in their assault against Eth . . (28) 10p1a. 
However, all Red Sea coasts could be vulnerable to attack 
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especially if a fifth Israeli-Arab round takes place or in 
armed superpower confrontation over the area. Regarding the 
Israeli threat, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has been anxious 
to improve its anti-air defence against possible Israeli air 
. d ( 29 ) Th ra1 s. us, there have been and still are diverse and 
competing interests over the Red Sea coasts ranging from 
local and regional to global scales. With regard to global 
concerns, the length of the coasts, port facilities and the 
political orientation of some Red Sea states towards the US 
could be of crucial importance 1n relation to the latter 1 s 
economic and military interests in the Red Sea region (see 
chapters 5, 6 and 7). 
2.1.4 Reefs and Islands 
Reefs 
Despite its considerable depth, the Red Sea is 
encumbered in some places with rocky islets and coral reefs 
which extend up to the main shipping channel. It contains the 
northern-most coral reefs in the world. Moreover, almost 
every known form of coral is represented. Al Rouathy and Al 
Muhandes (1984) state that many organisms migrated from the 
Atlantic and the Indian Ocean to the Red Sea through Bab al 
Mandeb where they found a congenial environment of high 
temperatures, shallow depths, limpidity of water and 
relatively high salinity. These reefs are immense and extend 
in long parallel strips along both shores of the Red Sea. The 
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barriers formed by these coral reefs are 45 to 90m wide. ( 30) 
Elevated discontinuous coral beaches are formed along the Red 
Sea coasts, with the highest reaching about 2 Sm above sea 
level at Tiran Island, in the northern part of the Sea. South 
of latitude 16°N, coral banks grow extensively and induce the 
accumulation of silt which separates the Red Sea and the Gulf 
of Aden at Bab al Mandeb. (3l) 
Some sources maintain that greater distribution and 
density of reefs exist in the southern sector of the Red Sea, 
where they attain a maximum width of 240m. But to others the 
most plentiful and luxuriant reefs are apparently in the 
middle sector. With regard to the northern part, coral reefs 
are few, and limited to Aqaba Bay, and the Gulf of Suez, 
where the general depth of the reefs ranges between 0.6m to 
0. 9m, but in summer when the level of the sea is at its 
lowest, they occasionally dry out in some parts. (3Z) 
Reefs divide the southern Red Sea into three channels. A 
central channel 72km wide lies between Dahlak bank, 112km off 
the African coast and Farasan Bank on the Asian shore, and it 
is the only channel navigable by large vessels. (33) The other 
two are inshore channels and insecure for navigation. It is 
notable that reefs, which are more abundant on the Asian 
coast than on the African side, leave a number of inden-
tations, some of which are very wide, especially in the 
northern waters. These openings connect the inshore channels 
with the main channel. In sum, despite the difficulty created 
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Table 2.2 
Ownership of islands in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden and the most 
important of these islands 
State 
Saudi Arabia 
Ethiopia 
YAR 
Sudan 
Egypt 
Djibouti 
PDRY 
Source: Mahmoud 
Arabic) 
p.30. 
Number of Most significant islands 
islands 
144 Far a San, Tiran and Sana fir 
126 Dahl a~, Halib, Fatima, Dumeira 
39 Kamaran, Zuqar 
36 Sawakin 
26 Shadwan 
6 Seba Mouleleh 
3 Perim, Socotra, -l~ Great Hanish 
( 1979) 1 The Red Sea 1n Global Strategy 1 ( 
1n Al-Siyasa Al-Duwaliya, No.57, July 1979. 
published by Al-Ahram Corporation, Cairo, 
K Socotra is added by the author. 
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by these reefs in approaching the shores, they leave tranquil 
waters and sandy beaches behind them, where many places are 
. (34) 
su1table for anchorage. However, in spite of the techno-
logical advancement in the field of navigation and detection 
of dangers in seas, it is found that in many parts of the Red 
Sea, particularly away from major harbours, reefs are not 
charted, and hence fear of them still exists among 
sailors. ( 3 S) Navigational hazards caused by these reefs will 
be discussed later. 
Islands 
The Red Sea contains hundreds of islands, most of which 
are in its southern sector. According to Mahmoud (1979), the 
Red Sea has about 397 islands, about 2.1 islands per 
2.56sq.km of water. Islands clearly create navigational 
problems, and at the same time provide opportunities for 
groups interested in interdiction of shipping. However, most 
of these islands are little more than exposed reefs, and 
large islands (with an area of more than 20sq.km) are limited 
to the Dahlak, Farasan, Kamaran, Zukur and Great Hanish 
groups. ( 36 ) Figure 2. 2 shows the most important islands in 
the Red Sea; and table 2. 2 shows the ownership of those 
islands. The Arab riparians own two thirds of the islands in 
the Red Sea, but widespread coral reefs and lack of fresh 
water have kept most of these islands from being permanently 
inhabited. As in the case of coasts, the neglect of these 
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islands by the Arab states cuased Hewidi (1980) to warn that 
such empty Arab territories might attract strangers who are 
characterized by an odd desire of colonization. ( 37 ) However, 
apart from peacetime military exercises, some strategically 
situated islands like Perim, Tiran and Socotra could be 
useful in wartime as in the Israeli-Arab wars of 1967 and 
1973. 
Regarding islands 1n the northern part of the Red Sea, 
both Mahmoud (1979) and Blake (1982) refer to numerous small 
offshore islands around the southern end of the Gulfs of Suez 
and Aqaba. Mahmoud considers Urn Gamar, Shadwan and Gubal 
islands as the most important ones at the entrance of the 
Gulf of Suez. To Blake, Tiran and Sanafir, at the entrance of 
the Gulf of Aqaba, are the most strategically significant 
islands in the northern part of the Sea. (3 8 ) 
Tiran Island lies in the centre of the throat of the 
Gulf of Aqaba, in the direction of Ras Muhammed, 5 to 6.4km 
from the Saudi coast and 4.8km from the Egyptian shore. It is 
ZOOkm from the Saudi air base at Tabuk. Its shape is 
irregular and it is 11.2km long from north to south and forms 
the eastern limit to the Strait of Tiran. Except for the 
summit (524m) on the southern part of the island, the 
remainder of Tiran consists of a sandy plain with low hills. 
On the western part, two prominent hills rise to heights of 
47 and 94m, and due to the tremendous amount of coral cliffs 
on the coasts, landing is provided only by the two sandy 
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beaches on the western coast. (39) 
Sana fir lies 2. 4km east of Tiran. Numerous limestone 
hills with jagged irregular peaks characterize the eastern 
part of the island. The highest peaks here rise to an 
elevation of 1OOm. A promontory, bordered with patches of 
coral reefs lies on the northwest corner of the island. Post 
World War Two information refers to an area in the middle of 
the island as a landing-ground for aircraft. These sources 
add that Sanafir lacks water; and rain falls only in the 
winter months of December, January and February. (40) 
Originally and formally, Tiran and Sanafir belonged to 
Saudi Arabia which leased them to President Nasser in 1954 as 
"a friendly gesture for the purpose of blockading Israel 1 s 
southern port of Eilat". Israel was able to capture the 
islands and break the blockade in the 1956 and 1967 wars. (4 1 ) 
After the conclusion of the Camp David Agreement in 1978 the 
future of the islands became somewhat controversial and a 
quarrel arose between Egypt and Israel over them. According 
to Arab sources, Ariel Sharon, the former Israeli Defence 
Minister, wanted the islands as a 11 small base for Israeli 
gunboats". Egypt reacted by announcing that after Israel 1 s 
withdrawal from Sinai, it would not accept any Israeli 
presence in the peninsula. President Mubarak made it clear 
that Egypt "would not accept to be remiss of others rights" -
which was taken to include the Saudi right to Tiran and 
Sanafir. ( 42 ) 
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However, it is reported that Israel "warned the United 
States and Egypt that it would not withdraw its troops if the 
islands were to revert to Saudi control". (43) The Arab 
sources emphasize Saudi ownership of the islands and indicate 
Egypt's intention to return them to the Kingdom as an 
initiative for anticipated negotiations between the two 
countries. Moreover, Prince Fahad (now King) announced that 
"the restoration of the two islands from the Israeli 
enemy and their return to Saudi Arabia is a 
responsibility of Egypt alone". (44) 
Blake (1982) maintains that Egypt occupied these islands only 
in 1949 he questions Saudi claims to the islands which could 
become the subject of serious dispute. ( 4 S) However, the 
Economist reports that the islands are to be treated under an 
agreement in much the same way as Sharm al Sheikh( 46 ) which 
the Camp David Accords guarantee as open to all. (47) 
Interestingly, some sources report American intentions of 
using the islands as a base for the Central Command (formerly 
Rapid Deployment Force). (4 8 ) 
The southern part of the Red Sea contains hundreds of 
islands. In this area, the most strategically important are 
Perim, Kamaran, Dahlak, Farasan and Socotra in the Gulf of 
Aden. Kennedy mentions a group of six islands known as 
Jezirate Seba, lying about 9. 6km off the African coast and 
16.Skm south-south-west of Perim island. ( 49 ) Apart from Perim 
and Jezirate Seba, the only other island in the area of Bab 
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al Mandeb is Dumerra whose outer edge is about 1.6km off the 
African shore and 22. 4km west-north-west of Perim island. 
Hewid (1980) mentions that this group which lies between the 
western and major channel of Bab al Mandeb and the African 
shore and known as the Seven Sisters, is of a volcanic 
nature. ( 50 ) The New Encyclopedia Britannica ( 197 4) confirms 
this by indicating the existence of a group of active 
volcanoes just south of Dahlak Archipelago ( 16°N); it also 
mentions the recently extinct volcano on Jabal at Tair. ( 51 ) 
Lapidoth ( 19 8 2) points out that these islands are hot, dry 
and uninhabited. She also mentions other islands north of Bab 
al Mandeb and controlling its northern mouth. These apart 
from the most important mentioned above include Saj id, 
Auntufash, Urmak, Uqban, Fatma, Halib, Jabal at-Tair, Zubair 
islands, Abu Ail islands, Zuqar islands - including Djezirat 
Zuqar, Great Hanish, and Small Hanish. (5Z) 
Regarding the ownership of these islands, Dumerra and 
the group of Jezirate Seba belong to Djibouti. Sajid and 
Farasan are Saudi islands. Auntufash, Urmak and Kamaran 
belong to AR Yemen. PDR Yemen owns Perim, Uqban and Socotra. 
Dahlak Archipelago, Fatma and Halib are Ethiopian islands. 
Lapidoth adds that sovereignty over the islands located in 
the centre of the Red Sea is disputed between Ethiopia, AR 
Yemen and PDR Yemen. These islands are: Jabal at-Tair, Zubair 
islands, Abu Ail islands, Zuqar islands which include 
Jezirate Zuqar, Great Hanish and Small Hanish. (53) Blake 
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(1982) remarks that disputes over ownership of islands in the 
seas around the Arabian peninsula are dangerous due to their 
strategic significance, and complicate boundary de-
1 . •t t• (54) 1m1 a 1on. 
In spite of their small size, the islands 1n the 
vicinity of Bab al Mandeb, as well as those in the mouths of 
the Gulfs of Aqaba and Suez, could be used to control or 
interrupt navigation. Therefore, the importance of the 
Jezirate Seba group stems from its being part of the 
navigable channel of Bab al Mandeb. Although the strategic 
importance of islands increases with proximity to major 
chokepoints, the islands north of Bab al Mandeb like Kamaran, 
Farasan, Zuqar, Hanish, Halib Fatma and Dahlak could be 
strategically crucial, since military action from such 
islands could threaten the coasts of these littoral states. A 
brief overview of the most significant islands in the 
southern Red Sea will follow, from which it will be seen that 
some have the geographical potential to provide genuine bases 
and fortress facilities while others do not. 
Perim, a former British coaling station, now belongs to 
PDR Yemen. It is rocky, barren and volcanic; Al Yamani (1947) 
suggests that every part of Perim tells that it was once a 
volcano. ( 55 ) It is situated at the narrowest point of the Red 
Sea where it bisects the Strait of Bab al Mandeb into two 
channels: the Western channel between the island and the 
African shore, and the eastern channel, 16. 4km wide, lying 
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between Perim and the Asian coast. According to the Naval 
Intelligence Division (1946) the channel is 19.2km wide; but 
various other sources - which could be more accurate say 
that its width is about 16. 7km. This channel is navigable 
while the eastern channel (9.3km wide) is dangerous for 
shipping. Perim Island is 3km at its widest point and about 
7km long.< 56 ) In 1968 the island was inhabited by 300 
people. (57) According to the Naval Intelligence Division 
(1946) the highest point on the island is on its eastern end; 
whereas its north-western coast is flat and sandy and its 
southern shore is irregular and all its bays are blocked by 
coral reefs. (58) Intersected by fresh water-courses, the 
surface of the island is composed of basalt rocks. Perim is 
situated within an area prohibited to shipping. ( 59 ) The 
south-western part of the island contains a harbour which is 
well sheltered except against the southerly winds. The 
entrance of the harbour, on the middle of the eastern side of 
the island, lies between Pirie and Lee Points, which are less 
(60) than 900m apart. The strategic significance of Perim was 
recognized during the 18th and 19th centuries. When the 
British saw Napoleon's conquest of Egypt as a major threat to 
their communications with India 1n 1799, they forcibly 
occupied Perim and blockaded the Red Sea. Owing to the lack 
of water on the island the British stayed for only a few 
months and withdrew their troops to Aden. In 1857 again the 
British annexed the island and for some years used it as an 
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important coaling and signal . ( 6 1 ) stat1on. The British built 
forts and a lighthouse on its peak, and made large tanks for 
drinking water. Thus, they turned the island into a key for 
two great doors to India and the Red Sea. ( 6 Z) Perim has the 
largest lighthouse in the whole Red Sea to guide ships 
passing the Straits of Bab al Mandeb. It also has two small 
airfields, one of which is about 1,000m long. ( 6 3) 
In the late 1960s, when the British decided to quit 
southern Arabia, they offered to internationalize the island 
and put it under United Nations supervision to guarantee the 
freedom of passage through Bab al Mandeb. However, PDR Yemen 
claimed the island and sovereignty was transferred to Aden in 
1967 after the inhabitants of the island opted to join the 
new Republic. Perim thus gives PDR Yemen a distinctive 
advantage of control over Bab al Mandeb. ( 6 4) 
Since the early 1970s the strategic importance of Perim 
has re-emerged. Bell ( 197 3) sees the strategic significance 
of Perim as comparable with that of Sharm al Sheikh. Bell 
states that Israel built a counter-presence in that area in 
the 19 7Os on the Ethiopian Dahlak islands off Massawa. He 
adds that the revolutionary regime in Aden maintained that 
"the Israelis are 1n Ethiopia on more than a training 
mission 11 , and that they have established their . "own Zionist 
Perim further up the Bab el Mandeb just in case 11 .( 6 5) An 
Israeli viewpoint maintains that before the 1974 Arab Rabat 
Summit, PDR Yemen declared its intention to fortify Perim 
Island; but in that Conference Aden agreed to a 99-year lease 
of the island to Egypt for $150 million, ( 66 ) paid by Saudi 
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A b . (67) ra 1a. Al Hakim ( 1979), however, maintains that the 
government of PDR Yemen announced that 
"the so-called lease of the island (of Perim) was 
not a subject for debate by anyone at the Seventh 
Arab Summit Conference in Rabat". (68) 
Salama ( 1980) QUts the Arab view that PDR Yemen might not be 
strong enough to defend the island against any Israeli raid; 
and because of the tremendous strategic value of the island, 
it should be transferred into a common Arab base. However, 
PDR Yemen rejected such a strategy, but agreed that the 
Egyptian navy could use the island if emergency arises. (69) 
Anthony Cordesman ( 1984), a US Middle East defence analyst, 
also believes that Perim is a valuable military facility. ( 70) 
According to Rear Admiral Hanks (1981) during the 
Israeli-Arab war of October 1973, Aden's tanks and artillery 
were based on Perim, and provided back-up support to Egyptian 
destroyers which patrolled the southern reaches of the Red 
Sea on the look-out for vessels flying the Star of David or 
Israel-bound Iranian oil tankers. Since then, the Israelis 
have been seriously concerned about the strategic threat the 
island could pose to their navigation through the southern 
entrance of the Red Sea, and accordingly have established 
some counter measures claiming that the island was within 
range of Israel's naval base in Southern Sinai. 
Responsibility for the "£oral Sea" incident in which an 
Israel-bound tanker was rocket-attacked by the PLO, somewhat 
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surprisingly left Aden unsuspected by Israel. ( 71 ) However, 
Abir ( 1974) believes that the Palestinian Bazooka missiles 
could not have been fired from the island without PDR Yemen's 
help or consent. ( 7 Z) Israeli military presence 0'-I'E other 
islands in the southern Red Sea has been also alleged by Arab 
sources. According to Mahmoud (1979), Israel built two naval 
bases on the islands of Fatima and Halib - the largest of the 
islands of the Bay of Assab close to the Eritrean coast and 
about 43. Zkm to the north of Bab al Mandeb. He adds that 
Israel used the island of Dumeirra, 20.8km northwest of Perim 
and near the African coast, for reconnaissance, and occupied 
some of the Zuqar group for communications. The same story is 
cited by Hewidi (1980). (73) However, although one may not 
doubt the validity of these claims, during the reign of 
Emperor Haile Selassie, when Israel had a close relationship 
with Ethiopia, one cannot accept these views after the 
Marxist revolution in September 19 7 4. The new regime has 
maintained a pro-Arab stance, and in 19 81 entered into a 
politico-stategic alliance with two of the most anti-Israeli 
regimes, Libya and PDR Yemen (see chapter 7). 
Regarding superpower strategic interests in Perim, 
Soviet military presence in or close to it has been indicated 
since the early 1970s. According to Yodfat and Abir (1977) in 
1974 reports mentioned that the Soviets had forces on the 
island, another recent view maintains that the Soviets were 
engaged in constructing a new base at the Bay of Turbah, near 
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the island. A third more recent claim comes from Andrew Boyd 
( 1984) who indicates that 11 Russia acquired valuable naval 
facilities at Aden and on the island of Perim and on 
Socotra 11 • ( 7 4 ) On the other hand, since the early 19 50s the 
Americans were not far from Perim. Their military presence 
since 197 3 near Bab al Mandeb has been indicated by Abir 
(1974). ( 7 S) Blake (1981) points out that superpower interest 
in the island stems from the fact that Perim could be 
employed to deter shipping from using the navigable channel 
where blockade is not easy due to its depth of more than 
180m ( 76 ). The currents are also fast enough to complicate 
mining the strait. 
Kamaran Islands: this group of island, of which Kamaran 
is the largest, lies about 4. 6km off AR Yemen's coast, and 
about 320km north of Perim Island. From north to south 
Kamaran measures about 25km and is about 9km from east to 
west. The area is about 179. 2sq. km. It is composed of rock 
and sand, and is generally low and sandy in appearance, but 
relatively high towards the southern end, where the highest 
point on the island (Jabel Yamen) reaches 24m. The sheltered 
Kamaran harbour, with its low head and mud bank, lies on the 
eastern coast of the island. The harbour is entered between 
North Point (1S 0 20'N, 42°37'E) and Milton Point which lies 
650m to the south-south-west.C 77 ) During the 1940s the har-
bour served as a quarantine base for Muslim pilgrims en route 
to Makkah and as a centre for export trade, charcoal and 
75 
dried fish. Apart from Kamaran village there were three other 
villages, all inhabited by fishermen who used to exchange 
some of their fish catches for vegetables. Some pearl-trading 
took place on the north western side of the island. These 
pearls used to be marketed in Bombay. (7 8 ) 
Since the 16th century different governments have ruled 
the island and used it for various purposes. During the 16th 
century the Portuguese occupied the island, built a fort, and 
used it as military headquarters. Later, the Turks defeated 
the Portuguese and destroyed the fort. From 1915 to 1967 the 
island was under British occupation. ( 79 ) On November 30, 
1967, PDR Yemen was proclaimed independent comprising the 
Territory of Aden, the islands of Perim, Kuria Muria, Kamaran 
and other offshore islands (according to the UN General 
Assembly Resolution 2183 (XXI) of 12 December 1966). On 
November 30th 1967 the UN was informed by the United Kingdom 
that: 
11 The people of Kamaran had decided to unite with 
Aden and accordingly it too would be part of the new 
State ... " 
It is worth recalling that the people of Perim opted to join 
PDR Yemen; while the people of Kuria Muria chose to unite 
with the Sultanate of Oman. ( 8 0) Perim island has an airfield, 
a port and an office building; its population, composed of 
Arabs, Ethiopians, Indians and Somalis, is nearly 3,000, most 
f h t . f. h. (81) o w om prac 1se 1s 1ng. 
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Being of strategic significance, the ownership of the 
island has thus been a matter of dispute between the United 
Kingdom and Yemen AR in 1956, and between the latter and PDR 
Yemen. In 1956 when Britain granted concessions for oil 
exploration on the island, the Yemeni government in Sanaa 
protested against the issue on the basis that Kamaran was 
part of its territory. London rejected any claim to the 
island by the Yemeni king. On this issue, Taylor (1972) 
argues that while Britain regarded the island as part of her 
Aden colony, Yemen AR claimed it as part of the former 
Turkish province of that name. However, the authorities in 
Sanaa did not press their claim. After 1967, conflict between 
the two Yemens over the sovereignty of the island was 
anticipated. In 1972 PDR Yemen abdicated the island in favour 
of Yemen AR. ( 82 ) In 1984 the Americans maintained that the 
Soviet Union seemed to be 11 expanding military facilities 11 on 
the island 11 • ( 8 J) 
Dahlak Islands: the Ethiopian Dahlak archipelago lies on 
Dahlak Bank - which extends to 288km south-east, with the 
outer edge lying between 48 and 128km. The islands are 
situated on broad shallow-water shelves northeast of Massawa 
Channel, on the African coast, near the port of Massawa 1n 
the Eritrean Province. The islands extend along Dahlak Bank 
in the form of reefs and banks. 
The villages on the northern side of the archipelago 
were centres of pearl-fishing. Owing to the lack of water, 
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the islands were supplied with water from the mainland and 
thus water had to be stored in tanks. Massawa Channel lies 
between Dahlak Bank and the Eritrean coast; it extends 
south-south-east for 345. 6km. It is bisected into northern 
and southern Massawa Channels which provide safe and con-
venient thoroughfare; nevertheless, caution is needed since 
low islands existing in this area are not easily seen. (SS) 
During the European colonial era, Dahlak had military 
significance with an aircraft landing ground, in addition to 
other facilities such as a wireless telegraph station. In the 
early 8th century, Muslims occupied Dahlak islands, con-
trolled Abyssinia, and retaliated against the Abyssinians who 
had burnt Jeddah. By the early lOth century the Abyssinians 
regained a hold on the African shore at the southern end of 
the Red Sea including the islands. However, by the 11th 
century, Muslim Arabs called Najahids were able to recontrol 
the islands which in the 12th century came under the control 
of the Muslim Shaddadid Dynasty whose territory included 
Massawa. ( 86 ) The second important island in the group is 
Norah, 16km north of Dahlak Al Kabir. Although none of the 
other islands display such special significance as Dahlak and 
Norah, some had military value because the Italians used them 
as aircraft landing-fields. (S7) 
Since the early 1970s the strategic significance of 
Dahlak archipelago has been recognized. Bell (1973) includes 
this group with Perim when he considers them important as 
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Sharm al Sheikh. In the early 1950s, the US gained a 25 year 
lease for Seninyan and Dahlak Islands from Ethiopia to 
w .e )-t-e_-(V\ 
enforce f~~ military bases in Mauritius, Maldives, 
and Diego . ( 8 8) Garc1a. During the era of Emperor Haile 
Selassie of Ethiopia (prior to September 1974) "the Israelis 
had a secret monitoring station on the Dahlak Islaneds 
11(89) Not only the Americans and the Israelis, but also 
the Russians gained a foothold in the Dahlak islands. The 
Financial Times ( 19 8 0) reports that Soviet ships acquired 
"facilities ... in the Ethiopian-owned Dahlak islands in the 
Red Sea". More information on Soviet presence there is stated 
in Foreign Report ( 19 8 3) which indicates existing Russian 
influence in Ethiopia by pointing out that ''Soviet forces are 
building up their base on the Dahlak islands in the Red 
S II (90) ea . 
Farasan Islands: this group of islands belong to Saudi 
Arabi and contain the largest islands on the Asian side of 
the Red Sea: Farasan Kabir and Segid, which are practically 
one island. They have plains, valleys and hills composed of 
coral rock. The whole group lie between Khor Itwad and Meidi, 
on a shallow offshore shelf. The group correspond in position 
to the Dahlak archipelago because both groups lie on the same 
shelf. They have irregular shapes and the highest point on 
them is 78m. Their area is 450 and 180sq.km respectively; and 
they are joined by a spit. Both have small anchorages, and a 
( 9 1 ) 
water supply. 
According to the Saudi newspaper, Al Madina Al Munawarah 
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(May, 1984) there are 73 islands 1n the Farasan group. 
Farasan, Kabir, Segid, Gamah and other islands are said to 
have date palms and a small population. The Farasan group has 
a very fascinating beauty, especially Farasan and Segid, 
suggesting that the Farasan islands are potentially useful 
for tourism. ( 92 ) 
Socotra: The island 1s located 35km off PDR Yemen's 
coast to the south overlooking the Gulf of Aden. Its western 
extremity is some 200km to the east-north-east of Cape 
Guardafui or Ras Asir - the easternmost tip of the Horn of 
Africa. It is mountainous and the highest point is 
1,428m. ( 93 ) Socotra is 138km long, and 36km wide. ( 94 ) In 1966 
its population was 166,000, estimated to be over 200,000 in 
1985. Hadibo is the capital of Socotra, a village situated on 
the northern part of the island. Bell ( 197 3) states that 
Socotra is obscure and has no visible resources, and its 
population live on fishing and goats. Other sources indicate 
that although the island is generally barren, it has some 
agriculture, coastlands and valleys; it has livestock, dates, 
gum and fishing; it exports dates, gum, incense and ghee. 
Also, it is described as having a significant continental 
shelf which is now being explored for oil. 
The strategic location of the island is widely 
acknowledged. The New Encyclopedia Britannica (1974) 
considers it one of the major Indian Ocean islands. Maritime 
authorities emphasize the strategic location of the island 
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close to shipping lanes entering or leaving the southern part 
of the Gulf of Aden. On the other hand, they point out its 
exposure to the monsoons, and its being devoid of safe 
harbours 
Aden. ( 9 5 ) 
or anchorages, like 
Consequently, Socotra 
those magnificant ones in 
is rarely visited by ships. 
The island, formerly British territory, has been owned by PDR 
Yemen since the independence of the latter in 1967. For many 
centuries the Eastern seaborne trade enriched the Arabs of 
Oman and Yemen. ( 96 ) In their rivalry with those Arabs, the 
Portuguese aimed at capturing the strategic approaches to the 
Indian Ocean in order to seal off foreign shipping access and 
establish territorial bases around its coasts. Therefore, in 
1506, Alfonso Albuquerque seized Socotra and Aden to block 
the entrance to the Red Sea. While extending its hegemony in 
the western sector of the Indian Ocean, Britain occupied 
Socotra and Aden in 1839. ( 97 ) 
As early as 1970 reports referred to Soviet marines 
landing on the island, and that the latter would be turned 
into a Russian base. Today, Socotra is considered by some to 
be 11 the lynchpin in the Soviet network 11 of military presence 
that includes Dahlak, Assab and Aden. Thus, Socotra con-
stitutes a central strategic interest compared even to Aden. 
Such a view has been held by Anderson and Blake (1982) when 
they maintain that a political change in PDR Yemen could lead 
to the dismantling of Soviet facilities in Aden - as the case 
with Berber a in 19 7 8, but Soviet evacuation from Socotra 
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would not be an easy task.( 98 ) During the first half of the 
1980s numerous sources indicated Soviet acquisition of 
valuable and dependable naval facilities in Socotra. 
Cordesman (1984) maintains that in a security agreement 
between PDR Yemen, the Soviet Union and Ethiopia, the USSR 
may have been allowed to build submarine pens on the island. 
He adds that the Soviets built a major anchorage close to 
Socotra. ( 99 ) When Israel learned the news that the Soviets 
had turned the island into a base, one of her newspapers 
warned both Moscow and Aden that 
"any move to choke-off Israeli routes to Eilat would 
be resisted, and noted the air mileage to Aden and 
Socotra". 
Aden denied the reports and took journalists to the island to 
prove its hands were clean. Rejection of such alleged Soviet 
military presence also comes from Vali who contended that, in 
1976 at least, "the report according to which Socotra island 
has been turned into a Soviet air base has proved incorrect". 
But he concedes that "there are fleet anchorages which are 
db S . t h' 11(100) use y ov1e wars 1ps ... 
Quoting Egyptian sources, Lapidoth ( 1982) states that 
Socotra has become "a haven and training ground for various 
terrorist groups". Cordesman (1984) maintains that PDR Yemen 
is expanding its air facilities at Hadibo and that the island 
contains one of PDR Yemen's naval bases.( 101 ) PDR Yemen's 
claim to an Exclusive Economic Zone over 200 miles around the 
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island, would put the entire area between Socotra and PDR 
Yemen's coast and the African coastline within the former's 
E. E. Z. Despite the rights of other states enshrined in the 
1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (Article 58) there 
could be fears that PDR Yemen and its allies in the 
Tripartite Pact might be tempted to threaten shipping for 
political reasons. The Gulf of Aden controls access to Bab al 
Mandeb. 
Red Sea islands may be harnessed for the construction of 
ports, airfields, or refineries. Despite the small size of 
most Red Sea islands, some are endowed with strategic 
positions adjacent to major shipping routes, and hence they 
enjoy strategic value. The possession of islands in the Red 
Sea would surely give their owners an opportunity to exercise 
some influence. The best chance in this respect are for PDR 
Yemen (Perim) and Saudi Arabia (Tiran and Sanafir). However, 
the situation for Saudi Arabia could be critical as its 
islands lie in the only outlet for Israel to the south. 
Consequently, Saudi Arabia could find itself in confrontation 
with Israel if the former tries to exercise the right be-
stowed on it by The Law of the Sea Convention in 1982, namely 
the right of coastal states to decide whether passage of a 
ship endangers that state's security or not, before allowing 
passage (chapter 6). While the Saudis may not create problems 
for US ships passing in the vicinity of areas under their 
jurisdiction, PDR Yemen's revolutionary regime might do so. 
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As Couper (1978) indicates, some islands have assumed a new 
importance in world geography because their ownership can 
. t t t· 1 . 1 b . ( 102 ) H glve access o po en la mlnera earlng areas. owever, 
the present significance of Red Sea islands 1s strategic. 
2.2 Physical Characteristics 
2. 2. 1 Climate 
Generally speaking, Red Sea climatic and weather 
conditions are typical of the Middle East. The region is 
characterized by long, hot and dry summers. It remains very 
warm in winter. High ground on both sides brings weather 
variabilities. ( 1 0J) 
Winds: Wind is mainly light along the Red Sea. From 
latitude 19°N to the northern end of the Red Sea, the 
prevailing winds are north and northwest. The occasional 
westerly or 1 Egyptian 1 , winds are the best known ln that 
part. During the winter they blow with some violence, and are 
generally associated with fog and sandstorms. Between 
latitudes 14° 16°N, the winds are variable; but from June 
to the end of August, strong north-west winds blow south and 
sometimes they extend to Bab al Mandeb. By September, the 
pattern retreats to a position north of latitude 16°N. In the 
area south of the dominant winds are south and 
southeast. Areas near the coasts are sometimes characterized 
by hot or sand-laden winds from the desert. ( 1 04) 
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Tab1e 2.3 
Precipitation at selected Red Sea stations 
Station 
Suez 
Eilat 
Port Sudan 
Jeddah 
Masawa 
Hodeidah 
Djibouti 
Aden 
Socotra 
Highest 
average 
Month/months Period with no 
precipitation 
Annual 
total 
mm mm. 
5 March, November-
December 
8 February-March, 
and December 
41 November 
31 December 
35 December 
23 December 
52 November 
8 January 
81 December 
April-September 24 
June-September 29 
June 
June 
June 
April, July-
67 
63 
180 
89 
144 
39 
August 195 
Source: Hydrographer of the Navy, Red Sea and Gulf of Aden Pilot, 
12th edition 19 80, publisher: Hydrographer of the Navy, 
Taunton, England- 1980, pp.34, 46, 41, 48, 44, 50, 55, 
51, 60. 
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In the southern part of the Red Sea shipping is affected 
by the southwest and northeast monsoons. In the Horn area, 
they erode the shoreline and practically halt navigation of 
small vessels for several months of the year, especially in 
. (105) the northern part of Somal1a. 
Cloud: The Red Sea region is covered by small amounts of 
cloud. Sometimes when rising dust forms strata at a higher 
level, a yellowish grey tint blurs the normal blue sky. 
Fisher (1983) remarks that absence of cloud here, especially 
away from coasts results in great heat with the sun beating 
. (106) down un1nterrupted. 
Precipitation: In general, rainfall is scanty and 
irregular. Absence or scarcity of rainfall along the sector 
from Suez to Jeddah is characteristic. Toward Massawa 
relatively great quantities of rainfall occur from October to 
April due to the proximity of the mountainous hinterland. For 
the rest of the region, east of Massawa, precipitation 1s 
little, except in Socotra island where it becomes moderate in 
June and heavier 1n November and December (table 2.3). 
However, although the domination of the Trade Winds 
throughout Arabia renders the latter as dry land, it is 
agreed that orographic precipitation caused by monsoonal 
currents from the Indian Ocean causes substantial rainfall in 
parts of PDR Yemen and 
intensifies rainfall. ( 1 07) 
Oman, and mountainous relief 
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Rain in the northern part is mainly due to the crossing 
of cold Mediterranean fronts. Here, the average is only 25 or 
SOmm at places like Cairo, Suez and Tor. On the Asian 
coastline the average amount normally occurs 1n 10 to 30 
days, and in nowhere exceeds 13mm. On the African side this 
quantity reaches 17mm at Massawa. Sometimes snow covers the 
peaks of higher mountains in winter. In the period from May 
to December, the Eritrean mountainous area experiences 
thunder which is rare in the coastal waters. In sum, the 
typical annual rainfall of the region is not more than 175 or 
200mm; but, with special reference to coasts, the amount is 
1 t . f 1 . . t th . ( 1 0 8) more p en 1 u 1n w1n er an 1n summer. 
Visibility: Visibility is normally good or very good and 
fog is rare. The frequency of fog over the whole Red Sea area 
is less than two per cent. Poor visibility below 8km 
occurs in many parts of the Red Sea between May and 
September. Drizzle and heavy rain also reduce visibility in 
the area. Visibility is also lowered to below fog limits by 
dust and sandstorms which reach coastal waters. However, the 
northern part of the Red Sea is the worst affected by dust 
and sandstorms. ( 109 ) 
Temperature: Most of the Red Sea area 1s either hot or 
very hot. Temperatures in this part, according to Fisher 
(1983), are higher than at the equator. It is normal to have 
daily maxima of 38°-46°C, and the area has experienced over 
52 °C. In February the mean temperature of the water of the 
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Table 2.4 
Daily and monthly mean and maximum temperatures during January 
and July at selected Red Sea.stations 
Station Month Mean daily Mean daily Mean highest Mean 
maximum minimum lowest 
oc oc oc oc 
Suez January 20 9 23 6 
July 37 23 41 20 
Jeddah January 29 19 32 13 
July 37 26 40 22 
Port-Sudan January 27 20 30 15 
July 41 28 46 24 
Massawa January 29 22 32 19 
July 39 31 42 27 
Aden January 28 23 29 19 
July 36 28 39 26 
Source: Hydrographer of the Navy, Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden 
Pilot, 12th edition, 1980, Hydrographer of the Navy, 
·Taunton:~ England, 1980, pp.34, 41, 44, 48, 51. 
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Gulf of Suez is 18° (figure 2.3 and table 2.4). This 
gradually increases to 26°C near Bah al Mandeb; and then it 
drops to 23 °C off the southeast coast of Arabia. August is 
the hottest period when temperature jumps from 28°C (figure 
2. 4). during the southwest monsoon the temperature of the 
surface water in the area of Cape Guardafai reaches its 
minimum of 28 °C. This low temperature is associated with 
upwelling of cold, deep water off the African coast north of 
the Equator. In summer, the air over the water is warmer than 
the sea by about 1° or 2 °C but in winter it falls to 1 °C 
below. The average annual temperatures of 29° to 30°C in the 
coastal waters near Massawa and Assab are the highest average 
of coastal stations in the world. ( 110 ) Table 2.5 shows 
temperatures over some Red Sea areas. 
Humidity: The averages of humidity along the Red Sea 
coasts and adjacent waters are about 75%. The highest reading 
of 90% takes place almost at dawn 1n flat coastal areas. 
Fisher ( 1983) remarks that 1n the Red Sea and the Gulf 
humidity, particularly in summer, creates living conditions 
of great discomfort, to the extent that rich people escape 
this period by living in hill stations. During the period 
from May to September, humidity becomes quite high over the 
southern part and near Aden (table 2.5.). It is also reported 
as highest near the northern-most tip of the Gulf of Aqaba, 
close to Eilat and Aqaba. ( 111) 
In sum, the climate of the Red Sea region is generally 
90 
Table 2.5 
The average wet-bulb temperature (°C) over the Red Sea 
Red Sea 
Month Lat 27°N 21°N 15°N Gulf of Aden 
January 16 19 23 22 
April 21 24 26 26 
July 25 27 29 27 
October 23 27 27 26 
Source: Hydrographer of the Navy, Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden 
Pilot, 12th ed. Hydrographer of the Navy, Taunton , 
England, 1980, p.32. 
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characterized by burning hotness, aridity, atmospheric 
humidity and sandy, duty winds. Such a climate renders year-
round active life difficult. As Fisher points out, only with 
technology have people become able to lessen the effects of 
such climate - eg, by desalination of sea-water for crops and 
(112) . drinking, and air-conditioning of houses. Obv1ously, the 
bulk of Red Sea population has no access to such amenities. 
Bell (1973) argues that although European rivalry for 
control of the Red Sea shores was great, the climate and 
sand, besides national hostility, baffled the grand designs 
of the imperial powers. He refers to the Italian defeat at 
Adwa in 1896, as an example of native hostility. ( 11 3) 
However, despite the unpleasantness of climate in the Red Sea 
region, both superpowers acquired footholds as early as 
thirty years ago. In the modern world, combat would be 
facilitated rather than impeded by the Red Sea's physical 
environment. 
2.2.2 Currents and Tides 
Currents: Currents in the Red Sea are categorized as 
predominantly weak, except in the southern sector towards Bah 
1 M db (114) a an e . At the latter, according to Mahmoud (1979) 
they are characterized by high speed, reaching to 320km in 24 
h (115) ours. Figures 2. 5 and 2. 6 represent the pattern of 
currents for the months of January and July respectively. The 
period from May to October is a transitional stage between 
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the two patterns. Superimposed on the flow southeast or 
northwest are many local eddies which may be one of the 
factors that create the great variability in Red Sea 
currents. During September and before the establishment of 
the season flow, currents at Bab al Mandeb are weak and 
variable in direction. 
In the Gulf of Aden currents are reported to be weaker 
and more changeable than in the Arabian Sea. Throughout 
April, currents going west continue to prevail over those 
going east. However, this predominance ceases in May; and 
currents become generally weak and vary in their direction. 
In June, when the southwest monsoon is established, east-
going currents are most frequent and highly stable except in 
the southern part of the gulf, south of about latitude 12°N 
where eddies of systems of counter-currents predominate. 
here, quite often, west-going currents operate. In September 
while east-going currents are almost restricted within the 
area north of latitude 13°N, those on the south become very 
variable. During October, currents related to the northeast 
monsoon, prevail. 
Tides: Since the classical medieval era, and to some 
extent today tides are sometimes known as adversaries of 
navigation. The predominance of reefs in the Red Sea has 
caused variations in water level; and hence tides in the Red 
Sea vary somewhat from one area to another. While tidal 
variation at the Suez Canal is 2. lm, it is only 0. 6m at El 
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Table 2.6 
Spring tidal ranges in the Red Sea 
Area Latitude Spring range of tide 
Shaker Island About 0.6m 
Near Sawakin 19° 07'N, 37° 20'E No appreciable 
semi-diurnal tide 
Kamaran Bay About 0. 9m 
Source: Hydrographer of the Navy, Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden 
~------~--~--~--------~--------Pilot, 12th ed., Hydrographer of the Navy, Taunton 
England, 1980, p.18. 
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Akhawein (The Brothers) islet (26°19'N 34°51'E) south of the 
Gulf of Suez. Tidal variation is just more than 0. 3m, and 
even imperceptible in other places. The level of water 1n the 
northern part of the Red Sea is usually raised by the strong 
southerly winter winds from December to March. In summer, the 
strong northerly winds lower that level by as much as 
0. 9m. ( 116) 
The tide of the Indian Ocean does not enter the Red Sea 
which develops a local oscillatory tide of semi-diurnal type. 
The fluctuation of the tide is not large, but whilst this 
oscillation is featured by high water in the southern end of 
the sea, it is indicated by low water in the northern end and 
. (117) 
v1ce versa. Table 2. 6 shows spring ranges of tide at 
different areas in the Red Sea. 
Tides in the Gulf of Suez and in the Gulf of Aqaba are 
caused by the effects of tidal oscillation in those waters. 
Occurrence of high water in the Gulf of Suez between Suez 
32°33'E) and Ras Gharib (28°21 'N, is 
almost simultaneous. But when water is low at Suez, it is 
high at the southern part of the gulf, and vice versa. Suez 
has a normal spring range of about 1.4m and an extreme range 
of about 2.0m. High water occurs almost simultaneously over 
the entire Gulf of Aqaba and the Gulf of Suez. But in the 
former, it takes place sixty to ninety minutes later than at 
Shaker island which forms the southwest entrance point to the 
Strait of Gubal in the Gulf of Suez. ( 118 ) 
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Table 2.7 
Relation between the average temperature of the surface 
water of the Red Sea and its salinity 
Latitude ( N) Temperature (in C) Salinity 
1Z 0 - 15 ° Z7.9 36.9 
15 ° - zoo Z8.6 38. 1 
zoo 
- Z5° Z7.Z 39.4 
Z5° - 30° Z3.7 41.3 
Source: Mahmoud, M., 'The Red Sea in Global Strategy' 
Siyasa Al Duwaliya, No.57, July 1979, Al 
Corporation, Cairo, 1979, p.33. 
in Al 
Ahram 
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2.2.3 Salinity 
The rate of evaporation and the rate of influx of fresh 
water (rivers and precipitation) are the two factors 
determining saltiness of water. Owing to the very high 
evaporation rates in the Red Sea, in excess of 2m annually, 
and the lack of inflow of fresh water ) because of deserts 
surrounding the sea, its waters are amongst the saltiest 
seawaters in the world, over 40 parts per thousand ( 40%) 
while the world average is 36%.). The lowest year-round 
salinity in the Red Sea is 36% on the southern end or around 
Perim island, and it gets progressively higher throughout the 
length of the sea until it reaches 41% in the Gulf of Suez 
and the Gulf of Aqaba. ( 119 ) In depths of 48m, where deep 
pools of hot salty water exist, the temperature reaches 56°C 
and salinity is recorded as eight times above average for 
normal seawater. 
During the 19 6Os a number of pools of hot brines were 
discovered at depths of 1920m, where the temperature is 
extremely high. The mean temperature of the brine in the 
Atlantis II deep is almost 60°C and its salinity is 256 parts 
per thousand, and with no oxygen. Similar pools of water are 
also indicated in Discovery Deep and in the Chain D (120) eep 
(at about 21°18'N). Table 2.7 reveals the relation of 
temperature to salinity in the northwestern quadrant of the 
Indian Ocean. The area between the Equator and the Arabian 
peninsula has a maximum salinity of over 37 parts per 
100 
thousand. Salinity in the Indian Ocean varies from 32 to 37 
( 1 2 1 ) parts per thousand. 
Although the Asian side is hotter than the African, 
salinity is greater in the latter. The reason, according to 
Mahmoud (1979), is that the temperature of the surface water 
on the Asian coast creates high humidity, which in turn slows 
the rate of evaporation in the water; consequently a low 
degree of salinity is created. Militarily, he adds, high 
degree of salinity affects the speed of sound waves in the 
sea; therefore, the Red Sea is not a sui table theatre for 
b . t . ( 1 2 2 ) 0 th th h d b . . su mar1ne opera 1ons. n e o er an su mar1nes 1n 
transit would be more difficult to detect. 
In addition to the outflow of water from the Red Sea 
through Bab al Mandeb, there is a constant sub-surface 
flowing out of highly salty water throughout the year. 
South-flowing bottom water from the Gulf of Suez spills over 
the sill at Bab al M db (123) an e . With regard to waters 
circulation in the Red Sea it is pointed out that when these 
waters are too hot, they move northward; but when they cool, 
they sink and create a deep current which flows over the 
southern end of the sea and pours into the Indian Ocean 
through the Gulf of Aden. Unesco Marine Science Programme for 
the Red Sea, and Unesco Technical Papers in Marine Science 
state that the pattern of the circulation of the Red Sea 
waters reverses from June to September; and in this movement, 
intermediate waters from the Gulf of Aden carry nutrients 
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Table 2.8 
Red Sea:seawater desalination plants* 
Plant 
Jeddah 
Al Wajh 
Dub a 
Yanbu al Bahr 
Haql 
Umm Lajj 
Al Qunfidah 
Eilat 
Al Lith 
Farasan 
Source: Couper, A. 
the Oceans, 
p. 118. 
Capacity Cum/day 
323,000 
60,000 
20,000 
19,000 
6,000 
5,000 
3,800 
3,788 
459 
250 
(ed.) The Times Atlas of 
Times Books Ltd, London, 1983, 
-l~ Except for Eilat, the rest are in Saudi 
Arabia. 
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into the relatively nutrient-poor sea, ie, the Red Sea. 
According to the New Encyclopedia Britannica (1974) there is 
a complete renewal of water in the Red Sea every 20 
(124) years. 
Fresh Water: Water is one of the major problems in the 
world. In the Middle East technology has made it possible for 
oil rich states to extract fresh water from the sea. The 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is heavily dependent on desalination 
plants utilising US technological know-how. According to MEED 
(1984) the Kingdom's total groundwater resources are 
estimated at 2.3 million million m3 with an approximate 
annual charge of 888 million 3 m • 
resources of water are mainly 
Saudi Arabia's renewable 
1n the western region. 
Groundwater meets 70-90 per cent of the Kingdom's present 
total demand. Water shortage clearly poses a threat to the 
Saudi farming expansion and thus the need to get to grips 
with the water problem is growing more urgent. Apart from 
seeking new ways to conserve groundwater resources, the main 
option for the government is to increase the output of 
desalinated water. ( 12 5 ) Table 2. 8 shows some Red Sea de-
salination plants. 
Saudi Arabia is already the world's single largest 
desalination market and boasts the biggest plant ever built -
a complex at Jubail, on the Gulf coast, producing about 1 
million of fresh water a day. The Saline Water 
Conservation Corporation (SWCC) operates 21 desalination 
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plants. Fifteen of these are on the Red Sea coast, and six on 
the Gulf. Stage four of the Saudi desalination project was to 
be completed in 1980, and Jeddah' s installed capacity of 
desalination had to be brought up to 19 million g/d. ( 126 ) 
OPEC Bulletin (1984) points out that in 1977 Saudi 
Arabia and the US set up a joint solar energy research 
programme under the Saudi Arabian-United States Joint 
Economic Commission. A seawater desalination plant at Yanbu 
due for completion in 1985 is one of the most ambitious 
projects involved in the programme. The plant aims at 
utilizing the abundant Saudi sunlight to produce fresh water. 
When it operates, its daily purification capacity will be 
and it will feed into the output of the larger 
desalination plant at Yanbu. At present the plant is not 
expected to be cost-effective, but officials of the SOLERAS 
estimate that by 
thousand gallons 
1995 the plant will be able to 
of water for four dollars. ( 127) 
produce a 
However, 
desalination plants on the Red Sea could be vulnerable to oil 
pollution, fire and explosion in ships - as in the case of 
the July-August 1984 mining of the Red Sea, or to attack by 
saboteurs or military conflict, notably to Saudi plants 
within Israel air-range. Such events could damage or ruin 
these installations, which needs the supply of fresh water 
for urban, industrial and agricultural activities. 
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Table 2.9 
Cities /towns of over 100,000 population along Red Sea coasts 
City/town Population Year 
Jeddah 750,000 1977 
Aden 300,000 1977 
Suez 194,000 1976 
Djibouti 160,000 1978 
Hodeidah 148,000 1975 
Port Sudan 120,000 1977 
Source: Except for Suez and Hodeidah, the rest of the 
information is from the Hydrographer of the 
Navy, Red Sea and Gulf of Aden Pilot, 12th 
edition, Taunto~--,, England, 1980, pp.115, 164, 
198 and 228. Information for Suez and Hodeidah 
is from Willett, M. (compiler and ed.) for 
Geographical Digest, 1981. Published by·George 
Philip& Son Ltd, London, 1981, pp.28, 39. -
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2.3 Pollution 
Since the early 1970s pollution at sea has been creating 
growing concern among coastal states. Regional organizations, 
such as the Arab League Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (ALESCO), have become increasingly involved with 
the problem. All this local, regional and international 
concern is aroused by the fact that pollution reduces the 
quality of human life while marine pollution puts marine 
resources at risk. Articles 207-212 of the 1982 Convention on 
The Law of the Sea indicate that pollution to the marine 
environment may be derived from: 
(1) land-based sources; 
(2) sea-bed activities, artificial islands and installations; 
(3) vessels and installations, and other devices flying their 
flags or of their registry or operating under their 
authority; 
(4) dumping; 
( 5) atmospheric sources. (128) 
Oil is considered as one of the most widespread 
pollutants at sea. (129) The Red Sea is clearly less 
vulnerable to certain types of pollution resulting from high 
population density (table 2.9), or large scale industry. But 
because of growing oil transportation 
offshore oil and mineral explorations, 
(Chapter 5) and 
the Red Sea is 
extremely susceptible to pollution. Oil slicks from drilling 
and oil tankers constitute the major pollution threat in the 
Red Sea, particularly if conflict occurs 1n the region 
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involving attacks on shipping as in the Gulf since 1982. 
Moreover, accidents may result when oil is transferred from 
ultra large crude carriers ( ULCC) to smaller ships. Even 
cleansing of tanks can contribute to oil pollution in the Red 
Sea. In a situation where collision and stranding annually 
cause an average total loss of 15 tankers, Red Sea states are 
clearly worried about oil pollution. For example, in 1976 the 
loss of 20 oil tankers in the world left almost a quarter of 
a million tonnes of oil polluting the seas. ( 130 ) 
Petro-chemical industries on Red Sea coasts, especially at 
Yanbu, Jeddah, Aden and Suez could add to the pollution 
problem. Moreover, the several desalination plants on the 
Saudi coast discharge substances that create pollution 
locally which may harm the natural . (131) env1ronment. In the 
Times Atlas of the Oceans (1983), the northern part of the 
Red Sea, specifically from about 130km north of Yanbu, is 
characterized by natural oil seepage; whereas in the rest, it 
shows high and low occurrences of oil pollution, especially 
around Bah 1 M db (132) a an e . Thus, owing to its location and 
function, the Red Sea is already threatened by oil pollution; 
and such threats are likely to increase. 
Regarding solutions to the problem of pollution, only 
after the UN Conference on The Human Environment (held at 
Stockholm in 1972) did people begin to realize the big threat 
of pollution, and to formulate serious environmental policies 
to combat it. ( 133 ) With regard to the Red Sea there have been 
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several attempts to control marine-pollution. The UN Environ-
mental Programme ( UNEP) sponsors a Regional Seas Programme 
( UNEPRSP) which includes the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. 
The Red Sea is considered by UNEP as one of the world 1 s 
priority areas for combatting pollution. According to Borgese 
and Ginsburg (1983) the Red Sea littoral states have signed 
and ratified the Regional Seas Programme and Related Regional 
conventions of the UNEP. The coverage for the Red Sea and the 
Gulf of Aden does not include Egypt and Israel because they 
are considered as Mediterranean participants, nor Somalia 
which is counted in the East African Region. ( 134) However, 
considering the fairly long coasts of both Egypt and Somalia, 
on the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden respectively, the two 
states should be parties to this coverage because each of 
them is strategically located and has been greatly concerned 
about Red Sea security. Consequently, their exclusion could 
seriously affect the anti-pollution cooperation in the 
region. 
The Arab League Educational Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (ALESCO) has shown considerable interest in 
protecting the Red Sea from pollution. In October 1974 ALESCO 
invited the United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) to convene a scientists' work-
shop on marine Sciences Programmes for the Red Sea. The 
meeting laid the basis for the development of an Action Plan 
for the region, which was adopted in two subsequent 
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inter-governmental conferences in Jeddah, in 197 4 and 1976. 
In 1978, Borgese and Ginsburg indicated that at the Jeddah 
meeting, all the Red Sea states attended except for Israel, 
and Djibouti which was not yet independent. The Action Plan 
included a draft convention, protocol and specific proposals 
for scientific research and monitoring programmes. The 
delegates also agreed to establish regional as well as 
national research institutions, and to hold training courses 
d . . . t h' (135) an sympos1a on mar1ne sc1ence eac 1ng. 
ALESCO has requested UNEP to participate ln the 
programme. The latter agreed to contribute to the cost of 
training the scientists and technologists who will operate 
the marine research and monitoring stations. Moreover, they 
will provide equipment for surveying living marine resources 
in the area in order to preserve their populations for 
sustained productivity. Another institution known as IUCN, 
interested in nature conservation, tourism, education and 
scientific research, has been actively engaged 1n the Red 
Sea. The IUCN urged the establishment of marine reserves in 
cooperation with the UNESCO's Man Biosphere Programme. ( 1 36 ) 
In January 1981 environmental and legal experts of the 
Red Sea states met to make the Action Plan more compre-
hensive, finalize the regional Convention for the 
Conservation of the Marine Environment, and to conclude a 
Protocol with respect to regional cooperation in combating 
pollution by oil and other damaging substances during 
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emergency situations. In February 1982 the Action Plan, 
Convention and Protocol were all approved at a conference in 
Jeddah. The conference also agreed to form a regional 
organization to superintend the implementation of the Action 
Plan and function as a secretariat to the Convention. Jeddah 
became the headquarters of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden 
Environmental, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
(RSGAESCO). ALESCO is to oversee the Programme, while UNEP 
participates as an advisor. ( 137) 
The UN Convention gives considerable attention to the 
protection of the marine environment. Articles 207-212 of the 
Convention oblige coastal states to adopt laws and 
regulations to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the 
marine environment. For example, Article 209, paragraph 2, 
spells out the coastal state rights to legislate against 
pollution: 
"Subject to the relevant provisions of this section, 
states shall adopt laws and regulations to prevent, 
reduce and control pollution of the marine environ-
ment from activities in the area undertaken by 
vessels, installations, structures and other devices 
flying their flag or of their registry or operating 
under their authority, as the case may be. The 
requirements of such laws and regulations shall be 
no less effective than the international rules, 
regulations and procedures referred to in paragraph 
1." (138) 
The need to prevent or control oil pollution has been the 
major reason why mandatory traffic separation schemes have 
been introduced in most of the main straits, such as Bab al 
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Mandeb, and other crowded sea areas. Although the number of 
tankers grew and tonnage carried by them has increased, 
better measures of control and new laws have 'lessened the 
volume of oil spills worldwide from 2. 4 million t.onnes in 
1971 to 1.58 tonnes million in 1980. ( 139) 
The Red Sea is clearly threatened above all by pollution 
from oil and the coastal states may not welcome an increase 
in oil traffic through it, especially supertankers. Since 
regional and inter-state conflicts are, to some extent, a 
characteristic of the region, and since the Red Sea is the 
most important economic factor that links these states, 
combating pollution in it could represent a good basis for 
cooperation between its states, but us technical and 
financial assistance in this respect would be crucial, and 
might help to promote friendly relations between Washington 
and the regional states. Since pollution of all kinds does 
not respect international boundaries there is little or no 
choice except for inter-state co-operation if pollution is to 
be controlled. A narrow sea with north-south and south-north 
curPents is especially vunerable to . pollution migration. On 
the other hand, pollution control could itself give rise to 
dispute between states, for example over monitoring, 
responsibli ties for damage caused, and other matters. Thus, 
the question of pollution is not yet ended in the Red Sea; it 
is just beginning. 
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CHAPTER 3 
RED SEA LIVING AND NON-LIVING RESOURCES 
3.1. Non-living Resources 
3.1.1 Offshore Oil Resources 
Apart from being a crucial route through which 
commercial and military vessels pass, the Red Sea contains 
three major types of mineral substances: first, petroleum 
deposits, second, evaporite deposits such as salt, gypsum and 
dolomite, and third, metallic muds of the Atlantis II, 
Discovery and other deeps between 21 ° 15 1 and 21 ° 3 0 1 N. The 
first and the last constitute the most important potential 
sources of wealth in the region. Coastal states all over the 
world as well as oil companies, have evinced considerable 
interest in offshore oil exploration. In 1980 offshore oil 
production reached 14m b/d, which was more than 20% of total 
world output. In 1990 it is expected to reach about 24mn b/d, 
and the annual value of offshore production could amount to 
more than $1 OObn. ( 1 ) The Times Atlas of the Oceans ( 19 8 3) 
shows the area from the entrances to the Gulf of Aqaba and 
the Gulf of Suez and then southward, until the Saudi-Yemeni 
border, as a potential oil area. Also the southern coast of 
the Gulf of Aden, just east of the Somali-Djibouti border, is 
. 1 d d . th . ( 2 ) 1nc u e 1n 1s zone. However, until now, actual offshore 
oil production in the Red Sea is confined to the Gulf of 
123 
Suez and Sinai peninsula. The ref ore, discussion of oil and 
gas in the Red Sea will concentrate on these two regions. 
The discovery of oil 1n Egypt 1 s Red Sea, surprisingly 
goes back to more than one hundred years when in 1868 
Americans reported its existence at Gemsa west of the 
entrance to the Gulf of Suez; and in February 1886 oil was 
found there, at a depth of 34.5 meters. Although the amount 
was small, Egypt 1 s great interest in the discovery led to a 
new American survey of the Red Sea coastal region. American 
mining engineers drilled five wells at Gemsa but the drilling 
proved unproductive. After several costly failures to find 
oil in any quantity, the Egyptian government suspended the 
operation and ended American participation. ( 3 ) 
From then until World War One, British companies 
monopolized oil exploratory activities in Egypt and in 1911 
oil was struck, again at Gems a; in this year Egypt 1 s total 
production was only 21,000 barrels. However, British oil 
experts came to the same conclusion as the Americans: that 
there was not sufficient oil at Gemsa to warrant large 
financial outlay.( 4 ) Nevertheless, in 1913 the Anglo-Egyptian 
Oil Fields Ltd, which later became the most significant 
company in Egyptian oil production, acquired a 30-year 
concession from the Egyptian government renewable for another 
15 years. The company accomplished its most successful find 
in 1913 when it discovered oil at Hurgada (27°15 1 N, 33°50 1 E) 
south of Gemsa. Hurgada 1 s field continued to be Egypt 1 s 
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TABLE 3.1 
Egypt's offshore oil production 1970-1980 
(1000 b/d) 
Year 
1970 
1975 
1977 
1978 
197 9, 
1980 
Production 
257.0 
165.0 
399.0 
396.0 
430.0 
390.3 
1979-1980 (% change) 
- 36.00 
+142.00 
0.75 
+ 8.60 
9.23 
Source: Borgese, E., and Ginsburg, N. (eds), Ocean Yearbo~k,The 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London~82, 
Appendix D, p.541. 
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virtual sole source of petroleum supply until 1930. Compared 
to the rich oil resources in Iran, Iraq and other Middle 
Eastern countries at that time, Egypt's crude oil potential 
was never thought to be high. ( 5 ) Significantly, however, the 
Americans played the pioneering role in Red Sea oil 
discoveries. It is worth mentioning that in January 19 7 2, 
Egypt became a member of the Organization of the Arab 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC). ( 6 ) 
During the 1960s Egypt's production of crude oil 
expanded rapidly, nevertheless, the country continued to be a 
net importer of oil until 1968. Fisher (1978) points out that 
in the mid-19 7Os petroleum became the major mineral export 
for Egypt; and the Gulf of Suez continued to be the country's 
chief source of production, especially from the important 
fields of El Morgan, Ramadan, Belayim, and July ( 7 ) (figure 
3. 1) . By the late 19 7Os further substantial increases in 
Egypt's crude production occurred and since then Egypt has 
been engaged in intensive exploration activity. A target of 
50m tonnes was set for 1980, and most of which was intended 
for export. Table 3.1 shows Egypt's oil production from 
1970-1980. ( 8 ) 
However, in 1980 the Department of Energy indicated that 
Egypt's output of crude oil would increase, but it added that 
there were doubts as to the country's ability to attain its 
target of 50m tonnes production before 1985. Also the 
Department pointed out that some uncertainty surrounds 
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TABLE 3.2 
Egyptian oil production 1983 
Region Tonnes (000) Increase on 1982 
Gulf of Suez 26,384 +10.2% 
Sinai 7,255 +7.6% 
Eastern Desert 1,324 +0.7% 
Western Desert 994 +13.2% 
Source: Various (see text) 
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Egypt's ability to maintain that production level to the year 
(9) (10) 2000. In 1983 Egypt's output reached 38.Sm tonnes; and 
the Gulf of Suez continued to preserve its dominant position 
as the largest crude production area. Out of Egypt's output 
of about 3 8. Sm tonnes, the Gulf of Suez contributed 26. 4m 
tonnes, over 73% of the total (table 3.2). ( 11 ) In 1984, there 
was no significant increase in production. One third of the 
total was exported. ( 1 Z) Egypt continues to remain under the 
psychologically important target of producing 50m tonnes by 
1986. ( 13 ) 
Being greatly concerned about becoming an oil producer, 
between 1973 and 1983 Egypt signed 111 exploration deals with 
44 companies representing 18 nationalities (table 3. 3). ( 14 ) 
This clearly reflected Egypt's determination to develop its 
energy resources upon which the country heavily depends, not 
only to meet rising domestic demands, but also to earn 
much-needed foreign exchange. Many of the concession areas 
are in the Gulf of Suez as figure 3. 1 has shown. Obviously, 
the number of nationalities demonstrates a growing 
international, and especially American, interest in Egypt's 
oil resources. Such world interest could have important 
geopolitical ~~repercussions if Egypt ever became a major oil 
exporter, not least in the Middle East itself. 
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Table 3.3. 
Gulf of Suez Offshore fields and concessions 
Name of field 
and discovery date 
El Morgan, 1965 
GS- 3 8 2 , 1 9 7 7 
July, 1973 
Ramadan, 1974 
SG-300, 1976 
Shoab Ali, 1978 
October, 19 7 3 
WD3 3, 197 2 
SB305, 1981 
GS315, 19 81 
GS34 7, 19 81 
G376, 1981 
Block 350, 1981 
Belayim Marine, 1961 
Company 
Amoco/Gupco 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
A Gip 
b/d average 
first 6 
months 1983 
150,000 
11,200 
83,100 
77,400 
5,700 
31,400 
123,800 
500 
2,000 
1,500 
6,100 
500 
1,700 
85,600 
Ras Budran, 1978 Demmex /Succo 12,500 
LL 87-2, 1976 II 650 
Ras Fanar, 1983 II 1,000 
Zeit Bay, 1 9 8 3 II 10,000 
Total average per day 598,950 
Cumulative 
bbL to 
1 July 1983 
773,600,000 
24,600,000 
325,600,000 
259,900,000 
10,900,000 
45,000,000 
109,300,000 
2,000,000 
1,000,000 
300,000 
1,100,000 
100,000 
6,800,000 
360,584,000 
2,250,000 
120,000 
N.A. 
N.A. 
Source: (Except for the last two fields) OGJ Report, Oil 
and Gas Journal, 26 December 1983 
pp.93-94· Information of the last two fields is from 
Petroleum Economist, March 1983, Vol.LI, No.3, 
pp.96 (map), 111. 
SG 300 :Amoco-Gupco _ __,~ 
July 
LL87-2 Deminex/Suco 
129· 
GS 277 
Ramadan 
58305 
GS 315 Amoco/Gupco 
~~:-'1'-...-~.-- El Morgan field 
Ras Shukheir/ 
1 Amoco/Gupco 
2 Deminex/Suco 
s IEOC/Petrobel 
4 Mobil 
5 Total 
6 Conoco 
7 Others 
e on field 
e Oil discovery 
Zeit Bay: 
Deminex/Suco 
0 km 50 
FIGo 3ol GULF OF SUEZ: OFFSHORE FIELDS AND CONCESSIONS 
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Table 3.4, 
Egypt: value of petroleum output: 1970-1983* 
Year Revenue $m 
1970 52.35 
1971 59.81 
1972 63.04 
1973 70.35 
1974 n.a. 
1975 59.6 
1976 86.46 
1977 127.33 
1978 750.00 
1979 1,300.00 
1980 2,500.00 
1981-82 2.700.00 
1982-83 .2.510.000 -
Source: (1) Middle East Annual Review, 1974, and 1975-76. 
The Middle East Review Co. Ltd, Essex, England, 
1974, and 1975-76, pp.65 and 126 respectively. 
(2) Middle East Annual Review, 1980, World of 
Information, Essex, England, 1980, p.208. 
(3) Africa Guide 1981, World of Information, 
Essex, England, 1981, pp.146-47. 
(4) Petroleum Economist, Vol.LI, No.3, march 
1984, p.111. 
(5) Al-Watan, 7 May, 1984, Kuwait, p.9. 
~< Value for 1970-73 is turned from Egyptian pounds 
into US dollars at official rate of 1974; 
£E = $0.393; see Middle East Annual Review, 1974, 
op.cit., p.9, 1975-77- at official rate of 1975: £E 
$0.400, see Middle East Annual Review, 1980, 
op.cit, 208. 
# Financial Times, 25 June 1984, London, p.IV. 
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The interim Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty of 1975 
enabled Egypt to recover the Sinai fields of Abu Rudeis and 
Belayim. The regaining of these fields, coupled with the 
reopening of the Suez Canal, enhanced the expansion of 
Egyptian oil production, chiefly from the reclaimed 
fields. ( 15 ) Blake (1978) indicates that between 1967 and 1975 
the Sinai oilfields had become the Israeli's major source of 
crude oil. During its eleven-year occupation of southern 
Sinai, Israel developed the Alma field on the northern part 
of Sinai. These fields used to supply Israel with 300,000 
b/d, or 20% of Israel's domestic consumption. However, the 
fields were handed back to Egypt in compliance with the 
Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty of 1979. ( 16 ) Figure 3. 2 shows 
Israel's phased withdrawal from Sinai between 1975 and 1982. 
In 1983 the Sinai peninsula contributed 7.3m tonnes, making a 
7. 6% increase over its production in 19 8 2. ( 17 ) The Eastern 
Desert produced 1.3m tonnes or 0.7% more than in 1982, while 
the Western Desert output reached 994,000 tonnes, making an 
increase of 13%. ( 18 ) 
Since the late 1970s oil has overtaken the Suez Canal 
(chapter 4) as Egypt's major foreign exchange earner (table 
3. 4·). In 19 7 8 Egypt 1 s revenues from crude oil amounted to 
$750m; in 1979 they reached $1,300m. ( 19) Some sources 
indicate that the country's foreign earnings broke the record 
in 1982-83 when they reached $3.3 billion, ( 20) an increase of 
22.22% over those of 1981-82. But other sources put the 
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Table 3-.5 
Egyptian energy supply 1980-2000* 
million tonne:soil equivalent 
1980 
Total demand 15. 5 
Percentage shares 
Oil and gas 55.0 
Hydropower 45.0 
Nuclear power 
Renewables 
1990 2000 
37.0 68.0 
60.0 40.0 
20.0 15.0 
40.0 
5.0 
Source: Petroleum Economist, March 1983, 
No.3, p.95. 
1\ 8% annual growth rate assumed. 
Vol. L, 
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figure for 1982-83 at $2.5 billion, indicating that there was 
a decline in revenues. As often happens with Egyptian 
figures, whatever the current level of revenues, Egypt is 
clearly striving to boost oil and gas productions while 
staggering domestic consumption continues to erode the 
country's big hopes of massive foreign revenues. 
Alarmed by the ever-growing level of home oil demand 
largely due to population growth and industrial expansion, 
since the 1980s Egypt has resorted to gas and other 
alternative fuels, hoping to save oil (table 3. 5). In 19 8 3 
Egypt designed schemes to build its first coal-fired 
electricity plant in Sinai. It was hoped that the plant would 
save about 200,000 b/d of oil. (Z 1 ) However, local consumption 
of gas has not been very different from that of oil, also 
skyrocketing (table 3.6). Although in 1983 Egypt's gas output 
grew by over 28% (table 3.7), its consumption rose by almost 
50%, thus eroding hopes for export. (ZZ) In the 1982-1987 Five 
Year Plan, Egypt is hoping to increase its gas production 
from 3.4m/cm to 12.9. The country's hope to raise gas 
production depends on finding new resources and the Gulf of 
Suez is thought to have high potential. (Z 3 ) The Sinai 
associated gas scheme, started in 19 84, is another source 
intended to boost gas output. Its ultimate production is 
rated at 25m/em. (Z4) 
It is interesting to speculate whether the United States 
would wish to see Egypt becoming a really wealthy oil 
producer. Being north of Hormuz, Bab el Mandeb and the Suez 
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Tab1e 3-6 
Estimates of Egyptian natural gas development (Billion cubic 
metres 
Year 
1981 
1985 
1990 
2000 
Domestic 
consumption 
2.6 
5. 8 
17. 5 
34.3 
Exports 
3 
9 
Total 
2.6 
s.8 
20.5 
43.3 
Residual 
262.4 
289.1 
417.8 
585.3 
Source: Middle East Review 1983, World of Information, Essex, 
England, 19 8 3, p. 8 8. Also see Petroleum Economist, 
March 1983, Vol.L, No.3, pp.97-98. 
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Table 3-1 
Egypt's offshore gas production (Bil~ion CFD) 
Year Production change % change 
1976 
1977 
1978 72.00 
1979 65.00 - 7.00 9.72 
1980 57.85 - 7. 15 11 . 00 
1981 60.00 + 2. 15 3.72 
1982 73.00 +13.00 13.67 
1983 94.10 +21.10 28.9 0 
Source: Offshore, 20 July, 1984m, p. 52. 
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Canal, it would be an attractive source of oil for western 
Europe and the US. On the other hand, with a large 
population, favourable location, growing industrial base, and 
political influence in the Arab world, Egypt could emerge as 
a powerful regional state able to resist superpower over-
tures, and stand up to Israel. It seems possible that 
American oil exploration in Egypt could have been more 
intensive than it has been. Meanwhile, the fact that a prime 
source of Egypt's energy is ln the Gulf of Suez is 
significant since this zone is vulnerable to action by 
Israel. Added to the Suez Canal, the oil resources of the 
Gulf of Suez increase Israel's chances of intimidating Egypt 
and pressurizing it not to break away from the peace treaty 
between the two. Israel's rising energy consumption (chapter 
4), growing military might and disunity among the Arabs could 
make such a geographically close energy source very tempting 
for Israel to exploit. 
Apart from the Gulf of Suez, potential for oil in the 
Red Sea lies mostly in the waters of Sudan and the two 
Yemens. Sudanese exploration for hydrocarbons was initiated 
1n the 19 50s and most of the prospecting operations were 
centred on the Red Sea coast where a number of non-commercial 
gas and oil finds were truck between Sawakin and Halaib. 
Sudan's reversal of political orientation from pro-East to 
pro-West ln 1973-74 has attracted Western investors, 
especially American oil companies. In 1974, Chevron Overseas 
138 
Inc. of the United States won a deal for oil exploration of 
the Red Sea coast. The concession covers an area of 
331,500sq.km. Chevron also got inland concessions. The 
country has been under continuous exploration by a number of 
other Western companies, including American, British, French 
(25) 
and German. however, Chevron is no longer prospecting in 
the Red Sea zone, and it lS currently centering its 
activities 1n southwestern and southern Sudan where there are 
better prospects. However, since 1984 the company has stopped 
operating in Sudan because of continuing instability in the 
southern part of the country and attacks on company personnel 
and equipment. 
In 1978 Texas Eastern made a deal to explore an area of 
26, 800sq. km on a Red Sea coastal tract. The firm initially 
drilled four wells in the area, but no finds were announced. 
In 1981 the company opted to continue exploration for another 
year in an offshore concession on the northern Red Sea coast. 
In 1982 Total of France scheduled further seismic work and an 
offshore well. Total has also been operating in the Red Sea 
area since 1978 when it won a contract to prospect an area of 
6,400sq.km on the Red Sea hills, extending offshore south of 
Sawakin.C 26 ) However, current hopes for Sudan's acquisition 
of oil probably lie inland rather than in the Red Sea zone. 
Regarding Yemen AR's oil prospects, the Financial Times 
(1984) indicated that exploration has centred on Tihama, the 
long Red Sea coastal strip, where offshore and onshore 
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drilling have taken place. In 1980 Deutsche Shell, the German 
company, confirmed that the offshore zone between Hodeida on 
the Saudi-Yemeni coastal border is a promising area. To 
assess the reserves, the company carried out drilling in 1981 
and 1982, but no finds were announced. Earlier, the 
state-owned Yemen Oil and Minerals Corporation (Yominco) had 
carried out a magnetic aerial survey on areas of prospective 
finds. This included the Tihama coast and offshore zones, 
which in early 1983 had also undergone exploratory operations 
by Hunt Oil - an American company - and Compagnie Francaise 
des Petroles (CFP). Helped by funds from the Soviet Union and 
Western aid agencies, Yominco also entered into further 
survey t . "t" (27) ac lVl 1es. The Petroleum Economist (1984) 
indicates that BP initiated a production-sharing contract 
with Yominco, covering an area of 2 2, OOOsq. km in the same 
area covered by Deutsche Shell. BP must start drilling before 
the last quarter of 1985 elapses, or the concession will be 
withdrawn. ( 28 ) 
Aden holds promising oil resources. In 1977 and 1979 PDR 
Yemen signed two agreements with Agip, an Italian firm, for 
offshore oil prospecting. In April 1982 the company announced 
a 3,000 b/d find in its Sharmah IX field in an offshore block 
off the Hadhramaut. The discovery renewed PDR Yemen's hopes 
of becoming an oil producer. (29) In January 1982 PDR Yemen 
signed a contract with Braspetro a Brazilian company for 
additional explorations in the area. During the same year 
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Hunt Oil held talks with Aden's government regarding the 
firm's interest in obtaining concessions. The Soviet Union, 
Iran and West Germany also provided aid to encourage oil 
t . . th t ( 30) prospec 1ng 1n e coun ry. 
In 1983 PDR Yemen signed a new deal with Agip for 
exploration. The concession covered an additional offshore 
area of S,OOOsq.km. The agreement also indicated the need to 
start the development of a number of earlier finds; and in 
1984 the firm undertook to conduct an appraisal drilling in 
two wells. ( 29 ) Also in 1984 onshore concessions went to 
Braspetro Brazil and Hispanoil (Spain) . Moreover, Kuwait's 
Independent Petroleum Group (IPG) won a tract offshore on the 
western side of Ras al Usaida (Asida) (13°57'N, 48°10'E). (3 1 ) 
Encouraged by sufficient seismic indication prospecting, IPG 
ran an onshore seismic test in May 19 84 on a neighbouring 
block, and committed itself to drill three wells; the first -
Spudding - started in March 1985. (3 2 ) 
The discovery of oil in the Egyptian Red Sea coast and 
waters encouraged exploration activities in Ethiopia. Those 
prospecting activities, located natural gas off Massawa 
(15°L3'N, 39°27'E) on the Eritrean coast. ( 33 ) Another find of 
oil and gas in the Red Sea has been indicated south-east of 
Sharm al Sheikh on the Saudi Red Sea coast. ( 34 ) Thus, apart 
from Egypt, no other state enjoys having actual oil resources 
in the Red Sea coasts and waters, although promising pros-
pects have been indicated in some states, particularly in 
a) 
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Yemen AR and PDR Yemen. Considerable inland potential 
apparently exists in Sudan. In general, Saudi Arabia is the 
only Red Sea state with vast oil resources - although these 
lie more than 900km east of the Red Sea. The point to note is 
that local oil production on any major scale could elevate 
the geostrategic significance of the Red Sea region to an 
even higher level than at present. 
3.1.2 Minerals 
In 1965 the American mining vessel, Atlantis II 
discovered enormous mineral deposits in the deep troughs of 
the Red Sea. The largest deep containing these metalliferous 
sediments was named after the ship as Atlantis II deep (A-II 
deep). Compared to other discoveries, such as Discovery deep, 
and Chain deep, the A-II deep is the most important, owing to 
its large resources (figure 3 ., 3·). The Discovery deep has a 
lower metal concentration than that of the A-II deep. The 
oozes of the latter and Discovery deep are located between 
21°15' and 21°30'N. The metals contained in the hot brine of 
the A- II consist of zinc, copper, iron, manganese, silver, 
gold and other metals. It is commonly agreed that the 
existence of these metal-rich brines is related to the 
splitting apart of Africa and Arabia. The depth of the A-II 
deep is between 2, 000 and 2, 200m, and its area is 60sq. km. 
The Red Sea's valuable metalliferous deposits are a second 
potential offshore source of considerable value. 
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Reports about the discovery of the metal-bearing 
deposits of the Red Sea created large-scale international and 
regional interest; and controversy over the question of legal 
rights concerning these resources cropped up. On February 15, 
1968, the American Metal Marketing Company applied to the UN 
for a 98.56sq.km exclusive mineral exploration lease to 
survey thermal sea-floor pools in the middle of the Red Sea. 
To determine the economic value of the deposits, the company 
requested the UN' s permission for a three-year period to 
sample and map mineral deposits. The UN replied that it had 
no authority to grant such mineral rights. In 1968 another 
company applied to Sudan, which granted it a mining 
concession on the grounds that the area of the metal-bearing 
muds lie under Sudanese sovereignty if delimitation is based 
on a median line. Two other companies have "considered the 
hot brine areas to be international territory, beyond the 
sovereignty of any nation."(3 6 ) 
In May 1968 Sudan and Saudi Arabia began negotiations to 
reach an agreement by which they could exploit the Red Sea 
minerals; but they did not arrive at such an accord. Later 
that year, according to Al-Hakim (1979) Saudi Arabia decreed 
its sovereign rights over the minerals. Article 1 of the 
Royal Decree provides that 
"All the hydrocarbon materials in the strata of the 
high sea bottom with respect to an area of the Red 
Sea extending below the high sea and contiguous to 
the continental Shelf of Saudi Arabia shall 
appertain to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia." (37) 
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The Kingdom thus asserted jurisdictional rights over a 
sea-bed area beyond its continental shelf. It seems clear 
that it based its claim on the concept of the 200-mile 
exclusive economic zone (EEZ) (see below) rather than on the 
convention of the continental shelf. Table 3. shows national 
claims by the Red Sea states to maritime jurisdictions. In 
justification of the claim, Sheikh Ahmed Zaki Yamani, the 
Saudi Minister for Oil and Mineral Resources, said: 
"Although Saudi ownership of these resources appears 
both equitable and justified, we have found it 
necessary to issue a Law declaring this ownership. 
In the meantime, the law does provide for the 
possibility of joint exploration of these resources 
with our neighbour, the Sudan, and we will contact 
them about this." (38) 
Although Sudan did not legislate any law to claim these 
mineral resources, according to Al Hakim (1979), nevertheless 
it was aware of their economic value. Such consciousness 
appeared in Sudan's statement to the UN Seabed Committee 1n 
1971 in which the former declared that it: 
"would certainly not view with favour any suggestion 
that it should renounce its title to that area of 
the Red Sea in which it had already been carrying 
out exploratory and prospecting activities for a 
number of years, since it possessed these rights 
under existing Law, etc." (39) 
However, Sudan had already legislated rights over the 
continental shelf adjacent to its coastal zone. Both Al-Hakim 
( 19 79) and the Secretary-General of the Red Sea Commission 
point out that Sudan considered all the metalliferous 
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sediments existing nearest to its coastline, including the 
A-II, Discovery and Chain deeps as subject to its sovereignty 
and signed joint development agreements with the West German 
mining company, Preussag AGA in 1973. ( 4 0) Griffin (1969) 
argues that if the ownership of these minerals is based on 
the median line, this claim is wholly justified. ( 41 ) In 1972, 
utilizing its geographical position and political influence 
in the region, Saudi Arabia decreed a law enabling Riyadh to 
play the role of custodian of all the non-living resources in 
the Red Sea until the riparian states agreed to principles 
for settlement of the question of sovereign rights over these 
resources. 
(42) 
Prompted by reports about the mineral riches of the Red 
Sea, Egypt, Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and AR Yemen met on 
16-17 July 1972 in their first Red Sea conference at Jeddah. 
The objective of the meeting was: 
"to assert the rights of the states bordering the 
Red Sea over their deep mineral resources and to 
regulate the use of those rights. 11 ( 43) 
The conference also considered the adoption of legislative 
measures to protect that wealth from "foreign states and/or 
institutions". Moreover, the necessity for cooperative 
exploration and exploitation was indicated by the coastal 
states. (44) Apart from Sudan and Saudi Arabia it seems that 
no other Red Sea state could realistically hope to achieve 
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sovereign rights over the mineralized muds of the A-II deep, 
because most arguments for rights and ownership would be on 
the side of the former two states which backed up such rights 
and ownership by legislation. (45) 
However, precedents for the Sudanese or Saudi claim to 
resources contiguous to either's continental shelf could be 
drawn from president Truman's proclamation of 1945 which 
stated that: 
"The United States regards the natural resources of 
the subsoil and seabed of the continental shelf 
beneath the high seas but contiguous to the coasts 
of the United States as appertaining to the United 
States, subject to its jurisdiction and 
control. " ( 46) 
No protest against the American declaration was reported. 
Instead, by the mid-19 50s over 
declarations had followed suit. (47) 
forty almost similar 
The 19 58 UN Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea 
adopted a convention on the Continental Shelf which defined 
the rights of the coastal states but failed to define the 
outer limit of the continental shelf. Continental shelf 
rights also feature in the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of 
the Sea, Article 76 of this convention states that the 
continental shelf of a coastal state: 
"comprises the sea-bed and subsoil of the submarine 
areas that extends beyond its territorial sea 
throughout the natural prolongation of its land 
territory to the outer edge of the continental 
margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from 
the baselines 
territorial sea 
the continental 
distance." ( 48) 
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from which the breadth of the 
is measured where the outer edge of 
margin does not extend up to that 
According to Article 77, the coastal state has exclusive 
sovereign rights over its continental shelf for the purpose 
of "exploring it and exploiting its natural resources". These 
resources "consist of the mineral and other non-living 
resources of the sea-bed and subsoil etc. " ( 49) Even if the 
coastal state is unable to exploit these resources no other 
state can do so without the express consent of the former. It 
does not matter if the coastal state has not expressly pro-
claimed rights over these resources (Article 77). ( 50) Article 
55 of the 1982 Convention defines the EEZ as "an area beyond 
and adjacent to the territorial sea "; but the EEZ should 
not exceed 200 nautical miles "from the baseline from which 
th b dth f th t . t . 1 . d ( 5l ) A d · e rea o e err1 or1a sea 1s measure . ccor 1ng 
to Article 56, the EEZ entitles the coastal state to: 
"sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and 
exploiting, conserving and managing the natural 
resources, whether living or non-living, of the 
waters superjacent to the sea-bed and its 
subsoil. (52) 
The riparian state also has the right to exploit and explore 
the zone for "the production of energy from the water, 
currents and wind."( 5J) In addition to other rights of 
jurisdiction, the coastal state can enact laws for "the 
protection and preservation of the marine environment". 
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Although the coastal state is entitled to these rights, it is 
obliged: 
"to have due regard to the rights and 
other states and shall act in a manner 
with the provisions of this Convention". 
duties of 
compatible 
(54) 
For a long time, and particularly since the convening of 
the Third UNCLOS in 1973, opinions regarding sea-bed minerals 
and deep ocean mining have been controversial. The developing 
states have been keen to play a part in future resource 
management within the international area, beyond the limits 
of national jurisdiction. Certain developed countries with 
technical and financial capabilities to extract the minerals, 
argued that they should acquire a fair share of the revenues 
of ocean mining since they would contribute the know-how and 
funds. (55) Al-Hakim (1979) thinks that the conference of the 
Red Sea states (1972) had been motivated by the meeting of 
the Third UNCLOS in 1973 and the proposed international 
regime and authority for the sea-bed zone beyond national 
juris- diction. (5 6 ) This is why in 1972 Auburn said that: 
"it would be most surprising if the Sudanese or the 
Saudi Arabian Government were prepared to consider 
the reservation of the brines, found at a depth of 
more than 2,000m and well beyond the territorial sea 
claimed by both coastal states for the proposed 
international regime. It is difficult to envisage 
either country giving up minerals having an 
estimated commercial value of hundreds of millions 
of dollars." (57) 
The adoption by UNCLOS of the doctrines of the continental 
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shelf and the EEZ has clearly protected state rights over 
sea-bed resources. 
3.1.2.1 Saudi-Sudanese Agreement 
To avoid disputes, in 1973, Sudan and Saudi Arabia 
resumed negotiations to settle the question of seabed owner-
ship. Good political relations contributed in creating the 
secure environment that led to the conclusion of a bilateral 
agreement between the two states in May 19 7 4. The accord 
recognizes both states' sovereign rights over the 
minerals. (SS) Blissenbach and Nawab (1982) allude to the slow 
progress in reaching international agreement on disputed 
boundaries of opposite states as a motivation for agree-
ment.(S9) According to the terms of the agreement, the sea-
bed between the two states is divided into three zones: 
(1) a zone extending westward from the Saudi coast to a line 
where the water depth is uninterruptedly about 1,000m; 
( 2) a zone extending eastward from the Sudanese coast to a 
line where the water depth is continuously 1,000m; and 
( 3) a common zone lying between the 1, 000 metre isobaths, 
including all the known deeps, where both states have 
equal rights to 
3.4).(60) 
all the natural resources (figure 
Marston ( 19 84) indicates that the agreement expressly 
recognised the status of the high seas and that it would not 
obstruct freedom of navigation with regard to the "limits 
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provided for by the established rules of public international 
1 " ( 61 ) T d 1 th . 19 7 5 th t t. aw . o eve op e resources, 1n , e wo par 1es 
formed a joint administration known as the Saudi-Sudanese Red 
Sea Joint Commission (RSC) and chose Jeddah as the 
headquarters of the Commission. ( 62 ) Required funds were put 
up by Saudi Arabia with the proviso that Sudan's share would 
eventually be recovered from future profits in a way to be 
decided by the two states. ( 63 ) A French company, the Bureau 
de Recherches Geologiques et Minier was chosen by the RSC as 
technical consultant. Preussag AG of Germany secured the 
position of a general contractor for the implementation of a 
feasibility study, including the development of mining 
equipment and mining tests to develop the mineral resources 
of A-II deep. The firm is reported to have developed a 
technology 
tests. ( 64 ) 
that proved successful in pre-pilot mining 
The Secretary General of the RSC (1984) points out that 
one of the intentions of the agreement is to establish a 
basis for wider arrangement between all Red Sea states. He 
describes the principles which led to the conclusion of the 
accord as: "unique, somewhat ingenious but fairly simple". 
Facts taken into account in signing the agreement include 
"geography and geology, national, regional and international, 
political, and diplomatic considerations". ( 65 ) According to 
Blissenbach and Nawab (1982) the recovery of the 
metalliferous mud of the A-II should have regional and 
152 
international benefits, among them: 
(1) economic benefit for Sudan, Saudi Arabia and the general 
contractor; 
(2) the establishment of the principle of cooperation - as it 
is being practised by the RSC and its contractor; 
(3) the manner in which the RSC handled the problem of 
technology transfer, greatly disputed elsewhere, could 
set a precedent for other areas. (66) 
Red Sea minerals could significantly contribute to the 
diversification of the economies of Sudan and Saudi Arabia, 
the latter until now ., solely dependent on oil. The Saudi 
need for diversification was stressed in 1984 by King Fahad 
h . lf (67) 1mse . As for handling the problem of technology 
transfer, thanks to Saudi Arabia 1 s vast financial resources 
and good relations with the sources of technology, there have 
been no problems. For example, if these sediments were 
between Ethiopia and Yemen AR, or in the sea-bed of PDR 
Yemen, poor states and not having friendly relations with the 
West, the problem might still be there. Finally, as for the 
RSC 1 s responsibility not to pollute the Red Sea by the 
extraction of the mineralized mud, it may be too early to 
evaluate environmental risks, resulting from mining and 
on-shore 
·vt ~ 
processing. As 11 indicated by the RSC 1 s Secretary 
General (1984), unless the precautionary measures commended 
by the Commission are implemented, these risks may not be 
(68) kept to a reasonabel level. Thus, there is a need for a 
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long-term assessment of the environmental effects of 
continued mining in the Red Sea, not least upon fish stocks. 
Quantity, Value and Exploitation 
The number of deeps so far identified is eighteen; the 
most recent being Commission 1 deep, discovered in 19 79 in 
the southern sector of the Common Zone. ( 69 ) Although many 
deeps have been tested no mineral findings to match those of 
A-II deep 
manganese 
have been found; and 
predominates.( 7 0) Figure 
in most deeps iron and 
3 , 5 shows the percentage 
of metal in Red Sea deeps. Table 3. 8 shows the possible 
quantities revealed by various sources. The averages obtained 
by the sediments are 2-5% zinc, 0.3-0.9% copper, and 60-100 
parts per million (ppm) silver. The existence of cadmium, 
cabal t, some gold and by-products of the processing stages 
such as gypsum, is indicated. ( 71 ) The economic outlook of 
these sediments is expected to be good provided that metal 
prices withstand inflation. In the late 1960s, sources other 
than Griffin ( 1969) (table 3. 1) estimated the economic value 
of these minerals as $2.5-Sbn for the metals in situ; but by 
1974 their value shot up to $25bn. The Guardian (1982) 
expects it to exceed $3bn, Borgese (1983) mentions $6.7bn, 
and a fifteen years life expectancy. But in May 1984 the 
Secretary-General of the R.S.C. stated in the Saudi newspaper 
Al Riyad, that according to early estimates annual revenue of 
these deposits could reach $208m at March 1985 dollar prices 
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Table 3.8 
Quantities of metals in the Atlantis II deep in the Red Sea -
according to different sources 
Estimator Metal Quantity 
in tons 
Value:US dollar 
at 1967 quotes 
Value:US dollar 
at March 1985 
quotes 
Griffin, 
(1969) 
Total 
Source: 
w. Copper 1,060,000 1,270,000,000 1,467,227,090 
Zinc 2,900,000 860,000,000 2,621,460,800 
Silver 0,004,500 280,000,000 73,967,256 
Gold 0,000,045 50,000,000 390,000,000 
Lead 0,080,000 20,000,000 28,248,500 
Iron 24,300,000 
2,480,000,000 4,522,214,256 
Griffin, W., International legal rights to minerals in 
the Red Sea deeps' in Degens, E. and Ross, D. ( eds) 
1969. Hot Brines and ~ecent Heavy Metals Deposits in the 
Red Sea, Wood Hole Oceanographic Institution, Wood Hole, 
Mass., Springer, Verlag Berlin, Heidelberg, New York, 
1969, p.570. 
Estimator Metal Quantity 
in tons 
Value: US dollar at 
March 1985 quotes 
The Guardian 
1982 
Total 
Copper 
Zinc 
Silver 
400,000 
1,700,000 
4,000 
553,670,000 
1,536,718,400 
65,748,672 
2,156,137,072 
Source: The Guardian, 18 February 1982, p.14. 
Estimator 
Blissentach1£· 
and NaWab/1• 
(1982) 
Metal 
Copper 
Zinc 
Silver 
Quantities 
(in tons) 
12,000 
60-80,000 
100 
Value: US dollar at 
March 1985 quotes 
16,610,118 
54,237,120 
1,643,716 
Total 72,490,954 
F 
Source: Bliss~nbachAand Nawab, Z. (1982) 'Metalliferous sediments 
of the sea-bed: the Atlantis II deep deposits of the Red 
Sea' in Borgese E. , and Ginsburg N'(eds) p fY~/~/$ - Ocean 
Yearbook 3, The University of Chicago Press Ltd: Chicago, 
1982, p.82. 
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1n Saudi Arabia. While no economic value is attached to the 
30m tons of iron and zinc production - though (1%-2% of the 
world total) it would certainly contribute to the economies 
of the countries involved in the project. (7 2 ) 
As to the technical viability of the project, it is 
pointed out that although encouraging findings are many, no 
assessment of overall technical and economic feasibility of 
the project could be drawn from development work so far 
carried out. The project really needs 200-300 days of 
long-term test mining and metal production on a pilot 
scale. ( 7 J) This pilot mining and metallurgical operation is 
to achieve three objectives: 
(1) to increase experience with the newly developed 
technology which will be applied extensively and over a 
longer period of time; 
(2) to gain a better evaluation of the econom1c value of the 
sediments; and 
(3) to assess the long-term environmental impact of 
t . . . (74) con 1nuous m1n1ng. 
Regarding commencement of actual extraction and commercial 
exploitation of the minerals, the Secretary General of the 
RSC (1984) told Al Riyad that by 1987 they would be ready to 
enter the stage of commercial production, and by 1990 world 
markets will be supplied with metals extracted from the 
sea-bed of the Red Sea for the first time.(75) 
As already mentioned, Article 77 of the UN Convention 
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protects the right of the coastal state to defend its 
property against trespassers. If the RSC's rights were 
violated by another power, they could request the assistance 
of the US, which may be tempted by these resources and thus 
extend its military might to the Red Sea, as is anticipated 
by Eaks (1982). In fact, US interest in Red Sea minerals has 
been there from the start. Moreover, in mid April 1979, the 
chartered American vessel Sedco an offshore oil drilling 
ship was converted into a mining ship and employed in 
exploratory work at A-II. (7 6 ) 
Apart from the metalliferous-rich muds of the Red Sea 
the Saudi Kingdom is endowed with metal riches located in its 
western provinces. In 19 50 Saudi Arabia asked the USGS to 
start charting the Kingdom's western half, which is know to 
geologists as 'the Arabian Shield'. This region extends the 
length of the Saudi Red Sea coastline and stretches eastwards 
across the peninsula, until Riyadh. It is suggested that the 
enormous mineral-rich deposits of this region makes it 
comparable with the oil-rich eastern province of Al Hasa. (77) 
Deposits of gold, silver and copper have been discovered 
throughout the mineral-rich western region of the Kingdom. 
Also discoveries of phosphate, lead, potassium, zinc, iron 
and aluminium have been announced by the Saudi petroleum and 
Mineral authorities. Enormous amounts of coal have been 
located in the Al-Qassim area, reported to be of good 
quality, and near to the surface. (7 8 ) 
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Table 3. ·9· 
Egypt's mineral production ( '000 tons) 1973-79 
Item 1973 1974 1976 1977 1978 1979 
Phosphate rock~c 553.0 507.0 500 635 635 
Iron ore 656.0 1,302.0 1,200 1,400 1,100 1,400 
Manganese 3.0 5.0 nq nq nq nq 
460.0 485.0 640 750 750 
Asbestos 0. 3 nq nq nq nq nq 
Aluminum nq nq nq 90 101 104 
Source: Except for Aluminum, the 197 3 and 197 4 information is 
from Middle East Yearbook 1978, published by I.C. 
Magazines Ltd, London, p.160. Figures for iron ore and 
aluminum 1976-and 1979 are from New African Yearbook 
1981-82, published by I.C. Magazines Ltd, London, 
1981-82, pp.20-21. The rest of the information is taken 
from Middle East Annual Review, 1983, published by World 
of Information, Essex, England, 1983, p.150. 
nq = no quantity is given. 
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With these new mineral discoveries the Saudi Kingdom is 
seen as entering a new economic era in which non-oil 
resources will be major sources of national income. The 
Deputy Petroleum and Minerals Minister, Engineer Ghazi Sultan 
points out that: 
Those who believe that the Kingdom is totally 
dependent on oil are mistaken as this country is 
endowed with many mineral riches which put her on a 
par with mineral producing nations such as phos-
phate, coal, tin, potash, copper, lead zinc, gold, 
silver, iron and aluminium ... This is not to mention 
mineral deposits in the Red Sea bed ... 11 (79) 
With the exception of the Sudanese and Saudi mineral 
finds, the only other state with a fair amount of minerals in 
its Red Sea Zone is Egypt. With regard to their value, Fisher 
(1978) states that Egypt's chief mineral resources are 
phosphates, coal, iron ore, zinc, barytes and magnetite. He 
points out that 9% of Egypt's total exports even in 1974 came 
evvtvl 
from 
Nile 
miningAquarrying. Egypt's iron ore resources between the 
Valley and the northwest coast of the Red Sea, were then 
much bigger than once thought . (80) pOSSlble. According to 
Mustafa (1984) deposits of lead, zinc, and manganese exist in 
Egypt, in the El Qusair-Berenice coastal strip. Table 3. 9 
shows Egypt's mineral production between 1973 and 1979, and 
table 3. 10 shows value of mining products in Egypt, 19 7 4-
1978. 
Prompted by the realization of the significance of 
mineral resources in Arab territories, the Arab Organization 
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Table J.fo 
Value of mining products in Egypt: 1974-1978 
Year Income ln 
1974 1. 50 
1975 1. 82 
1976 2.01. 
1977 2. 20.;;. ,. 
1977 January 1.6o< 
1978 September 1. 91 , 
Source: Middle East Annual Review 
by World of Information, 
1980, p.207. 
$ 
1980, published 
Essex, England, 
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for Mineral Wealth ' an affiliation of the Arab League ~ has 
decided to draw an Arab geological map, expand the Higher 
Institute for Mineralization in Morocco, and establish a 
higher institute for minerals 1n Amman (Jordan). Asharq 
Al-Awsat (12/1982) reports that a symposium about mining 
exploitation was held in Jeddah, and Shaikh Yamani, the Saudi 
Minister for Petroleum and Minerals Wealth, emphasized the 
Arab need to search for alternative Arab wealth, notably 
mineral wealth. ( 82 ) 
Owing to its unusual geology, and its enormous untapped 
economic potential, the Red Sea will inevitably continue to 
be a subject of extensive study and further exploration of 
mineral concentrations may occur. In the 1970s the German 
Social Democrat, Helmut Schmidt warned that during the 1980s 
the industrial West would face a struggle for world mineral 
products. Also during the decade of the 1970s the President 
of the National Strategy Information Center in the United 
States, Frank Barnett indicated that the age of detente is 
shading into the era of resource war; in his view the Soviet 
Union has been seeking to seal off mineral-rich Africa from 
America and its Western and Japanese 11 . (83) a 1es. Thus, 
suffice it to say that at a time when the US has already 
entered the so-called 'resource war' with regard to mineral 
imports, ( 84 ) the discovery of {ftfff/fi/t{ffi minerals in the Red 
Sea has enhanced the latter's importance regionally and 
globally as well, because as Legum ( 19 7 8) indicates, the 
162 
discovery has rendered the Red Sea attractive not only to the 
US but the USSR as well. ( 85) 
3.2 Living Resources: Fisheries 
Generally, the Red Sea is characterized by a paucity of 
fisheries because plankton production which develops in 
shallow waters does not thrive in its deeps; it thus lacks 
nutrient resources that support fish. Compared to the Red Sea 
the Gulf sustains high levels of such elements, and contains 
more fish than the Red Sea. Nevertheless, the southern sector 
of the Red Sea comes second to the southeastern coasts of the 
Arabian peninsula - which are the richest fisheries of the 
whole region. But the rest of the Red Sea has much lower 
potential. In the northern sector of the Red Sea, around 
Gardaqa in the Gulf of Suez sardine is caught by 
lamparas, or nets used with lights to attract the fish to the 
surface. The Gardaqa area also has shrimps and various kinds 
f f . h . t . . t t ( 86 ) o 1s ex1s 1n 1 s cen re. 
The deeper waters of the Red Sea, rather than the 
shallows of the Gulf, make a better environment for sharks. 
Altogether, about 400 species of fish have been identified in 
the Red Sea. However, apart from the lack of nutrient 
components as a reason for paucity of fish in the Red Sea, 
the presence of coral reefs restrict the activity of bottom 
trawlers. Moreover, the narrowness of the continental shelf 
of the Red Sea is also responsible for the scarcity of 
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fishing grounds there. In sum, no major fishing industry is 
associated with the Red Sea. ( 87) 
PDR Yemen waters are among the richest zones for fish. 
According to Lackner (1984) the fishing industry is playing a 
major role in Yemeni development, where improvement of 
villagers' training and reduction of their isolation is one 
of the priorities. Apart from improving the population's 
diet, PDR Yemen's fish earns precious foreign exchange. 
Lawless (1978) says that in 1975 fresh and dried fish 
constituted the main export and in 1972-73 PDR Yemen's fish 
catches were valued at $2J.86mn. He adds that exports of fish 
make up about 36% of the total exports of local products. ( 88 ) 
Between 1971 and 1983, PDR Yemen invested about $196.05m in 
infrastructure and building up of industrial fishing 
capacity. Migration to the nearby oil rich states, and the 
more secure employment by the national fishing fleet have 
reduced traditional small-scale fishing. 
To increase its catches, PDR Yemen has made concessions 
to Japan and the Soviet Union since the 1960s. The agreements 
provided for the deli very of part of the catches to PDR 
Yemen. Lawless ( 19 7 8) indicates that in February 19 7 5, PDR 
Yemen entered into a joint venture with Iraq, with capital of 
$30m, in which PDR Yemen owns 51%. The enterprise was to 
develop a deep-sea fishing fleet to trawl 1n PDR Yemen 1 s 
territorial and international waters. In 1980 and 1981 PDR 
Yemen's trawler fleet produced about 14% of the national 
Table 3 . .11 
The Red Sea: marine fish catches 
1 9 7 7 1 9 8 3 
Total marine Red Sea Red Sea Total marine Red Sea Red Sea 
catch catch Per cent catch catch Per cent 
(metric tons) (metric of total (metric tons) (metric of total 
tons) marine tons) marine 
catch catch 
--··--
Egypt 29,582 7,899 26.7 25,090 13,650 54-4 
Ethiopia 2,472 2,472 100.0 3,750 3,750 100.0 
Israel 9,100 Nil Nil 9,500 68 0.7 
I-' 
0'\ 
Jordan 31 31 100.0 17 31 100.0 ~ 
Saudi Arabia 23,400 23,400 100.0 26,425 26.425 100.0 
Sudan 23,570 23,570 100.0 29,500 29,500 100.0 
Yemen A.R. 17,500 17,500 100.0 12,200 12,200 100.0 
P.D.R. Yemen 63,983 Nil Nil 74,124 Nil Nil 
TOTAL 169,638 74,872 44. 1 180,606 85,624 47-4 
Source: F.A.O. Fisheries Department, Rome (Unpublished data by private correspondence, May 
1985). . 
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catch. ( 89 ) In 1982 the foreign fleets - fishing by agreement 
in the country 1 s waters produced 3 8% of the total catch. 
However, depletion of PDR Yemen's fishing resources is 
anticipated due to their being over-fished by the Soviet and 
Japanese fleets which use intensive methods. ( 9 0) In the early 
1970s PDR Yemen 1 s estimates of potential yield were over 
360,000 tonnes per annum. But later, a more realistic figure 
of about 125,000 tonnes was indicated, compared with 74,000 
tonnes in 1983( 91 ) (table 3.11). 
Internally and externally funded projects to develop 
inshore fishing capcity in PDR Yemen have been planned. One 
of these projects is the Third Fisheries Development Project 
involving $21.4mn. In this project, the World Bank's 
International Development Association (IDA) is supplying $6m 
of the cost; the European Economic Community (EEC) £3.4m; the 
International Fund for agricultural Development (IFAD) $5m; 
and the PDR Yemen's government $7m. Seeing that the project 
needs more funding, in October 1983 the Arab Fund for 
Economic and Social Development (AFESD) - in Kuwait - agreed 
to provide $3.3m. (92) Owing to its promising fishing 
resources, PDR Yemen declared in 1977 an exclusive economic 
zone (EEZ) of 200nm. Thus, when the proposed EEZ is formally 
adopted, PDR Yemen will benefit considerably. Blake ( 1982) 
sees no Arab State apart from Morocco that gains from the 
adoption of the suggested zone to the same extent as PDR 
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Yemen and Oman. ( 93 ) 
In Ethiopia, the role of fishing in the traditional 
economy is negligible. Commercial fishing is entirely 
restricted to the Red Sea coastal waters, and involves little 
deep-sea fishing. Production has fluctuated from year to year 
because of poor techniques and equipment and the relative 
total dependence on foreign markets. In Somalia, owing to 
droughts, in 197 5, the government was able to turn a few 
nomads into fishermen in spite of great resistance from the 
former who traditionally considered fish-eating with 
abhorrence. Due to the persistance of this antipathy, the 
Somali coast usually lacked large fishing communities. 
However, Somalia's almost untapped fisheries resources are 
understood to be extensive notably along the Indian Ocean 
coast. ( 94) With regard to Israel some fishing takes place in 
the Gulf of Aqaba. However, fishing is one of Israel's 
sources of national income, but only a limited quantity is 
available off Israel's Mediterranean and Red Sea coasts; 
therefore Israeli trawlers sail to the rich fisheries off the 
Ethiopian coast and engage 1n deep-sea fishing there, as well 
as in the Atlantic Ocean. (95) 
In the Red Sea proper as well as 1n the Gulf, commercial 
fishing has proved unsuccessful as a long-term project 
because of insufficiently large catches. And although the 
Farasan Banks are thought to be a promising part of the Saudi 
Red Sea fisheries, Japanese and Korean commercial fishing 
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Tab1e 3.112 
Distribution of areas suitable f0TRed Sea fishing, excluding the 
Gulf of Aden 
Country Area (sq.km) percent of total 
Saudi Arabia 41,553 51.3 
YAR 16,848 20.8 
Egypt 10,854 13.4 
Sudan 8,910 11.0 
Djibouti 2,835 3. 5 
Total 81,000 100.0 
Source: Adapted from Al Riyad No.S897, Aug. 1 5' 
1984, Riyad, Saudi Arabia, p. 12. 
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projects in the area were unsuccessful. ( 96 ) The following are 
considered by a recent study carried out in the Arab Red SEa 
waters - as among the factors that impede Red Sea fisheries: 
(1) physical 
fishing 
geography which 
to 81,000sq.km; 
limits the viable area of 
(table 3.12) shows the 
distribution of this area) 
( 2) the human factor which includes shortage of manpower, 
illiteracy ( 90%) which hinders the skill of fishermen, 
low income from fishing, migration inland where wages 
from some developing industries are greater, and 
emigration to the neighbouring oil rich states; 
(3) the use of traditional and poor fishing equipment such as 
small fishing boats; 
( 4) lack of facilities such as wharfs where fishermen can 
unload their catches and load provisions, fuel and water 
supplies, repair and maintenance workshops and storage, 
refrigeration and freezing plants; 
( 5) lack of adequate transportation from production to 
marketing areas; also mentioned in the report were 
inadequacy of technical and managerial personnel, absence 
of statistical information; and absence of adeqate 
associations of fishermen. 
The study emphasizes the need for a strategy based on 
three main dimensions to develop Red Sea fisheries. First, 
the establishment of a central governmental administration 
for fisheries in each state. Second, the organization of 
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fishermen into effective cooperatives. Third, the setting up 
of a regional institution for Red Sea fishing grounds _y 
especially due to the threat posed to Red Sea fishing 
resources by the activity of foreign fishing vessels under 
th b 11 f . . . t t ( 97) e urn re a o concess1ons or JOln ven ure. 
It is also worth mentioning that since nothing can limit 
the mobility of the fish between ponds created by the· 200nm 
EEZ, Couper (1978) indicates that it is imperative for 
countries to enter into very elaborate "catch agreements and 
surveillance systems". To develop and increase animal 
protein, greatly needed by Red Sea nations, the latter have 
to consider such programmes as increasing fish farming, 
seabed aquaculture, and evolving methods for the use of 
fauna. ( 98 ) 
According to Ayubi (1984) some Arabian peninsular 
states, such as Saudi Arabia, PDR Yemen and others, have 
recently made claims to 
sea much larger than 
,_ 
e1fcusive rights 
those previously 
over areas of the 
contemplated by 
international law mainly for control of fishing 
t . •t• (99) ac lVl 1es. Article 56 of the 1982 Convention of the 
United Nations Conference on the law of the Sea III 
(UNCLOSIII) has given coastal states the right to protect and 
preserve their marine environments. Article 61 which deals 
with the conservation of the living resources has bestowed 
such rights on these states to determine the allowable catch 
of the living resources in their exclusive economic zones 
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(EEZ) (see chapter 6) and the right to protect these 
f 1 "t t" (100) resources rom over-exp 01 a 1on. 
It is estimated that by the year 2000, the Arab world 
may face shortages of food amounting to 2.5m tons of meat, 
s.sm tons of milk, about 28m tons of white meat and about 28m 
(102) tons of eggs. Therefore, if fishing resources in the Red 
Sea and other Arab waters are developed, they may lessen 
potential deficiency in animal protein, not only in the Arab 
states but also in the desperately poor countries of the Horn 
of Africa. It seems likely therefore that a fresh element may 
enter the international scene in the region in the shape of 
fishing disputes. At the same time, interest 1n offshore 
resources will intensify. 
Petroleum and mineral resources have given hope of 
easing economic problems of some states and encouraging 
others to undertake research for such assets. These resources 
have attracted Western, especially American, companies 
engaged in exploration and the extractive activities. These 
resources could create problems with regard to the 
delimitation of maritime boundaries, between Red Sea states 
despite the precedent of peaceful cooperation established by 
Sudan and Saudi Arabia. The existence of minerals near the 
shores of the Red Sea could increase the strategic importance 
of these areas, and their attraction to outside powers. It is 
therefore easy to imagine a future in which the Red Sea and 
Gulf of Aden coastal states take a keen interest in the 
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control and protection of their offshore waters. Egypt, and 
Israel already po~ess powerful navies of regional standing 
with some ocean-going ships. Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Ethiopia, 
Somalia and Oman already posess coastal navies, chiefly 
consisting of large patrol vessels, while the Yemens and 
Jordan have small patrol craft. (lOZ) These forces are likely 
to be strengthened, thus heightening the potential for local 
conflict quite regardless of superpower activity. 
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PART II: 
UNITED STATES INTERESTS IN THE RED SEA REGION 
4.1 Introduction 
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CHAPTER 4 
SHIPPING INTERESTS 
The Red Sea has global significance as the major highway 
between the Atlantic and Indian Oceans via the Mediterranean 
Sea and Suez Canal. On world maps of any scale this function 
can be seen at a glance. By the end of the 18th century and 
up to World War Two, the Red Sea had played a vital role in 
European colonial expansion, with special reference to 
British imperialism, and British-French-Italian competition, 
particularly in the southern half of the Red Sea region. By 
the 1950s and 1960s the Red Sea began to capture the 
interests of the US and USSR. From the late 1960s to the 
present it has become a contested arena between the 
superpowers for economic and strategic reasons. Locally, 
conflict over the Red Sea between the Arabs and Israel 
established a pretext for superpower involvement (chapter 7). 
The Red Sea has a number of constricted waterways which make 
its use as an international highway subject to political 
decision (chapter 4. ) and military action. The Suez Canal, 
the Strait of Bab al Man deb and the Strait of Tiran are 
arguably the flash points of the region. 
The aim of this chapter is to investigate the importance 
of the shipping lanes of the Red Sea, its ports and strategic 
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water-passages with regard to US economic and strategic 
interests. Despite a distance of over 18,000km separating the 
United States from the Red Sea, such interests were 
reaffirmed in a Senatorial testimony given by Professor 
Donald Levine of Chicago University in 1976. He indicated 
that the US has 
"a strategic interest in keeping the Bab el-Mandab, 
the port of Jibuti, and the Red Sea open to the flow 
of international shipping, especially to Israel, 
Western Europe, and North America". (1) 
Discussion will also cover the 1982 Convention on the Law of 
the Sea, and its impact on the Red Sea and its waterways in 
an era when US interests in the freedom of navigation, over 
flight, and sea-bed mining have faced formidable challenges 
from the developing nations including the Red Sea States. 
Such challenges generated US opposition to the Convention, 
and finally US refusal to become a signatory. Discussion will 
also include vulnerability of shipping in the Red Sea, 
especially after the threat posed to navigation in the Middle 
East by the tanker war in the Gulf since 1982 and the mining 
of the Red Sea, in July-August 1984. 
4.2 The Suez Canal 
"The breaching of the Suez 
authorization to the breakout of a 
still continuing." 
Canal was 
new war which 
an 
is 
"The Canal is no longer belonging to Egypt, but it 
is Egypt which belongs to the Canal." 
G.A. Nasser (1956) (2) 
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Canals: There are four major canals in the world joining seas 
in global passage: Panama, in Central America opened in 1914; 
Suez, in Egypt, opened in 1869; Kiel, in West Germany, opened 
in 1895; and the St Lawrence Seaway in North America, opened 
in 1959( 3 ) Overland transport across narrow land routes often 
preceded the cutting of interoceanic canals. Such areas of 
transhipment and interoceanic canals have played a 
significant role in world seaborne commerce; and the major 
canals still exercise a remarkable influence on the pattern 
and extent of international trade, as well as on politics. ( 4 ) 
While international straits are subject to rules of inter-
national law, canals are governed by the special regimes of 
their owners. 
Historical Overview 
Literature on the Suez Canal is prolific. ( 5) Much is 
concerned ultimately with its geopolitical importance as an 
artery for commercial and naval shipping, a theme which has 
hardly changed since it was opened in 1869. It is pertinent 
to this thesis that the United States is a relative newcomer 
to the list of states for whom the Canal was a foreign policy 
preoccupation. In the following pages several issues 
concerning the canal will be discussed; meanwhile American/ 
Western interests and involvement in the canal's affairs will 
be highlighted. 
Between 1854 and 1869 an agreement between a 
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French-based international company and the Ottoman and 
Egyptian governments enabled the French engineer Ferdinand de 
Lesseps to construct the Suez Canal with French and Egyptian 
finance. To start with: he made extensive searches for 
assistance. On 21 October 1857 he wrote to the American 
President, Buchanan, hoping to get his interest 1n the 
scheme. In the letter he said: 
"The liberal and generous policy of the American 
Union has always defended the freedom of the seas, 
and if any one other selfish and exclusive policy 
should show itself trb obstruct the free 
communication between the Mediterranean and the 
Indian Sea, the principle of the freedom of the sea 
would receive serious injury. In that case the 
intervention of the Agent of the United States at 
Constantinople would be perfectly justifiable, aside 
from motives of national interests concerning the 
commerce and navigation of the Union." (6) 
He pointed out that the cutting of the canal 
"will give at a future day to the United States the 
occasion and the right of intervention in the coun-
cils of European diplomacy to effect, with the con-
currence of France, this inevitable solution". (7) 
He added that 
"The respect of private property on the seas and the 
abolition of the blockade of commercial ports, 
extending over commerce from the enemy the 
Legislation which already governs the commerce of 
neutrals. " ( 8) 
However, the US ignored all the arguments forwarded by 
De Lesseps and made no move towards the project. Without 
approval from the Turkish Sultan, De Lessps started work on 
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the canal in April 18 59. But two months later, the British 
forced the Sultan to stop the work. The latter asked the 
Americans impatiently 
"your Government is not afraid of the English, Would 
they support me with ships in case I should resist?" 
The prompt American reply was ironical: 
"Certainly not, your Highness! Suez and India are 
very far from America, and her interests there are 
very small indeed!" (9) 
The Canal was eventually inaugurated on 17 November 
1869. The US was the only important Western nation that did 
not officially participate. The American absence was no doubt 
related to the American-French dispute over Alabama which by 
then was actively at issue. However, the strongest reason for 
American absence was 
"indifference at home to the desirability of a 
prominent representation 11 • ( 10) 
Wright (1969) agrees with this explanation and sees it 
conforming with the 
11 general lack of official American interest in the 
Suez Canal in this early period". (11) 
In October 1873 an international conference was 
organized by the Turkish Sultan to establish a system for 
measuring ship tonnage in the canal. The US did not attend 
that meeting either. Wright (1969) thinks that the official 
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instruction dated 3 November 1873 and received by the 
American Minister in Constantinople explains the reason for 
American absence. It was: 
11 it is obvious that we have little direct 
interest in the matter, as the flag of the United 
States is seldom seen in the canal, and it is not 
likely to be seen there often in comparison with 
those nations whose tonnage employed in foreign 
commerce may comparatively be much less than 
ours." (12) 
He adds that the omission of the US from the Canal's 
administration was associated with 
"United States failure on almost every level, 
especially commercial, to participate in Suez Canal 
activities." (13) 
However, later, especially during its war with Spain in 1898, 
and after the discovery of oil in the Middle East, the US 
realized the strategic and economic significance of the Suez 
Canal. Thereafter it became interested 1n the affairs of the 
waterway, particularly after the emergence of the USSR as a 
rival power with interest in the Canal. 
On 29 October 1888 the Constantinople Convention was 
signed by Austria, Hungary, France, Germany, Great Britain, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Russia, Spain and Turkey. 
Convention provided that the Suez Canal: 
"Shall always be free and open, 1n time of war as 
in time of peace, to every vessel of commerce or 
war, without distinction of flag." (14) 
(Full text is in Appendix 2) 
The 
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Understanding that the occupation of Egypt by Great 
Britain gave the latter a decisive voice in the Suez Canal, 
the US sounded out Britain about the American desire to send 
warships through the waterway. Britain replied that there 
would be no objection to us interests; moreover, no 
modification was made to the Convention to treat nonsignatory 
powers differently. However, even if any power made a protest 
to US use of the Canal; such an objection would not hold. Mr 
John Hay, the American Minister to Great Britain, who 
received the British reply, indicated to his Government that 
the attitude of the British authorities was that: 
11 we are unquestionably entitled to use the Canal for 
warships". (15) 
In May 1898 the US ordered its consul at Cairo 11 to watch 
for Spanish vessels passing the Canal 11 ; and in June the 
Consul was telegraphed precise instructions saying that: 
11 Should Spanish squadron call at Port Said or Suez, 
endeavour prevent getting coal and other supplies 
for belligerent voyage and other operations against 
United States in East. Mail copies this telegram 
confidentially Aden, Colombo, Singapore, for those 
consuls take similar action." (16) 
However, had it not been for the British cooperation, 
American success in stopping the Spanish fleet in the Red 
Sea, seven miles outside the Canal harbour and preventing it 
from proceeding to the Far East would not have been possible. 
This British attitude towards the US was important since the 
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Table 4.1 
Sample transit figure for Suez Canal traffic, 1883-1913 
(in thousand tons) 
Year 
1883 
1887 
1901 
1905 
1910 
1913 
u.s. 
1 
1 
45 
13 
9 
7 
British 
4,406 
4,517 
6,253 
8,357 
10,424 
12,052 
Others 
1,370 
1,386 
4,570 
4,777 
6,158 
7,982 
Total 
5,776 
5,903 
10,823 
13,134 
16,582 
20,034 
Source: Wright, L.C., United States Policy toward Egypt 
1830-1914; An Exposition University Book 
Exposition Press, New York, 1969, p.94. 
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h E S . h (17) ot er uropean powers were pro- pan1s . 
Wright ( 19 69) argues that in spite of a clear lack of 
concern with the Suez Canal affairs the Americans have been 
considerably influenced by its history and development due to 
an analogous interest in building an interoceanic canal 
. (18) through Central Amer1ca, the Panama Canal. He adds that 
American strategic interest in the Suez Canal did not develop 
much until World War Two and after. US indifference to Suez 
Canal political problems before World War One is partly 
( 19) 
explained by the absence of US shipping in the waterway, 
as transit figures demonstrate in table 4. 1. Although the 
figures indicate a slight increase in American shipping 
through the Canal at the outset of the 20th century, a drop 
thereafter occurred, while British shipping and overall 
tonnage showed a steady rise. During World War Two, the Canal 
zone became a major British base which was relinquished only 
after President Nasser's nationalization of the Canal on 16 
July 1956. Nasser's appropriation of the Canal precipitated 
the tripartite Israeli-British-French military invasion of 
Egypt in October 1956.( 20) Strenuous American efforts led to 
the stoppage of the war and eventual withdrawal of the 
attackers. 
Nasser's action was the outcome of a political dispute 
developed over requests for Western, especially American, 
loans to build the Aswan High Dam. One of the ways in which 
Nasser 1 s move interested the Americans is that it involved 
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the use of strategic surprise, and thus it constituted a 
( 21 ) 
special kind of "hyper game 11 • The draft agreement of 19 55 
between Britain, the US and Egypt regarding the construction 
of the Dam stipulated that the former would pay 30%, and 
Egypt 70% of the total cost of the project, about $1.3 
billion. ( 22 ) One of the conditions of the deal was that help 
from communist-bloc countries was to be refused. ( 23) 
Apart from the financial return from the nationalization 
of the Canal the action was seen to remove "the last vestige 
of Egypt's subordination to the West", and 
"a bold defiant gesture which shocked the West and 
sparked the Suez crisis of 1956 and created 
immediate concern from the West for the security of 
the Canal". ( 24) 
Nasser's move enhanced his influential position over most of 
the main Arab nationalist movements, while his political 
popularity ro?e to its greatest height. ( 2 5 ) During the high 
tension over the invasion of the Suez Canal region by France 
and Britain the major American objective was to limit Soviet 
influence 1n the Middle East, and to promote Egyptian 
nationalism without antagonizing B . t . ( 26) r1 a1n. Perennial 
antagonism between Israel and the Arabs led to the Six Day 
War of 1967 between the two parties. The canal was then 
closed and became the cease-fire line between Egyptian and 
Israeli troops. ( 27 ) As a consequence of the 1967 closure most 
east-west trading activity was diverted to the longer Cape 
route round South Africa. 
Railway to Cairo 
Underpass tunnels 
Proposed 
-Open 
KANTARA 
0 
e Proposed new Port --~====~======~~50km 
0 25mlles 
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Mediterranean Sea 
SINAl 
Ahmed 
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FIG.4.1 THE SUEZ CANAL SHOWING UNDERPASS TUNNELS 
191 
Physical Features and Distances 
The canal - a sea-level waterway - extends between Port 
Said on the Mediterranean and Suez city on the Gulf of Suez, 
the most northwestern extremity of the Red Sea (figure 4.1). 
It was dug through a sandy isthmus of land and shallow Lakes. 
To utilize four bodies of water: Lake Manzala, Lake Ballah, 
Lake Timsah, and the Bitter Lakes; the canal does not take 
the shortest route across the isthmus. ( 2S) Due to the absence 
of significant differences in water level between the 
Mediterranean and the Gulf of Suez, there are no locks as 1n 
the Panama Canal, and the current in the waterway is 
weak. ( 29 ) Though predominantly straight, the canal has eight 
major bends. ( 30) The construction of the canal and subsequent 
developments have been relatively easy, while its 
construction cost was less than half that of Panama Canal, 
(Couper, 19 83). ( 31 ) Originally, the length of the Canal was 
161.6km - which included 65.6km of land-cut canals and 96km 
of lake-dredged channels. In 1985 its length reached 195km, 
including approach fairways.( 32 ) Its maximum depth is 53ft, 
with breadth ranging between 300 to 350m, while the width 
under 11m of water is only 160-179m. The greatest permitted 
speed for tankers in ballast and other vessels is 14km/hour. 
Vessels need about 24 hours to transit the Canal, although 
the actual period of sailing is about 12 hours. ( 3 3 ) The 
low-lying delta of the Nile borders the Canal to the west, 
while the higher, rugged and arid Sinai peninsula borders it 
Table 4.2 
Comparative distances via Cape and Red Sea routes to principal ports, distance saving percentage 
and saving in days and hours at top fleet speed of 20 knots 
London or 
Liverpool to 
Bombay 
Kuwait 
Melbourne 
Calcutta 
Singapore 
Marseille to 
Bombay 
Melbourne 
Black Sea to 
Bombay-l*-
New York to 
Bombay 
Singapore 
Ras Tanura 
(Saudi Arabia) 
Florida (USA) to 
the Gulf-lHc 
Rotterdam to 
the Gulf-~Hc 
Malta to 
Abadan-lHHc 
Via 
Cape 
Route 
nm 
10,800 
11,300 
12,200 
11,700 
11,800 
10,400 
11,900 
11,800 
11,800 
12,500 
11,900 
23,218 
23,218 
22,678 
11,971 
Sailing 
days and 
hours 
D 
22 
23 
25 
24 
24 
21 
24 
24 
24 
26 
24 
48 
48 
47 
24 
hr 
6 
12 
9 
9 
13 
15 
18 
13 
13 
18 
8 
8 
5 
22 
Via Canal -
Red Sea route 
nm 
6,300 
6,500 
11,000 
7,900 
8,300 
4,600 
9,400 
4,200 
8,200 
10,200 
8,300 
20,788 
20,788 
12,905 
4,271 
Sailing 
days and 
hours 
D hr 
13 3 
13 12 
22 21 
16 10 
17 6 
9 13 
19 13 
8 
17 
21 
17 
43 
20 
26 
18 
1 
6 
6 
7 
7 
2 
8 21 
Distance 
saving 
percentage 
42 
42 
10 
32 
30 
56 
21 
64 
31 
18 
30 
10 
10 
43 
64 
Saving 
in days 
and hours 
D 
9 
10 
2 
7 
7 
12 
5 
15 
7 
4 
7 
5 
28 
21 
16 
hr 
3 
12 
23 
7 
2 
5 
19 
12 
18 
12 
1 
1 
8 
1 
Source: Except for -l~- and -~He, the rest is from W. B. Fisher, 'The Suez Canal' in Encyclopedia 
Britannica, 15th edn, Vol.17, Hemingway Benton, publisher, London, 1974, p.76 . 
* From A.A-Al Sultan (1980) Op.cit., p.19. 
** A.H. Cordesman (1984) Op.cit., p.559. 
***Calculated from Couper (1983) (ed.)Op.cit., pp.230-31. 
....... 
1.0 
N 
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to the east. The canal is in Egyptian territory and subject 
to Egyptian jurisdiction. 
In terms of distance, the Canal demonstrates its 
significance in the considerable reduction of shipping 
distance between Europe or the US and the East (table 4.2). 
Figure 4. 2 shows a United States view of global relative 
distances. For voyages between East and West, the Canal saves 
from 17% to 59% in distance and from so% to 70% in fuel 
the tonnage, speed and the consumption, depending on 
destination of a ship. (34) From the Strait of Hormuz to the 
Strait of Dover via the Canal is over 9,600km less than via 
the Cape route. ( 3 5) Vessels making two-way transits of the 
Canal can cut 4,900km from the US round trip and 9,000km from 
the run to Rotterdam. ( 36 ) Cordesman (1984) emphasizes that in 
terms of fuel, distance and time savings, the significance of 
the Canal is indisputable. ( 37 ) Thus, there are obviously 
important benefits for commercial shipping especially small 
vessels. Moreover strategically, the waterway is clearly 
significant to naval ships between the Mediterranean, the 
Indian Ocean and beyond. 
Experts vary as to the estimated cost of losses 
inflicted on the world by the eight year closure of the Canal 
from 1967-1976. American sources put the figure at $800m a 
(38) . (39) year, but Egypt1an sources suggest $1700m a year. It 
may be difficult to decide which is right because each has 
specific interest in calculating their figure. The cost was 
United States 
Brega 4700 %0 
Ras Tanura 8490 
All figures are in nautical miles 
FIG. 4.2 A UNITED STATES VIEW OF GLOBAL RELATIVE DISTANCE (FROM SENATE HEARINGS, 1980) 
I-' 
~ 
*'-
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in terms of increased tankerage rates for oil and increased 
transportation costs for cargo. British maritime companies 
lost £150,000 daily; thousands of workers were made redundant 
in European, East African, Red Sea and Mediterranean ports; 
and the cost of transportation of one ton of crude oil via 
the Cape route was four times greater in comparison to its 
rate through the Canal. The volume of trade between Asia, 
Africa and Europe dropped by 16%; Egypt's loss was sub-
stantial amounting to some £143 million in revenues; moreover 
about one million citizens were moved from the Canal area 
into the interior of the country and lost their jobs. 
Obviously the US suffered very little although there was 
natural American concern about the damage inflicted upon its 
European allies. In fact, the Americans were somewhat relaxed 
during the closure because it benefited them strategically 
(chapter 6) according to William Quandt since it deprived the 
Soviets of using the Canal while the Americans were entangled 
. v· t (41) 1n 1e nam. 
Importance of an 'Open' Canal 
Cohen (1964) pointed out that Mahan (1840-1914) 
considered the Suez and Panama canals as marking the southern 
limit of the most active regions in world commerce and 
l •t• (42) po 1 lCS. To Mackinder (1942), according to Parker 
(1982), it was the Suez Canal that made the Middle East the 
"most vital part of the whole 'Inner Crescent'"· ( 43 ) Because 
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40 years later after Mackinder 's view the Canal is still a 
significant artery for oil transit and general commerce, its 
closure would affect: 
"the cost of oil in the US, the price of Egyptian 
cotton in England and the availability of Ceylonese 
tea in London". (44) 
Beneficiaries of an open canal would be Egypt, in respect of 
foreign revenues; European countries, for shortening of 
communication routes; Gulf and Asian countries, for some 
lowering of costs of imported goods; and the Soviet Union 
with regard to its transit route across the Indian ocean and 
the increase of its political alignment in the Red Sea region 
and beyond. ( 4 S) 
The distance between Odessa and Bombay is 6720km via the 
Suez-Red Sea route, and 19,040km round the Cape of Good Hope, 
almost three times as much. Quoted in Wolde-Mariam ( 197 2), 
Robert Hunter - former Director of Middle East Affairs in the 
National Security Council Staff 1979-1981 - remarks that: 
"While the Suez Canal remains closed the Red Sea is 
the farthest point on earth from the Soviet Union by 
sea." (46) 
The Americans perceive that in times of military crisis 
an open Canal could help the Soviets to use vessels of either 
the Pacific or Atlantic fleets to enhance the strength of the 
other, which is why the reopening of the Canal was seen by 
Senator Jackson ( 1970) as a Soviet "priority". Therefore 
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Table 4-3 
The Suez Canal: transiting vessels and tankers of the US and the 
USSR 19 6 7 -19_8 3 
u s A u s s R 
T a n k e r s 0 t h e r s T a n k e r s 0 t h e r s 
Number Net Number Net Year Number Net Number Net 
tonnage tonnage tonnage tonnage 
5000 5000 5000 5000 
55 1' 18 2 350 5,889 1976 173 2' 211 1,249 9,738 
73 1,537 459 7,519 1977 188 2,547 1,462 11,630 
19 582 306 4,950 1978 264 3,109 1,753 13,781 
23 660 305 4,583 1979 304 4,221 1,886 16,371 
58 1,055 348 5,269 1980 343 5' 17 3 2,031 19,610 
44 789 320 5,192 1981 356 4,876 1,823 18,125 
64 1,719 277 4,938 1982 350 4,509 1,962 19,471 
33 675 242 3,651 1983 350 4,380 2,060 20,213 
369 8,199 2607 41,991 2,328 31,026 14,226 128,939 
Source: Suez Canal Authority Yearly Reports, 1976-83 Ismailia, 
Egypt. 
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during its involvement in Vietnam in the late 1960s and early 
1970s the US was pleased to have the Canal closed. The 
Senator saw the Canal issue as a pressure point which the US 
could use in negotiations. To him, the reopening would 
deprive the US of one of the chief incentives to pressurise 
the Soviet Union to "make concessions on other outstanding 
differences". C47 ) Since the early 1980s, the Soviet Union has 
been ranked as the second largest user of the Canal, chiefly 
for merchant shipping. ( 48 ) Table 4.3 shows transiting tankers 
of the US and USSR through the Canal. 
Following the 1967 war and particularly after the 
cease-fire of 1970 and US initiatives for an 1 interim 1 
settlement, the Canal assumed a new political importance for 
the US as a major element in the quest for peace in the 
Middle East. ( 49 ) Before closure, an uninterrupted passage 
through the Canal was an important factor in American Middle 
Eastern policy. But thereafter transit rights were not as 
important to the US as was the utilization of the waterway as 
an instrument of political leverage and negotiation, (table 
4.4). Such value was further emphasized in the post-October 
War disengagement accords between Israel and Egypt. (SO) In 
1970 Senator Jackson pointed out that without Israel 1 s 
consent, the Canal could not be opened. Therefore 
emphasized that the reopening: 
"must be considered a trump card in any forthcoming 
settlement of the Arab Israeli dispute••. 
With this in mind, he added that an 
he 
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Tab1e 4-4 
Suez Canal: Northbound movement of petroleum and products, 
and US share, 1976-1984 ( '000 tons) 
Year Amount US share US % of total north-
bound volume 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
29,855 
30,878 
28,363 
27,284 
28,474 
36,566 
63,139 
81,223 
86,628 
104 
1,076 
417 
311 
379 
1,448 
3,710 
5,055 
NA 
0.35 
3.50 
1. 50 
1. 14 
1. 33 
4.00 
6.00 
6.22 
Source: Suez Canal Authority ¥early Reports 
and Monthly ~eport January-December 
Suez Canal Authority, Ismailia. 
1976-1983, 
for 1984, 
Thus, 
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11 agreement on this point should be wi the}d_- until a 
settlement of the fundamental issues is 
reached". (51) 
the Canal was thought of by Israel's American 
supporters as a card of pressure to reach an enforced peace 
with Israel. 
While the American military were concerned about naval 
movement through the Canal, Michael Sterner of the Department 
of State ( 197 4) argues that the effect of a reopened canal 
should not be restricted to the narrow context of naval and 
commercial movements; it should be viewed as a sequel to the 
initial Israeli-Egyptian agreement. (52) Ten years later, 
although Mr Sterner did not attach great importance to the 
Canal-Red Sea route with regard to oil supplies for the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
(chapter 5), he emphasized the important strategic advantage 
of this route for naval movements from Norfolk (USA) and the 
Mediterranean. ( 5J) However, after the reopening in 1975, 
traffic began to return to its former levels and the Canal 
regained its importance 1n tonnage, as subsequent tables 
indicate. 
In March 1974 the US indicated to Egypt its preparedness 
to sweep the canal and its approaches of mines, and provide 
technical help to enable Egyptian forces to locate and 
dispose of unexploded ordnance in the canal and along its 
banks. The total cost of getting the canal back to its 1967 
condition was estimated at $150- 200m. ( 54 ) Japan, the World 
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Bank and the UK all participated in the project. Mr Michael 
Sterner of the American State Department (1974) made it clear 
that the Israelis did not contribute to the scheme, either 
financially or mechanically; he added that they provided very 
detailed information of the minefields they had placed on the 
east bank of the Canal. He considered the information as very 
helpful; and that the US had full cooperation from the 
Israeli intelligence in locating the mines. ( 55 ) After 
thirteen months' scouring operation, through Western, 
especially American, money and technical assistance, the 
Canal was cleared and reopened in June 1975. 
After the reopening of the Canal, the first Israeli 
vessel transited the waterway in April 1979( 56 ) thanks to the 
Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty of that year. During the 
Congressional debate in 1974 over the US contribution to the 
reopening of the Canal and Israel's chances of using it, Mr 
Sterner explained that both Egypt and Israel agreed to defer 
the issue until they reached a final peace settlement. ( 57 ) 
The canal is important to Israel; statistics show that in 
1982 and 1983 the number of ships flying the Star of David 
reached 38 and 50 respectively, carrying tonnage of 412, 000 
tons in 1982 and 584,000 tons in 1983, 41 7% . (58) a . o 1ncrease. 
According to the treaty the parties agreed on: 
"The right of free passage 
through the Gulf of Suez and 
basis of the Constantinople 
applying to all nations." (59) 
by ships of Israel 
the Suez Canal on the 
Convention of 1888 
EXPANSION OF THE SUEZ CANAL 
1~ 633feet ~1~ 400 feet .. 1 
f... 295 feet .. I 
. ~ Canal in 1976 (49 feet deep) for laden ships of 50,000dwt 
~ Widening completed 1980 (64feet deep) for laden ships 150,000 dwt 
illii] Proposed future project (77 feet deep) for ships of 250,000 dwt 
FIG. 4.3 CROSS-SECTION TO SHOW EXPANSION OF THE SUEZ CANAL, 1976-1980 
N 
0 
N 
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Development Projects 
For some years after its breaching the canal was 22ft 
( 8m) deep, 7 2. 2ft (22m) wide and a permissible draught of 
24.6ft(7.Sm). Between 1876 and 1954 it witnessed seven 
development projects. The first stage of the eighth scheme, 
known as the Nasser project, was completed in 1961 and 
. ( 60) 
enabled vessels of 37ft draught to trans1t the waterway. 
In 19 6 2 two salvage stations and a system of direct radio 
communication between ships and the traffic control station 
were established at Ismailia. The second stage of the 
project, finished in 1964, brought allowable draught to 38ft. 
When it was reopened in June 197 5 permissible draught was 
only 33ft but a month later it came to be 38ft. ( 61 ) 
On 16 December 1980, the first phase of a massive 
development project of widening and deepening the Canal was 
completed. The execution of this stage cost $1, 270m. The 
scheme funded by Japan involved the construction of three 
bypasses and increased the draught from 38ft to 53ft (figure 
4. 3). ( 62 ) Owing to this expansion, the canal is able to 
handle more than one third of the world's tanker tonnage 
laden and more than 90% in ballast. ( 63 ) With such depth, the 
waterway can accommodae almost the entire world's cargo 
vessels. ( 6 4) The bypasses raised the Canal's daily transit 
capacity by 12 ships (Al Ahgam S/84). The paper adds that the 
Chairman of the Suez Canal Authority, Izzel Adel states that 
the Canal had entered the era of super tankers. The project 
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served supertankers in two ways: 
(1) From Europe en route to the Gulf empty tankers of 370,000 
tons can pass through compared with 250,000 tons before; 
and 
(2) the increased draught and the widening from 297 to 480m 
enables the Canal to handle tankers of 150,000 tons fully 
laden and 200,000 tons partly loaded compared with 70,000 
tons before. In October 1981, the authorities inaugurated 
the Suez Canal Vessel Traffic. ( 6 5) 
Management: Owing to the completion of the first stage and 
the opening of the Saudi East West pipeline in 1981 (chapter 
5), tanker traffic in the Canal has risen significantly 
(tables 4.5). The development programme included 
equipment and human factors; and most important here is the 
promotion of maritime surveillance and its furnishing with 
the most modern equipment. The project also included the 
construction of four highways, and five tunnels traversing 
the Canal and linking the west and east banks. ( 67 ) Thus, 
Africa and Asia were linked for the first time by road 
through the four km long Ahmed Hamdi Tunnel which was 
(68) . 
completed on 1st October 1980. The tunnel cost $143m and 
includes a two-lane highway accommodating up to 1, 000 cars 
per hour ( 69 ). 
Quoting Canal officials, the International Herald 
Tribune (January 19 8 5) indicates the shelving of the plans 
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Table 4-5 
Suez Canal: Effect of East-West pipeline on tanker traffic 
(thousand tons deadweight) 
Direction Ship size dwt 
Northbound 10-70,000 
over 70,000 
Southbound 10-70,000 
70-175,000 
over 175,000 
Total 
1980 
19,937 
21,602 
41,539 
21,068 
41,895 
51,145 
114,108 
1981 
21,067 
28,090 
49,157 
20,898 
42,730 
134,368 
197,996 
1982 
21,423 
42,995 
64,418 
22,483 
57,923 
82,696 
163,102 
Source: The Drewry Tanker Market Review: 19 8 2, Drewry 
Shipping Consultants Ltd, London, reproduced in 
Petroleum Economist, Vol. L. No.6, June 1983, p.241. 
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for the second phase of development. The reason, according to 
the paper, is the continued levelling off of Egypt's revenues 
from the Canal and the sluggishness of the Canal's shipping 
since 1980. ( 70 ) Although there has been continued rise in 
Canal revenues between 1980 and 1984 (see below), the income 
has been short of the $1m projected by the Chairman of the 
Canal. ( 71 ) The deferred phase was intended to incr~e the 
number of daily transits of vessels from 62 to 78 by cutting 
new 
(72) bypasses. The postponed phase is also designed to 
deepen the canal to increase its wet cross-section to 
4200sq.m and the permissible draught to 67ft, thereby 
achieving the objective of handling fully loaded tankers of 
260,000dwt and up to 300 ,OOOdwt partially loaded. (73) 
Completion of this stage was scheduled for 1986-87, and its 
cost was expected to reach between $7 SOm to $1 b. ( 7 4 ) The 
development project would have been the biggest scheme so far 
undertaken by Egypt, expected to bring a revenue of $1200m 
annually. Moreover, it was seen to alleviate some internal 
economic difficulties, besides its re-enforcement of the 
importance of the canal as a vital artery and the shortest 
and cheapest international water passage. (?5) 
Japan would play a leading role in building the second 
phase, consisting of a second canal running parallel to the 
existing one, to handle . two-way traffic. (? 6 ) The future 
widening of the Canal could change the pattern of crude oil 
movement, although the volume of traffic will depend on dues 
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Table 4.6 
The Suez Canal: Volume of goods traffic in both directions, 
quantities of petroleum and products and their percentage to 
total volume: 1966, 1975-1983 (thousand tons) 
Southbound goods traffic Northbound goods traffic 
Year Total Petroleum % Total Petroleum % 
and products and products 
1966 47,725 8,953 18.76 194,168 166,718 85.86 
1975 19' 140 2,012 10. 51 18,480 5,309 28.73 
1976 45,633 3,969 8.70 72,020 29,855 41.45 
1977 56,063 4,068 7.26 72,630 30,878 42.51 
1978 so, 182 4,316 5.38 69,597 28,363 40.75 
1979 81,919 8,970 10.95 78,730 27,284 34.65 
1980 89,729 13,994 15.60 86,547 28,474 32.90 
1981 102,532 18,211 17.76 93,896 36,566 38.94 
1982 106,588 20,312 19.06 124,805 63,139 so.6o 
1983 115,703 17,010 14.70 141,002 81,223 57.60 
Source: Suez Canal Authority Yearly Report, Ismailia, Egypt, 
pp.117-118. 
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fixed by the canal authority compared with fuel costs and 
time consumption by circumnavigating the Cape of Good 
Hope. ( 77 ) Following the execution of the first stage of 
development, the Canal Authority increased transit charges in 
January 1981 by 50%, the first rise since 1967. To encourage 
traffic 1n general and also the largest tankers, in 
particular, the Authority has taken a conservative approach 
towards dues, and put them on a sliding scale. Since the 
beginning of 1983 a new transit rate has come into effect. In 
January 1984 transit rates were increased by 5%. These dues 
were expected to bring a net increase 1n canal revenue of 
about $30m by the end of that year. 
were again put up by 3.74%. ( 78 ) 
In January 1985 
However, despite 
tolls 
these 
increases, the Chairman of the Suez Canal Authority ( 1984) 
contends that still the Canal will continue to be the 
cheapest maritime route between East and West; and 
consequently, the volume of trade which passes through the 
canal is much larger than that using routes competing with 
the Canal. ( 79 ) 
Number of Ships and Tonnage 
Since the reopening of the Canal, the number of flags, 
as well as tonnage carried through it, have continued to show 
a steady growth (table 4.6). while in 1976 the ships of 85 
nationalities passed through the canal, in 1983 it increased 
by 11. 8% reaching 9 5 despite a slump in the world oil market 
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Table 4.7 
Canal revenues :19 8 0-19 84 
Year 
1980-1981 
1981-1982 
1982-1983 
1983-1984~*-
Income ($m) 
780 
909 
9 57 
960 
Source: Financial Times, 25 June 1984, London. 
* From International Herald Tribune, 17 
January 1985, New York. 
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since 1980. In 1966, 21,250 vessels with tonnage of 274.25m 
tonnes, transited the waterways; and in 1982 the figure rose 
to 22,545 ships loaded with 363,5328m tonnes passed through. 
By 1980, even before the completion to the present depth, 
total tonnage carried through the waterway had surpassed the 
peak year before the closure. In 1981, despite a slump in 
world oil demand, the number of tankers transiting'the canal 
had increased by 16% over the 1980 level, while the rise in 
tonnage was as much as 46%. ( 80 ) The Canal handles 14% of 
sea-borne world trade and 41% of the commodities exchanged in 
( 81 ) 
the Gulf's ports. In 1984 some 185.4m tonnes of oil were 
transported from the Middle East to Western consumers; and 
out of this amount the canal handled 86.73mt, or 47% Western 
. (82) 1mports. 
Revenues 
Once the Canal used to be Egypt's biggest source of 
foreign earnings, but as figures of the Financial Times 
(1984) reveal, canal revenues have been drastically overtaken 
$95 rYl 
by workers' transfers. In 1982-83 the Canal brought in $9~m, 
while workers' remittances attained $3 bill>ion. The continued 
slump in the oil market since 1980 has affected Canal 
revenues because some of the ships that transit the waterway 
are oil tankers. Egypt's oil exports also bring greater 
foreign currency than those of the canal. ( 8 3) During the last 
few years the Canal's earnings have been oscillating around 
$900m a year (table 4.7). In 1984 the canal brought $960m, 
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Table 4.8 
The Suez Canal: total number of US vessels and tankers 
transiting the Canal, . and their percentage to world total: 
1976-1983 
V e s s e _L s T a n k e r s 
Year World us % us World "us % us 
1976 16,806 350 2.08 2,610 55 2.10 
1977 19,703 459 2.32 2,620 73 2.78 
1978 21,266 306 1.43 2,489 19 0.76 
1979 20,363 305 1. 49 2,698 23 0.85 
1980 20,795 348 1. 67 2,921 58 1. 98 
1981 21,577 320 1. 48 3,438 44 1. 27 
1982 22,545 277 1. 22 3,548 64 1.80 
1983 .2 2' 224 242 1. 08 3' 602 I 33 0.91 
Source: Suez Canal Authority, Yearl,y: Reeo1't, 1976, 1978, 
1980, 1982 and 1983. Ismailia, Egypt. 
) 
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one hundred million dollars short of the projections of the 
Canal's Chairman. Interruptions caused by air attack on Gulf 
shipping and the recent series of mine blasts in the Red Sea 
have been considered as the major factor for the shortfall 
from the predicted revenue of $1b in 1984. The International 
Herald Tribune (1985) indicates that damage to more than 60 
tankers in the Gulf in 19 84 coupled with the slow economic 
recovery in the Gulf countries would continue to cause a 
slowdown in the activity of the waterway. ( 84 ) However, 
considering the remarkable shift that has been going on since 
19 81 in the transportation of oil from the Gulf through 
pipelines terminating at the Red Sea (chapter 5) and the 
increased tension in the Gulf area (chapter 6), it could be 
argued that the canal's activity may increase, and some Cape 
route traffic could shift to the Red Sea. 
The US and the Suez Canal 
As table 4.8 indicates, there is no significant American 
Shipping activity in the Canal. But US interests in the canal 
might be best perceived in the shipping activities of 
America's Western and Japanese allies who depend on US 
military strength to defend their interests in the Middle 
East. Table 4.9 highlights those allies' interests. 
Another strong reason to attract American interest in 
the Canal is the steady growth of Soviet use of the waterway, 
especially when US apprehension over Soviet military build-up 
in the southern sector of the Red Sea region and the Indian 
Table 4-9 
Cargo vessels and tankers belonging to six l5 allies transitingthe Canal in 1978 and 
19S3, and their percentage to ~orld total 
C a r· g o 
Yea1' 
1978 
1983 
World 
total 
21,266 
22,224 
\' e s s e l s 
Total of Greece, 
UK , W. Germany 
France, Italy and Japan 
7794 
5915 
% of h'orld 
allies total 
to world 
36.65 2,489 
26.61 3,602 
T a n k e r s 
Total of Greece, 
UK , W. Germany 
franc~, Italy and Japan 
861 
1043 
Source: Suez Canal Authority Yearly Report, 1978 and 1983, Ismailia, Egypt. 
; 
% of 
ailies 
to world 
35-59 
28.95 
N 
....... 
w· 
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Table 4.10 
The Suez Canal: transiting warships 1976-1983 
Year Number of ships Tonnage ( I 000) 
1976 91 334 
1977 100 604 
1978 122 405 
1979 149 500 
1980 190 1' 17 2 
1981 190 1,039 
1982 180 1,094 
1983 182 1,075 
Total 1,204 6,223 
Source: Suez Canal Authority, Yearly Reports 1976-1983, 
Ismailia, Egypt. 
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Ocean is considered. Such military presence, flanking the 
Arabian peninsula on the south-west must be worrying to the 
US, and therefore it may need the Canal for quick action, in 
time of crisis. Apart from transporting energy and facilit-
ating naval movements, the Canal handles other crucial 
materials, important to the industrial West, notably 
strategic minerals. Also other goods include manufactured 
materials from the West transported to countries beyond the 
Suez Canal. It also serves passengers. It proved impossible 
to obtain detailed breakdown of commodities specifically 
bound or originating in the US. Data on US naval shipping 
through the waterway are not easy to obtain. However, since 
the reopening the number of transiting warships has grown 
(table 4. 10) . At a depth of 53ft, the canal 1s seen by the 
Americans as able to handle virtually all the world's 
warships. ( 85 ) 
However, Egypt has always refused to allow nuclear-
powered ships passage through the Canal fearing that an 
accident could close the waterway. It has been the Suez Canal 
Authority, rather than the Government, that strongly opposed 
. ( 8 6) the passage of such sh1ps. Although the Americans gave 
Egypt several assurances in the past, that the ships would 
not create danger to the Canal, civilian Egyptian authorities 
"have not wanted to allow passage of anything that 
they believe could endanger a major revenue-producer 
like the Canal." (87) 
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But in early November, 1984 
"Egypt allowed 
pass through 
a nuclear-powered 
the Suez Canal 
US naval ship to 
for the first 
time. 11 ( 88) 
The event is considered by the Americans as "a breakthrough" 
for American policy in the Red Sea-Canal route. But the 
nuclear-powered cruiser, USS '~rkansa~~ 
"travelled from the Red Sea to the Mediterranean at 
night because of Egyptian sensitivity over the 
issue. 11 ( 89) 
being very much concerned that to create problems for Egypt 
and to continue enjoying success, a number of US officials, 
including the ambassador, Mr Nicholas Valiotes, 
"warned that public discussion of the transit could 
embarrass the Egyptians and set-back efforts to win 
a permanent policy change." (90) 
One official was quoted by The Guardian (11/84) as saying 
"Right now, we're all very sensitive 
are They've done something nice 
want to spoil it. 11 ( 91) 
The USS "Arkansas "was on a spy mission of 
because 
and we 
they 
don't 
"shadowing a conventionally powered Soviet ship that 
had steamed through the Canal the previous day." 
The Americans think that Egypt's previous decision not 
to allow such passage was caused by Soviet pressure upon the 
former not to change policy. (9Z) 
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However, the event may be a quite significant achieve-
ment for the US, and may be to the Soviets whose navy is 
considered by the former as 
"currently far less dependent on nuclear power than 
the US navy". (93) 
Although such an achievement, if it continues, will enable 
the US to enjoy rapid mobility of nuclear-power vessels 
between the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean, nevertheless 
it may endanger the Canal. 
Vulnerability of the Canal 
Since the creation of Israel 1n 19 48, the canal has 
continued to be a flashpoint for Middle Eastern conflicts. 
Events between 1956 and 1973 have revealed both the political 
and military value and vulnerability of the Canal. According 
to an American view, the canal is vulnerable to modern 
weapons and in war time its protection from closure would be 
problematic. The canal also proved to be a feeble line of 
defence during the crossing of both Egyptian-Israeli forces 
in the 1973 war, and the view concludes that because of the 
Canal's minor military significance, President Sadat was 
convinced that the area should be transformed into a region 
of peace.( 94 ) Sadat's peace with Israel, however, was by no 
means an outcome of such hopes. The Israeli-Egyptian peace 
cannot guarantee keeping the Canal open. The 1984 mining of 
the Red Sea (chapter 6), especially at the Gulf of Suez, was 
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a strong reminder that a wide range of Arabs and Muslims have 
been frustrated by the American-designed peace, and by 
American attitudes in the region. Thus, Sadat 1 s peace may 
have left the Canal more vulnerable than before. 
In 1974 Professor Ragaei El Mallakh, Chairman of African 
and Middle Eastern Studies at the University of Colorado, 
USA, wrote: 
"In many people 1 s mind the canal has been linked 
with colonial empires, war and the romantic aura 
exuded by Verdi 1 s Aida composed for the waterway 1 s 
grand opening a century ago and the glamour of 
emperors, kings, queens and pashas. Now the present 
outlook for the canal is more concentrated on 
Egypt 1 s economic development, making it the most 
important petroleum transiting nation in the world, 
expanding regional linkages and growth, easing the 
energy crisis, facilitating world trade and 
deepening the mutuality of economic interests and 
interdependence of the Middle East not only with 
Europe and the Third World but with the United 
States as well." (95) 
The character of Suez Canal traffic clearly changed 
between 1969 and 1975, especially with regard to oil traffic. 
As a result the importance of the canal has probably been 
under-estimated. By 19 7 5 it was already regaining lost oil 
traffic and the number of ships transiting were back to 
pre-closure levels. In geopolitical terms perhaps the most 
significant developments have been (1) the open1ng of SUMED 
which further concentrates oil transportation in the 
geostrategic Canal/Nile Delta zone, and (2) the growing 
number of states with a stake in the Canal. The existing and 
on-going construction of pipelines from the Gulf to major Red 
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Sea ports (chapter 5) and an anticipated further widening of 
the Canal, which could occur in the 1990s, might transform 
world assessments of the value of the Canal-Red Sea highway. 
4.3 International Waterways 
An Overview 
International waterways can be natural features, in the 
form of straits or man-made features or canals. Hanks (1981) 
argues that although international waterways contribute to 
cutting the length of voyages for merchant ships and naval 
traffic, they also provide opportunities for those who would 
seek to interdict such traffic. ( 96 ) At such 'chokepoints' 
sealanes are highly vulnerable and may require protection. In 
the Middle East, certain of these waterways are heavily used, 
notably the Suez Canal, the Strait of Hormuz, and Bab al 
Mandeb. Others may not have heavy traffic but are charac-
terized by high conflict potential, such as the Strait of 
Tiran. 
Straits: According to Bruel (1947) a strait is geographically 
a contraction of the sea between two territories, being of 
limited width and connecting two seas. Despite its separation 
of opposite territories a strait may function as the 
connecting element of those territories by traffic. ( 9 7) To 
Leifer (1978) a strait is a narrow sea channel or a corridor 
connecting two larger bodies of water. (9 8 ) The 1982 UN 
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Convention gives a clear definition of international straits 
subject to the regime of transit passage: 
" Straits which are used for international 
navigation between one part of the high seas or an 
exclusive economic zone and another part of the high 
seas or an exclusive economic zone". (99) 
There are approximately 120 international straits in the 
world less than 24nm in width. The proposed extension of the 
territorial sea to 12nm under Article 3 of the 1982 
Convention on the Law of the Sea would place all these 
straits into the territorial seas of coastal states. While 
about two thirds of them are in the developing world, most 
international shipping belongs to the maritime powers, 
(100) predominantly Western. In the past few years the right 
of passage through, under, or over international §traits has 
become a preoccupation of both coastal states and maritime 
powers. Along with the rise in the number of ships and the 
increase in their size, passage through §traits by ships has 
· t · f · d ( 1 0 1 ) Such t d th · h · · b 1n ens1 1e . remen ous grow 1n s 1pp1ng can e 
seen in a decade during which world gross registered tonnage 
grew from 186mt in 1971 to 420mt in 1980, an increase of over 
12 5%. ( 10 2 ) With regard to military activity on the sea the 
world stock of warships rose from 4,857 in 1965, to 5,363 1n 
197 5, a rise of over 11%; at the same time their speed, as 
well as their range and destructive capacity grew con-
. (103) 
s1derably. 
Although the Convention upholds the freedom of 
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navigation through territorial seas with the concept of 
1 innocent passage 1 (Article 17), and through international 
straits with the principle of 'transit passage' (Article 
38), ( 104) conflict of interest between littoral States and 
maritime powers has become inevitable, especially since the 
1960s when most of the developing nations achieved in-
dependence and have become aware of their economic and 
security interests. Coastal States have naturally become 
worried about their national security which may be 
jeopardized by the passage of warships and military aircraft. 
Equally they have become concerned about dangers to their 
marine resources from pollution, especially by huge oil 
tankers. Therefore they commonly objected to the principle of 
'free passage' and demanded more authorization to regulate 
h . . d . t . th . . t ( 1 0 5 ) ( h t 6 ) 0 th s 1pp1ng an ma1n a1n e1r secur1 y c ap er . n e 
other hand, maritime powers are preoccupied with the interest 
of retaining the greatest freedom to sail through, under, or 
over straits joining international waters because of their 
dependence upon these narrow waters for both economic and 
strategic shipping. Maritime powers worry about the right of 
coastal states to determine what constitutes innocent 
passage, especially because some of these straits are without 
alternative routes, for example Hormuz, Tiran and Bab al 
Mandeb in the Middle East. In a classic work on the subject, 
Bruel (1947) indicates that straits may have naval and 
political importance. Strategically and tactically a strait 
may 
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"offer a comparatively easy control of the passage 
of merchant vessels and men of war, respectively for 
completely or partly barring The closing of a 
strait may be e.g. a part of the defence against a 
power outside the strait expected to force its way 
in through the strait. (105) 
He adds that 1n this respect a strait is a strategically 
important, and at times decisive area. (106) Morevoer, full 
benefit of the naval advantage opened up by straits may 
necessitate control of its coasts. Bruel points out that 
although the emergence of air-power has somewhat changed the 
importance of straits, the development of_air attack has not 
materially reduced the possibility of closing a strait to 
warships belonging to belligerants. ( 107 ) Politically, Bruel 
indicates that from the earliest historical times straits 
have drawn conquerors, and political intrigues over straits 
may continue for centuries. He sees examples of this in 
situations where the political conditions have prevented a 
state from occupying its coasts; and in consequence has had 
to try to control the strait via a weak littoral state. 
Often, when one of the Great Powers have failed to gain 
direct control over a strait, it has confined itself to 
. (108) preventing a competitor from gaining dom1nance. 
Africa can be thought of as having four so-called 
peripheral chokepoints the Suez Canal, Bab al Mandeb, 
Gibraltar and the Cape in South Africa. Of these, the Red Sea 
arguably encompasses the most important two: the Suez Canal 
and Bab al Mandeb. Considerable quantities of Gulf oil pass 
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through these two narrows to Western consumers. Also, via 
these water passages large quantities of dry cargo are 
transported. Moreover, warships benefit from them by 
shortening the distance between the Mediterranean and the 
Indian Ocean. maintenance of access to international 
waterways in the Middle East, specifically the Canal, Turkish 
Straits, Red Sea and Gulf Straits as well as use of 
international communication facilities have long been 
regarded as crucial to American interest. ( 109 ) Besides 
overall American concern about Red Sea strategic waterways, 
the US has been greatly concerned about Israel's right to use 
these narrows. Such US interest has been demonstrated in 
various ways, for instance, in the 1975 US-Israel agreement 
with regard to passage through Bab al Mandeb and in US 
designation and implementation of the peace treaty between 
Egypt and Israel in 1979 following the Camp David agreement 
ln 1978; that agreement guaranteed Israel's right of 
navigation through the narrow waters in the northern sector 
of the Red Sea. Moreover, the US has been much concerned not 
to allow Soviet domination over these chokepoints. 
The Strait of Gubal and the Gulf of Suez 
The Strait of Gubal forms the entrance to the Gulf of 
Suez. It has a fairway 10. 4km wide at its narrowest point. 
The Strait controls access to the Gulf of Suez. It is safe 
for shipping due to the establishment of a traffic separation 
Table 4.11 
Physical-geographical features of Red Sea gulfs 
Name of Length Width Depth tidal range surface water surface salinity river 
Gulf (in km) (in km) (in m) (in m) temp.(celsius) (parts per runoff 
thousand) 
-
max mouth max P.lean sill max min max min 
Gulf of 
Aden 900 335 335 3,328 - none 2.9 30 25 36.5 36 none 
Gulf of 
Aqaba 180 28 6 1,828 462 0.7 26 24 42.0 41 N - none N 
""" 
Gulf of 
Suez 325 58 58 82 40-60 none 1.8 28 23 43.0 41 none 
Source: The New EncycloEedia Britannica, Vol. 8, Encyclopedia Britannica In~. Helen Benton 
Publisher~ 1974. 
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scheme in the 1970s which separates northbound and southbound 
shipping, otherwise navigation would be difficult due to the 
presence of so many shoals, reefs and islets. A rectangular 
zone on the northeast side of the navigable channel is 
declared as dangerous, being a mining area. The strategic 
importance of the strait appeared during the October War of 
197 3 when the Gulf of Suez was blockaded at the Strait of 
Gubal. ( 110 ) Tables 4. 11 and 4. 12 give basic data about Red 
Sea gulfs and main straits in the Middle East respectively. 
Lying in the northwest end of the Red Sea, the Gulf of 
Suez forms the western arm of the former, and represents one 
of its principal bays; it is shallow and bordered by a wide 
. (111) 
coastal plaln. (For the geographical characteristics of 
the Gulfs of Suez, Aqaba and Aden, see table 4. 11. ) The 
coasts are of high lands and characterized by coral reefs, 
particularly on the eastern side where these reefs extend 
offshore a considerable distance. On both shores of the Gulf 
there are oil rigs; therefore caution is required while 
navigating in the vicinity of these coasts. The Gulf is quite 
deep throughout> 1.1.. its length and to a short distance off the 
t (112) coas . 
Bell ( 19 7 3) thinks that Egyptian tolerance of Israeli 
shipping in the Red Sea was related to Egypt's desire to 
exploit oil resources on the Gulf of Suez without inter-
ruption. However, the Egyptian reconquest of part of western 
Sinai in October 1973, and the interim peace accord of 1975 
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Table 4.12 
Middle East Main Straits used for international navigation 
Strait Sovereignty Depth Maximum Length Average 
( m) draft (nm) no. of 
permitted ships 
per day 
Gibraltar Spain-Morocco 82-1000 Unlimited 36 140 
Dardanelles Turkey 45-90 Unlimited 31 57 
Bosporus Turkey 70 Unlimited 15 57 
Tiran Egypt-
Saudi Arabia 73-183 
Bab al Man deb Djibouti-PDRY- 42 Unlimited 50 50 
YAR-Ethiopia 305 (main 
channel) 
Hormuz Iran-Oman 55-91 Unlimited 100 so 
Source: Couper, A. (ed.), The Times Atlas of the Oceans, Times 
Books Ltd, London, 1983, p.151. 
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enabled the former to recontrol about 15% of Sinai. This 
development put much of the eastern coast of the Gulf of 
Suez, formerly under UN supervision, under Egyptian 
control. ( 11 3) The presence of oil in the Gulf of Suez was 
expected to blockade the road to peace with Israel. In 1976, 
and also later in February 1978, Israeli gunboats warned off 
Amoco ships which were prospecting for oil around the 
demarcation line off the southern Sinai coast. The US 
officially protested to Israel about the incident. In 
November 1977 Israel declared that it had found oil there; 
consequently a high state of tension was generated in the 
area. In April 1978 American oil firms were warned by Egypt 
that they would be barred from operating in the country if 
they carried out 
S . . ( 114) The 1na1. 
exploratory activities in Israeli occupied 
American sponsored Israeli-Egyptian peace 
treaty of 19 79 enabled Egypt to gain full control over the 
Gulf of Suez; on the other hand Israel secured the right of 
passing through it. But still being worried about the freedom 
of navigation through the Gulf of Suez, Lapidoth (1982) wants 
the latter to be associated with the legal regime of the 
Canal and treated as an approach to the latter. In such a 
development, the Gulf of Suez would include territorial 
waters and high seas. 
The Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba 
Table 4.12 shows main characteristics of principal 
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Middle East Straits which include the Strait of Tiran. It is 
a narrow water passage linking the Gulf of Aqaba, en route to 
the ports of Eilat or Aqaba (chapter 4). The Strait lies 
between Ras Nusrani, 27.2km northeast of Ras Muhammad on the 
southeastern tip of Sinai, and Tiran island on the east. The 
island lies at the entrance of the Strait which is divided 
into two passages by reefs lying in its fairway. The Strait 
is dominated by Sharm al-Sheikh on the southwest. It is 6.4km 
wide at its narrowest point and full of reefs. ( 11 5) The 
Strait is essential to Jordan since it is the country's only 
outlet to the sea and then to the Indian Ocean and 
Mediterranean. To Israel, the Strait is vital for Eilat which 
is crucial to the development of the Negev and is Israel's 
only access to the Red Sea. In 1967 President Nasser repeated 
the 1956 strategy of blockading the Israeli entrance through 
the Strait, installing giant guns at Ras Nasrani. Since those 
guns fronted the Strait and thus imposed a blockade on the 
Israeli port of Eilat, Israel responded by occupation of 
Sinai and thus controlled Sharm al Sheikh.(~16 ) During their 
eleven years occupation, the Israelis established a major 
base across Na ama Bay, at Sharm al Sheikh. From that base 
Israeli patrol craft maintained regular surveillance in the 
Red Sea; and controlled access to the Gulf of Aqaba, and the 
Suez Canal. The Egyptian blockade of the Strait from Sharm al 
Sheikh in 1967 is seen by Bell ( 197 3) as a symbolic Arab 
gesture that had nothing to do with tonnage, artillery ranges 
t . . (117) or magne 1c m1nes. 
After the first Israeli-Arab war of 1948-49 the US 
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committed itself to safegua~d Israel's shipping rights in the 
Strait. Since 1956 the maritime nations, led by the US, have 
guaranteed Israel's freedom of passage through the Strait. 
Moreover, in 1979 and under US auspices the Strait became 
open to Israel in compliance with the 1979 Israeli-Egyptian 
peace treaty which stipulated that 
"The Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba are 
international waterways to be open to all nations 
for unimpeded and nonsuspendable freedom of 
navigation and overflight." (118) 
In the memorandum of agreement between the US and Israel 
attached to the Camp David Accords, the US promised to 
guarantee Israel's right to overfly and pass through the 
Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba. According to the peace 
treaty Israel can also use the airfield that it left near 
( 1 1 9 ) Sharm al-Sheikh for commercial purposes. 
On 18 May 1981 the UN Security Council declined to 
authorize a peacekeeping force in Sinai because such 
authorization would involve the UN in the Israeli-Egyptian 
(120) peace treaty. Consequently, and 1n response to President 
Carter's prior letters to both Begin and Sadat, the US formed 
the Multinational Force ;::md Observers (MFO), consisting of 
2,600 men. The US provided the largest battallion plus 
observers and logistic support. The other units of the force 
came from Britain, France, Italy, Australia, New Zealand, 
Fiji, Colombia and Uruguay. In fact, from the start Israel 
wanted an American or Western rather than a UN force in Sinai 
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to monitor peace following the last phase of Israeli 
withdrawal on 26 April 19 82. Sharm al Sheikh has been made 
the second main base of the force, where a US battallion was 
stationed. An Italian naval component 
"verifies freedom of navigation through the Strait 
of Tiran and operates minesweepers at the southern 
end of the peninsula 11 • ( 121) 
Despite its lack of obvious strategic importance to the 
Soviet Union, unlike Bab al Mandeb, the Strait is considered 
significant because it has been (and still is) capable of 
being utilized to create instability which has had reper-
cussions that have gone beyond the littorals of the Strait. 
For example, there was Soviet support to the Arabs and 
American/Western backing for Israel during the Israeli-Arab 
wars of 19 56, 19 67 and 19 7 3 when the Strait was the spark 
that ignited conflict, especially in the first two wars. 
Entered via the Strait of Tiran, the Gulf of Aqaba 
stretches out to make the eastern arm of the Red Sea. 
Geologically it is the continuation southwards of Wadi al 
Araba, the sandy valley flanked by high mountains south of 
the Dead Sea. Unlike the Gulf of Suez, its coasts are steep 
db d db 1 . (122) an or ere y narrow p a1ns. 
Undisputedly, the location of the Gulf of Aqaba gives it 
a strategic significance, especially when Israeli-Arab 
hostility and Israel's threat to the security of the Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia are considered. Before the Iranian Islamic 
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revolution, Israeli-Iranian cooperation enabled Iran to 
benefit from shipping its oil through the Gulf to Eilat, then 
by overland to Ashdod, and from there to European 
markets. ( 123 ) To the Americans, the intrinsic value of the 
Gulf of Aqaba is its function of linking both Aqaba and Eilat 
with the Red Sea and thus with the Indian Ocean. Moreover, 
the US envisages a potential increase in the importance of 
the Gulf of Aqaba by the future laying of pipelines (chapter 
. (124) 5.2) by Saudi Arabia, Iraq and other Gulf countr1es. 
The US has pledged support for both parties in relation 
to their interests in the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of 
Aqaba. Such commitment is also embodied in the memorandum, 
which says: 
"The United States will support the parties right to 
navigation and overflight for access to either 
country through and over the Strait of Tiran and 
Gulf of Aqaba pursuant to the Treaty of Peace. 11 
(125) 
However, although US participation in the peace process 
between Israel and Egypt enabled the latter to regain control 
over its waterways, nevertheless actual Egyptian sovereignty 
over these assets could be perceived as partial or incomplete 
since Egypt must first consider Israel's interest rather than 
that of the Arabs in relation to their conflict with Israel. 
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4.3.4 The Strait of Bab al Mandeb 
Bab al Mandeb is the narrow waterway that separates 
southwest Arabia from northeast Africa. It lies between Ras 
Bab al Mandeb on the east and Ras Siane on the west. Perim 
Island divides the Strait into eastern and western channels. 
The latter is the larger (16.8km - 10.5 miles) lying between 
Perim and the African coast. The width of the smaller channel 
is between 4. 8 and 1. 6km. The western passage is deep and 
navigable except at a bank lying 1. 11km south southeast of 
Pirie Point where the least depth is 11.9m. The area in the 
vicinity of Perim is prohibited to ships. The smaller passage 
east of Perim is dangerous because of strong and irregular 
tidal streams and coral reefs. Several casuali ties to ships 
h d . h' h 1 (126) ave occurre 1n t 1s c anne . 
Both the African and the Asian shores of the Strait are 
fringed by coral reefs some hundred meters wide. At Ras Bab 
al Man deb their width reaches 1,50 Om. The western shores of 
the Strait are dry and barren plains with many hills attain-
ing heights of a few hundred meters in the interior. ( 12 7) To 
cut down the risk of collisions and strandings a traffic 
separation scheme was introduced in November 197 3 by the 
Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO, 
now IMO) in the main channel. The Scheme divides the passage 
into northbound and southbound shipping 1 (128) anes (figure 
4. 4) . 
It is known in Arab sea-faring history that sailors 
PLATE 4.1. GEMINI II SATELLITE VIEW OF BAB AL MANDEB (SEPTEMBER 
1966) FROM AN ALTITUDE OF 850KM. (APPROXIMATE SCALE: 
1:3,500,000) 
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called Bab al Mandeb the 'Gate of Tears' , 'Gate of 
Affliction' , 'Gate of Wailing', or 'Gate of Lamentation' 
because of the dangers they used to face from reefs, islands 
or rocks against which their ships were wrecked and many 
sailors drowned. Therefore sailors' families used to mourn 
them during their absence. Additional dangers came from 
pirates who used to hide in the vicinity of the Strait. 
Another view associates the name Bab al Mandeb with the hot 
humid climate and bleak topography of the area. It has been 
suggested that the Americans might also apply the name to the 
t t t · ·t· of the Stra1"t.( 129 ) presen s ra eg1c pos1 1on 
The Strait is flanked on the east by PDR Yemen and Yemen 
AR; and on the west by Djibouti and Ethiopia (figure 4.2). 
PDR Yemen's sovereignty over Perim Island gives the country a 
clear advantage in the control of the Strait. The Americans 
are not at ease with regard to PDR Yemen and Ethiopia, both 
of which have strong links with the Soviet Union. In 197 3 
Bell argued that Aden might mount a blockade of the Strait 
against Israeli shipping. In those days, if the PDR Yemen had 
been militarily capable of carrying out the action it would 
have caused a substantial loss to Israel since its big oil 
supplies from Iran would have been hal ted. The Americans 
believe that Saudi passage in and out of the Red Sea could 
easily be blocked by unfriendly . (130) ne1ghbours. Tahtinen 
(1979) indicates that the Marxist states of Ethiopia and PDR 
Yemen are already in a position to close Bab al Mandeb. ( 1 3 1 ) 
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However, during the 1970s, Saudi Arabia has challenged PDR 
Yemen's claim of complete sovereignty over the Strait 
according to Ziring (1984), and stressed that Bab al Mandeb 
is a recognized international waterway, so that "any attempt 
to block passage through it would be considered an unfriendly 
t II ( 1 3 2 ) H d 0 t s d 0 0 t 0 t PDR y ac . owever, esp1 e au 1 oppos1 1on o emen 
because of the latter's Marxist ideology, Saudi Arabia would 
certainly welcome such blockade against Israel 1n another 
Israeli-Arab war. ( 1 33) 
Since the late 1940s the importance of Bab al Mandeb as 
one of the most internationally crucial waterways has been 
widely acknowledged as for example by Bruel. ( 1 34) It plays a 
major role in world shipping, because when coupled with the 
Suez Canal, it constitutes the shortest link between Europe 
and the Far East. While keeping the Canal open renders the 
Strait important to global trading and military interests, 
its closure increases the dependence of Red Sea states 
especially Ethiopia, Yemen AR, Sudan and Jordan on the 
Strait. Recent American perspectives consider the Strait to 
be as vital as Hormuz for the following reasons: 
( 1) G lf t 1 A-Je>:tillleAd for Western E the u pe ro eum _,u:@~.gl'leo, urope uses 
Strait; 
(2) the ports of Eilat and Aqaba depend on it; 
(3) because of their shift of naval facilities from Berbera 
to Aden in 1977-78 and their use of Socotra island, the 
Soviets find it convenient to have an open Bab al-Mandeb. 
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According to Anderson and Blake (1982) the USSR has built 
naval bases on Dahlak islands - as well as in the port of 
Assab - in Ethiopia; 
(4) the Saudis are engaged in building new port facilities on 
the Red Sea, notably at Yanbu; 
(S) the Egyptian naval forces have been actively operating in 
the Red Sea, and Egyptian vessels regularly transit the 
Strait en route to Oman and the United Arab Emirates 
(UAE); and 
(6) the French reluctance to leave Djibouti fearing that one 
of the perennial Horn belligerents, Ethiopia and Somalia, 
might annex the strategic city state since both, 
especially Ethiopia, 
territory. ( 135 ) 
claim Djibouti as part of its 
To the former British Ambassador to Somalia, Mr Harry 
Brind (1983-84) the Horn of Africa may be used to carry out 
"'surveillance' of the Strait of Bab el Mandel". 
practically, he adds, it may not be easy to contemplate a 
" situation far short of total war in which it would 
be possible for one superpower to close the 
Straits"; 
But 
Yet 1n this case the Canal would be closed and this would 
leave the Straits with no real value. ( 136 ) Nevertheless, 
since the late 1970s a possible Israeli threat to Bab al 
Mandeb has been "a headache for Egypt and Saudi Arabia". ( 137) 
The schemes for the widening and deepening of the Suez 
237 
Canal could greatly enhance the significance of the Strait. 
The Strait already stands as a vital chokepoint regarding 
energy, commercial interests and military traffic, and may be 
viewed as the most important factor that creates the geo-
politics of the southern Red Sea region. To Blake (1982), it 
is Bab al Mandeb and Hormuz together, that give Southewest 
A . d h H th . 1. t. 1 . . f. ( 1 3 8 ) Th s1a an t e orn e1r geopo 1 1ca s1gn1 1cance. us, 
as a vital Red Sea asset, the Strait attracts superpower 
rivalry. 
Despite the difficulty of blocking the deep channel of 
Bab al Mandeb interference with shipping has taken place. The 
first such incident occurred on 11 June 1971 when the 'Coral 
Sea~ a Liberian flag ship chartered by Israel, was hit by 
bazooka rockets fired from a swift patrol boat by Pales-
tinians. The ship was carrying 65,000 tons of Iranian oil and 
en route for Eilat. The shelling left three holes in the ship 
but it did not ignite the oil. Both Israeli and American 
views agree that the attackers were helped by or had the 
acquiescence of PDR Yemen. The 1 Coral Sea' incident brought 
. 
I 
worldwide attention to the Strait as a crjf:ic al point of 
conflict, convincing Israel that it was not enough to control 
the Strait of Tiran, but it had to operate long-range 
aircraft to cover distant targets, as well as to acquire a 
flotilla of long-range missile boats in the Red Sea. 
Cordesman (1984) indicates that the Strait falls within 
Israeli fighter range with use of airborne refuelling. ( 1 39 ) 
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In 197 2 a French merchant ship steaming through the 
strait, was hit by fire from PDR Yemen's tanks positioned on 
Perim Island. During the Israeli-Arab war of 1973, PDR Yemen 
declared a blockade of the Strait against ships flying the 
Israeli flag ships operated by Israeli companies and ships en 
route to Israel. Aden also declared the Strait to be a 'war 
zone'. Egyptian forces participated in the blockade which was 
considered as an alternative geostrategic chokepoint to 
Tiran, then under Israeli occupation. The Israelis clearly 
felt the effects of the effective blockade of Eilat from Bab 
al Mandeb which cut Israel's sea communications to East 
Africa, Asia and the Far East. ( 140 ) During the 1973 war PDR 
Yemen deployed tanks in the area of Bab al Mandeb to monitor 
all shipping through the Strait. Moreover, warships of the US 
. ddl ~~~~~~~-- . d . M1 e East Force were r'fii~Nlfflrtf'Jt'ftttil! subJecte to a rout1ne check 
during their north and south transits. ( 1 41 ) 
The fourth attempt to interfere with shipping in the 
Strait occurred in October 1974 during the Rabat Arab Summit 
when a lease agreement was allegedly concluded between Egypt 
and PDR Yemen by which the former were to occupy the 
strategic island of Perim to interdict shipping to Eilat. 
However, the authorities in Aden have always denied the 
existence of such a deal. The event was interpreted by the 
Israelis as Egyptian interest in preventing a Soviet presence 
in the vicinity of Bab al Mandeb. ( 142 ) The Egyptian blockade 
of the Strait indicated a warning to Israel that 
239 
"freedom of passage across 
secure for Israel access 
shipping might be closed at 
Indian Ocean". ( 143) 
Tiran Strait does 
to Eilat because 
Bab el Mandeb to 
not 
its 
the 
The rocketing of the 'Coral Sea' demonstrated to the Americans 
that attacks from the shoreline of PDR Yemen could threaten 
maritime traffic in the Red Sea. The situation has worsened 
steadily due to the American conviction that many of the 
rebel forces in the area have been supplied with explosives, 
anti-armour rockets and light-guided missiles, besides the 
presence::' of Soviet military establishments 1n Socotra and 
Kamaran Islands. Moreover, military facilities used by the 
USSR in Massawa and Assab increase such threats to the area 
of Bab al Mandeb. ( 144 ) Both superpowers are interested in 
deploying units of their fleets from the Mediterranean to the 
Indian Ocean. Owing to this need and to the Soviet military 
presence in the area around Bab al Mandeb, Western scholars 
consider the Strait "of direct strategic importance to the 
West". ( 1 45) Therefore, there is growing US apprehension about 
the threat posed by the Strait to Western and Gulf maritime 
interests associated with the Suez Canal. The Americans feel 
that the French military presence in Djibouti is some 
guarantee of continuing Western use of the Bab al Mandeb. 
However, the US feels the need for more effective policing of 
the St "t (146) ra1 . Therefore, in 1975 the us concluded an 
agreement with Israel in support 0f free passage in the 
Strait. The "Memorandum of Agreement between the Government 
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of Israel and the United States" stipulates that: 
11 in accordance with the principle of the freedom of 
navigation on the high seas and free and unimpeded 
passage through and over straits connecting inter-
national waters, the United States Government 
regards the Straits of Bah al Mandeb and the Strait 
of Gibraltar as international waterways. It will 
support Israel's right to free and unimpeded passage 
through such straits. Similarly, the United States 
Government recognizes Israel's right to freedom of 
flights over the Red Sea and such straits and will 
support diplomatically the exercise of that 
right." ( 147) 
Although the Israeli-American accord was associated with 
the Israeli-Egyptian interim settlement of 197 5, the sub-
sequent peace treaty of 1979 did not abrogate it. However, 
most American-Israeli preoccupations about interference with 
shipping in Bah al Mandeb emanate from the Yemens' attitude 
towards Israel and the US. This is why in 1974 Abir indicated 
Israel's awareness of vulnerability of its shipping in waters 
under exclusive Arab control; therefore Israel was convinced 
that arguments for keeping Sharm al-Sheikh in command of 
Tiran Strait would be invalid if Israel were unable to 
protect her shipping through to Bab al Mandeb (Abir, 197 4). 
Israel was not the only country to worry about Bab al Mandeb. 
Ten years later the Americans indicated their preoccupation 
about the uncertainty of international waters in Bab al 
Mandeb. ( 148 ) 
Due to the importance of the Strait to international 
shipping and its vulnerability especially after the bazooka 
raid on the Coral Sea Western powers made several attempts to 
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put Perim Island under some sort of international 
sovereignty, but all such efforts failed. ( 1 49) It has been 
clear that Bab al Mandeb represents the second major 
chokepoint 1n the Red Sea; and it lies in a volatile area 
characterized by continuous instability and superpower 
rivalry. Therefore the Strait may be seen as one of the most 
dangerous troublespots in the world which could ignite war in 
the region. Direct and indirect American interests in the 
Strait are clearly considerable, and closure of the Strait 
may cause great problems to all nations using the Suez Canal. 
The Gulf of Aden 
The Gulf of Aden constituting the Southern approaches to 
the Red Sea is much larger than the ~ulfs of Suez and Aqaba. 
It is fronted by PDR Yemen on the north, Somalia on the south 
and Djibouti on the west. Its geographical limits are defined 
by Bah al Mandeb on the west and Cape Guardafui on the 
east. ( 1 50) As a deep water basin, the Gulf of Aden is 
physically linked to the Red Sea via Bab al Mandeb; and thus 
it connects the Red Sea with the northwest Indian Ocean. It 
takes its name from the sea port of Aden located between the 
southern coasts of Arabia and the Horn of Africa, the Gulf is 
on the shipping lane between the Indian Ocean and the 
Mediterranean. Aden and Mukalla are the two major ports on 
the §ulf's northern coast; Djibouti and Berbera are the main 
ones on its southern shore. To the west it narrows at Bah al 
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Mandeb and the Gulf of Tadjoura. In parenthesis, it should be 
noted, however, that the Gulf of Aden has strategic 
significance quite independent of Red Sea interests. It gives 
access to the vi tal Horn of Africa and to the southwest 
corners of the Arabian peninsula. Both are keys to vast 
interior hinterlands caught up in cold war superpower 
competition. More than 100 years ago the Americans recognized 
the strategic importance of the Gulf of Aden. They thought of 
building a lighthouse somewhere on one of the adjacent coasts 
to "add to the security of vessels entering the Gulf of Aden 
from the Indian Ocean". ( 1 51 ) Currently, Soviet military 
presence in Aden (see below) and Socotra may enhance the 
importance of the Gulf of Aden in US strategic thinking. If 
blockaded, the Gulf of Aden would render Bah al Mandeb of no 
use and the most important effect would be upon the Suez 
Canal. 
4.4 Major Ports 
Introduction 
Throughout time, seaborne trade in the Middle East has 
led to the development of ports. The breaching of the Suez 
Canal in 1869 and the discovery of oil in the Middle East in 
the 1930s have greatly contributed to the growth of ports in 
the Red Sea region. Port development in the region is of two 
kinds: those that serve solely national trade needs such as 
Jeddah and those that function as transhipment centres, 
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typified by Djibouti. ( 152 ) As The Times Atlas of the Oceans 
(1983) indicates, a port's influence will sometimes go beyond 
the domestic environment or even territorial boundaries. ( 153 ) 
Port Sudan could exemplify this kind of port because it 
serves Muslim pilgrims from west and central Africa when they 
cross the Red Sea to Jeddah on their annual journey to Makka. 
Djibouti and its vital transit function for Ethiopia is 
another striking example. 
The role played by Aden in linking Great Britain with 
its vast dominions in the Far East and East Africa during the 
imperial era is well known. The location of Aden, Djibouti 
and Berber a on the Gulf of Aden has given these ports a 
significant strategic value as they front on critical 
shipping routes both from the Mediterranean and the Cape of 
Good Hope to the Gulf. Some Suez Canal traffic has been 
attracted to these ports for victualling and maintenance. 
There is no land-locked state in the Red Sea region; 
access to the sea is enjoyed by all (figure 2.2.). Some states 
such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Israel are also endowed with 
coasts on other waters. In general, the Red Sea is 
characterized by paucity of good and deep ports. The average 
distance of over 700km between one port and another may 
indicate such scarcity. ( 1 54) Port activity in the Red Sea 
was considerably affected by the 1967 closure of the Suez 
Canal. For example, before the closure Aden and Djibouti were 
ranked fourth and sixth in the world for intensity of 
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Table 4.13 
Red Sea princi arts: dr-aught, number of berths and tanker 
ter-minals 
Port Dt'aught No. of berths Tanker terminals 
Aden 1 1 . 9m·:~ 13 I 
Aqaba_ 1 0. 1m-;~ 1 1 I 
Assab 10.4rn 1 1 I 
I 
Be r·be r'<.l 9.8m NA 
Djibouti 11 rn 1 3 ~:- I 
Eilat 12.3m 5 ~/ I 
Hodeidah 7.9m 7 I 
Jeddah 14. Om-;~ 44 I 
1\'lassawa 8.8sm 6g " I 
l'o r· t Sudan 11.28m 18 I 
Suez 11.28m 13 I 
Yanbu 18m 9 I 
Source: Lloyd's of London Press Ltd, 1984, Ports of the lvorld, 
London, 1984, pp.18, 24, 28, 29, 59, 66, 314, 316, 353, 
382, 38(•. 416. 
* from: the Hydrographer of the Navy, Red Sea and Gulf of 
Aden Pilot, Taunton, England, 1980, 12th ed, pp.13, 136, 
230. 
NA Not available 
# Additional port information is in Appendix 
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traffic. ( 1 5 5 ) After the closure they lost their positions and 
even after the re-opening of the Canal, they could not regain 
their previous significance, due to the shift ot the Cape 
route. A brief survey of 12 major ports in the region will 
follow. Table 4.13 shows draughts, number of berths and oil 
terminals in these principal ports; and appendix t.wo gives 
detailed information about the kind of exports and imports 
handled by these ports, as well as facilities found in them. 
4.4.2 Ports 
Suez 
The port of Suez is located at the southern end of the 
Canal. It.can accommodate four ships at a time but passenger 
vessels take priority, and are allowed to stay alongside for 
24 hours. The port has a free zone and it is an adminis-
trative centre. There are seven concrete jetties used by 
tankers of about 18,000dwt. There are six pipelines in oper-
ation and the port can handle all kinds of oil products. ( 1 56 ) 
However, due to Egypt's concentration of port development on 
its Mediterranean coast, Port Suez has only 2,000m of quays. 
However, it underwent harbour expansion, costing $23m, 
completed in 1980. ( 157 ) The largest vessel that the port can 
accommodate is 228m long. The city and the port are connected 
to the main railway system; Suez is linked to Ismailia with a 
motor road which also connects Port Said with Cairo. Port 
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Suez is connected to Berenice and Port Sudan, 1,1 04km to the 
south, via a motorway running along the western shores of the 
(158) Gulf of Suez and the Red Sea. 
Port Sudan 
Apart from the River Nile, Port Sudan is Sudan's vital 
outlet to the sea. It lies about 730km north east of 
Khartoum. In 1900 Port Sudan replaced Saw akin, 6 5km to the 
south, as the main port of the country. Besides the recently 
built roadway (1980),the Port is connected to Khartoum by a 
narrow gauge railway; it has an international airport. Its 
population was 120,000 in 1977. ( 159 ) Besides its vital role 
in 
in Sudan's economyAhandling more than So% of Sudan's foreign 
trade, the port provides an important cultural service to 
Muslims, not only from Sudan, but from other parts of Africa, 
Iespeciall¥' ~igeria, during t:tieir pilgrimage to Makka. The Hajj 
season is an occasion of economic and social activity for the 
port. Moreover, Port Sudan is a transit port for Uganda, Chad 
and Zaire. 
The port's harbour has a good entrance, 278m wide, free 
from hazards and protected from all directions; but there is 
a remarkable rapid drop in depth, from 73.2m to 25.6m at the 
entrance. Container ships and oil tankers are handled. The 
largest vessel to be accommodated by the port is 11.28m deep 
and 277m long. ( 160 ) With American assistance, Port Sudan is 
undergoing a large development programme, to be completed in 
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19 8 5 , ~ 'this includes a new ro/ ro berth and enhanced grain 
handling capacity. The latter project, clearly important when 
one considers the famine disasters 1n Sudan and neighbouring 
Ethiopia and Chad, is an upgrading of existing conveyors and 
elevators. (l 6 l) Owing to the discovery of oil in western and 
southern Sudan, a project to develop a complementary con-
tainer port and oil terminals will be carried out at New 
Sawakin Port, north of old Sawakin. (l 62 ) The scheme will also 
alleviate the burden on Port Sudan. New Sawakin is expected 
to be operational in 1986. Plans to improve facilities at Old 
Sawakin to cater for transit traffic have been considered. 
Massaws 
Ethiopia's major port of Massawa is located on the 
Eritrean coast about 55km east of Asmara, the provincial 
capital. Almost the same distance separates the port from the 
Dahlak islands. Thus, the location of the port is strategic 
with regard to Asmara, while proximity to Dahlak archipelago 
could be advantageous. The harbour is well protected and 
enclosed by a chain of islands. The maximum size of vessel 
accommodated by the port is of 8.85m draught and 180m length. 
A project for the construction of a ship repair yard has been 
started. The port is connected to Asmara by railway and, to 
Addis Ababa by road. Ethiopia's naval base as well as its 
. (163) 
naval academy are 1n Massawa. 
In 19 53 the US entered into a 25 year agreement with 
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Emperor~Selassie by which the former established the Kagnew 
communication station at Asmara. Two years after the 
overthrow of the Emperor in 1974 and the Marxist revolution, 
the US dismantled the station with a view to develop~ the 
former British base at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. In 
1978 the Eritrean rebels were able to cut communications 
between Asmara and Massawa, and made great efforts to capture 
the latter, but they were unsuccessful and were forced by the 
Ethiopian regime to abandon all the towns they had seized. 
According to The Times Atals of the Oceans ( 19 8 3) Soviet 
warships took part in defending the port. ( 16 4) 
Assab 
Assab, like Hodeidah, Aden, Djibouti and Massawa, is one 
of the important ports near the southern entrance of the Red 
Sea. Lying on the southern extremity of the Eritrean coast., 
Assab is Ethiopia 1 s second major port, handling most of the 
country's trade. Ethiopia's only oil refinery is located at 
Assab; and the port is free from hazards and sandbanks, and 
it has three large tanker terminals. ( 16 5) 
Port development programmes include extensive widening 
of the port area and plans for building a ro/ro berth. In 
1982 Assab received 494 ships and handled 1,494,548 tons as 
imports and 555,884 tons as exports. It is connected with 
Addis Ababa and Asmara by road, but a railway line to connect 
Assab with Addis has been under study by British 
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consultants. (166) 
Apart from its commanding position, SOkm from Bab al 
Mandeb, the port is in the close vicinity of the strategic 
islands of Fatma and Halib, which may make it more important 
than Djibouti with regard to the security of Bab al Mandeb. 
Lapidoth (1982) states that in 1979 the Ethiopian regime was 
able to keep Assab under its control despite strong Eritrean 
resistance. ( 167 ) 
Djibouti 
Located about 100km only from Bab aL Mandeb, the port of 
Djibouti enjoys an enormously important position. Since its 
annexation by France in 1884, Djibouti has continued to 
represent a French strategic 1 toehold 1 1n Africa. In 1897 a 
French-Ethiopian agreement was signed to make Djibouti "the 
official outlet for Ethiopian commerce", and in 1917 the 
Addis Ababa-Djibouti railway linked the two cities, and thus 
Djibouti became the chief port for transit trade to and from 
Eth . . (168) 10p1a. A new container terminal is scheduled for 
completion by 1984-85~ the main objective being to facilitate 
transhipment to the Red Sea, Arabian Gulf, East Africa, the 
Far East, Europe and the United States. The project is 
financed by Saudi, Kuwaiti and Western financiers. In 1982, 
920 ships called at Djibouti,which handled in the same year 
298,869 tons of imports and 27,469 tons as exports and 
transits. ( 169 ) During the process of Djibouti's independence, 
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France deployed 18 warships (including two aircraft carriers) 
off the port to guarantee peaceful voting on the referendum 
about independence and to protect 
withdrawal was needed. ( 17°) 
French nationals if 
The city state of Djibouti is still garrisoned by 5,000 
French troops despite the independence in 1977 of the former 
Territory of Afars and Issas. The reason resides in the 
strategic value of the port and the perennial Ethiopian-
Somali claims to the territory. France, which also maintains 
a naval base in the port, invested 11m francs in port 
( 1 7 1 ) development there. The Americans are very much concerned 
about the future of this important port. At the time of 
Djibouti's independence, the Americans perceived the Soviets 
as pursuing, through Somalia: 
"the seizure of the highly strategic port of 
Djibouti as soon as the French leave". (172) 
It is the location of the port on one side of Bab al Mandeb, 
joining the Gulf of Aden and eventually the Indian Ocean 
which matters to the United States. Consequently, apart from 
the threat to Ethiopia, control of the port by Somalia would 
"represent the fact that Soviet-supported South 
Yemen stands on the other side of the strait spells 
its wider significance". (173) 
The admission of Djibouti into the Arab League in September 
1975 resulted in its denying Israeli traffic the use of the 
port. Salama (1980) maintains that in the late 1970s Saudi 
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Arabia played an important role by convincing Djibouti to 
cease availing civilian and military facilities to the 
Israeli navy which had been using the port. ( 174 ) The US makes 
"from time to time routine air or sea calls using 
commercial facilities". (175) 
Two events have greatly affected the activity of the port: 
the closure of the Suez Canal in 1967, and the Ethiopian-
Somali war over Ogaden in 1977-78. Before the Canal's 1967 
closure, the port used to handle 1,000 vessels annually and 
it was the fifth container port of the world. After closure 
it was overtaken by Jeddah for the maintenance and supply of 
ships. However, even after the reopening of the Canal, the 
port has not regained its importance. Due to the Ogaden war 
which led to the cutting of the railway, the port's traffic 
has been reduced by about 15%. ( 1 7 6 ) 
Berbera 
Situated on the head of an inlet on the southern shores 
of the Gulf of Aden, Berbera is about 320km from both Bab al 
Mandeb and Aden. It affords a good anchorage, except in 
strong winds. The 320m long wharf of the newly constructed 
port of Berbera enables the accommodation of cargo vessels of 
up to 12,000dwt. Vessels carrying containers can be served in 
Berbera. Shell operates two oil berths for vessels of up to 
164.6m long and 5.49 to 8. 54m deep. Berber a has a 
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maintenance workshop and a 40m long maintenance quay, and can 
handle minor repairs. Due to Somalia's lack of good roads and 
railways, coastal shipping forms an important element in 
domestic transport. Berbera is linked by road with Hargeisa, 
160km southwest and with Mogadishu, the capital. The port 
maintains regular sea links with Aden. ( 177 ) After Somalia's 
abrogation of The Treaty of Friendship with Moscow and the 
expulsion of Soviet and Cuban advisers in 1977, Soviet use of 
facilities at Berbera came to an end. On 22 August 1980 the 
US signed an 
the port .C 1 7 8 ) 
Aden 
Aden, like 
agreement with Somalia 
Djibouti, is located 
for the use of 
on the southern 
approaches to the Red Sea. It is the capital and chief port 
of PDR Yemen. Aden's location on the corssroads of shipping 
lanes bestows on it an enormous strategic 
significance. Between 1839 and 1966 the port was known as the 
Colony of Aden under the British Crown; it became one of the 
key British naval bases on a sea route once considered of 
vital significance to Great Britain. The breaching of the 
Canal and the discovery of oil in the Persian Gulf enabled 
the port to assume great political and commercial importance. 
Before the closure of the Canal, the port's dues represented 
the major source of revenue for the country. The closure of 
the Canal hit the port very hard. In 1966 the port handled 
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6, 000 ships; in 1968 only 1, 200 vessels called. Even after 
the reopening of the Suez Canal, Aden has not recovered its 
previous level of activity and it probably never will. (l 79 ) 
The shift to the Cape route and the laying of pipelines to 
the Red Sea account for this. Fish is the major export 
commodity. Aden is a transhipment and entrepot functioning as 
a centre of distribution to and from neighbouring 
territories. 
Aden has an inner and outer harbour. The outer harbour 
has a good anchorage which can serve a large number of ships. 
Aden's oil harbour which serves the port's refinery can 
accommodate four tankers of up to 65,000 tons dwt. The inner 
harbour contains 13 oil bunkering berths. Cargo is served by 
five buoy berths with depths of 10.97m, and another five with 
depths ranging between 5.18 to 8.53m. (lSO) The port has 
undergone an $18m improvement project funded by the World 
Bank and Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development 
(AFESD). In November 1977 Japan,built a new floating dry dock 
with a capacity of 12,000 tons. In 1982 British consultants 
completed plans for a further $8m development project. Five 
new deep water berths with 770m of quayage, as well as other 
facilities, are to be built in the port and scheduled for 
completion by 1985. Also, a new floating dock with lifting 
capacity of 4, 500 tons is said to be in operation. In 1980 
the port received 2,436 vessels and handled 7,773,297 tons of 
cargo. (181) 
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It seems clear that Aden is becoming less attractive 
than Djibouti and Jeddah for the latter 1 s more competitive 
bunkering, cheaper port dues and higher level of trade. ( 182 ) 
In 1981 Aden 1 s huge refinery handled 3 to 4m tons of crude 
oil. With BP 1 s assistance, its capacity is being upgraded. 
The activity of the complex has been enhanced by supplies 
coming from kuwait and India, both of which have lost 
refining services in the northern Gulf since 1980 due to the 
Iraq-Iran war.(183) In current geopolitics, the Americans 
perceive Aden as of high strategic significance; moreover 
they are very concerned about the port becoming a major 
foothold for Soviet naval and air fleets, availing Moscow an 
"operational extension in a crucial area of the Indian 
0 II (1 84) Th. 1 . h w h. t h b k cean . 1s may exp a1n w y as 1ng on as ecome een 
to acquire facilities at Berbera, and Masira island (Oman). 
Hodeidah 
In the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden Pilot (1980) Ahmedi, 
rather than Hodeidah, is considered as Yemen AR 1 s main port, 
but most maritime literature regards Hodeidah as the major 
port of the country. In 1974 the port handled 601,000 tons. 
Despite Soviet reconstruction projects in 1962, by 1978 
Hodeidah was again badly congested, and further development 
started. In 1980 and 1984 another development expansion 
programme of $73m was completed and new berths were 
constructed.( 185 ) As in the case of Aden in the early 1970s 
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the Americans expressed their concern that Hodeidah was under 
Soviet influence. A surface road of 552km connects Hodeidah 
to Sanaa (160km), J1zan (216km) and to Ta'iz (176km), south 
south-east. ( 186 ) 
Jeddah 
Jeddah Islamic port is the principal port of Saudi 
Arabia and the pilgrim port catering for Makka which lies 
2 7km south west inland. The port owes its growth to the 
presence of the Muslim shrines of Makka and al Madina, rather 
than to the development of commerce. Jeddah receives Muslim 
pilgrims from all over the world. According to Prince 
Abdullah al Faisal al-Turki al-Saud ( 1984) the number of 
annual pilgrims reached 2.5m; a very considerable number of 
whom come by sea. (187) After the discovery of substantial 
amounts of oil in Saudi Arabia, pilgrimage was no longer the 
major source of foreign revenue. In order to cope with the 
increasing demands of oil production and export, port 
facilities had to be expanded and improved considerably. 
Expansion of the port since the late 1970s has enabled 
it to handle 6m tons of cargo in comparison with 1.2m tons in 
1973. Further expansions in the early 1980s will make Jeddah 
the largest port on the Red Sea. J eddah' s ship repair yard, 
inaugurated in 1982, has two floating docks that can handle 
ships loaded up to 45,000dwt and 16,000dwt respectively; they 
are described as the first of their kind in the Red Sea. The 
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port authority hopes to secure 95% of the repair operations 
for ships plying the Red Sea. Moreover, other multi-purpose 
terminals and pilgrim/passenger terminal are under way. At 
the Northern Extension a refrigerated warehouse space of 
156, 000 was scheduled for completion by 19 84; also a live-
stock terminal as well as food and fruit terminals were 
planned to open in 1982;and two new berths of 400m and lOOm 
length, designed specially for the handling of livestock,will 
(188) . be constructed. In 1981 Jeddah handled 4,758 sh1ps 
carrying 15. 4m tons of imported cargo, 180, 000 passengers, 
and 3, 254,453 head of imported livestock; it also handled 
615,507 TEU's (Ports of the World, 1984). In 1982 the number 
of ships which called at the port increased to 5,572 loaded 
with 19.5m tons of cargo from abroad. The port has an 
associated iron and steel mill and an oil refinery which has 
been operating since the 1960s. In 1983, the refinery 
throughput was more than 33-4m barrels of crude oil, a rise 
of 9. 55% over the figure for 1982 (Arab News, 1984). The 
complex handled 335 oil tankers and loaded 341 tankers with 
oil products in 1982. The capacity of Jeddah's desalination 
plant, 323,000 cum/day is the largest in the Red Sea region 
and second only in size to that in Al Khubar (Saudi Arabia), 
on the eastern coast of the Arabian peninsula. Military 
Technology (January, 1984) indicates that both Jeddah and 
Yanbu industrial complexes are. areas where the Saudi navy is 
based. ( 189 ) On 21 August 1984 King Fahad inaugurated King 
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Faisal 1 s Naval base at Jeddah, saying that 
" the Kingdom 1 s boundaries extend far more than 
1, OOOkm along the Red Sea the Kingdom will 
not allow violation of its waters from sea, land, or 
space". (190) 
The base is the second to King Abdul Aziz Naval base at 
Al-Jubail. Prince Sultan, Second Deputy to the Prime 
Minister, and Minister of Defence, declared that the two 
bases are 
·"built on the basis of Islam, and for peace 
they constitute support to every Muslim Arab". 
and 
( 1 9 1 ) 
The Commander of the base explained its major function as 
Yanbu 
"the defence of security and integrity of the 
Kingdom 1 s land, territorial waters and wealth". 
(192) 
Yanbu is the second largest port on the Hijaz coast. It 
is located 360km north of Jeddah and 160km west of al-Madina. 
While Jeddah is the port of Makka, Yanbu is the port of Al 
Madina. It is divided into two: Yanbu commercial port and 
Yanbu industrial port which lies about 29km south-east of the 
former, and is used for landing construction material, 
particularly cement. Impressive oil-based industrial develop-
ment has been established at Yanbu; and this has led to the 
rapid growth of the city as an industrial port. Yanbu was 
chosen as the site for significantly vital industrial 
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development for a number of reasons: 
( 1) it provides an alternative outlet to the Gulf for oil, 
gas and industrial products; 
( 2) it contributes to the economic development and 
diversification of the western region; 
(3) it provides a shorter distance for tankers and NGL 
carriers to the Western world and north-east Africa; 
(4) it had an existing commercial harbour in the old city of 
Yanbu (about 129km away from the industrial city). ( 193 ) 
The port's facilities include bulk and floating cement 
terminals. The East-West crude pipeline (chapter 5) is served 
by an offshore terminal. Three berths are used as loading 
points for the crude oil coming through this line. 
Along the 25km coastline of the port, the construction 
of a special purpose harbour to serve the new industrial 
plants, is going on. It has been reported that the 
construction of a new industrial port, known as King F ahd 
Port at Madinat Yanbu Al-Sinaiyah (Yanbu Industrial City) has 
been commissioned. The port lacks railway facilities. In 1981 
it handled 922,411 tons of imported cargo. ( 194) 
Transportation of oil and gas from the Eastern Province 
constitutes the basis of Yanbu's industry. Yanbu's population 
was expected to reach 42,000 by December 1984 and is forecasfud 
to reach 59, 000 by 1991. ( 19 S) Yanbu industrial complex is 
intended to avoid undue concentration of the Kingdom's heavy 
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industry in the Eastern Province. Already some major 
industrial projects have been set up: a crude oil export 
terminal supplied by the East-West trans-peninsular pipeline, 
and a natural gas liquid ( NGL) terminal. In 1982 the NGL 
fractionation plants produced the first liquified petroleum 
gas. Yanbu may be the world's biggest cement terminal. The 
Saudis want this development to lessen the burden on Jeddah 
and to receive the huge quantities of building materials and 
industrial equipment imported by the Kingdom. ( 196 ) According 
to Blissenbach and Nawab (1982) an anticipated production of 
about 10 tons/day of concentrate from Red Sea metalliferous 
mud would also be transported to the metallurgical pilot 
plant at Yanbu for processing. The process would be the first 
mineral resource project in the Yanbu industrial 
complex. ( 19 7) The 17 5, 000 b/ d Lube oil refinery built by 
Petromine at Yanbu began production in June 1983.( 198 ) 
Although Yanbu's industrial projects have been criticised by 
several people, according to Prince Abdullah al-Saud (1984), 
as "white elephants which are not economically viable" the 
Saudis are confident that the projects will prove the critics 
wrong. ( 199 ) Table 4.14 shows major industries in the port. 
Finally, the Petroleum Economist (December, 19 81) indicates 
that despite official Saudi denial of plans for a giant 
underground storage facility for oil on the Red Sea, Saudi 
Arabia admitted that its storage capacity at Yanbu would be 
. (200) 1ncreased to around 50m barrels. 
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Regarding vulnerability to sabotage or attack, Cordesman 
( 1984) holds the view that Yanbu "is a far more secure area 
than any port or facility in the Gulf". However, Yanbu could 
be more vulnerable than Gulf ports if the American defence 
specialist considered Israel's threat. Moreover, it is 
located in the vicinity of persistent local conflicts 
(chapter 7) and Soviet manoeuvres. Yanbu is flanked by 
sources of threat from the north and south, but it is the 
northern source that is feared most. However, it is the 
question of internal or regional instability that may 
threaten the safety of such industrial development, not only 
at Yanbu but in the· region as a whole. However, Saudi and 
American views are identical in considering Israeli threat to 
Yanbu. Both William Quandt (1982), former US National 
Security Advisor and Prince Abdulla al-Saud ( 1984), agree 
that Israel constitutes the chief source of threat to the 
Yanbu industrial development. Prince Abdullah al-Faisal 
al-Turki al Saud ( 19 84) indicates that bombing in a single 
day could destroy all these schemes and buildings. He 
emphasizes that 
"For anybody who lives in the Red Sea region, the 
greatest threat to all these projects is Israel." 
The Saudis feel that the Israeli threat may be a pressure 
card to obtain access to the Kingdom's energy resources, 
especially to such a relatively close area as Yanbu. The 
Prince maintains that: 
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Table 4.14 
J>rimar·y industr·ies in Yanbu 
l'lant Capacity Status Operational 
start-up date 
Crude oil terminal 1,600,000 b/d 0 July 1981 
Domestic ref iner·y 170,000 b/d c July 1983 
NGL plant 270,000 b/d 0 October 1982 
Expor·t r·e fine t'Y 250,000 b/d c 1984a 
Lube oil r·cf i ne r·y 5,000 b/d D 
J> e t r· o c h c rn i c a 1 s ( I ) 450,000 t/y c 1984a 
Metal p r· o cess i n g 1 b p ant D 
Metal pr~ocess i ng plant b D 
Note: a) Forecast dates 
b) Each plant is undertaken by a different company 
Abbreviations: C 
D 
0 
b/d 
t/y 
Under construction 
Deferred 
Operational 
bar-rels per· day 
= tons per year· 
Sour·cc: Pr·.ince Abdullah al-Faisail al-Turki al-Saud ( 1984), 
'Saudi Development Plans in the Red Sea Region' in 
Far·id,, A (ed), The Red Sea, Croom Helm, London 
and Sydrwy, in association with the Arab Resear·ch 
Centre, London, StMartin's Press, N.Y., 1984., p-44· 
262 
"The Israelis ask why they should import refined 
petroleum products from Rotterdam when they can get 
them cheaper from Yanbu." (202) 
Quandt ( 19 8 2) points out that Israeli air and naval units 
pose a threat to the port of Yanbu which constitutes an 
attractive target for Israel in case the latter is drawn into 
direct confrontation with the Kingdom. ( 203) 
Aqaba 
Being the only Jordanian outlet to the Sea, the port of 
Aqaba is vital to the Kingdom. To Fisher (1971) the emergence 
of Aqaba and Eilat, is a result of the geographical impacts 
of the protracted Israeli-Arab conflict and the port's modern 
developments are 
"in response to recent exigencies of political 
geography". (204) 
Situated at the northern extremity of the Gulf of Aqaba, the 
port is about 8km east of the port of Eilat. Aqaba was 
established after World War One and grew as Trans-Jordan 1 s 
most significant commercial outlet. Before its establishment, 
all Jordanian trade was carried across Palestine to the 
. (205) Med1terranean. The Lebanese civil war of 1975 which 
closed Beirut, and the reopening of the Suez Canal in 1975 
increased the importance of Aqaba. However, this also led to 
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serious congestion and delays. Phosphate is the major 
commodity export by volume. In 1966 Aqaba handled 612,000 
tons of goods, and in 1974 this jumped to 1,116,000 tons, 
(206) 
about 95% of which was phosphate. In 1979 the number of 
ships calling at Aqaba reached 1,238, and in the first nine 
months of 1982 it handled 6.7m tons of cargo. 
Aqaba has sufficient lighters to handle cargo, and it 
can serve ships of up to 20,000dwt and 9.76m draught. (208) 
Import of some petroleum products and edible oils can be 
carried through pipes to tanks in the vicinity of the port, 
also these pipelines provide bunkers to vessels. Among the 
development programmes, floating berths will be replaced by 
permanent container terminals to handle vessels with 15m 
d ht (209) raug . 
Apart from the oil terminal and refinery, the 1976-80 
plan was intended to make major investment in phosphate 
handling. Consequently, three major schemes took place at 
Aqaba: 
(1) an expansion of the port; 
(2) an increase in phosphate storage capacity; and 
(3) additional rail links to the port. 
Moreover, potash from the Dead Sea began to be exported via 
Aqaba in 1982. (210) Threatened by mounting attacks on 
shipping posed by the Gulf war since 1980, Arab oil 
exporters, especially Iraq, have been much attracted to Aqaba 
as a viable alternative to dangerous Gulf exits. Projects for 
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oil pipelines from Iraq as well as from other Gulf states to 
Aqaba have been considered (chapter 5. 2). Between 19 8 2 and 
1983 the port's exports increased by 24%. ( 211 ) 
Considerable Iraqi dependence on the port since 1981 to 
handle large amounts of cargo has benefited Jordan with 
greatly needed transit tolls. Of the 6. 7m tons of cargo 
handled by the port in the first nine months of 1982, about 
60% including weapons, was bound for Iraq. ( 212 ) Aqaba is seen 
to 
"remain an important sea port, and will always be a 
second line of defence for shipping, depending on 
where trouble should be in the Middle East". (213) 
Regular flights from the Aqaba airport connect it with Amma~ 
' ' 
the capital, 248km to the north; it is also linked with the 
'•lfo:rmer by an all-weather road; this road diverges 160km to 
the south east to connect Aqaba with Tabuk in Saudi Arabia, 
where the Saudis have a major military base. Also Aqaba is 
joined to Yanbu by a coastal road. ( 214 ) However, it is the 
Gulf war that increased the importance of Aqaba, which may 
thrive further after the laying of the proposed Iraqi oil 
pipeline. The port's position opposite Israel could threaten 
its existence. The expected Iraqi pipeline could increase 
such potential threat (chapter 5). 
Eilat 
Located on the northwestern side of the head of the Gulf 
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of Aqaba, Eilat is one of Israel's three major ports. It is 
Israel's only exit to the Red Sea, East Africa and the Far 
East. Israeli interests in Eilat and the Gulf of Aqaba 
preoccupied the minds of leading Zionists fifteen years 
earlier than the creation of the Zionist State in Palestine. 
Such interest was voiced in 19 3 3 by David Ben Gurian, who 
later became the first Israeli Prime Minister. He emphasized 
that it would not be possible for Israel to possess Eilat 
only 
11 if we could first succeed in 
ourselves along the entire gulf 
Sea". (215) 
establishing 
of the Red 
This clearly reflects a long-rooted Zionist appetite for 
expansion in Arab lands and waters, of which the Red Sea 
region is the first and most important, as Israel's 
successive behaviour has consistently shown. Preoccupation 
with control over the Gulf of Aqaba, basically inclusion of 
Jordanian, Egyptian and Saudi land) and water}, needs no 
comment. Preparations took place to make Eilat a principal 
port immediately after the 19 56 war. Associated with this 
step was the Israeli positioning of the "Red Sea squadron 11. 
which consisted of two frigates of Israel's navy and the 
laying of the Eilat-Haif a pipeline (chapter 5). During the 
eight-year closure of the Suez Canal, Eilat thrived and thus 
enabled Israel to exploit its location as a land bridge 
between the Red Sea and the Mediterranean, especially for 
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carrying Iranian oil. 
Eilat has an open roadstead besides good and safe 
anchorage at a depth of 36.06m. Apart from a berth equipped 
with bulk elevator, the port has berthage facilities for 
general cargo and containers. Owing to Israel's concentration 
onf port development in its Mediterranean ports, Eilat does 
not seem to have much importance with regard to general 
cargo, except in serving the desert and thinly inhabited 
. (217) Negev reg1on. Emphasizing the importance of Eilat to the 
development of the Negev region, Ben Gurian (quoted in Lucas, 
1984) said: 
" I am sure that the dream of a big international 
port city will be achieved. It will carry the 
produce of hundreds of thousands of inhabitants of 
the Negev, agricultural, industrial and mineral 
products ... to the four corners of Asia." (218) 
Lucas (1984) argues that the reopening of the Suez Canal in 
1975 affected Eilat because the port could not maintain the 
growing importance it had gained following the closure of the 
Canal. He adds that for economic reasons there is an 
increasing preference for the use of the canal route rather 
than Eilat. However, Ziring ( 19 84) argues differently with 
regard to the significance of Eilat. He sees the port as 
vi tal to Israel. He adds that the large maritime vessels, 
especially oil tankers, prefer using Eilat's facilities 
rather than transiting the Canal to the Mediterranean 
t (219) por s. 
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The Egyptian blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba restricted 
the growth of settlement in Eilat, according to Pounds (1972)y 
who adds that between 19 56 and 1967 the presence of the UN 
peace keeping force ensured the freedom of 11 ingress to and 
egress from 11 Eilat. Owing to the Israeli occupation of Sinai 
and control of entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba after the 1967 
war, the port witnessed a greater expansion to its 
f "l"t" (220) ac1 1 1es. Abir (1974) shows that Eilat and the 
increasingly significant oil pipeline between the former and 
Haifa (as well as its terminal) have been considered by the 
Arab Press necessary for hitting 11 Israel 's soft underbelly 11 
by blockading Sharm al Sheikh; an attitude which Israel 
considered a threat to its existence and an act of war. ( 221 ) 
Some Israeli strategists indicate that the elimination of 
Israel's need to have a military presence 1n the Red Sea 
following the Iranian cessation of oil supplies to Israel in 
1979 could make Eilat 11 suffer in wartime because of its 
proximity to Jordan and Saudi Arabia 11 • (222) 
Shipping to Israel is a vital factor both in its economy 
and communications with other countries. As a result of the 
closing of the land frontiers to Israel by the Arabs, 
shipping has become very important in the transporation of 
supplies and in providing passages for immigrants. Israel's 
access to the Indian Ocean has stimulated the continuous 
growth of its merchant fleet. ( 22 3) Israel's problem with Bab 
al Mandeb is seen by Anderson and Blake (1982) as 11 a serious 
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blow" to Isk"'ael, because enormous amounts of coal from 
11---fr)cti 
Australia and South ..MftJ'fl/¢',.8 destined for Israel's new power 
station near Caesarea would not be able to pass through Bab 
al Mandeb. Plans for the transportation of coal via the Cape 
route have been considered, although this means a longer 
journey, especially for Australian supplies. (ZZ4) 
In 19 7 5 the number of ships calling at Eilat reached 
110, freight loading was 497,000 tons and unloading 325,000 
tons. In 19 8 2, Eilat handled 1, 100, 000 tons of cargo and 
30,000 twenty foot equivalent units (TEUs). The largest 
vessel the port can accommodate is a general cargo ship of 
300m length, 12.3m draught, and 70,000dwt capacity. (ZZ5) The 
peace treaty with Israel obliged Egypt to sell Israel some 2m 
tons of oil annually which is handled by Eilat. Besides 
petroleum, Eilat exports chemicals and machinery and handles 
raw materials and hides as imports. Because transportation 
between Eilat and Israel's major areas of production and 
population is costly, Lucas (1984) anticipates Eilat's future 
. (226) 
activities w1ll be stagnant. 
4.5 Conclusion 
The foregoing chapter has clearly shown that Red Sea 
waterways and ports are both internationally and locally 
important. US shipping interests (especially strategic ones, 
and those concerning Israel) there are considerable. The 
Suez Canal is the most outstanding among Red Sea strategic 
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water passages. Its importance to the US has come late, and 
has been associated with the interests of Israel, and Western 
allies, as well as becoming a catalyst of war, and a card of 
pressure for peace, as it was used by the US between 
1975-1979. Although US attaining of Egyptian permission 
regarding passage of American nuclear-powered vessels through 
the Canal could enhance American ability to enforce its naval 
capability in either theatre: the Indian Ocean or the 
Mediterranean, such development could be dangerous especially 
in an area used as a battleground between Israel and the 
Arabs, not ·>. 
' r' ' 
least between the superpowers. Moreover, such 
development could threaten the safety of other coastal 
states; it may also endanger their marine resources if 
accidents occur to such ships, therefore the application of 
the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea (chapter 6.) could 
create an issue of conflict between the US and some Red Sea 
littorals over this matter. 
Being preoccupied by guaranteeing freedom of navigation 
in the Red Sea, especially to Israel, the US showed 
considerable interest in Bah al Mandeb by what has been 
mentioned in Congressional discussions and by the entering of 
the US with Israel into a memorandum . in which the former 
supported the latter's right of passage through the Strait. 
Moreover, the growing Soviet presence around the Strait, and 
the development of radicalsim in that area, symbolized by the 
tripartite pact of 19 81 (chapter 7) increased US concerns 
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Table 4.1 5 
-+ fo'(OZ. 
Visits by US Mideas~ to Red Sea ports: January 197 4 to 
December 1976 
Port 
Aqaba 
Assab 
Djibouti 
Hodeidah 
Jeddah 
Massawa 
Port Sudan 
Totals 
1974 
5 
20 
33 
3 
4 
28 
93 
1975 
3 
19 
29 
5 
6 
4 
2 
68 
1976 
8 
16 
30 
2 
24 
5 
85 
Days 
visited 
1974-1976 
16 
55 
92 
10 
34 
32 
7 
321 
Source: US Arms policies in the Persian Gulf and the Red 
Sea areas: past, present and future. Report of a 
Staff Survey Mission to Ethiopia, Iran, and the 
Arabian Peninsula. pursuant to H. Res. 313: 95th 
Congress, 1st Session December, 1977. Printed for 
the use of the Committee on International 
Relations. US Government Printing Office, 
Washington, 1977, p.l06. 
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about Bah al Mandeb. Finally the Strait must be important to 
the US and its NATO allies with respect to the movement of 
naval units between the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean. 
The Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba have shown 
that they can also become a catalyst in igniting war. US 
interest in them has been demonstrated by the inclusion in 
the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty of 1979 of Israel's right 
to pass through them; also such concern has been reflected in 
the choice of Sharm al Sheikh as a stationing point for the 
multinational Peace Monitoring Force organized by the US, 
following the Israeli evacuation of Sinai on 26 April 1982. 
American interest in Red Sea ports can be seen in the visits 
made by MIDEASTFOR to some of these ports during the 1970s. 
Tables 4.15 and 4.16 show such visits by US and USSR's naval 
ships respectively. Moreover, the US search for bases, such 
as at Berbera in 1980 highlights such pursuit. Some Red Sea 
ports, especially those belonging to US friends or allies, 
for instance Aqaba and Yanbu, have become increasingly vital 
outlets for energy supplies to the West following threats 
(chapter 6) to oil transportation through the Strait of 
Hormuz as a result of the tanker war in the Gulf. Prospects 
for an increase in the capacity and importance of those ports 
could be described as high if they witness more development, 
especially with regard to berthing, oil terminals and bulk 
handling facilities. Also such prospects are high because 
instability in the Gulf and the Soviet presence in 
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Table 4-16 
Soviet naval operational ship visits to Red Sea States: 1967-1976oc 
Country. 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 Days 
visited 
1967-76 
Ethiopia 1 1 
PDRY 4 5 15 7 14 37 34 18 134 
Somalia 3 7 22 20 42 61 54 75 283 
Sudan 1 1 
YAR 1 2 1 2 3 9 
Totals 8 15 37 27 56 99 90 96 428 
Source: Remnek, R. 'Soviet Policy in the Horn of Africa: the 
decision to intervene' in Donaldson, R. ( ed. ) , The Soviet 
Union in the Third World: Successes and Failures, Westview 
Press, Colorado, USA, 1981, p.130. 
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Afghanistan, southern Arabia and the Horn of Africa could 
increase vulnerability of oil transportation via Hormuz; and 
thus trans-peninsula pipelines to ports on the Red Sea could 
considerably enhance the capacity of those ports. 
Finally, security of US shipping interest has been an 
important American concern. Threats against such interests 
will be discussed in chapter 6. 
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CHAPTER 5 
ENERGY SUPPLY AND TRANSPORTATION 
5.1 Energy Supply 
The aim of this chapter is to discuss US oil interests in 
the Middle East and the role of the Red Sea in the movement of 
these supplies to Western consumers, particularly the USA. The 
closely associated question of oil supplies to the US allies, 
especially Western Europe and Japan are discussed. The Red Sea 
region is an oil-dry area, apart from the Gulf of Suez and 
Sinai (chapter 3). This region is, however, crucially linked 
to the oil 1 heartland 1 of the Gulf region which dominates US 
interests. Prior to the closure of the Suez Canal in 1967, 
almost all Western oil supplies were shipped through the 
convenient Red Sea-Suez Canal route. The closure of the Canal 
in 1967 turned it into a cul-de-sac, regarding navigation to 
and from the Mediterranean. Thereafter most shipping, 
especially oil transportation was shifted to the Cape routes. 
The reopening of the Canal in 197 5 enabled the Red Sea to 
regain some of its significance, especially after the opening 
of the SUMED pipeline in 1977 and the execution of the first 
phase of the Canal 1 s development project which increased the 
number of tankers traversing the Red Sea (chapters 4 and 5). 
The opening of the East-West Saudi Pipeline in 19 81 further 
boosted Canal oil traffic. 
The importance of the Red Sea as a strategic artery for 
Table 5.1 
Middle East oil discoveries: cumulative production and remaining reserves (billions of barrels) 
Country 
Bahrain 
Iran 
Iraq 
Kuwai t-l*-
Oman 
Qatar 
Saudi Arabia-l*-
U.A.E. 
Total Gulf area 
Egypt 
Total Middle East 
United States 
Total world 
Cumulative 
production 
as of Jan.l 
1983 
0.7 
31.8 
16.6 
23.0 
1.9 
3.6 
50.1 
8.6 
136.3 
3.0 
139-3 
136.9 
515.0 
Estimated proven reserves 
as of Jan. 1st 
1950 1965 1980 
0.3 
13.0 
8.7 
15.0 
1.0 
10. 0 
48.0 
0.2 
48.2 
26.2 
95.0 
0. 3 
38.0 
25.0 
69.3 
o.s 
3. 5 
66.8 
7-7 
2 1 1 • 1 
1.5 
212.6 
34-5 
341.3 
0.2 
58.0 
31.0 
68.5 
2.4 
3. 8 
166.5 
29.4 
359.8 
3. 1 
362.9 
26.5 
641.6 
x Includes one half of Neutral Zone 
1984 
0.2 
51.0 
43.0 
66.8 
2. 8 
3. 3 
168.9 
32.3 
368.3 
3. 5 
371.8 
27.3 
669.3 
Source: Exxon Background Series: Middle East Oil and Gas, 
Department, Exxon Corporation, New York, 1984, p.3. 
Total discoveries: 
(reserves+ cum. prodn.) 
as of Jan.lst 1984 
December 
0.9 
82.8 
59.6 
89.8 
4-7 
6.9 
219.0 
40.9 
504.6 
6.5 
511.1 
164.2 
1,184.3 
1984, Public Affairs 
N 
1..0 
0 
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oil transportation is expected to rise after the completion of 
the current and proposed pipelines from the Gulf to the Red 
Sea, as a strategy to avoid the dangers to shipping via the 
Strait of Hormuz, following the Iraq-Iran tanker war since 
19 8 2. The development of pipelines to the Red Sea may also 
encourage the execution of the suspended second phase of the 
Canal's development, a step which could attract even the very 
large crude carriers (VLCC 's) to the Red Sea route. Another 
significant factor linking the Red Sea to the issue of US oil 
interests is the presence of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
Having the longest coastline on the Red Sea, the greatest oil 
reserves in the world (table 5.1) and being second in 
production to the Soviet Union, Saudi Arabia is by far the 
most important state with which the US maintains "an evolving 
special relationship". ( 1 ) Saudi Arabian plans to shift the 
petroleum industry and transportation to the Red Sea region is 
an important development that has already involved Western and 
especially American interests. Thus, the Kingdom's rich oil 
resources, its concern about the Red Sea route, its 
longstanding relationship with the us, which is deeply 
concerned about the uninterrupted flow of oil from the Gulf, 
especially from Saudi Arabia, -all constitute sound links 
between the Red Sea and the discussion of oil supply. 
Egypt is the other Red Sea State which significantly 
highlights this connection. Once one of the foremost leading 
powers in the Arab world prior to President Sadat's initiative 
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and its resultant peace treaty with Israel in 1979, Egypt 
initiated the 197 3 Israeli-Arab war which caused the most 
serious experienced oil crisis ever in 1973-74 following the 
Arab decision to cut oil supplies to the US and other 
supporters of Israel. The denial of Israel's right of 
navigation through the Red Sea because of the issue of 
Palestine was an important factor in the breakout of wars 
between Israel and Egypt in 1956 and 1967. Thus, the fact that 
Egypt was the key state in waging the war which led to the 
disruption of oil supply to the US, and that Saudi Arabia was 
the central power that effected the embargo, also provide 
additional logic in the relationship between the Red Sea and 
the issue of oil supply. 
5.1.1 The US and Middle Eastern Oil 
Apart from narrow commercial interests, the American 
international oil industry raises three major issues with 
which each US administration has been and remains preoccupied. 
These matters are: 
(1) the security of international oil supplies both to the US 
and her allies; 
(2) the economic strength of all friendly states; and 
( 3) 'selling 1 its own way of doing things for ideological 
reasons, in which oil is an important weapon (Odell, 
1983). ( 2 ) 
It hardly needs mentioning that the vast oil resources of the 
Table 5.2 
Production, consumption, and imports of US oil and its percentage contribution to United States 
energy 1973-1995 
Pro j e c·t ion 
1973 1974 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1985 1990 1995 
Total energy 
production 62.43 61.23 61.23 63.85 65.50 65.18 63.85 61.02 68.50 76.30 85.80 
of which oil 19.50 18.58 18.43 18. 10 18.25 20.44 20.50 20.53 17.00 18.00 19.30 
percent of total 31 30 31 30 28 31 32 33 25 24 22 
Total energy 
consumption 74.61 72.76 78.18 78.91 75-91 74.12 70.82 70-45 81.30 85.70 92.90 
of which oil 34.84 33-46 37-96 37. 12 34.20 3 2. 11 30.23 29.98 33-90 32.00 31.80 
percent of total 47 46 49 47 45 43 42 42 42 37 34 
Total imports of 
oil and oil 
products 12.98 12.66 17.06 16.93 13.50 11.42 9.05 8.94 14.70 12.00 10.60 
Percentage of 
total US oil 
consumption 37-30 37.80 44-90 45.60 39-50 35-50 29.90 29.80 43 37-50 33-30 
Percentage of 
US energy 
consumption 17.40 17.40 21.80 21.50 17.80 15.40 12.70 12.70 18. 10 14.00 11.40 
o~ One 'quad' equivalent to 172 million barrels of crude oil. 
Source: Based on Petroleum Economist, Vol. L. no. 1, May 19 8 2, p. 17 8, and Petroleum Economist, 
Vol.LI, No.6 June 1984, p.231. 
N 
1.0 
w 
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Middle East are the main drive behind American interest and 
involvement in the region. As long as petroleum continues to 
be the veritable lifeblood of Western economies, US perception 
of interests in the Middle East must also be categorically 
related to the oil needs of the US and its Western and 
Japanese allies. Since the early 1960s the importance of the 
Middle East as a source of oil supply to the US has increased. 
The emergence of the US in the late 1960s and 1970s as a 
large-scale purchaser of Middle Eastern oil, constitutes "the 
most significant change in the pattern of crude oil demand in 
the decade". ( 3 ) Between 1973 and 1983 the US was the largest 
consumer of oil among its European and Japanese allies. From 
1974 to 1979 American purchases from the Middle East showed a 
steady increase, registering a 400% increase in 1979 compared 
with 1974. US emergence as a major buyer of Middle East crude 
oil indicates to McLachlan (1981) that the US was not only 
"unable to provide other areas with supplies in the 
normal commercial circumstances or during periods of 
world oil crisis, but was also unable to meet 
regional demand from internal sources". (4) 
While American demand for overseas oil has sharply 
risen, domestic production continued to decline until 1980 
(table 5.1). In 1985 American oil production is expected to 
fall by 8% from what it was 1n 1983 (table 5.2). The real US 
preoccupation with oil from the Middle East, however, resides 
in the significance of these resources to America's Western 
and Japanese allies, who cannot do without them (tables 5.3 
Table 5.3 Non-Communist world oil consumptions, 1973-1983 
1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1982 1983 Percentage of total 
non-communist 
consumption 
1973 1983 
a) Industrialised States 
USA 16.4 15. 3 17.2 17. 1 15. 1 14.4 14. 3 35-4 32.9 
Canada 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.6 1.4 1.3 3. 5 3.0 
Western Europe 13.9 12.4 13. 1 13.9 12.0 11.4 11. 1 30.0 25.5 
Australia 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 1.5 1.6 
Japan 4-9 4-5 5.0 5. 1 4.4 4.2 4.2 10.6 9.7 
Total 37-5 34-5 37.6 38.6 33.8 3 2. 1 31.5 81.0 72.7 
b) Non-industrialised N 
areas 1..0 ll1 
Latin America 2.9 3. 2 3.6 4. 1 4.2 4. 1 4.0 6.3 9-3 
Africa and the Middle East 1.5 1.8 2.3 2.7 3.0 3. 2 3-3 3. 2 7-5 
Indian sub-continent 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.3 2. 1 
Other Asia 1.2 1.3 1.7 1.9 2.0 2.0 2. 1 2.6 4.8 
Total 6.2 6.9 8.3 9-5 1 0. 1 10. 2 10.3 13.4 23.7 
Total a) and b) 43.7 41.4 45-9 48. 1 43-9 42.3 41.8 94-4 96.4 
c) Bunkers 2.6 2.2 2.3 2.2 2.0 1.7 1.6 5.6 3.6 
Total 46.3 43.6 48.2 50.3 45-9 44.0 43-4 100.0 100.0 
Source: Petroleum Economist, Vol.LI, No.8, August 1984, p.285. 
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Table 5-4 
Oil imports of the United States, Western Europe and Japan from 
the Middle East* and North Africa# and their percentage to total 
imports, 1983 ( '000 b/d) 
Area 
USA 
Western 
Europe 
Japan 
Total 
Total 
imports 
4,990 
8,665 
4,145 
17,800 
Imports 
from the 
Middle 
East 
575 
3,415 
2,750 
6,740 
% of 
Middle 
East 
imports 
to total 
11.52 
39-41 
66.35 
37.87 
Imports 
from 
North 
Africa 
280 
1,675 
40 
1,995 
% of 
North 
African 
imports 
to total 
5.61 
19.33 
1. 00 
11. 21 
Source: Based on BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 1984. 
Briefing Services, Government and Public Affairs 
Department, The British Petroleum Company PLC, London, 
1984, p.17. 
~ Middle East: Arabian Peninsula, Iran, Iraq, Israel, 
Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. 
# North Africa: States on the north coast of Africa. 
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and 5.4). In his 1977 report, Senator Jackson emphasizes the 
clear American determination to hold on to the oil resources 
of the region because he could not think of a reliable 
alternative for Western supplies. He anticipates excep-
tionally strong competition from the whole industrial world 
to obtain Middle East oil. He stated that: 
11 For the United States, access to secure supplies of 
foreign oil has become an increasingly vital policy 
goal with the decline of domestic production and our 
growing dependence on oil imports A decade from 
now, the entire industrial world will be competing 
for available Middle East supply on an unprecedented 
scale ... No substitute for the U.S. presence in the 
Middle East oil primarily to help assure security of 
supplies to allies and secondarily to help assure 
that its own import needs are met. 11 (5) 
However, there are voices in the House of Representatives, 
like Frederick Richmond ( 19 8 2) who do not see real American 
need for the Middle East oil because the US obtain its own 
supplies from Venezuela, Canada, Indonesia and Alaska. He 
emphasizes that the enormous oil resources of the Middle East 
11 really are of no practical value to the United 
States. They are of practical value to our allies in 
Europe, and of practical value to our very, very 
rich, selfish allies in the Far East 11 • (6) 
Since the US can do well without Middle East supplies, while 
its allies cannot, therefore 
11 why do the Americans pay the entire bill for the 
defence of the Middle East? 11 (7) 
asks representative Richmond. However, contrary to the House's 
298 
perception, the Department of State believes that one day 
Middle East resources could be of more direct relevance to US 
needs. According to Arab News (Sept. 19 84), a Congressional 
report indicates that US dependence on overseas petroleum will 
increasingly grow in the 1990s despite conservation measures 
and that the major US Alaskan and other State oil resources 
are being 
"drained at a faster rate than at which new ones can 
be discovered or developed, a trend expected to 
continue into the next decade 11 • ( 8) 
Production from Alaska is estimated to reach 2.5m b/d in 1985, 
falling to 2.0m b/d by 1990 (Fesharaki and Issak, 1983). 
Despite current availability of oil and seemingly easy 
access to it, American petroleum sources say that Western 
consumers will continue to depend on OPEC oil until the year 
2000. These sources add that although slumps 1n demand 
eclipsed the power of OPEC, this power will 
"gradually 
and some 
peak". (9) 
strengthen as oil consumption picks up 
of the non-OPEC production passes its 
Meanwhile, within OPEC the centre of power will shift toward 
the Middle East and especially to the Arab States of the Gulf 
because the export potential of other countries will end. The 
Gulf Cooperation Council ( GCC) is expected to rival OPEC as 
the dominant force ln the oil trade. ( 10 ) Table 5. 1. shows a 
steady growth in the oil reserves of the Gulf, and a 26. 4% 
Table 5-5 US oil consumption, production and imports, 1973-1983 
Year Oil consumption Oil production Net imports Net imports from OPEC Net imports from OAPEC 
1973 17.00 11.00 6.00 3.00 0.90 
1974 16.40 10.50 5.90 3.30 0.75 
1975 16.00 10.00 6.00 3.60 1. 40 
1976 17.00 9.80 7.20 5. 10 2.40 
1977 18.40 9.80 8.60 6.20 3.20 
1978 18.30 10.30 8.00 5-70 3.00 
1979 18.20 10.20 8.00 5.60 3.00 N 
"' 
"' 1980 16.50 10.20 6.30 4-30 2.50 
1981 15.60 10.20 5-40 3-30 1. 80 
1982 15.00 10.25 4-75 2. 10 0.80 
19 8 3'c 14.75 10.25 4-99 - 0.58 
1984'c 15. 15 10.36 5.38 - 0.62 
Sources: 1 ) 1973-1982 adapted from MEED, 25 November, 1983, p. 3 3. 
2) BP Statistical Review ;--:Illne 1984, and June 1985, pp.8, 4 and 1 6 . The British 
Petroleum Co. PLC, London. 
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decline in American reserves between 1965 and 
Interestingly, such a fall was indicated exactly forty years 
ago by the then Secretary of the Navy, James Forrestal, in his 
memorandum to Secretary of State, Byrnes, dated 1 August 1945: 
"Because of my firm conviction that within the next 
twenty-five years the United States is going to be 
faced with very sharply declining oil reserves".(ll) 
Regardless of the oil glut since the early 1980s, and the 
in world demand by lOrn b/d in 1984 compared with 
drop 
1979, 
economic recovery in the us has caused a gradual rise in 
American demand for overseas oil. In 1984 us oil imports 
increased by over 13% over those of 1982 (table 5.4). 
Moreover, in 19 8 3 the US, Western Europe and Japan imported 
37.87% of their total collective consumption; needless to say 
most of this petroleum was used by Western Europe and Japan, 
two areas consuming some 91.50% of their total supplies from 
the Middle East in 1983. In March 1985 the Petroleum Economist 
indicated that because of falling US domestic oil production 
in the period 1985-1995 the US will experience a 
"renewed - and possibly heavy - dependence upon the 
Middle East ... for the 1990s 11 • (12) 
Not only the US, but Britain, according to Renner (1984) may 
need to import oil in the 1990s because its potential is also 
limited. He states that 
"It seems likely that Britain will once again become 
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a net importer of petroleum in the 1990s (if not 
earlier). 11 (13) 
Regarding the effect of oil on US military interests, 
Mangold (1978) argues that prior to the 1970s, American 
interests in the Middle East were defined in mainly 
politico-strategic terms. Before 197 3 oil was essentially a 
commercial-financial objective of the US business and economic 
interests. Both Mangold (1978) and Reich (1981) agree that the 
situation has drastically changed since the October war of 
19 7 3 when oil assumed a new role in American perspective by 
being 
11 a significant component of the US national interest 
affecting American political and strategic interests 
and calculation of policy 11 • (14) 
In fact, Noyes (1982) shows that since 1945 the US military 
have indicated the critical relations between oil and US 
military strength. The military have often considered that 
obtaining adequate amounts of oil is a problem to the US. The 
Secretary of the Navy, James Forrestal, quoted in Noyes 
(1982), statedthis: 
11 and because oil and all of its by-products are 
the foundation of the ability to fight a modern war, 
I consider this to be one of the most important 
problems of the government 11 • (15) 
In early 1978 Secretary of Defence, Harold Brown, linked the 
security of the US and the oil resources of the Middle East. 
He said: 
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"Because the area 1s the world's greatest source of 
oil, the security of the Middle East and the Persian 
Gulf cannot be separated from our security and that 
of NATO and our allies in Asia We intend to 
safeguard the production of oil and its trans-
portation to consumer nations without interference 
by hostile powers." (16) 
Also to the American military lobby any discussion of US 
interests in the Gulf must first admit that: 
"energy policy is an integral part to security 
policy and cannot be considered in isolation". (17) 
In 1980, Joseph Sisco argued that in the decade of the 1980s, 
the US confronts three fundamental challenges, at the top of 
which will be the inescapable need to slow down unacceptable 
American dependence on overseas oil which, has mortgaged both 
American security and economy. The other two worries are 
rising Soviet military strength and rapid political change in 
the developing world, ( 18 ) both of which could threaten easy 
access to oil by the West. 
In sum, considering the continuously declining energy 
resources in the West, and the tremendous reserves of the 
Middle East, the area will continue to be the vital source of 
energy for the West, and despite the current oil glut, a surge 
of Western demand especially American is expected. The Red 
Sea, with its developing oil transportation infrastructure, 
could play a leading role in this respect. 
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Table 5. 6• 
Arab oil cutbacks in November 1973 (hundred barrels per day) 
State Production 
September 
1973 
Saudi Arabia 85,499 
Kuwait 35,063 
Iraq 21,115 
Abu Dhabi 13,980 
Qatar 6,086 
Libya 22,861 
Algeria 10,500 
Other States: 
(Egypt, Syria, 
Dubai and Oman) 11,000 
Total 206,104 
Production 
after 
cutbacks 
58,494 
24,788 
19,560 
10,485 
4,584 
17,146 
7,875 
8,250 
151,182 
Change in 
volume 
27,005 
10,275 
1,555 
3' 49 5 
1,502 
5,715 
2,625 
2,750 
54,922 
Percentage of 
cutbacks 
31.5 
29.0 
7-3 
25.0 
25.0 
25.0 
25.0 
25.0 
26.7 
Source: Arab Oil and Gas Journal ( 16 Dec. 19 7 3), reproduced in 
Al-Sowayegh, A. ( 1984), Arab Petro-Politics, Croom Helm, 
London and Canberra, 1984, p.131. 
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5.1.2 The 1973 Arab Oil Embargo 
Following the Israeli-Arab war of 197 3, the Arabs were 
furious about US backing of Israel and resentful of the 
domination of American oil companies. Perceiving growing 
American dependence on their oil, the Arabs decided to use it 
as a weapon to pressur ise the United States to withdraw its 
support for Israel. They accordingly declared a complete 
boycott on oil supplies to the US. Table 5. 6 shows that the 
Arabs removed 5.5m b/d from the oil market, equivalent to 20% 
of total Arab production in September 1973, 10% of the 
non-Communist world's output, and 12% of OPEC supplies. The 
embargo resulted in panic buying and price hykes (Merip 
Reports 5/7 4). World oil prices shot up over 160%, for Arab 
light reference crude, from $3. 5 a barrel to $9. 22 (table 
5.7).(19) 
Three events eventually led to the lifting of the boycott 
on 18 March 1974 at Tripoli: 
(1) US success in making progress in disengagement on the Suez 
front; 
(2) The announcement of the resumption of diplomatic relations 
between Egypt and the US on 28 February 1974; and 
( 3) Kissinger's initial steps for disengagement on the Golan 
H . ht ( 20) e1g s. 
Economically, by mid March 1974, the US economy outlook 
was described as 'grim indeed'. Energy shortages caused by the 
embargo reached crisis proportions. Some of the harsh 
consequences experienced by the US included: 
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Table 5-7 
Changes in price of crude oil:1970-1983 
Date US Dollars per barrel % change 
1 Jan. 1970 1. 39 
16 Oct. 1973 3.65 + 162.60 
1 Jan. 1974 8.32 + 130.00 
1 Nov. 1974 10.46 + 25.72 
1 July 1977 12.70 + 21.41 
1 Nov. 1979 24. 00-l~ + 89.00 
1 Jan. 1980 26.00 + 8.33 
1 April 1980 28.00 + 7.70 
1 Aug. 1980 30.00 + 7. 14 
1 Nov. 1980 32.00 + 6.70 
1 Oct. 1981 34.00 + 6.30 
1 Feb. 1983 30.00 11. so 
1 March 1983 29.00 3.33 
-l~ From the spring of 19 79 until October 19 81 OPEC did not 
have a unified pricing system. 
Source: Exxon Background Series, Middle East Oil and Gas, 
December 19 84, Public Affairs Department, Exxon 
Corporation, New York, 1984, p.27. 
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(1) the laying off of 345,000 workers from services and 
industries such as auto industry and airlines, in addition 
to thousands made redundant from hotels, motels and 
restaurants; 
(2) the 15% gasoline shortfall would have reached 20% had the 
. ( 21) 
embargo not been l1fted. 
However, the effect of the embargo was even more· severe in 
Western Europe than in the US whose economy arguably enjoyed 
1 a temporary strengthening 1 • Oil companies, for example, as 
well as oil producers, gained a sharp increase in 
revenues. 
(22) 
Politically, the embargo initiated the first and most 
important challenge to the Western stance on the Israeli-Arab 
conflict. Because the repercussions of the embargo were 
particularly hard on Western Europe and Japan, the latter 
began to appease the Arabs and to reassert their good 
intentions with them and "to disavow any association with US 
(23) 
support for Israel". Thus, the embargo created a cleavage 
in the Western alliance. In response, in 1974 all members of 
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
( OECD), except France, decided for the first time to act 
jointly in forming the International Energy Agency to design 
measures to alleviate the effects of future crises. The French 
opposed the idea of establishing such an organization because 
such a body means submission to American leadership (Al 
Sowayegh, 1981). The French Foreign Minister, Michael Jobert, 
indicated that: 
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11 energy issues have been a cover to conceal the main 
reason of the meeting, which is the American 
'political drive to restrict the freedom of 
manoeuvre of Western European states and Japan, and 
to keep them under American control 11 • (24) 
However, the French effort to undermine the effectiveness of 
the meeting was overcome by President Nixon 1 s proposal that 
the US might: 
11 cut back its military establishment in Europe 
should the European states prove uncooperative 
during the energy crisis 11 • (25) 
Therefore, the delegates agreed to implement Kissinger's 
programme of energy measures, regardless of French opposition. 
Despite some fruitful achievements attained by the IEA, 
11 The political urge to pursue national self-interest 
proved stronger than the will to cooperate. 11 (26) 
Such an attitude proved true in 1979, following Iranian 
cutbacks in production, and the ensuing fear of a serious 
shortfall which: 
11 led to a wild scramble for oil, with companies 
making every effort to pile up stocks while 
governments rushed to negotiate bilateral deals with 
individual exporting countries 11 • (27) 
Western allies' different perceptions of what is the biggest 
threat to the security of the Middle East presented the 
political split in the alliance. While Western Europe, Japan 
and the Gulf States chorus the Israeli-Arab conflict, of which 
the Palestinian tragedy represents the cornerstone as the 
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major source of threat the US proclaims the USSR. The American 
report, The Critical Link: energy and national security in the 
1980s, which discloses these differences, suspects that 
Western Europe and Japan have begun to forge connections with 
the Middle East oil suppliers, separate from the consumer 
alliance, the IEA. The report warns that such a development 
could: 
11 weaken the united front that the USA would like to 
present to OPEC 11 • (28) 
Feeling that the countries in proximity to the Middle East 
energy resources seek to develop unilateral links there, the 
report urges the US to establish a special link with the oil 
producers in the western hemisphere - Venezuela and Mexico, 
11 if they 
America 11 • 
can agree 
(29) 
over the us policy in Central 
Odell ( 19 83) argues that regardless of the difficulties 
created for the US by the boycott American support to Israel 
was never really shaken during this period. ( 30) Other sources 
point out th-at Arab demand for a complete Israeli evacuation 
from Arab territories were not met. The lifting of the embargo 
as a result of disengagement between Israeli and Egyptian 
forces split the Arab states along familiar radical-
reactionary lines (Merip Reports, 5/74). ( 31 ) A different view 
on the matter comes from Bryson (1977); he considers the Arab 
utilization of oil as a diplomatic tool to have been 
successful because the US exerted strong pressure on Israel to 
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reach a ceasefire and disengagement on the Suez front. ( 3Z) 
Quoted in Al Sowayegh (1981), Maull refers to what he 
considers as: 
11 Arab producers 
Europe, Japan, and -
States". ( 33) 
strong 
to some 
leverage 
extent 
vis-a-vis 
the United 
However, to Odell (1983) the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty of 
1979 represents an opening up of the possibility of a long 
term settlement to the Middle East conflict; a solution which 
is still held by the US as critical to the longer-term future 
of oil supplies from the area. (34) 
Bryson (1977) believes that to: 
"effect a policy 
associated with 
transportation 
stability", 
based on real and vital interests 
oil, trade, the Suez Canal link, 
and communication routes, and 
the US needs a reassessment of its policy towards Israel 1n 
order to sustain sound relations with the Middle East 
countries. ( 3 S) The prospect that the Gulf oil states will one 
day compete with OPEC as the most important source of oil 
production 
"should impress upon the Foreign Offices of the 
Western powers the need for an urgent review of 
policy vis-a-vis the Middle East. Washington, in 
particular, needs to ponder anew the paradox 
inherent in a situation which combines heavy 
economic dependence on Arab oil with a policy of 
such open diplomatic support for Israel". (36) 
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In fact, the time has passed when only economic factors 
determine the international oil market. Therefore, Ebinger 
( 1981) contends that the industrialized world, particularly 
the US, 
"can no longer afford to disregard the vital 
interests of the major oil producers". (37) 
5.1.3 The Military Option 
The relationship between Middle Eastern oil and US 
national security was clearly established during World War 
Two. Quoted in Noyes (1982) Malone notes that: 
11 in June 1943, as the combat zones widened in the 
Pacific and the armed forces of the United States 
and her allies expended fuel at a prodigious, 
unprecedented rate Arabia took on a new 
significance to the Western democracies". (38) 
By the late 1940s there was a conviction in the US that the 
Americans, the Europeans, and the Japanese would have to get 
hold of Middle East oil in order to survive. ( 39 ) Sixteen years 
before the 1973-74 oil embargo, America's willingness to use 
force to obtain access to Middle East oil was voiced by 
President Eisenhower. Late in 1957, in reaction to the 
objection of his advisor, Dillon Anderson, not to use force to 
get Middle Eastern oil, the President said: 
"I think you have, in the analysis presented in the 
letter, proved that should a crisis arise 
threatening to cut the Western world off from Middle 
East oil, we would have (Eisenhower 1 s italics) to 
use force." (40) 
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Military occupation of Gulf oilfields was one of the 
policy options considered by the US following the Arab 
imposition of an oil boycott in 1973-74. ( 41 ) Figure 5.1 shows 
a US view of emergency approaches to the Gulf; the northern 
Red Sea region appears very crucial. When Schlesinger, then 
5ecyda-rJ 
~~~~/ of Defence, threatened on 7 January 1974 that the US 
might 'use force' to end the embargo, an immediate response 
came from Kuwait's Foreign Minister, Sheikh Sabah Ahmed 
al-Sabah, who declared that: 
"Kuwait would sabotage its installations should any 
foreign power utilize force to obtain oil". (42) 
In 1975 a congressional study on the military option concluded 
that American military intervention in the Gulf would combine 
high costs with high risks (Bryson, 1977), and while 
indications of success are poor, the punishment for failure 
would be "enormous". ( 43 ) The assasination of King Faisal on 25 
March 197 5 according to Murarka (1980), deepened Saudi 
distrust of the Americans who did not conceal their intentions 
that if the former disregards for US interests continued, they 
"would not hesitate to occupy Saudi oilfields by force". (44) 
The author adds that the Saudis are aware that: 
"it is not their welfare which 
concerned about but the welfare 
wells". (45) 
Washington 
of their 
is 
oil 
On 30 August 1979 President Carter said that he "would not let 
any Arab country blackmail our nation" into a Middle East 
peace settlement;( 46 ) meaning that he would not give in if the 
Table 5. 8 
Four scenarios of potential disruption of oil from the Gulf 
Scenario 
1. Limited regional warfare 
Iran-Iraq 
Iraq-Kuwait 
Iran-Kuwait 
Iran-Saudi Arabia 
2. Generalized regional warfare 
Iran-Iraq-Km.,:ai t 
Saudi Arabia-Iran-Iraq 
3. Internal destabilization 
Saudi Arabia 
Kuwait 
·united Arab Emir·ates 
4. Closure of Strait of Hormuz 
Maximum Loss 
of Exports 
( 'OOOb/d) 
4,000 
4,000 
4,000 
12,000 
9,000 
15,000 
10,000 
2,500 
1;500 
18,000 
Available Additional 
Capacity of Other 
Persian Gulf Exporters ('000 bjd) 
1,300 
800 
800 
1,300 
800 
800 
1,300 
800 
.)00 
0 
Haximum 
Net Loss 
('000 b/d) 
~,700 
3,200 
3,200 
10,700 
8,200 
14,200 w 
I-' 
w 
8.700 
1,]00 
1 : 000 
18,000 
Source: Pakravan, K. Oil Supplv llisruptions in the 1080s: an Economic Analvsis, Hoover 
Internati6nal Studies, Hoover Institution Press, Standford University, St~sdford, 
California, 1984, p.21 
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Arabs used oil as a political weapon to achieve their ends. 
Since the late 1970s American apprehension over Soviet 
threats to the Gulf has grown considerably. Vice-Admiral Crowe 
(1978), now Director of the Navy, emphasizes the US need for a 
strong military presence in areas close to the Arabian 
peninsula. He sees the Gulf as: 
11 a part of the world where the United States and its 
allies cannot afford to live with a large degree of 
uncertainty 11 • ( 4 7) 
American fear of disruption of oil supplies from the Middle 
East has been compounded since 1979, following Soviet 
involvement in Afghanistan and the fall of the Shah (table 
5.8). In response to fear of encroachment upon Gulf oil 
resources, the US formed in 1980 what was called the Rapid 
Deployment Force ( RDF), which is now known as US Central 
Command (USCENTCOM). Before dwelling on the function of this 
force, it may be useful to consider which areas the US 
perceives important to American security . t t ( 48) 1n eres s. 
Some American political-strategic analysts argue that 
the US Middle East policy should consider the key area of 
concern as being from the Strait of Gibraltar to the Khaibar 
Pass, d t th f th N. 1 ( 48) an o e sources o e 1 e. Interestingly, 
while the 'line' that defines Central Europe is 1 clear' and 
where, if the 11 Soviets step across it 11 the US is going to 
fight, ( 4 9 ) the 'line' is unclear with regard to the Gulf, 
which neither the Carter nor Reagan Administration has 
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defined. With regard to the Red Sea region, the Americans see 
it as encompassing: 
"all of the Arabian 
part of the Eastern 
Ocean complex". (50) 
peninsula, Egypt, 
Mediterranean and 
Israel and 
the Indian 
However, with reference to the Gulf, the Department of State 
prefers the term Southwest Asia, because it perceives the 
area in which US interests need protection in a 1 broader 1 
context which includes: 
"Pakistan, North 
peninsula itself 
Egypt" . ( 51 ) 
Yemen 
the 
as far as the Arabian 
Horn, and of course 
It is quite clear that in all these definitions, which are 
overlapping, the US is preoccupied with the necessity to 
enlarge the area of its strategic manoeuvreability. Looking 
at these definitions, it is also quite obvious that the Red 
Sea region is the only region centrally placed 1n US 
strategic definitions. The reason for such expanding 
definitions is given by the Department of State. Quite 
simply, the protection of American vital interests in the 
Gulf makes it imperative to consider its periphery as well. 
This means that the US operational zone includes the: 
"areas that 
perspective 
there" . ( 52) 
are not only 
but important to 
important 
our friends 
from 
who 
our 
are 
Such broad definitions are designed to give scope for the 
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y 
establishment of det7rent measures because, as the Department 
of State puts it, 
"the most important element of our policy in this 
respect is deterrence". (53) 
Thus, this policy of deterrence inevitably leads the US to 
conceive of an ever-widening geopolitical map in order to 
detect and confront the sources of threat and shield its 
friends and allies against it. 
Having indicated the area where US military forces may 
operate, we will discuss the issue of the RDF. Perceiving the 
Middle East to be threatened by Soviet troops in Afghanistan, 
President Carter declared the region to be of great strategic 
importance. Therefore, the Soviet Union's attempt to: 
"consolidate its strategic position poses a 
grave threat to the free movement of Middle Eastern 
oil". (54) 
Accordingly, he believed that: 
"We must call on the best that is in us to preserve 
the secur:tty of this crucial region." (55) 
He then declared what came to be known as the Carter 
Doctrine: 
"Let our position be absolutely clear: an attempt by 
any outside force to gain control of the Persian 
Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the 
vital interests of the United States of America, and 
such an assault will be repelled by any means 
necessary, including military force." (56) 
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That "best ability" demanded by President Carter came to mean 
the creation of the RDF whose function was seen by him 1n 
these terms: 
"to provide the United States with an effective 
capability to intervene militarily in various 
contingencies around the world". (51) 
Obviously the force's mission is a global one. But the 
Commander of the force Lt Gen. Paul Kelley (USMC) indicates 
that the initial focus of his force will be 
"the Middle East and the problems associated with 
that area". (58) 
Those problems could include oil, regional conflict between a 
US ally and enemy, or even against political change that the 
US does not approve of. Since the Middle East is a priority 
area for use of the force, it follows that: 
"near-term propositioning would 
the Middle East and Indian Ocean 
probably focus 
area". (59) 
on 
In August 1982, John Lehman, Secretary of the Navy, declared 
that the US had 
"formal treaty commitments to defend about 40 
allies, and this commits us to all the world's major 
oceans. Our strategy is to be able to meet our 
commmitments, even in the teeth of Russia's naval 
power " . ( 6 0 ) 
Indicating the areas where US Navy would operate the 
Secretary of the Navy specified the Southern flank of NATO, 
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Turkey and Greece, as potential naval theatres: 
"Similarly, the Persian Gulf-Indian Ocean is 
certainly one of our key interests". (61) 
Thus, the Middle East is seen by all branches of the US 
forces as a key battleground. A statement issued by the 
Defense Department in 1982 explained why the RD Task Force 
might be used in the Middle East: 
"For the Middle East and South-west Asia, there are 
four primary security goals designed to support our 
foreign policy in that area." (62) 
These goals may be summarised as follows: 
( 1) to ensure the security of Israel while promoting the 
continuation of the Camp David Mideast peace process; 
( 2) to support moderate states (for example Saudi Arabia, 
Oman, Jordan and Egypt) against overt attacks by radical 
states; 
(3) to support moderate states against the spill-over of 
regional conflicts and subversion aided or directed by 
outside powers; and 
( 4) to limit Soviet military influence and leverage 1n the 
region and to deter Soviet invasion. ( 63) 
Because of the Soviet threat to Middle East oil resources and 
the political stability there, the mission of the force 
11 is to deter Soviet aggression in south-west Asia, 
particularly as it threatens access to oil, and to 
prevent the threat of Soviet military power being 
used as a tool of political coercion". (64) 
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To respond rapidly and effectively, the force must avoid 
the geographical disadvantage created by distances of 
12,000nm separating the home-base of the force from the area 
considered as a central theatre of action, for instance, the 
Gulf. The US thus began the search for naval facilities 
because in any action in the Gulf: 
11 In the initial stages, it would definitely be the 
Navy and Marine Corps" 
that would play the major role, because, as the Secretary of 
the Navy puts it, 
"we're there, and we can get real forces into the 
action much faster and start operating". (65) 
During the Carter administration, the US began the search for 
facilities in and around the Gulf for the stationing of RDF 
units. The Red Sea region features quite centrally as a 
potential staging area for the operation of the Force. This 
could be seen clearly in President Carter's speech in 1980. 
He said: 
"We are now making arrangements 
air facilities to be used by 
region of northeast Africa 
Gulf." ( 66) 
for key naval and 
our forces in the 
and the Persian 
In April 1981, Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger 
transformed the Rapid Deployment Force into a separate 
command area for a Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF). 
Six months later a separate command area for south-west Asia 
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was created. On 1 January 19 8 3 the commander of the RDJTF 
became the Commander-in-Chief of USCENTCOM and all planning 
exercises and operations in southwest Asia. ( 6 7) USCENTCOM's 
area of responsibility stretches from Kenya to Pakistan, 
covering the territory of nineteen countries. ( 68 ) 
Regarding basing facilities for use by USCENTCOM, Diego 
Garcia, a tiny island in the Indian Ocean, so far emerges as 
the most important assignment. In the late 1960s the island 
was leased by Britain to the US, which later established an 
important communication centre there. In 197 5 the Congress 
approved a plan for the development of Diego Garcia as a 
major naval, air, and logistic base. ( 69 ) The island, which 
has air-fields, a deep harbour, storages, workshop and other 
facilities, is 
"fitted with the most sophisticated technological 
equipment from space-tracking stations to submarine-
tracking gadgetry". (70) 
Apart from being far away from the Gulf, over Z,OOOkm, Diego 
Gareis 1s claimed by Mauritius, according to the Strategic 
Studies (1982). The journal indicates that the leftist regime 
in Mauritius 
"bans supply of essentials to Diego Garcia and 
working of the Mauritians on the island". (71) 
The fact that the island is distant from the Gulf and 
associated with potential political problems and sovereign 
rights over it, 
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Table 5. -9<-
USCENTCOM contingency bases or facilities for the defence of 
the Gulf 
Country 
Portugal 
Somalia-;:-
Kenya-lc 
Egypt 
Facility 
Lajes 
Seeb 
Thumrait 
Khasab/Goat Island 
Salalah 
Masirah 
Berbera 
Mogadishu 
Mombasa 
Nairobi 
Nanyuki 
Ras Banas 
Etzion 
Type 
air staging point 
airfield/port 
airfield 
airfield/port 
airfield 
airfield 
airfield/port 
airfield/port 
airfield/port 
airfield 
airfield 
airfield/port 
airfield 
Great Britain Diego Garcia airfield/port 
Turkey Erzurum 
Batman 
Mus 
airfield 
airfield 
airfield 
Sources: a) -lc From Record, J., The Rapid Deployment Force and 
US military intervention in the Persian Gulf, 
Special Report, Institute for Foreign Policy 
Analysis, Inc. Cambridge, Massachusetts, and 
Washington, DC, February 1981, p.59. 
b) Cordesman, A. The Gulf and the search for ~~~~~~~~~~~~--~~~~~~~ 
strategic stability. Westview Press, Boulder, 
Colorado 1984, mansell Publishing Limited, London, 
1984, p.8JS. 
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11 forced the US to adopt the strategy of seeking 
staging bases ... 11 (72) 
close to the potential theatre of conflict in the Gulf. Based 
at MacDill Air Force Base in Florida, the USCENTCOM also has 
"a small 20 man headquarters on a US Navy ship 1n the 
Gulf", ( 7 3 ) presumably at Bahrain. The US has negotiated and 
reached agreements for naval and air facilities since 1980 in 
various parts of the Red Sea region and the Gulf. Areas where 
actual agreements have been concluded include Masirah, and 
Salala in Oman, Berbera in Somalia and Mombassa in Kenya, ( 74) 
(figure 5.J). 
In 1984 president Mubarak of Egypt declared that he 
"will not allow anyone to 
Egypt and the US and that 
between Egypt and the US 
has no alternative to it". 
distort relations between 
the special relationship 
is continuing, and Egypt 
(7 5) 
Following this announcement Egypt gave its consent that the 
US could develop a base at Ras Banas for the use of Egyptian 
forces and not as an American military base. However, several 
sources indicate that Ras Banas features in the planning of 
e... 
USCENTCOM' s facilities in the Middle East. Isra}f/,1' s naval 
base at Eilat could be used by the US besides Ras Banas and 
other bases in Sinai. ( 76 ) Table 5. 9 shows USENTCOM basing 
facilities for the defence of the Gulf. Egypt is specially 
important in respect of basing facilities because: 
For 
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"Egypt plays a pivotal role because it links the Red 
Sea and the Mediterranean and, through its close 
relations with Sudan, protects the corridor into 
Africa, helping to form an unbroken line of defence 
contiguous to Libya, Chad and Central African 
Republic." (77) 
this reason President Carter considered the 
Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty of 1979 as 
"a notable achievement which represents a strategic 
asset for America " . ( 7 8 ) 
Sudan has also been included in the system of American bases 
for which Diego Garcia represents the nexus. ( 79 ) In sum, the 
US is clearly determined to depend on military action as the 
principal means whether to guarantee oil supplies, protect 
friends, or to counter the Soviet threat. The Red Sea region 
has a central position in this respect. Jeffrey Record 
(1981), however, concludes that the USCENTCOM would fail the 
American military strategy to safeguard the Gulf, because: 
(1) it is a fatally flawed instrument for effective American 
military intervention; 
(2) its flaws are attributed in part to the inherent 
political obstacles to successful intervention in the 
Gulf and 1n part to the structural, technological and 
doctrinal unsuitability of rapidly deployable US forces 
for the likely combat environments they would confront in 
the region; and 
(3) fundamental alterations both in the concept of military 
intervention and 1n the character of the Rapid Deployment 
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Force itself are required if the strategic commitment 
enunciated in the Carter Doctrine is to be convincingly 
t db "l"t (80) suppor e y m1 1 ary power. 
However, to make these forces adapted to the harsh 
Middle Eastern climate, the US conducted military manoeuvres 
in the Red Sea/Gulf area in 1981, 1982, 1983 and 1985, in 
which regional forces from Egypt, Oman and Sudan too~ part. 
One major objective of those exercises in the Red Sea region 
is: 
"to provide US troops with training conditions 
similar to those throughout much of the Middle East 
and Gulf regions". (81) 
In sum, the foregoing pages have discussed the 
association of the Red Sea (water and countries) with the 
issue of Middle Eastern oil. The issue of US, Western, and 
Japanese concern about and dependence on Middle Eastern oil 
have been highlighted. Politicization of oil, the US threat 
to use force, and the Arab reaction were very important 
issues, which led to a shaking in the unity of the Western 
alliance. What follows is an evaluation of the communi-
cational role played and that will be played by the Red Sea 
in transporting oil supplies, especially to Western Europe. 
Apart from Western interests, the Gulf tanker war and its 
threat to loading facilities in the Gulf and passage through 
Hormuz, have alerted Arab Gulf States to seek alternative 
outlets for their exports; they seem to have found that such 
outlets exist above all in the Red Sea. 
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5.2 Energy Transportation 
5.2.1 Red Sea Route 
Prior to the closure of the Suez Canal in 1967 the 
industrialized West utilised the short Red Sea route for the 
bulk of its oil needs, chiefly from the Gulf. The 5,000nm the 
Red Sea saves Western Europe (compared with the Cape of Good 
Hope route) means both savings in time and distance. However, 
the closure of the Canal halted that benefit for eight years. 
Figure 5.4 shows oil movement before and after the 1967 
closure of the Canal. In 1966 some 167m tonnes of oil 
transited the Canal 1n a northbound direction, nearly six 
times the quantity handled by the Canal · 1976 ( 82 ) s· 1n . 1nce the 
reopening of the Canal oil transportation via the Red Sea has 
been picking up due to the merit of the route as a short-cut, 
especially to Western Europe. The expansion and deepening of 
the Canal, the opening of the SUMED pipeline in 1977, as well 
as the Saudi East-West pipeline in 1981, also have contributed 
to this recovery. In 1984 some 86.628m tons of crude oil and 
petroleum products passed northbound through the Suez Canal, 
while total Gulf oil exports to the US and Western Europe in 
the same year were at most 181.9m tonnes. ( 8 J) This means that 
over 55% of Gulf supplies to the US and Western Europe used 
the Red Sea route in that year. Compared to the 29.855m tons 
that transited the Canal in 1976, the figure for 1984 shows a 
tremendous increase amounting to about 200%, which clearly 
reflects the growing redirection of Gulf oil traffic from the 
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Cape route to the Red Sea route. 
5.2.2 Overland Pipelines 
Introduction 
There is a noticeable increase in the laying of pipelines 
for the transportation of gas, crude oil or products in the 
world. These pipelines function as an alternative to the long 
haul at sea, or as internal means of energy transportation, 
especially where no sea link exists and where land con-
figurations are inhospitable. They may not be economic, but 
surely they are quicker, and therefore important in a world 
where speed is an important component of competition. They 
need pumping stations to enhance their capacity, they also 
need terminals for loading and unloading. Pipelines may run 
into more than one country (see below) in which case such 
lines may be vulnerable to sabotage or blowing up if 
differences occur between the owner and a hosting country, 
even without difference between such countries those lines 
could be disrupted by non- governmental groups (see below). 
Pipelines need maintenance, which entails continuous expenses. 
The volume of crude they transport may not be as big as that 
carried by tankers or VLCCs. However, they are less hazardous 
than tankers, particularly in such troubled waters as those of 
the Gulf. Laying of pipelines, especially in the Middle East, 
could benefit the West, especially American companies due to 
the US upper hand in the Middle East. 
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In 1982 the length of pipelines laid or planned for laying 
in the non-Communist world was 53,130 miles. The longest 
mileage of 21,631 is in the US, followed by 10,068 in Canada. 
The least mileage of 1, 440 is in the Middle East, ( 84 ) (table 
5. 10) . Following the completion of the Saudi east-west 
pipeline (see below) in 1981, the International Petroleum 
Encyclopedia (1982) 
pipelines in the 
indicates a drop 
Middle East. ( 85 ) 
in 
The 
the projection of 
reason for such 
reduction may lie in the general decline of world demand for 
oil. However, the Gulf tanker war has clearly changed this 
situation (see below) by encouraging more building of crude 
pipeline. Planning for pipelines in the Middle East includes 
two Iraqi pipelines to the Red Sea, via Saudi Arabia and 
Jordan; and Oman plans the building of a 251 mile line in its 
northern oilfields. Also Yemen AR plans to construct a 170 
mile pipeline from Salifa to Sanaa via Mabar.( 86 ) A proposed 
3,600 km Trans-Africa pipeline contract was signed in 1984, to 
carry oil from the Red Sea to the Atlantic. However, the more 
vulnerable shipping becomes, the greater the use of pipelines 
will be. Table 5.11 shows Gulf-Red Sea pipelines. 
It is the laying of new oil pipelines that has enhanced 
and is expected to increase the role of the Red Sea as an oil 
artery. The construction and/or operation of these pipelines 
may yield important geopolitical repercussions. As the US used 
the issue of the reopening of the Suez Canal in 197 5 as a 
political card which contributed to the deradicalization of 
330 a 
Table 5.10 
Laid or planned pipelines in the non-Communist world during 
and beyond :1982 
Area 
United States 
Canada 
Latin America 
West Europe 
Asia-Pacific 
Africa 
Middle East 
Total 
Length of pipelines 
(in miles) 
21,631 
10,068 
9,861 
4,261 
3,874 
1,995 
1,440 
53,130 
Source: International Petroleum Encyclopedia 
1982, Pennwell Publishing Co., Tulsa OK, 
~1982, p.407. 
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Table 5.11 
Gulf-Red Sea pipelines 
Pipeline Capacity:mb/d 
Current Potential 
Sumed 1. 60 2.40 
East-West 1. 85 3.00 
Eilat-Ashdod 0.90 1. 20 
Iraq-Saudi Arabia 1. 60 
Haditha-Aqaba 1. 00 
Totals 4-35 9.20 
Sources: Various (see text). 
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Egypt and brought it closer to the US and Israel, so US 
involvement in the construction of pipelines in the Middle 
East has resulted in more leaning by one of the most 
anti-American elements in the Middle East, ie Iraq, towards 
America, as this will become clear later. Hereafter discussion 
of existing and proposed pipelines that terminate on the Red 
Sea coast will follow. Figure 5.5 shows the network of these 
lines. Also discussion will include vulnerability of and 
geopolitical development associated with these pipelines. 
Tapline 
Built 1n 1950, the 30m diameter and 1,213km Trans-Arabia 
Pipeline ( Tapline) traverses Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Syria 
to end in Aramco's Nahar Zahrani terminal in Sidon (Lebanon) 
on the eastern Mediterranean (figure 5.2.2). Laid with a 
maximum capacity of 0.5m b/d, the line was designed to lessen 
the cost of shipment of oil supplies to Western Europe by 
avoiding the long voyage around the Arabian Peninsula. ( 87 ) 
Although a route through Israel would be more direct and 
cheaper, Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco) avoided laying 
the line across Israel, adding a diversion of about 30 miles 
(88) . 
around Israel to end 1n Lebanon. For a long t1me, the 
Tapline functioned as one of the significant arteries through 
which Gulf oil was carried to consumers in Western Europe. 
Compared to shipment of Gulf oil by VLCCs, the line is 
considered uneconomic; but its economic viability was 
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exacerbated by the lack of modernization and service due to 
continuous differences between Saudi Arabia and Lebanon 
d . t . t d d t t. f th 1. ( 89) regar 1ng rans1 ues an pro ec 100 o e 1ne. Growing 
dependence upon huge crude carriers and the continued 
political turmoil in Lebanon, besides other difficulties, 
caused Saudi Arabia to close the line in April 1975. 
Israeli intransigence over the Palestinian question and US 
unrestrained backing of Israel, led to the blowing up of 
sections of Tapline before 1973, by pro-Palestinian 
guerrillas. ( 90) Although some miles of this line run through 
Israeli occupied Syrian terri tory, Odell ( 19 8 3 )· wonders that 
Israel did not disrupt its operation, while such an action was 
taken by Arab commandos, apparently acting against an Arab 
State.( 91 ) However, the blowing up was clearly meant to harm 
backers of Israel who were using Tapline supplies. Continued, 
sometimes intensive, conflict in Lebanon has not allowed re-
opening of the line only for a brief spell in 1978, never-
theless the line's operation continued to be tenuous due to 
the fragile state of peace . ( 9 2) 1n Lebanon. Between 1979 and 
1982 intermittent supplies of the line ranged between 50,000 
to 60,000 b/d, a total of 20-29 m/b or 0.26-0.83% of the 
Kingdom's crude output during that period. The Lebanese 
connection was sabotaged in 1981. However, the line continued 
until May 1982 to carry some 36,000 b/d of Saudi oil to Jordan 
to feed a refinery at Zarka. The Israeli invasion of Lebanon 
10 June 1982 effectively shut the Tapline down even for local 
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use. Since 1975 losses caused by the line are put at $250m. 
The fact that even as a local supplier the line has become 
uneconomic, has cast doubts upon resumption of its activity. 
Therefore the owners of the line - the US partners in Aramco 
were reported to be completely closing down Tapline 
installations at the end of 1985. ( 9 3) 
Just a few months after this announcement, the Saudi 
authorities declared its resurrection according to the 
Petroleum Economist (July, 1984). ( 94 ) However, the Gulf war 
was not wholly responsible for the reactivation of the line. 
Security problems which continue to surround the line at its 
western end in Lebanon are described as 'even more 
insuperable' when compared with the Iranian threat. But still 
the line is perceived to: 
"play a major role in Saudi domestic plans while 
also supplementing export capacity of the much 
bigger Petroline outlet". (95) 
Saudi switch in policy to resume operation of the line has 
been explained by the Kingdom's need to feed the 160,000 b/d 
refinery planned for al-Qasim province, 400m west north-west 
of Yanbu. Repercussions of the Gulf war also resulted in an 
idea to maximise the capacity of the Petroline (1.85mb/d) for 
export in case the Strait of Hormuz was put at risk; therfore 
the Saudis decided that the almost-defunct Tapline could be 
used instead (Petroleum Economist 7/8 4)). Diversion of the 
northern end of Tapline to a Red Sea exit has been thought of 
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to feed the planned Saudi refineries at al-Qasim and 
(96) Shuqayq on the soutehrn Red Sea, about 60m from Jizan and 
90m from the Saudi Yemeni coastal border. However, security 
problems have been the major issue throughout the life-span of 
Tapline leading to its closedown in 1975 and its intermittent 
disruptions. There is a view that if Saudi Arabia could get 
Syria's cooperation, this could help reactivation of the line, 
because Syria has been supporting Iran against Iraq. ( 9 7) It is 
obvious that Syria cannot guarantee the security of the line 
because the major threat comes firstly from Israel and 
secondly, possibly from radical Palestinian and Islamic 
groups. Thus, without improvement of security, it is difficult 
to envisage an uninterrupted export of Gulf oil through the 
Tapline. 
SUMED 
The inauguration of the Suez-Mediterranean pipeline 
(SUMED) early in 1977, marked a major new departure in the 
role of the Red Sea. The 320 km pipeline extends from Ain al 
Suphna an Egyptian port south of Suez, to Sidi Kreir 
terminal near Alexandria. It consists of twin 42-inch diameter 
pipes. Tankers move crude from the Gulf, round the Arabian 
peninsula, through Bab al Mandeb and north to Ain Sukhna. 
Alternatively, oil is shipped in tankers from the terminal at 
Yanbu in Saudi Arabia from Suli Kreir, the oil is carried by 
large tankers to refineries in Western Europe and the US. The 
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loading and unloading of large tankers has been made easy due 
to facilities associated with SUMED at both terminals on the 
Red Sea and Mediterranean. The intention of building the line 
was partly to bypass the Canal in order to offset problems of 
ships too large to transit the waterway and secondly to evade 
transit restrictions of the latter. (9 8 ) 
Since its initial conception SUMED has been viewed by the 
US as an important development. During the 1974 Congressional 
hearings on the US role in reopening the Canal, the Americans 
held the view that the pipeline - coupled with the Canal 
would 
"increase maximization of the economies of scale in 
petroleum logistics by offering a vast flexibility 
in choice of product-crude movement alternatives, 
and size of carrier dictated by the ultimate 
destination via single tanker or in a tanker-
pipeline tanker combination". (99) 
Regarding Egyptian interests, the economic motivation for the 
construction of the line is related to the country's financial 
needs resulting from the loss of revenues during the eight 
year closure of the Canal, and to some extent from rivalry 
with the Cape route following the 1975 reopening. During the 
early stages of the operation of the line after 1977, Egypt's 
annual revenue from SUMED was put at $80m; this income is 
expected to rise to $120m when its current capacity (see 
below) increases by some SO%. (100) 
SUMED started with an initial capacity of 800,000 b/d; 
this was doubled in early 1978 to the present level of 1.6m 
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b/d. Indicating the 78m tons of crude oil moved by the line in 
1981, some 1.57m b/d, Blake (1984) points out that it was the 
completion of Saudi east-west pipeline in that year which 
brought SUMED to near capacity use. Odell (1983) also 
confirmed that the prospect for the line has been 
substantially enhanced by the building of the Saudiline. ( 101 ) 
According to the Journal of the Arab Maritime Academy (1977), 
SUMED is designed to carry an annual amount of 80m tons; and 
that this capacity could be increased to 117m tons per year 
(2.4m b/d) if the need arises. Also Odell (1983) indicates the 
possibility of increasing the line 1 s annual output to 12 Sm 
tons, approximately 2. Sm b/ d. Compared to that of the Canal 
(1.75m b/d of crude and products) the line's capacity is only 
0.1Sm b/d less than the former. Being concerned about 
protecting Europe from shortages of oil, the Americans 
consider the current capacity of the line as significant to 
boosting the amount of Europe's oil from the Gulf. ( 102 ) Table 
5.11 shows the current capacities of Red Sea pipelines. 
The line is owned by a consortium of the following Arab 
States: Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Abu Dhabi and Qatar. On 
29 September 197 3 these states signed a contract for the 
formation of what came later (21 January 1974) to be known as 
the Arab Company for Oil Pipelines with capital of $400m. 
Being built by Arab money, the line is seen by the Arabs as: 
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11 the first project of investment of Arab money for 
the benefit of Arab people. The Company will serve 
both the interests of Gulf producers and consumers 
in Western Europe, besides the line 1 s revival of 
international trade and East-West linkage". (103) 
The cost of the construction, $500m, was paid by the owners. 
The life-span of the company is 27 years during which the 
former should pay Egypt transiting charges of 27.78% from the 
company's income. Failure of Western European firms to reach 
an agreement with the Company regarding the cost of building 
the line, enabled Bechtel Corporation of the US to win the 
construction deal, by paying $354.4m. Construction started in 
April 197 4. Exxon Company was the first to sign a contract 
(until March 1988) with the Arab Company for Oil Pipelines to 
use SUMED, and the former agreed to pay the latter an annual 
sum of $10 to $12m. In early 1977 Mobil Co. concluded an 
agreement with SUMED 1 s owners. Also other Western firms, like 
Amoco, Greek Petrofina, and other French and Spanish 
companies, negotiated deals with the owners to use the 
1 . (104) 1ne. 
Some American experts in the oil industry and oil politics 
perceive SUMED as an alternative to the Suez Canal and that it 
is going to compete directly with the waterway once the 
latter 1 s deepening is completed. They also see the line as 
having negligible effects on tanker demand. Closure of SUMED 
1s not expected, by these experts, to have much effect on 
world oil transportation, except that it enhances the mood of 
many tanker owners. In contrast to what is mentioned above 
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about oil companies interests in SUMED, it is believed that 
the prolonged Israeli-Arab hostility, despite partial peace 
between Israel and Egypt, is the main reason why 
"no major oil company has been prepared to put all 
its eggs into this particular basket". (105) 
However, although the American-sponsored peace between Israel 
and Egypt has hitherto had no impact on the· flow of oil 
through SUMED, Admiral Hanks (1981) anticipates that further 
'unhappiness' of the Gulf Arab leaders, especially the Saudis, 
could end in an embargo which might obviously stem the supply 
f t 1 t th 1 . ( 106 ) c . d . h t h b . o pe ro eum o e 1ne. ons1 er1ng w a as een go1ng 
on in the Gulf since 1982 with the tanker war and the 
increasing interests of the Arab Gulf producers as well as 
Egypt in finding alternative outlets in the Red Sea through 
pipelines, the Admiral's assumption may not look correct. 
Compared with the Israeli line of Eilat-Ashkelon (see below), 
SUMED is considered to be relatively free from the political 
problems that stopped the former's operation, specifically due 
to the stoppage of the flow of Iranian oil to Eilat, but it is 
still vulnerable to the same threats that endanger activity in 
the Canal, namely, another Israeli-Arab conflict in which 
Egypt is involved. However, other views argue that the route 
the line follows, south and west of the Nile delta, distances 
it from the vulnerable Canal. ( 107 ) Clearly, in any 
Israeli-Arab war the line could be an Israeli target since a 
considerable part of it falls within the Canal zone; moreover 
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threats to this part of the line could stop the tanker shuttle 
between Yanbu and Ain Sukhna (figure 5.5). 
The Journal of Arab Maritime Academy (7/1977) points out 
that SUMED has achieved the following objectives: 
(1) participation of Arab capital in joint ventures which 
could consolidate the bonds of Arab solidarity and unite 
Arab ranks; 
(2) an increase 1n the GNP of the Arab Gulf States and Egypt; 
(3) a stabilization of Egypt's role in the transport of oil to 
the West; 
( 4) the passage of part of the Arab oil through Arab land, 
hence, Egypt which minimizes the dangers that may threaten 
the safety of this oil shipped via the Cape route; 
( 5) a guaranteed flow of sufficient amounts of oil to the 
Egyptian refineries and petrochemical installations on the 
Mediterranean; 
( 6) an increase in the activity of ports on the Red Sea and 
Mediterranean; 
(7) a contribution to causing the slump in the Israeli 
Eilat-Ashkelon pipeline; and 
(8) an ability to supply Europe with about 30% of its total 
oil imports, and covering about 43% of the amount handled 
t ( 108) by European por s. 
The East-West PipeLine 
Apprehension about the vulnerability of loading facilities 
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in the Gulf or sabotage or strikes has also been associated 
with the Israeli-Arab conflict, especially after the Israeli 
invasion of Lebanon (June, 1982) and its bringing the Tapline 
activity to an end. Moreover, such worries have been 
compounded by the five year old Gulf war. Fears of the Arab 
Gulf States about disruption of their oil transportation moved 
these states, Saudi Arabia in particular, to seriously 
contemplate the reduction of their dependence on the Gulf's 
export installations, according to John Anthony ( 19 81), who 
was appointed by the Department of State as Chairman of the 
Advanced Area Studies Programme 1n 1980 for the Arabian 
peninsula and Iran. Anthony adds that before the Iraq-Iran 
war, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia planned to utilize the Red 
Sea as a substitute route in the future to lessen the 
possibility of disruption to its oil exports. ( 1 09) 
The East-West crude export pipeline (formerly known as 
Petroline) extends from the Ghawar oilfield (the largest in 
the world) on the Gulf to the Port of Yanbu on the Red Sea 
(figure 5.5). The line extends for about 1,170km (731 miles). 
The laying of the line started 1n November 1978 and was 
commissioned in July 1981, with great fanfare (The Economist, 
2/8 2). ( 110 ) The east-west pipeline is the key factor in the 
establishment of the industrial complex at Yanbu. This complex 
as well as its counterpart at al-Jubail on the Gulf are 
considered: 
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"the brightest stars in the Kingdom's industrial-
ization galaxy 11 • ( 111) 
Until the inauguration of the line, all Saudi oil exports - at 
least 40% of total OPEC output - were shipped from Ras Tanura 
and Ju' aymah and passed through the Strait of Hormuz. The 
completion of the East-West pipeline has enabled Saudi Arabia 
to shift substantial amounts (see capacity below) to Yanbu, 
from which shuttle tankers carry the crude for about 400nm to 
Ain Sukhna. Thereafter, responsibility for moving oil from 
there rests on SUMED. Built by the US Mobil Oil Corporation, 
the line cost $1.6 billion. ( 112 ) 
Theoretically, the capacity of the East-West pipeline is 
put at 2.35m b/d. In 1981 the line moved 0.5m b/d, or 
something in the region of 5.3% of total Saudi output. By the 
close of 1981 the line's throughput was rapidly increased to 
its full capacity of 1.85m b/d and continued so till 1982. But 
in early 19 8 3 its entire throughput dropped to only 400, 000 
b/d, obviously owing to the world oil glut, then it grew to 
600,000 b/d late in the same year. Until mid-1985 the line's 
output was 700,000 b/d. In 1982 and 1983 the increase of the 
1.85m b/d capacity of the line to 2.45m b/d was anticipated. 
This has recently come to fruition according to the 
Petroleum Economist (9/84). The Saudi Gazette (8/84) indicates 
that about 20% of total Saudi crude production is now carried 
via the line. The Saudi decision to reactivate Tapline will 
enhance the throughput of the East-West line by a further 
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160/000 b/d of export throughput needed for the Qasim 
refinery. It is indicated that the amount extracted from the 
former will pass through a spur to be tied in the latter. 
However, no map to date has shown where such connections will 
take place. A future increase in the capacity of the east-west 
pipeline to 3.6-4m b/d could occur by laying another parallel 
line which is currently being considered. ( 11 3) Regarding 
storage facilities associated with the line, construction at 
Yanbu of a $7 billion storage facility complex with a 1. 5 
billion barrel capacity has been planned, scheduled for 
completion by 1990. The storage could hold 6 months' output at 
a rate of 8.3m b/d. Between 1981-1983 the US Chicago Bridge & 
Iron Co. built 14 overground storage tanks each holding 1m/b 
in the vicinity of Yanbu in order to take crude oil 
transported by the East-West pipeline. ( 11 4) 
With respect to the objectives of building the line, the 
Economist (2/1982) indicates two major reasons: 
( 1) to diversify Saudi export outlets from the potentially 
dangerous Gulf; and 
(2) to cut transport costs, particularly for Mediterranean 
customers. ( 115 ) 
Disruption of Saudi exports via the Tapline is considered as a 
factor that prompted the Kingdom's decision to lay the east-
west ll.ne.( 116 ) Th · t f th 1· h b h d e 1mpor ance o e 1ne as een en ance 
by the intention of other Gulf States, namely Iraq (see 
below), to connect their oilfields with it in order. to avoid 
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traffic hazards created by the Gulf tanker war and the Iranian 
threat to blockade Hormuz. The Financial Times ( 10/83) says 
that in the event of closure of Hormuz the line could 
contribute to offset the shortfall; certainly this cannot be 
attained with the line's current output. Without being 
transited through the Canal or pipeline, Saudi oil supplies to 
Western Eruope via 
economically viable, 
the c J,J f!ast-west 
argues Odell 
Saudi-Egyptian cooperation is crucial 
S d . (117) au 1s. 
pipeline cannot be 
(1983). Therefore, 
especially to the 
Besides attack or sabotage, the line could be vulnerable 
to other factors that may affect its operation. The world oil 
glut is one of the crucial causes that could affect the line. 
In early 1982 the Economist anticipated that the slump in 
world demand for oil could precipitate the shutting down of 
the line because exports from Yanbu declined from 1.2m b/d to 
just 300,000 b/d, or 75%. Another view contends that the line 
'has hardly been a commercial success', since its opening four 
years ago. Despite its saving of 3,600km compared to the sea 
route round the Arabian peninsula, still the overland pipeline 
is rivalled by tankers whose price rates have become lower 
owing to recession in the world shipping industry. Also 
transit dues constitute a deterrent to use of the line. At 
first, a 60 cent was charged by the Saudis as a premium for 
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loading oil on the Red Sea. Negotiations by Aramco partners 
and Petromin customers against this rate resulted in a 10 cent 
cut, but this did not satisfy the customers who continued to 
believe that: 
"the gains from loading oil in the Red Sea are still 
outweighed by the depressed demand for oil". (118) 
Therefore, oil exports through the Red Sea were expected to be 
suspended. However, owing to a general decline in oil demand, 
the Saudis have cut their exports via the Red Sea, a step that 
has been linked to a Saudi strategy of allowing its oil output 
to be determined by market forces as the Kingdom's oil 
Minister, Sheikh Ahmed Zaki Yamani, stated in 1982. ( 11 9) 
With regard to physical threat, such as attack or 
sabotage, in 1984 Cordesman argued that Saudi expansion of 
facilities, such as those at Yanbu, will 
"require new air defense coverage and increase Saudi 
Arabia's defense problems". (120) 
Because storage and loading facilities at Yanbu are many and 
of the same kind, they are dangerously exposed to the extent 
that: 
"a single air strike could paralyze a plant costing 
several hundred million dollars for up to two 
years". ( 121) 
Being greatly concerned about the growing network of pipelines 
to the Red Sea, especially to Yanbu, the US 
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"is planning to develop a military facility across 
from Yanbu at Ras Banas", (122) 
on the Egyptian coast. Thus Yanbu will be only 240km away from 
the potential American base. Quandt (1983) perceives the 
location of Ras Banas, in relation to the port of Yanbu, to be 
capable of threatening or defending the industrial complex 
there. ( 12 3) To Cordesman (1984) the ~ast-~est pipeline 
"will open up new opportunities for sabotage and 
long range air str~ that bypass Saudi Arabia's 
radar system along the Gulf". (124) 
Moreover, this new Saudi industrial complex will burden the 
Kingdom's air defence with a logistically difficult task 
because it will 
"force the small Saudi Air Force to defend two 
coastal areas more than 1,000 miles apart". (125) 
However, just one year later (1985), Cordesman's proposal 
for the protection of those Saudi facilities directly 
contradicted his 1984 analysis of the reasons that make those 
facilities vulnerable. In 19 8 5 he argued that protection of 
Saudi petroleum and gas facilities could be facilitated by 
building more installations in various locations: 
"The gas and oil facilities should 
rendered more superfluous to Saudi 
duplicate facilities elsewhere, and 
vulnerable to attack." (126) 
be dispersed, 
needs through 
so become less 
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Cordesman thus supports the idea of a second east-west pipe-
line (see below). 
Political factors that could threaten the east-west 
pipeline have also been identified by the Americans who think 
that the viability of the line is too subject to the policies · 
of Egypt which controls the Suez Canal. ( 127 ) However, the 
Americans should remember that the line is of value to Egypt 
because it has created a tremendous impact on the enlarged 
Canal by causing a dramatic increase in northbound tonnage of 
oil tankers. As a result the Canal witnessed a SO% increase in 
its handling of tankers between 1980 and 1982, despite an 
overall world oil glut. Saudi Arabia's opposition to the 
partial peace between Israel and Egypt, as demonstrated by the 
Kingdom 1 s participation in the 1977 Baghdad Conference, in 
opposition to Sadat's visit to Israel, and the Saudi view that 
Israel is the major source of insecurity to the Kingdom is 
well known. One wonders, therefore, how Odell (1983) can claim 
that the peace accord between Israel and Egypt 1 persuaded 1 
Saudi Arabia that the east-west pipeline/Yanbu/Suez Canal 
route was a f 't' (128) sa e propos1 1on. The consequences of us 
involvement in Red Sea and Gulf affairs have been demonstrated 
in various anti-American actions, for instance, 'the mines of 
1984', which was claimed by an Islamic fundamentalist group, 
was announced as an action against the US (chapter 6). 
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A Second East-West Pipeline (Proposed) 
The most recent developments in Saudi Arabia's system of 
oil transportation are represented by the looping of the 
east-west crude export pipeline to take in 500,000 b/ d via 
Iraq's spur (see below), and the plan to build a second 
· 1 · (1 29 ) A . b h . t east-west p1pe 1ne. mer1can concern a out t e secur1 y 
of Gulf oil supplies and acceptable oil prices have been the 
reason behind US interest in the new line, as is clearly shown 
by Cordesman (1985). He points out that a few Iranian attacks 
on the Kingdom's oil complex might increase the price of oil 
and halve its flow. He therefore emphasizes the importance of 
the second east-west line which would enable Saudi Arabia to 
maintain exports 
"so that Iran does not have leverage to cause a 
major crisis by hitting existing facilities and 
shutting down the flow". (130) 
The second pipeline would be 56 inches in diameter, running 
parallel to the 48 inch first east-west line (figure s.s), and 
would raise the latter 1 s throughput to 3m b/ d. Such large 
capacity, equivalent to nearly 20% of OPEC's combined 
production in the spring of 19 8 5, is important when it is 
linked to the increasing impact of the Gulf war on oil 
production and/or transportation. Since mid-1984 it has been 
clear that the Gulf tanker war demonstrated to both oil 
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producers and consumers 
"a clear need to maximize crude throughput for 
export should Gulf outlets be put at risk". (131) 
The possibility of linking the new line with Saudi Arabia's 
grandiose scheme for underground storage in the vicinity of 
Yanbu, has already been mentioned. The scheduled date for the 
commissioning of the line is 1987 at a cost estimated at 
$500m.(132) 
Besides Saudi Arabia, beleaguered Iraq will also benefit 
from the project which will help the transportation of all the 
oil to be exported through Iraq's 500,000 b/d spur by tying in 
the latter with the new line. Quandt (1985) views the line as 
providing a useful substitute in case the situation in the 
Gulf becomes unmanageable; besides it avails Iraq a 'useful 
facility for exporting' , and 1n relation to the Red Sea, 
Quandt adds that the line 
"provides the capability of putting a substantial 
amount of oil into a part of the Middle East likely 
to be more stable than the Gulf, namely the northern 
Red Sea" . ( 1 3 3) 
Preoccupation with the Gulf war and its threat to disrupt oil 
transportation has created a general agreement between the US 
and Saudi Arabia about the execution of the line which is 
perceived by both countries of fundamental long-term strategic 
importance. The line 
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"makes good sense, and in the long-term it enhances 
stability and energy security in the region. Even 
now, with a relatively low demand for Saudi oil it 
makes considerable sense to embark on such a major 
long-term measure to reduce the need to ship crude 
through the Strait of Hormuz". (134) 
MEED (5/85) indicates that most observers are convinced that 
the decision to build the line has been 
"a purely political move, a form of 
against the Gulf being closed to shipping" 
insurance 
(135) 
as a consequence of escalation ±ii the Gulf war and possible 
future hostilities in the zone of oil routes. 
Due to American apprehension over interruption of 
supplies, especially since 1982, the project has become 
appealing to the US and Western allies. Such interest has been 
typically expressed by Christine Helm, a Middle East and 
energy analyst at the Brooking Institution, thus: 
"It diversifies vulnerability, so it will be 
welcomed by the US and West European states." (136) 
The relative ease and costs involved 1n protecting such a 
line, compared to the defence of a whole oilfield zone and 
associated sea routes is considered by Cordesman (1985) as an 
important criterion in support of the laying of the line. In 
his words- according to MEED (5/85): 
"Investment ln pipelines by Saudi Arabia and other 
states is a far better form of defence than 
investment in any defence system or missiles. It 
takes a very high investment to improve military 
352 
systems even marginally - particularly one to defend 
the entire Gulf, since you have to protect a whole 
range of installations and shipping lanes over a 
wide area. But a pipeline to the Red Sea is 
relatively easy to defend, using Saudi Arabia 1 s 
existing air force and defence capabilities. 11 (137) 
Although the decision to build a second line came from the 
highest level (a reference to King Fahad), the $500m cost of 
the project has stirred up criticism - especially as it has 
coincided with Saudi public spending cuts and a decline in 
government payments. The increase in throughput has also 
created understandable argument against the scheme due to the 
lack of any commercial need to increase crude oil export 
capacity: 
11 Aramco and the technocrats 
because it is unattractive 
would have preferred to have 
and carried on with the Qasim 
were against the 
commercially 
scrapped the new 
refinery 11 , (138) 
line 
They 
line 
MEED ( 5/85) with reference to an oil executive close to 
Aramco. 
Eilat-Mediterranean Pipeline 
Soon after the second Israeli-Arab war in October 19 56, 
Israel laid the first 8-inch diameter trans-Negev oil pipeline 
extending from Eilat to Ashdod and Haifa. In 1960, with the 
flourishing of Eilat and increase in Israeli oil supplies from 
Iran, a 160 inch line replaced the previous one. With 
persistent Israeli increase of oil consumption, which jumped 
from 3m/b in 1948 to 25m/b in 1967, and to about 60 m/b in 
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1983, Israel built a new 42-inch pipeline from Eilat to Ashdod 
in the early 1970s, with a potential capacity of 60m tons per 
year. The line's current capacity is 0.9m b/d. ( 139) 
Israel was not expecting that Arab oil would be allowed to 
pass through the line. Odell (1983) argues that as long as the 
Arabs do not recognize Israel or allow it to benefit from its 
favourable location the economic viability of this line would 
be in doubt. No Arab state has ever consented to transport its 
oil through the line, and until 1978 Iran continued to be the 
only country to utilise the line to export moving large 
amounts of oil. Because most Iranian oil was produced and 
shipped by companies with large interests in the Arab world, 
the line's throughput was limited since these companies 
clearly did not want to antagonise the Arabs. Pre-Khomeini 
Iranian oil carried through the line from Eilat to Ashkelon 
"1 d I 1 f b dl d d h d · ( 14°) ava1 e srae o a y nee e ar currency earn1ngs. 
Since the downfall of the Shah in February 1979 and the 
Iranian Islamic Revolution, Iran has ceased cooperation with 
Israel; and the revolutionary Iran became 
"more vociferous and active 
against Israel". (141) 
in its opposition 
Consequently the line ceased to be used in moving Iranian 
oil, according to Odell ( 19 8 3) who concludes that unless a 
comprehensive settlement to the Israeli-Arab dispute is 
achieved, neither a major expansion of the line's capacity or 
the full use of its current capacity (40m tons a year) will 
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. (142) be poss1ble. At present, the line may be transporting 
some Israeli supplies provided by Egypt in pursuance of the 
peace between the two in 1979. However, if the line's 
activity grows, it can only enhance Israeli interest in the 
Red Sea. 
Iraq-Arabia-Red Sea Pipeline (Proposed) 
The Israeli-Arab dispute and tensions associated with it 
have affected oil supply and transportation in the Middle 
East directly and indirectly. This has been demonstrated in 
the oil embargo of 1973, and relevantly in the intermittent 
closure of the Iraqi network of pipelines to the 
Mediterranean. At present, the only secure outlet left for 
Iraq is the 700,000 b/d line ending at Ceyhan in Turkey, but 
differences between the two countries over transit tolls has 
led to occasional interruptions in the line. The capacity of 
this line was later increased to 1mb/d. ( 1 43) 
The need to find a substitute to the hampered 
Mediterranean exits and the loss of export facilities on the 
Gulf, due to the effective Iranian blockade forced Iraq to 
search for alternative outlets for its oil exports. It seems 
the best solution for the beleagured Iraq will be through 
the Red Sea. Iraq thus concluded two deals with Saudi Arabia 
and Jordan in 1984. The line through Saudi Arabia will carry 
oil from Iraq's southern oilfields to a new port refinery on 
the Saudi Red Sea coast. The line consists of two phases, 
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with an entire length of 970km. Installation of the line and 
its associated facilities are estimated to cost $2b. The 
whole project will be completed in two years time (MEED 
5/8 5). ( 144 ) Scheduled to begin in October 19 84 the first 
phase will extend for 630km and include the building of a 
48-inch diameter pipeline linking Zubair depot no.1 in 
southern Iraq with the pumping station no. 3 of the Saudi 
east-west pipeline. The first phase will be completed by 
September 19 8 5, according to MEED ( 10/8 4) . The Iraqi oil 
Minister, Mr Qasim Taqi, has indicated Iraq's desire to 
accomplish this phase in a very short time. The contract for 
the construction of the entire line has been won by an 
Italian-French consortium. The first phase of the project 
will cost $508m which will be covered by the delivery of 
35,000 b/d of Iraqi oil for 'slightly over a year' to Italy's 
Agip. The US company Brown & Root has become the project 
consultant. ( 145 ) 
Initial capacity of the line will be 500,000 b/d during 
the first phase; and this will be upgraded to 1.6m b/d by the 
execution of the second phase which will be an independent 
line extending from Iraq to a new terminal on the Saudi coast 
on the Red Sea. The ultimate capacity will help Iraq regain 
export levels close to its pre-September 1980 maximum export 
of 3.5m b/d. In early 1984 only slightly more than one fourth 
of that amount was carried through Iraq's line via Turkey to 
the . (146) Med1terranean. The execution of the second phase 
will include construction of twelve pumping stations between 
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Zubair and the Red Sea, where storage tanks and, on and 
offshore loading terminals will be constructed, somewhere 
south of Yanbu. However, until about mid-1985 there has been 
no mention of a construction programme for the second phase, 
which could mean that the entire line may not come to 
fruition at the scheduled time, 1986. ( 14 7) 
Haditha-Aqaba Pipeline (Proposed) 
The proposed Haditha-Aqaba pipeline from Iraq to Jordan 
is the other solution sought by beleagured Iraq. The Iraqis 
are very concerned about finding a safe export route that 
could enable its economy to keep up even if 
"its lines through Syria and Turkey and its Gulf 
loading facilities were damaged". (148) 
Neither the Iraqi line via Jordan or through Saudi Arabia is 
expected to be complete before 1990. Both Iraq and Jordan are 
desperate to go ahead with the scheme. For Jordan the project 
is seen as helping alleviate domestic unemployment problems 
besides boosting the port of Aqaba. As in the case of Saudi 
Arabia's second east-west line, the Iraqi line to Jordan 
procured support from the highest level of authority; 
according to the International Herald Tribune (3/84) the 
scheme 
"long regarded a rank outsider, now has the support 
of Iraq's top leadership". (149) 
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The two countries have initialled the scheme in principle 
according to International Saudi Report (7/84). Both countries 
are reported to be 
11 determined to implement what they describe as a 
'vital' project 11 (lSO) 
despite difficulties surrounding it. To enable Iraq to export 
oil from its northern and southern oilfields, the line will 
begin at Haditha, 200km northwest of Baghdad, and extend west 
until the Iraq-Jordanian border then southwest across Jordan 
to Aqaba. Its total length is 900-1, OOOkm. The line may be 
preceded by the Iraq-Saudi line formerly mentioned and 
planned and built by the American construction firm Bechtel 
Inc. The line's capacity will be about 1mb/d. ( 1 51 ) 
From the start, however, the proposed line has become 
subject to possible Israeli attack, because it will run close 
to Israel's frontiers. It is worth mentioning that Iraq 
already suffered Israeli aggression when the former's nuclear 
reactor was destroyed by Israel in 1982. With regard to the 
line, Israel objected to its construction informing Washington 
that oil spills from the pipeline and the refinery associated 
with it would 'pollute the Red Sea Bay', and could 'pollute 
the port of Eilat'. To ensure the safety of the line against 
Israeli threats, the Petroleum Economist (9/84) reported that 
11 Iraq . . . insists that the scheme will not go ahead 
unless there is major US participation in the 
project, either from Export Import Bank other banks, 
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with Chase Manhattan Bank as lead manager, and that 
US companies involved in construction of the 
$1 billion line agree to repay the cost of damage 
incurred in the event of an Israeli attack." (152) 
Iraq, once one of the most radical and fiercest opponents 
of the US has been leaning~: somewhat more towards the US 
recently, recognizing the latter's political leverage. In 
pursuance of seeking assurances for the line Iraqi Deputy 
Prime Minister, Mr Taha Ramadan has indicated that, according 
to Saudi sources, the line must be built by an American firm 
because 
The 
"the US is the only power that can deter Israel from 
attacking a project executed by a major US 
company". ( 153) 
Iraqis are convinced taht unless they set strong 
conditions they might lose; therefore they wish to link 
payment for construction work with revenues from the operation 
of the line, in the hope that this may curb Israeli threats to 
the line. This view was articulated by the Iraqi Oil Minister, 
Qasim Taqi, reported by the BBC Summary of World Broadcast 
(8/84) as saying that: 
"to guarantee that the pipeline will not be attacked 
by the Zionist entity, Iraq had stipulated that it 
would not finance implementation of the pipeline 
except through the oil exported through it .... Iraq 
would withhold payment should oil exportation be 
suspended as a result of intervention by a third 
party". (154) 
The Minister believes that such firm stipulations will oblige 
359 
"the interested states to put pressure on the 
Zionist entity to prevent it from interfering or 
attacking this pipeline". (155) 
The Minister emphasized that his country's condition 1n this 
respect was 'basic, firm, and principled 1 and that Iraq has 
communicated this position to the construction firm and the 
. (156) f1nancers. 
What Iraq is looking for is political and military 
guarantees that Israel will not interfere with the operation 
of the line. 
With reference to the US official view the International 
Herald Tribune (3/84) points out that the US Government 
"played a major role in secret negotiations over the 
Iraqi pipeline ... across Jordan ... 11 (157) 
The US, with no diplomatic ties with Ba 'athist Iraq, assured 
the latter that: 
"Israel will not interfere with the pipeline". (156) 
Interestingly, The Guardian (5/84) discloses that the 
decision to announce the go-ahead for the scheme was taken by 
the Iraqis who had, previously, the negotiations in silence, 
after Baghdad was embarrassed by a speech from the Israeli 
Minister of Energy, Mr Modari, who promised that the proposed 
line would not be attacked. The Minister gave the guarantee, 
as he said, adds The Guardian, 1n response to Washington 1 s 
request following an appeal to do so by Baghdad. ( 1 59) 
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However, the Iraqi Oil Minister denied that his government 
had sought such assurance. Drawing on the aforementioned 
official Iraqi approach toward the project, it would be 
possible to believe that such a guarantee has been sought. 
Al-Sharq al-Ausat (8/84) says that the Jordanian Minister for 
Trade and Industry has announced that the building of the 
line is a pressing necessity for Jordan, and that they 
11 had guarantees 
it 11 • (160) 
that Israel would not attack 
However, no mention about the nature of these assurances was 
made. Iraq seems dissatisfied with what its partner, Jordan, 
has said about these guarantees because the former believe 
that 
11 this is a strategic pipeline, 
obtain guarantees at least for 
of time 11 , ( 1 6 1 ) 
a 
therefore it must 
convenient period 
according to the Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister, quoted in Asharg 
Al-Awsat (8/84). Israel is seen by the paper as trying to rob 
Iraq and Jordan through the issue of guaranteeing the security 
of the line. Interestingly, the paper links this Israeli 
behaviour with that of 1979 when it tried to capitalize on the 
Jordanian-Syrian agreement regarding the waters of the Yarmuk 
River (in N. W. Jordan). The agreement indicated that Jordan 
would build the Muqaran Dam under an American guarantee that 
Israel would not interfere with the project. Later Israel 
indicated taht unless a water quota were to be allotted to 
361 
Israel there would be no safety for the scheme. Consequently, 
Jordan dropped the . (162) proJect. Although the Israeli 
government gave assurances that it has "no plans for a 
sabotage operation" still "fears over Israeli intentions 
exist". ( 16 3) The Middle East (10/84) perceives Israel as 
attempting to "score a political point" similar to the Muqaran 
Dam episode, because Israel proposed that: 
"the line be linked with its own oil pipeline from 
Eilat to Ashkelon". (164) 
The financing of the project is thus critically linked to 
the issue of guaranteeing the security of the line. American 
geopolitical manoeuvres in the matter will be critical. After 
a 17-year interval of severed diplomatic ties between them, 
Iraq and the US started a rapprochement some time after the 
beginning of the Gulf war, and poised to re-establish 
diplomatic relations (MEED 11/84). Baghdad is apparently 
satisfied with President Reagan's attitude with regard to the 
Iraq-Iran war because his 'policies ... towards the Gulf war 
have been fair'. MEED (11/84) declares this to be the general 
belief in Iraq. The magazine argues that Iraq benefits from a 
US desire not to see Iran emerge as victorious; therefore Iraq 
"makes much of the fact that an Iranian success in 
the war could pose a threat to US and Western 
interests in the region. (163) 
However, the fact is that the Americans want neither 
belligerent to come out successful (chapter 7). Growing 
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American pro-Iraqi orientation has been evident since August 
1984, for example, in a report prepared for the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, indicating that US policy has tilted 
towards Iraq. Generally speaking, the American stance toward 
Iraq is embodied in 
"economic and political matters, rather than through 
military assistance". (166) 
It is this economic policy pursued by the US that has 
created an influential US role in the Haditha-Aqaba pipeline 
scenario. To help Iraq economically, is seen as helping it in 
its costly 5-year-old war. Israeli threats to the line have 
hampered discussion on the finance of the line. The story of 
Israeli threat has made 'financial institutions cautious' 
especially when Iraq demanded that it should be permitted to 
suspend payments of construction should the line be disrupted 
by sabotage. Bechtel, the constructor, rejected Iraq's 
condition of security guarantees, because such assurances 
would be a 
"bitter and unprecedented pill for international 
banks to swallow". (167) 
In June 1984 reports said that due to 'pressure from the White 
House' the American Export Import Bank (Eximbank) which 
gives insurance to US exporters, expressed its willingness to 
provide $500m, to help the construction of the Haditha-Aqaba 
line. Thus, US official involvement in the matter could be 
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related to 
11 US willingness to help to ease Iraq 1 s economic 
plight - and thus aid its overall war effort 11 • (168) 
Other sources of finance have been sought in Britain and 
France. Britain 1 s Export Credit Guarantee Department ( ECGD) 
seems to be considerably interested in the scheme. Although no 
formal deal so far has been reached between the institution 
and the Iraqi-Jordanian delegation, the ECGD 1 s spokesman 
indicated that they would 
11 give serious consideration to 
exporters for this scheme". (169) 
approaches from 
It was reported, however, on 14 August 19 84 that Iraq 
announced that it had suspended the pipeline project until 
proper guarantees were obtained. MEED ( 10/84) reports that 
negotiations between Western companies, headed by Bechtel, and 
an Iraq-Jordan team over the issue of guarantees against 
Israeli political or military interference with the operation 
of the line had reached a deadlock. Thus, the Israeli 
potential threat has compelled Iraq and Jordan to stop short 
of executing the project, which is also hampered because the 
"US government could not provide guarantees 
Israel would refrain from attacking the line". 
that 
(170) 
Early in 1984, some analyses of Arab oil politics expressed 
pessimism that the line would ever be built. However, though 
unhopeful about the line, the same analysts emphasize the 
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importance of US manoeuvre in support of Iraq. ( 171 ) Despite 
the tremendous problems surrounding Haditha-Aqaba pipeline, 
the project is said to be still under discussion with the US 
(172) Bechtel Group. 
In sum, if proposed Iraqi pipelines via Saudi Arabia and 
Jordan materialize, they will give Iraq considerable export 
capability when added to the Dortyol line, even if its war 
against Iran continues. Iraq's exports through these avenues 
could exceed 3m b/d by late 1986, according to the Petroleum 
Economist (9/84). ( 17 3 ) Both proposed lines have created 
important regional and geopolitical developments which have 
clearly given the US some unexpected geopolitical leverage in 
the area. 
Other Proposed Pipelines 
Middle and southern Red Sea zones are seen as becoming 
increasingly vulnerable, therefore Cordesman (1984) sees 
dependence on ports south of Yanbu, as terminals for 
pipelines, to be dangerous. However, to bypass the Strait of 
Hormuz, discussions of laying more pipelines have begun among 
the six members of the GCC since the beginning of the Gulf 
tanker war in 1982. Middle and southern sectors of the Red Sea 
are seen as becoming increasingly vulnerable to disruptive 
activities the Eritrean conflict on the western side, the 
revolutionary PDR Yemen, and hostilities in the Horn on the 
southwest extremities of the Red Sea region are some sources 
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of such fears, especially when Soviet influence in these areas 
is linked to the latter 1 s endemic instability. As a result 
dependence on any port south of Yanbu as a pipeline terminal 
is considered by Cordesman (1983) as dangerous. He sees 
pipelines through Oman as being less vulnerable to 
interdictions at Hormuz and Bah al Mandeb.( 174 ) Such a line, 
via Oman, has already been scrutinized by the GCC, with 
Salala, on the Arabian Sea, being chosen as its future 
terminal. A feasibility study of this project is reported to 
have begun. The proposed line would start in Iraq and continue 
southward through Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and southern part of 
the UAE, with branch lines to Qatar and possibly the northern 
part of the UAE. The line 1 s capacity would be the same as 
first East-West pipeline, namely 1.85mb/d. Phase two of this 
line would be a branching of the line to Muscat or Masirah 
Island. However, Salala is in Dhofar Province and it is just 
60-70km from the PDR Yemen-Oman land (175) boundary. 1 Shou d 
hostilities resume between the revolutionary PDR Yemen and 
monarchical Oman, such a line could be vulnerable to sabotage. 
There are several other possible pipelines within the Gulf 
area. The Arab Gulf producers have an idea of extending a line 
from the Gulf to Aden 1 s refinery. The scheme is seen as an 
important device to enhance Arab security, easing economic 
difficulties in a strategically located oil-dry Arab country. 
It could also help bridge the gap between the 1 haves 1 and 
1 have-nots 1 , ( 176 ) or between oil producers and transit states. 
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Trans-Africa Pipeline 
The Trans-Africa pipeline is an idea conceived by some 
American business circles in 1973 to move oil from the Red Sea 
to the Atlantic. The Israeli-Arab war of October 1973 and its 
impacts on guaranteed flow of oil supplies were the major 
reason behind the idea at that time. Ten years later, the same 
American investors feared that a spill-over of the Gulf war or 
any new eruption of an Israeli-Arab round of confrontation 
might cut the flow of oil to the West. Therefore the idea 
about the line was revived in 1983. In July 1984, the 
Trans-African Pipeline Company (TAPCO), an American firm, 
signed an agreement with Sudan to use the latter's territory 
for the construction of the line. ( 1 77) Two objectives have 
revived the long-shelved idea; 
( 1) an economic aspect conceived in an expected surplus in 
Gulf oil transported via the line instead of tankers; and 
( 2) a strategic aspect, as the line would help to by-pass 
strategic complications in the Gulf area. ( 17 8 ) 
The project includes the building of a new port facility, 
somewhere near Port Sudan, to hold 30mb. A 3, 600km two-fold 
line of a 56-in diameter and 4m b/d capacity would run from 
the new port to the port of Douala on the Atlantic. 
Construction of the line is scheduled to be commissioned. The 
official Sudanow (8/84) reports the cost of the project as $10 
billion, but Tapco sources indicate a higher figure of $12 
billion, and even $15 billion- according to MEED (8/84). ( 179 ) 
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However, again the idea of the Trans-Africa pipeline has been 
muted due to: 
(1) the difficulty of securing oil supplies for the operation 
of the line, although Tapco was hoping that Saudi Arabia 
would supply 2. 6m b/d and Iraq 1. 4m b/d, but neither of 
the two states so far have indicated their willingness to 
supply the oil; 
(2) failure to find finance: this factor is closely associated 
with the former; 
( 3) corruption allegations which have surrounded the signing 
of the project, and led to the 'start of investigation by 
the US senate ethics committee. ( 180 ) 
However, the issue of safety of such a line traversing three 
countries, where instability, especially in Sudan since 1984, 
has led to the stoppage of oil explorations, must be one of 
the main reasons behind the reluctance of both oil suppliers 
and financers to be involved in the project. It could be 
maintained that basically, had it not been for the issue of 
security the building of the line could be useful to both 
consumers and suppliers, and not least to countries of transit 
in royalties and services. If it were to materialize the line 
could contribute to the promotion of Afro-Arab ties. Port 
activity at Yanbu and especially at Port Sudan could increase 
substantially. However, one important country might not 
welcome the project, that is Egypt, because the line could 
have considerable impact upon the Suez Canal and Sumed 
pipeline. 
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5.3 Conclusion 
Rapidly declining reserves and production in the US, 
Western Europe and Japan, combined with a rising curve of 
consumption, growing instability in the main sources of 
dependence, especially the Middle East and Central America, 
all indicate that the fundamental oil equation will continue 
to have important implications for US interests. While Western 
sources of oil are depleting, those of the Middle East, 
particularly the Gulf, are growing. Oil has long been an 
important component of US military strength, and the 1973 
embargo established deepseated concerns about oil cuts 
especially whenever conflict in the Middle East flares, as 
during the Iranian cutoffs in 1979 and the ongoing Iraq-Iran 
war. Use of force to obtain oil during crisis times is 
considered a poor option combining great military risks, and 
likely damage to US interests. The American-designed peace 
between Israel and Egypt has not removed the possibility of 
disruption of oil supplies to the West. The Red Sea will play 
an important role in transporting oil supplies to the West, 
especially if rise in demand takes place. Moreover, the 
completion of the network of current and proposed pipelines 
could enhance the role of the Red Sea. Also, if the shelved 
second phase of development of the Canal is to be re-
considered, this may increase the importance of the Red Sea. 
The crisis situation in the Gulf has created for the US a 
geopolitical platform in the Red Sea and, to some extent, 
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soothed a long-rooted anti-American attitude in the northern 
Red Sea region. Such development has been mainly remarkable in 
the tilting by both the US and Iraq toward each other. 
American geopolitical influence in that part of the region has 
opened up economic opportunities for US companies through the 
involvement of the latter in the building of pipelines to the 
Red Sea. 
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CHAPTER 6 
SECURITY OF SHIPPING: PHYSICAL AND LEGAL THREATS 
6.1 Physical Threats 
Much has been written about 11 threats 11 to shipping in the 
Middle East, particularly the Gulf region, with much of it 1n 
popular newspapers and journals. It is worth noting that 1n 
the Red Sea region both the opportunities and the motives for 
threats to shipping can be said to exist (appendix 3). The 
opportunities are presented by a number of geopolitical 
characteristics, five of which deserve mention. 
First, the Red Sea is narrow and long, with fairly 
restricted shipping lanes. 
Second, it has thinly populated coasts which are flanked 
on both sides by mountains and/or high lands facilitating the 
activities of saboteurs or armed groups. 
Third, it contains numerous islands, some of which are 
strategically located in the middle or at the entrance of 
straits and gulfs. Many are uninhabited and could provide 
temporary bases from which to attack shipping. 
Fourth, most of the riparian states are caught up in 
inter-state and/or regional disputes, a situation which 
renders each party's territorial waters a potential target 
for sabotage or attacks. The 11 spillover 11 effect of such 
attacks has been seen in the Gulf since 1982. 
Fifth, superpower competition has led to the acquisition 
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Table 6-i 
Tankers hit and damaged by air attack in the Gulf: 1982-1984 1~ 
Ship Tonnage Flag Cargo Attacker 
Atlas I 142,806 Turkey Ballast Iraq 
Rover Star 50,000 Panama Laden Iraq 
Safina al-Arab 357,100 S.Arabia Laden Iraq 
al-Ahood 117,710 S.Arabia Laden Iraq 
Umm al-Casbah 79,999 Kuwait Laden Iran 
Bahrah 26,000 Kuwait Ballast Iran 
Tabriz 69,000 Iran Laden Iraq 
Esperanza 62,000 Panama Ballast Iraq 
Yanbu Pride 214,992 S.Arabia Part-laden Iraq 
Chemical 
Venture 29,427 Liberia Ballast Iran 
Buyuk Hun 153,274 Turkey Ballast Iraq 
Kazimah 294,739 Kuwait Ballast Iran 
Alexander the 
Great 152,372 Greece Laden Iraq 
Date 
May 1 82 
18.4.84 
25.4.84 
7.5.84 
13.5.84 
14.5.84 
14.5.84 
14.5.84 
15.5.84 
24.5.84 
4.6.84 
10.6.84 
24.6.84 
*Note: The above thirteen are those clearly confirmed as attacked 
and damaged. Known to have been attacked but not damaged are: Ras 
al-Zourer, Atlanticos, Barcelona and Arizona. Others may have 
been attacked but, because most of these attacks are at long 
range, never knew it since missiles missed their target. 
Source: Petroleum Economist, Vol. I, no. 7, July 19 84, Petroleum 
Press Bureau Ltd, London 1984, p.261. 
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of bases or facilities in the Red Sea, heightening maritime 
strategic and tactical thinking in the region. 
It should be remembered that the Red Sea is located near 
other spheres of potential maritime conflict in the eastern 
Mediterranean and Gulf, and conflict in these spheres could 
spread to the Red Sea. 
Physical threats to shipping could be carried out by 
non-government groups, such as resistance movements, or 
terrorists, representing extremist organisations. Their 
motives may be to achieve short-term publicity, long-term 
political change, or merely to damage the interests of a 
third party such as the United States. Their methods could 
include planting small mines, rocket attacks from land or 
from small ships at sea, hijacking, or sabotage of ships in 
port. The use of mines and rockets has already occurred in 
the Red Sea, so that the idea of threats to shipping is quite 
real. As the Gulf tanker war has demonstrated, many ship-
owners will be deterred from using particular ports and 
routes as long as the risk of attack is posed, even though 
shipping lanes may not be physically blocked. Table 6.1 gives 
details on tankers hit and damaged in the Gulf. Governments, 
with conventional armed forces at their disposal on land, 
sea, and air, are 1n an even stronger position to pose 
threats to shipping than non-government organisations. The 
mining of deepwater channels, attacks from the air, the 
deployment of missiles, and naval blockade are all in their 
repertoires. On the other hand, the risks of a state 
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attacking shipping are far greater. Retaliation would be 
almost certain, and as we have seen, there are few states 
which stand to gain much by stopping the free movement of 
ships. Equally, the Gulf War has demonstrated the willingness 
of states to attack the ships of states not directly involved 
in hostilities. In this case, the possibility of drastic 
retaliation by the United States air force has been seriously 
discussed. 
There are, unfortunately, a large number of states and 
non-state organisations who could have some motive for 
attacking or threatening to attack Red Sea shipping. These 
are briefly considered in the following paragraphs. It is 
argued that if both opportunity and motive are present, 
sooner or later ships in the Red Sea could be seriously at 
risk. The United States might then consider some form of 
intervention because of its perceived interests, both direct, 
and indirect on behalf of her allies. 
Israel's powerful air and long-reach naval strength 
could threaten navigation in the Red Sea( 1 ) as far south as 
Bab al Mandeb, or in the vicinity of Sinai. In 1967 Israel 
occupied Sharm al Sheikh and controlled shipping through the 
Strait of Rian; such action could be repeated if a fifth 
Israeli-Arab war took place - especially if Egypt repeals its 
peace agreement with Israel and reinstates its leading 
position in the Arab world. In its 1982 invasion of Lebanon, 
Israel damaged the Tapline which carries Arab oil to 
terminals in the eastern Mediterranean, and it has threatened 
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to attack the proposed Iraqi pipeline to Aqaba claiming that 
the line may pollute Eilat port. Iraq has been seeking 
American protection of the future line(Z) (chapter 5). 
The five-year old Iraq-Iran war has already affected the 
Red Sea states mainly due to the role of the Gulf states, 
especially Saudi Arabia as the main financial backer of Iraq, 
and Egypt because of its support for Iraq. The shooting down 
of an Iranian plane by Saudi jets, backed by US surveillance 
aircraft and refuelling planes in the Gulf in June 1984, (J) 
and the mining of the Red Sea in July-August 1984, which was 
claimed by the Islamic Jihad, are evidence of this. Thus, as 
long as such important Red Sea states as Saudi Arabia, Egypt 
and Jordan continue to support Iraq, Iran, or a pro-Iranian 
organization could retaliate in the Red sea, using pipelines 
or ships as targets. The mining of the Red Sea represents a 
striking example of the spill-over of the Gulf conflict. It 
indicates the 
"guerrilla-like harrassment against shipping 
at sea", (4) 
a scenario which is most feared by countries lacking strong 
seapower. 
Frustrated Palestinians, with possible support from PDR 
Yemen, Libya, Syria or Iran may threaten navigation, 
especially at Bab al Mandeb, as they did in 1971. They could 
carry out attacks on oilf ields, installations and routes in 
the Gulf or the Red Sea as an indication of their disenchant-
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ment with the Gulf rulers and the US. There is no doubt about 
their willingness or ability, as was shown by the blowing up 
f T 1 . . (S) o ap 1ne on many occas1ons. 
The endemic conflict in the Horn of Africa could also 
endanger shipping in the Red Sea, especially if Somalia 
managed to annex Djibouti and cut Ethiopia's supply line 
through the strategic pocket state. In 1976 a Senatorial 
testimony expressed American worry about the threat to the 
Red Sea from Somalia - backed by the Arabs and the Soviet 
Union, which was expected to indulge in its 
"aggressive intentions ... including conceivably the 
annexation of Djibouti and the constriction of the 
flow of traffic in the Red Sea". (6) 
The most radical and the only Marxist State in the Arabian 
peninsula, occurs in the southern Red Sea, that is PDR Yemen. 
The Marxist state, with the upper hand over Bab al Mandeb, is 
in a good position to hamper shipping through the Strait 
especially perhaps Israeli vessels, or ships bound for 
Israel, or even American ships. 
Soviet-American rivalry in the region could cause one of 
the two giants, especially in crisis time, to interfere with 
shipping in the Red Sea, especially when one recalls 
America's strategic gains from the closure of the Suez Canal 
during the US predicament in Vietnam, as indicated earlier. 
Superpower contention over the Indian Ocean has gradually 
included the Red Sea. (7) Therefore, it may be impossible to 
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isolate the latter from what is going on in the former, 
especially in the northwestern quadrant, where Soviet-
American military competition is greatest. Buzan (1978) 
points out that the major and maybe the only conflict 
potential in the Indian Ocean region with regard to the Law 
of the Sea will be interference with shipping in the Red 
Sea. ( 8 ) Past and current Western/American preoccupation with 
oil disruptions emanate from a US perception of Soviet thrust 
toward the oil resources and routes in the Middle East, 
including Red Sea shipping lanes. Therefore, it may be 
instructive to highlight such preoccupations. 
Since the late 1960s, the time which signalled the first 
Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean, while the 
Americans were entangled in Vietnam, the US was preoccupied 
by the spectre of conflict at sea with the USSR. Robert 
McNamara, then Secretary of Defence emphasized that: 
"there is one possible contingency which is a war at 
sea with the Soviet Union not involving land 
battle". (9) 
In 1982 Captain Moore wrote that: 
"Of all the areas in which the Soviet Union has 
expanded its capability none has created such a 
general impression in the West as that of Soviet 
Navy the Soviet Navy is now the second most 
powerful in the world." (10) 
Political-strategic concerns remain as the major objectives 
of the Soviet navy in the Indian Ocean and adjacent waters 
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that include the Red Sea. In these waters this navy has 
political and military tasks assigned to it. ( 11 ) In 1967 the 
Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union, Sergei Gorshkov, 
declared that his fleet was "fully capable of offensive 
operations". But recently the Admiral has been quoted as 
saying: 
"The Soviet Navy is a powerful factor in the 
creation of favourable conditions for the building 
of Socialism and Communism, for the active defence 
of peace and for strenthening international 
security." (12) 
Thus, ideologically as well as strategically, Soviet maritime 
policy would be in clear conflict with that of the US, 
especially in waters that are part of or close to areas of 
American interest as in the Red Sea and Gulf regions. 
In 1972 the US became anx1ous over the USSR enjoying a 
dominant presence in the Suez-Red Sea area, believing that 
the Soviet presence: 
"will remain so at least while Arab-Israeli tension 
is high". (13) 
However, the Israeli-Arab conflict is not yet over, despite 
the US sponsored peace between Egypt and Israel in 1979. 
Directly or indirectly, the US was able to pull Egypt out of 
the Soviet camp after the death of President Nasser and the 
takeover by the lat~ President Sadat, in 1980. As a result 
of political differences with Moscow and owing to the 
) 
redirection of the course of Egyptian policy toward the US, 
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Egypt expelled the Soviets in 1971, ( 14 ) after some 18 years 
there. Even before their ejection from Egypt the Soviets were 
already establishing their political and military presence in 
the southern sector of the Red Sea, at Hodeidah ( 1963-79), 
Aden since 1969, Berbera (1962-1978), Socotra since the 
1970s, and at the Ethiopian ports of Assab and Massawah 
(chapter 4), and the islands of Dahlak on the Eritrean coast 
since 1978. Linkage of Soviet facilities in Angola and 
Mozambique with those in the lower Red Sea region could 
enhance the range of Soviet activities along the sea routes 
through which oil supplies needed by Western Europe pass. 
However, when the Americans consider the growing Soviet 
presence around Bab al Mandeb and link it with Soviet 
involvement in Afghanistan and Libya, they perceive all this 
as a threat to the interests of the US and its Western 
allies. George Lenczowski (1979) envisages such a presence as 
11 an encircling movement stretching in a broad arc 
from Afghanistan to the southern reaches of the Red 
Sea". (15) 
American intelligence sources, according to Ashard Al Awsat 
(3/1982), reported the transfer of Soviet floating dry-docks 
from the former Soviet base at Berbera to Dahlak. These 
sources add that: 
"Ethiopan Nocra island has been developed to a full 
Soviet base for provisions and repairs". (16) 
Moreover, the intelligence reports indicate that the number 
of Soviet naval units that use Nocra base monthly ranges 
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between 25 and 30 units, which include nuclear submarines and 
destroyers, and although the Ethiopian authorities deny that 
they have an agreement with the Soviets over the base, they 
do not object to the arrival of those naval units and use of 
the base. ( 17 ) 
After the ousting of Haile Selassie of Ethiopia in 
September 1974 and the takeover by the Marxist military, the 
US became seriously concerned about the development of events 
in the lower Red Sea region. A Senatorial reaction to those 
events was that: 
"the Soviet Union has occupied all the strategic 
points held by the British in the region of the Red 
Sea and the Gulf of Aden". (18) 
The Senatorial remarks added that American friends in the 
region, named as: Iran, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Sudan 
and Ethiopia, were all interested in the freedom of 
navigation through the Red Sea, but they fear 
"an expansion of Soviet power in the Red Sea and 
Gulf of Aden region 11 • ( 19) 
In those Senatorial discussions, the former Chief Adviser to 
the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mr Spencer, 
emphasized that the Soviet control over the Horn of Africa is 
"a terrible threat to the lines of communication 
through the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean and the line 
of oil tankers from the Persian Gulf around the Cape 
to the ports of Western Europe". (20) 
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Thus, American apprehension about the Soviet threat to 
US shipping interest in the Red Sea started in the late 1960s 
and has continued throughout the last decade and still 
exists. In the early 1980s some US experts on the impact of 
' 
oil on American foreign affairs percieved that during the 
1980s, the Soviet Union could interdict vital Middle Eastern 
oil supplies to the West from several places where it 
exercises military and political control. Moscow 1 s areas of 
movement to interfere with oil supplies to the West include 
Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, the Strait of Hormuz, the entrance to the 
Gulf, Oman and 
11 either end of the Red Sea, Egypt and 
Canal, either flank of the Strait of Bab 
at the southern entrance to the Red Sea 11 
. ( 21) 
or from Libya in the southern Med1terranean. 
the Suez 
al Mandeb 
In 1977 the operational area of the MIDEASTFOR of the US 
included the Gulf, the Red Sea, and the Indian Ocean from the 
Cape of Good Hope to the Strait of Malacca. One of the 
missions assigned to the force in this area was to deter the 
activity of the USSR and that of potentially hostile forces 
in the operational area, and to counter the 
11 threat of hijacking by 
elements, of American 
ships 11 • (22) 
radical or 
or friendly 
terrorist 
merchant 
However, contrary to extreme American views about an 
imminent Soviet danger to Western oil routes, some Israeli 
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political/strategic analysts, namely Yodfat and Abir ( 1977) 
do not expect the Soviet Union to take a direct step in 
disrupting the flow of oil to the West since such a scfonario 
would be 
"completely incompatible with Soviet detente....policy 
and is far beyond their occasional brinkmanship 
policy", (23) 
but they caution that the USSR would make its utmost effort 
to eradicate the position of Western oil firms and Western 
interests in the Gulf area. According to Sterner ( 1984), 
being within convenient striking range of the tanker routes, 
Soviet naval units could threaten the life-line of the 
Western economies, however, like Yodfat and Abir ( 1977) he 
does not seem to anticipate a Soviet strike because: 
"Moscow knows that any attempt to interrupt the flow 
of oil to the West would be a casus beLLi 11 
and that the West could not only "protect tanker routes" but 
has the 
"capacity to respond against Soviet interests in 
other theatres". (24) 
Not only direct Soviet threat worries the US, but possible 
threat from Soviet allies in the region also concerns 
Washington. Mr Sterner expects 11 Soviet surrogates 
interfere with shipping."( 2 5) 
to 
Although it may be true that attacking oil installations 
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on land is the simplest t . (26) op 1on the events of the Gulf 
tanker war since 1982 have demonstrated that attacks on 
shipping in the Red Sea/Middle East waters are no more 
difficult than on land, not least because it is almost 
impossible to get hold of the culprits. 
It is worth emphasizing that as indicated earlier, 
threats to the national security of coastal states may also 
impair freedom of navigation especially in such narrow waters 
as the Red Sea. Coastal states have the right to legislate 
for the protection of their waters from threats posed by 
foreign vessels and other factors. Such rights could lead to 
restrictions on shipping. After surveying the types and 
sources of interruption of shipping it may be instructive to 
look at the fresh and classical example of a threat to 
shipping in the Red Sea, the mines of 1984. 
The Mines of 1984 
A mysterious spate of blasts occurred in the Red Sea in 
July-August 1984. These most dramatic events were followed by 
political rows and military manoeuvres. These underwater 
detonations were the first since the 197 4-197 5 scouring of 
mines from the Suez Canal by combined American, British and 
French forces with Japanese financial aid. Although no ship 
was sunk by the explosions, eighteen vessels were damaged, 
according to Lloyd's list (Appendix 4 ). The first explosion 
occurred on 9 July 19 84 and the last was on 15 August 
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1984. ( 2?) As the security of the Canal is so important to 
Egypt, it took the latter some weeks before admitting that 
there had been a crisis in the Red Sea. However, President 
Mubarak eventually disclosed that Egypt requested the help of 
the US, Britain and France to sweep the affected areas. Saudi 
Arabia and the states bordering the Red Sea also requested 
(28) ( 0 help., f1g, 6. 1.) 
Following the explosions, there was a flurry of charges 
and counter charges over who laid the mines. Although the 
Lebanese-based, shadowy and extremist Islamic Jihad 
Organization had boastfully claimed the planting of 190 mines 
along the Red Sea, Egyptian and American suspicions were 
centred on Libya and Iran, but without solid evidence. The US 
insisted that it was not possible for such a group to plant 
the mines unless it was aided by a maritime nation. ( 29 ) The 
same pro-Iranian group claimed credit for the truck-bomb 
operation which left 241 US servicemen dead at the 
headquarters in Beirut in October 1983. ( 30) American 
Marine 
sources 
think that the mine-operation was designed to achieve the 
following objectives. 
( 1) to punish Egypt, an ally of Iraq, by threatening to 
disrupt the Canal revenues of about $1,000 million; 
(2) to weaken the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, also a supporter 
and financial backer of Iraq which transports much of its 
oil via the Red Sea; and 
(3) to foil the Iraqi scheme of laying two pipelines across 
s 
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Saudi Arabia to the Red Sea, in order to "bypass Iranian 
guns that overlook the Persian Gulf". (3l) 
Because the first two target states are close friends of the 
us and thus their instability concerns the latter 
politically, strategically and economically, Washington 
promptly responded to their request and came to help in the 
mine-clearing operations in the Red Sea. In addition, the 
proposed Iraqi pipe- lines involve American interest (chapter 
5. 2) . 
While President Mubarak's Chief of Staff indicated that 
Egypt's "suspicions are almost confirmed" that Libya laid the 
mines, the President said: 
"We have no definite answer, but we have big 
suspicions since the first Libyan ship passed 
through the Canal on July 6 and the first explosion 
was reported on July 9". (32) 
Although without conclusive proof, Mr Rambert, the spokesman 
of the American Department of State emphasized that: 
" There is persuasive 
indicating that Libya was 
entrances of the Red Sea". 
circumstantial evidence 
involved in mining the 
(33) 
The Pentagon spokesman, Michael Burch, also openly accused 
Libya by saying that "Libya is suspect"; but he added that 
the Defence Department was "not willing to go as far as the 
Egyptians" in accusing Libya and without additional proof 
"We are not willing to say who the possible culprit 
or culprits are". (34) 
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US hesitation in directing open accusation at any state 
or organization has been related to the politically critical 
situation that the US was involved in when it mined the 
Nicaraguan ports. The Kuwaiti daily, Al Ray Al Aam ( 8/84) 
quoted the Washington Post as saying that planting of mines 
anywhere is an act of war. ( 3S) Apart from denying any 
involvement in mining the Red Sea, Libya accused the US of 
planting the mines, and branded the allegations as 
"a campaign of lies spread by imperialist and 
reactionary circles." 
The former Chief of Staff of the Jordanian Army, Lieutenant 
General Al Majali argued that the mining must have been 
carried out by an advanced state because the operation needed 
advanced technology which could not be obtained by terrorist 
groups. He accused the US and Israel of the incident (plate 
6.1). On the other hand, Israel named extremist Palestinians 
as the culprits. However, Israel was the only state asked by 
the US to give information about previous minelaying in the 
Gulf of Suez. ( 36 ) 
In spite of the apparent picking up of dozens of 
minelike objects on the various sonar screens of the 
multinational flotilla, thorough investigation has revealed 
only empty oil drums, garbage, or coral. American sources 
intimated that no mine could be found. Indicating their 
fa ding hope 1n retrieving mines, in spite of the 18 ships 
PLATE 6.1 · 
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operation by an international minehunting force, Egyptian 
naval sources and Western diplomats suggested that the mines 
might have been set with time fuses that would have made them 
self-destructive before they could be recovered for 
identification. ( 3?) In the absence of hard evidence over who 
was to blame, a high Pentagon official summed up events in 
the Red Sea region by saying that "the whole thing is just 
weird". Thus, the saga died a quiet death which greatly 
relieved officials in Cairo, who have subsequently been 
making every effort to prove that the area was safe for 
shipping. ( 38 ) 
Egypt drew attention to the 1888 Constantinople 
Convention which entitles the former to inspect ships passing 
through the Suez Canal and impose bans on vessels if she 
perceives a danger to its security, or the security of the 
Canal. ( 39 ) Regarding possible sanctions against whichever 
state may be found responsible for planting the mines, the 
idea has been distasteful to Western countries. The issue is 
particularly critical for the US which found itself in a 
"particular quandary since it had recently indulged 
in a bit of its own mining in Nicaraguan 
harbours". ( 40) 
The mining fiasco was immediately followed by a call 
from Sudan for a conference on Red Sea security. Sudan 1 s 
Foreign Minister announced that all the states of the Red Sea 
would participate at the meeting; and the Kingdom of Saudi 
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Arabia accepted an invitation by Sudan to attend. A spokesman 
for the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs indicated that 
Israel had also been consulting with other governments about 
the mining of the Red Sea. The spokesman added that: 
"We are 
interests 
( 41) 
a state fronting 
would be affected 
the 
by 
Red Sea and our 
these explosions. 11 
The Egyptian minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Butros 
Ghali pointed out that the absence of any solid proof about 
who sowed the mines was probably the reason for the 
apparently lukewarm reception to Egypt 1 s call for a con-
ference on Red Sea security.( 4Z) It is also clear that both 
Sudan and Egypt did not show any inclination to exclude 
Israel from such a conference. In fact, it was not the 
absence of proof that caused the unenthusiastic reception to 
Egypt's call for the meeting as the Minister maintained, but 
it was more likely the severance of diplomatic relations with 
Egypt by the Arab States following President Sadat 's peace 
with Israel. However, no conference was held and the 
initiative died out. France proposed the convening of an 
international conference to safeguard navigation in the Red 
Sea, and the conclusion of an international agreement similar 
to that of the Contadora states in Latin America. ( 4J) 
One of the repercussions of the mining incident was that 
the sight of Western minehunters steaming down the Suez Canal 
brought back painful memories to the people of the Canal zone 
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whose livelihood depends on the waterway. ( 44 ) The episode has 
established a dangerous and tempting precedent of deliberate 
action to disrupt shipping in the Red Sea which the US 
regards as one of the world's busiest waterways. The incident 
could easily repeat itself. ( 4S) Following the leading role of 
the US in scouring the Red Sea from mines the International 
Herald Tribune (8/84) emphasized that: 
"No nation has a greater interest in the general 
freedom of the Seas than the United States." (46) 
Regardless of the objectives of the persons planting the 
mines the question of why the Red Sea was chosen for the 
mining operation, is of interest. The geological/physical 
formation of the Red Sea may have been a helpful factor in 
the considerable effect of the mines, as the Chairman of the 
Suez Canal Authority suggests. Because the Red Sea is narrow 
and with limited sea lanes, a few mines placed along one of 
these channels means that some vessels are bound to be 
hit. <47 ) Other seas have less confined sea lanes and 
consequently mines would be less effective in those seas. 
Ironically, the regional attitude that followed the mining 
episode was directed against the US because both Red Sea 
radical and Gulf moderate states, as well as the Soviet 
Union, all considered that American intervention in the Red 
Sea would threaten the security of Arab and Red Sea states. 
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6.2 Legal Threat 
The future application of the 1982 UN Convention on the 
Law of the Sea would place international straits of 24nm or 
less in the territorial waters of states bordering the 
Straits. Article 3 of the Convention entitles every state to 
extend its territorial sea to 12nm. The Article states that: 
"Every State has the right to establish the breadth 
of its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 
12 nautical miles, measured from baselines 
determined in accordance with this Covention." 
Apart from the Suez Canal which is subject to a special 
regime the other Red Sea waterways would be affected by the 
Convention, namely the straits of Gubal, Tiran and Bab al 
Mandeb. Moreover, the introduction of the EEZ has increased 
the area of state jurisdiction of Red Sea states. This 
situation is bound to intensify navigational problems, 
particularly through Arab waters. With escalating tensions 
and suspicions such as that surrounded the mining of the Red 
Sea in 1984, further interference with Western, especially 
American, shipping could be anticipated. 
The legal regime of straits has long been debated 
between the riparian states and maritime powers. Coastal 
states generally seek a regime of territorial sea in which 
transit is subject to the coastal states' jurisdictions and 
serving their economic and security interests. Maritime 
powers have been inclined to press for a separate regime 
402 
allowing unhindered passage through straits.( 50) Article 17 
of the Convention stipulates that: 
"Ships of all States, whether coastal or land-
locked, enjoy the right of innocent passage through 
the territorial sea." (51) 
Such passage should be "continuous and expeditious" except in 
'force majeure' distress or emergency situations, as for 
example to assist people, ships or aircraft in danger or 
distress, where stoppage or anchorage might be considered as 
part of a continuous passage. According to Article 19 passage 
would be innocent if 
11 it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or 
security of the coastal state". (52) 
However, the problem will be who is going to decide whether a 
passage is innocent or not? And how will this be decided 
without being influenced by an already established attitude 
between coastal and non-coastal states, for example the Arabs 
and Israel. Obviously, the decision would be at the 
discretion of the coastal state; hence, problems are bound to 
arise especially with regard to Israeli shipping or ships 
bound for Israel, as well as ships flying the US flag, either 
due to US refusal to sign the Convention or with regard to 
its support for Israel. Maritime powers fear that their 
strategic and commercial interests might be prejudiced by the 
principle of 'innocent passage 1 • These major powers, with 
particular reference to the US, were greatly concerned by the 
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right of coastal states to interpret 1 innocent passage 1 • (SJ) 
Article 19 also indicates that passage will not be 
innocent if 1n the territorial water the foreign ship 
undertakes: 
( 1) any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, 
territorial integrity or political independence of the 
coastal state, or 1n any other manner in violation of 
the principles of international law embodied 1n the 
Charter of the United Nations; 
(2) any exercise or practice with weapons of any kind; 
(3) any act aimed at collecting information to the prejudice 
of the defence or security of the coastal state; 
(4) any act of propaganda aimed at affecting the defence or 
security of the coastal state; 
( 5) the launching, landing or taking on board of any 
military device; 
(6) the loading or unloading of any commodity, currency or 
person contrary to the customs, fiscal, immigration or 
sanitary laws and regulations of the coastal state; 
(7) any act of wilful and serious pollution contrary to this 
Convention; 
(8) any fishing activities; 
(9) the carrying out of research or survey activities; 
(10) any act aimed at interfering with any systems of 
communication or any other facilities or installations 
of the coastal state; 
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(11) any other activity not having a direct bearing on 
passage. ( 54 ) 
Although foreign ships are allowed 'innocent passage' through 
territorial seas, "submerged submarine and other underwater 
vehicles" cannot enjoy that right unless they "navigate on 
the surface" and "show their flag". ( 5S) Article 45 stipulates 
that the regime of innocent passage should be applicable in 
the Straits( 56 ) excluded from the regime of transit passage. 
The regime of transit passage was introduced to strengthen 
freedom of navigation in international straits beyond the 
rights contained in the concept of "innocent passage". Inter-
national straits are defined as straits: 
"which are used for international 
one part of the high seas or an 
zone and another part of the 
exclusive economic zone." (57) 
navigation between 
exclusive economic 
high seas or an 
Article 38 guarantees the right of transit passage through 
international straits where: 
"all ships and aircraft enjoy the right of transit 
passage, which shall not be impeded ... " 
except under certain circumstances elaborated in paragraph 1 
of the Article. Transit passage is defined as: 
" the exercise of the freedom of navigation 
and overflight solely for the purpose of continuous 
and expeditious transit of the strait However, 
the requirement of, and expeditious transit does not 
preclude passage through the Strait for the purpose 
of entering, leaving or returning from a State 
bordering the Strait, subject to the conditions of 
entry to that State." (58) 
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In exercising the right of transit passage, ships and 
aircraft are obliged by Article 39 to observe specific duties 
similar to those in Article 19 such as not to threaten the 
security of the coastal state, or cause pollution. Aircraft 
are required to comply with the regulations set by the 
International Civil Aviation Organization. (59) 
According to Article 40 prior authorization of the State 
bordering on strait may be needed by foreign ships to "carry 
out any research or survey activities", and Article 41 
entitles states bordering on straits to "designate sea lanes 
and prescribe traffic separation schemes" for shipping in 
straits where they are important to "promote the safe passage 
of ships 11 • During transit passage, vessels are obliged to 
abide by those navigational systems. (60) Coastal states may 
also prevent fishing and any activity contravening their 
customs, fiscal, immigration of sanitary laws and 
regulations. While exercising the right of adopting laws and 
regulations related to transit passage states bordering 
straits, should understand that such legislations, according 
to Article 42, 
form or in fact among 
application have the 
hampering or imparing 
( 6 1 ) 
11 shall not discriminate in 
foreign ships or in their 
practical effect of denying, 
the right of transit passage". 
On the other hand, foreign vessels enjoying the right of 
transit passage are required to comply with those rules. ( 62 ) 
However, with regard to the Red Sea, as well as to other Arab 
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waters, it is debatable whether Israeli ships or vessels en 
route to Israel will be seen as having the right of transit 
passage as stated above. If denied, it could lead to conflict 
involving the US, which is in agreement with Israel regarding 
the latter 1 s rights in navigating Red Sea straits. Denial of 
transit passage to US ships by some Red Sea states bordering 
on straits, such as Bab al Mandeb, could then be expected. 
Some coastal states emphasize that the passage of 
certain type of ships is inherently non-innocent. Quoted in 
Marston (1984) the delegation of Yemen AR said in its final 
speech at the UN conference on the Law of the Sea at Montego 
Bay that: 
11 The passage of foreign warships and nuclear-powered 
vessels in the territorial waters near the coast of 
small developing states is difficult to describe as 
innocent, whatever justifications may be used. The 
governments and people of those states cannot view 
favourably the presence of foreign warships in their 
territorial waters without prior notification or 
knowledge of their intentions and purposes. 
Similarly, it is difficult to say that such passage 
does not infringe the sovereignty of these small 
developing coastal states. 11 (63) 
Ambassador Elliot Richardson, the Special Representative of 
the US President at the Law of the Sea Conference indicated 
in 1980 that his country had traditionally seen its military 
and commercial interests as requiring maximum freedom of 
mobility for its ships; and that any extension of the 
territorial sea would potentially impair such freedom. He 
added that all the world 1 s most important straits would be 
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subject to the limitations of innocent passage. Among these 
straits he specifically referred to Bab al Mandeb. He 
maintained that these restrictions could profoundly impede 
the flexibility of the US conventional forces as well as its 
fleet of ballistic missile submarines since they depend on 
complete mobility in the oceans and unimpaired passage 
through international t 't (64) s ra1 s. The former US Defence 
Secretary, Donald Rusfeld (1977) said that: 
"we must be vitally interested in the freedom of the 
seas and the narrow waters that connect them". (65) 
Three years later, the former American president, Mr Nixon 
was quoted as saying that: 
"The United States is an island country As an 
island sea power, dependent on ocean going commerce 
and on sea lines of communication with our allies, 
the United States must insist on decisive 
superiority on the waterways of the world." (66) 
Since assuming office in 1981, President Reagan's naval 
policy has been: "full steam ahead on a build up", and the 
essence of his naval strategy has been: "offensive power, 
ready to steam toward a crisis", according to the 
InternatLonal Herald Tribune (4/84). The paper adds that 
shortly after taking office ( 19 81), the President declared 
that: 
"Maritime power for us is a necessity. We must be 
able in time of emergency to venture in harm's way, 
controlling air, surface and subsurface areas to 
assure access to all the oceans of the world." (67) 
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Since that time, the President has remained committed to his 
country's domination of the seas. Consistent with the 
attitude quoted above, the US which has retained a 3nm 
territorial sea since 1973 while the USSR has adopted a 12nm 
territorial water since 1921. Significantly, however, the 
USSR has maintained the same position as the US regarding 
straits. ( 68 ) 
With regard to potential legal problems in the Red Sea 
!?ea... 
Marson (1984) argues that conflict between Arab RedAriparians 
could be solved by resort to local customary rule or 
bilateral agreements. But difficulties would arise in a 
dispute between these states and non-Red Sea states whose 
vessels traverse the Red Sea. Rules of general customary 
international law may not be practically applicable owing to 
the rejection by developing countries of laws adopted by 
Western countries at a time when most of the developing 
states did not exist. ( 69 ) Before the 19 8 2 Convention, the 
area beyond territorial sea, was considered as 1 high sea 1 , 
where no state could claim jurisdictional rights, and where 
any state could fish, carry out scientific research, lay 
pipelines and cables, and practise overflight. At that time a 
great part of the Red Sea fell in this category. But since 
the introduction of the 1982 Convention which entitles every 
coastal state to claim a 200nm EEZ those freedoms have been 
restricted. High seas rights are still applicable beyond 
national jurisdiction (Article 87), but no high seas area 
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exists in the Red Sea because of its narrowness. 
Nevertheless, in spite of their rights in the EEZ, 
maritime powers feel some sort of uneasiness about "creeping" 
coastal state jurisdiction that might impede freedom of 
shipping. Riparian states are equally disturbed by the 
passage of huge oil tankers, nuclear powered ships, vessels 
loaded with noxious cargo passing through their fishing 
grounds, zones of mineral resources, and close to their 
tourist beaches. Consequently, littoral states wish to: 
"subject such vessels to their own regulations 
rather than those of the state whose flag the ship 
flies particularly since there may not be a 
genuine link between the flag and ownership". (70) 
As Marston (1984) indicates, apart from the 1982 Convention, 
it is probable that a coastal state now has a customary right 
to make such a claim. ( 71 ) The Americans feel that if the 
riparian states increasingly seem to regard the EEZ of 200nm 
as subject to their sovereignty for purposes of regulating 
navigation and overflight and related activities, the result 
could be a drastic curtailing of 11 the sovereign right of 
communications 11 • ( 72 ) The US and its allies have alwasy firmly 
stated that any recognition of riparian state sovereignty 
over the resources of adjacent waters must preserve the 
high-seas freedom of navigation and overflight 1n and over 
such waters. The US clearly needs such unchallenged rights of 
navigation and overflight for 11 access to the Gulf, the Red 
Sea and the Indian Ocean". (73) 
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Al Hakim ( 1979) points out that at a session of the 
Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea 
( UNCOLSIII), held in December 197 5, the Arab view opposed 
Article 16(4) of the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention because 
the Articles treated all straits alike. The Arabs, spoken for 
by Kuwait, stressed that the term 'strait' should be strictly 
confined to straits that link two parts of the high seas, and 
should not include territorial waters. Both Al Hakim (1979) 
and Marston (1984) agree that the Arab view obviously had in 
mind Tiran Strait, which the Arabs wanted to deny to Israeli 
h . . (74) s 1pp1ng. The definition of what constitutes an 
international strait eventually adopted covered this point. 
Marston ( 19 84) argues that since the Strait of Bab al 
Mandeb is not governed by the 1958 Convention because neither 
Yemen AR, PDRY Yemen, nor Djibouti was a signatory to the 
Convention and the 1982 Convention is not yet in force, 
passage through the waterway is left without an inter-
nationally recognized regime. He adds that the regime of 
Customary International Law cannot be applied because it has 
been rejected at Law of the Sea Conference debates by 
developing countries since 1982. Regarding Israel's right to 
use the Strait, Marston ( 19 84) says that the Arab Red Sea 
states do not comply either with what the International Court 
of Justice stated in the Corfu Channel Case in 1949, or with 
the 19 58 Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous 
Zone. ( 75 ) However, regardless of Israeli-American insistance 
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on a liberal regime for Bab al Mandeb, as indicated earlier 
in the 1 Memorandum 1 between the two countries the Red Sea 
Arab States may not allow Israeli shipping through their 
waters, despite what the 1982 Convention demands in this 
respect. 
Between December 6-10, 1982, the UN Convention on the 
Law of the Sea was signed by 119 states;( 76 ) by 11 December 
1984, the closing date for signature, the number of 
signatories of nations and organizations had reached 159. (77) 
From the start the US fallowed by the UK and West Germany 
were the only states to 
support. (7 8 ) The treaty needs 
deny the Convention their 
to be ratified by 60 states 
before entering into force. By December 1984 only 14 states 
had ratified. A decade could be needed to complete 
ratification of the treaty. In 19 80 Ambassador Richardson 
declared the us conviction that the absence of any 
internationally binding treaty to assure freedom of 
navigation and overflight through Straits and EEZs, could 
complicate relations between the US and its allies. He added 
that:· 
"even the friendliest state is subject to its own 
set of indigenous political constraints and 
pressures, and especially during a crisis time it is 
inevitable that these constraints and pressures 
lead to perceptions of national interest divergent 
from ours". ( 79) 
He referred to such incidents during the Israeli-Arab war of 
1973 when 
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"some of our allies denied us the use of their bases 
and airspace". ( 80) 
Despite Richardson's emphasis that the US was keen to see a 
universally adopted treaty, and in spite of the fact that 
President Reagan found that most provisions of the 1982 
Convention 
"are consistent with US interests and serve well the 
interests of all nations", 
he declined to sign the Convention because of objections to 
. . 1 t" b d . . ( 81 ) prov1s1ons regu a 1ng sea- e m1n1ng. 
According to Payne (1983) and Ayubi (1984) American 
opposition to the treaty rests on the basis that US firms 
pioneered the technology for the exploration and recovery of 
seabed mineral nodules and that they are not adequately 
protected by the treaty. Specifically, US objections are that 
the convention impedes the exploitation of manganese nodules 
and sets production limits, creates a decision-making process 
unfavourable to the US, provides for the transfer of mining 
technology and benefits to developing countries, and contains 
provisions concerning national liberation movements (like the 
PLO) and their eligibility to obtain a share of the revenues 
of the Seabed Authority. Mining arrangements moreover, could 
be amended without US approval. ( 82 ) Thus, while UN diplomats 
regard the treaty as the 
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"most significant event in the history of 
peaceful cooperation", 
US commentators describe it as "history's greatest rip-
off". ( 83 ) 
The Secretary-General of the UN commented that: 
"Such overwhelming support for a convention of this 
universal character is unprecedented It has 
indeed irreversibly transformed the political map of 
the world." (84) 
However, US refusal to sign the Convention may jeopardise 
American interests in the Red Sea region, with special 
reference to oil tankers and warships flying the US flag, and 
overflight. 
Maritime claims of the Red Sea states (Appendix 
indicate that except for Jordan and Israel which claim 3nm 
and 6nm respectively as territorial waters, seven Red Sea 
states demand a 12nm territorial sea, and one, Somalia, 
demands a 200nm territorial water. Regarding nuclear-powered 
vessels and warships wishing to traverse the Red Sea 
territorial waters, they may face difficulties since the most 
strategically located states in the Red Sea region, 
(especially Egypt, PDR Yemen, Djibouti, Yemen AR, as well as 
Sudan and Somalia) have made it conditional for warships, 
nuclear-powered vessels, warplanes and ships carrying noxious 
substances to give prior notification of transit. Such 
requirements could clearly complicate the situation for US 
military shipping in Red Sea waters especially when US 
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alignment with Israel against the Arabs is considered. In 
fact, an outright objection to prevent Israeli ships or 
vessels bound for Israel from traversing Arab territorial 
waters is alrady maintained. However, since its peace treaty 
with Egypt in 1979, Israeli ships have continued to enjoy 
free passage through Egyptian territorial seas in compliance 
with the accord, as indicated earlier. 
By refusing to sign the Law of the Sea treaty, the US 
lost an important opportunity for harmonious global sea 
management because the Convention handles much more than the 
issue of seabed mining. The Convention also deals with 
military and commercial navigation, over flight and 
communications, rights over living and non-living resources, 
prevention of pollution, marine scientific research, and 
settlement of disputes. ( 8S) These issues are undoubtedly of 
considerable interest to the US. When President Reagan 
rejected the Convention he said that: 
11 Deep-sea bed 
the freedom 
nations. 11 (86) 
mining remains 
of the high 
a lawful exercise 
seas, open to 
of 
all 
Mr Tommy Koh, the Singapore diplomat who chaired the UN 
Conference on the Law of the Sea warned the US that: 
11 any companies trying to mine 
will be challenged in 
courts 11 • (86) 
outside the treaty 
the international 
The Suez Canal, Bab al-Mandeb, Tiran Strait, as well as 
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the Red Sea gulfs could prove to be significant and also 
strategic troublespots in a vital route located in the oil 
arc in particular and in the politically volatile area of the 
Middle East in general. These waterways could be regarded as 
major strategic flashpoints which no doubt are associated 
with national, regional and international security circles. 
Therefore, conflict over any of these water passages could 
threaten peace. All trading nations, particularly Western 
maritime powers, led by the US, with large trading and 
military activities will wish to have unimpeded transit 
through these waterways. Militarily rapidity in mobilizing 
naval forces is particulalry important to the US - as Sterner 
(1984) emphasizes because it needs to fulfil 
11 global maritime 
number of ships 11 , 
responsibility with 
(87) 
a very finite 
in the face of a larger Soviet Indian Ocean fleet compared to 
that of the US. Thus, to meet such obligations the US has to 
11 put a premium on rapidity 
flexibility of deployment 11 • (88) 
of movement and 
Owing to the vast distance of about 12,000nm separating the 
US from the Indian Ocean, the remotest body of water from the 
former, America has no choice but to concentrate the 
deployment of its naval forces in the Atlantic and Pacific 
Oceans as well as in the Mediterranean Sea. In order to 
offset potential Soviet threats, the US is in need of 11 surge 
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capability 11 ; (S 9 ) and this could be achieved at its best level 
only by using the Suez-Red Sea route. 
6.3 Conclusion 
The general situation of unrest in the Middle East has 
already impinged upon the Red Sea in the form of physical and 
legal interference with shipping. Threats to Israeli and 
Western shipping have increased due to the number of radical 
forces who maintain an uncompromising position with regard to 
Israeli and American interests in the Middle East. Insecurity 
of shipping in the Red Sea is not necessarily derived solely 
from within the region, as the geopolitical links of the Red 
Sea with other areas have clearly shown. 
Since the early 1970s possible threats to shipping 
through Red Sea Arab waters, especially in the Straits of Bab 
al Mandeb and Tiran, have never escaped the Israeli and 
American vision. Only through the growing influence of the US 
upon Egypt, and the American formulation of peace between 
Israel and Egypt, has Israel been able to enjoy the right of 
passage through northern Red Sea waters. But Bab al Mandel 
has continued to be a problem both for Israel and the US. 
While the US insists that the Soviet Union is the principal 
source of insecurity to shipping in the Red Sea, the Arabs, 
specifically the Saudis, are convinced that Israel is the 
major source of such threat. 
Regarding legal threats, the surprising US refusal to 
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sign the Convention on the Law of the Sea, and American 
insistance that they will follow their maritime interests 
despite what the Convention provides for, could result in 
conflict at sea between the US and anti-American elements in 
the region, notably members of the 19 81 Aden pact linking 
Libya, PDR Yemen and Ethiopia (chapter 7). Moreover, the 
controversy surrounding the discretion of the coastal state 
to decide whether passage is innocent or not, and the 
introduction of the 200nm EEZ, and the right of the coastal 
state to protect its resources in this zone, could all 
involve the US in disputes in the Red Sea, as elsewhere. The 
Soviet Union 1 s signing of the Convention could place the 
Soviets in good standing with coastal states, giving them 
confidence to apply the Convention to the disadvantage of US 
interests. The US does not wish to see any challenge to its 
global power, but the Convention appears to be such a 
challenge as long as the US does not sign it. 
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CHAPTER 7 
REGIONAL STABILITY: POLITICAL AND MILITARY THREATS 
7.1. An Overview 
The Arabian peninsula is bounded to the east by the Gulf 
which separates it from Iran; while the Red Sea represents 
its western flank and separates it from Africa. Iraq and 
Jordan to the north constitute the only land border of the 
peninsula. The Arabian peninsula is seemingly surrounded by 
radical states which display anti-monarchist and anti-
American attitudes, and cause great anxiety to the oil states 
of the peninsula. In the north there is Iraq, with a 
pro-Soviet socialist system since the revolution in 1958. To 
the east 1ies Iran. Prior to the coming to power of Khomeini 
in 1979 the Shah's Iran was viewed by the Gulf States as an 
ambitious country striving for domination over its neigh-
bours. After the Iranian Islamic Revolution, Iran has been 
perceived both by the peninsular states and the US as an 
exporter of revolution, as well as an external destabilizer, 
especially since the launching of Iraq's war against Iran in 
1980. Also to the east, through Soviet intervention in 
Afghanistan in December 1979, the USSR has drawn physically 
nearer to the Arabian peninsula, only 450km away. To the 
south, on the margins of the peninsula itself, lie PDR Yemen 
and Yemen AR. Both Yemens have been 1n conflict with each 
other, since the late 1960s, mainly over borders. Both states 
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Table 7.1 
Area and Population of the Arabian Penisula* States 
Country 
Bahrain 
Kuwait 
Oman 
Qatar 
Saudi Arabia 
UAE 
Yemen AR 
PDR Yemen 
Total 
Area 
000 Km 2 ) 
0.62 
18-lH~ 
212 
11 
2,150-lH~ 
333-lH~ 
3,003.62 
1,648 
435 
Population-lHH~ 
in thousands 
mid 1982 
371 
1,565 
1,079 
270 
10,025 
1' 13 2 
6,085 
2,093 
22,620 
40,777 
14,161 
Source: -~~ Iran and Iraq are included for comparison. -lH< These 
areas are from The Arab World: An International 
Statistical Directory, Wilson R. Westview Press, 
Boulder, Colorado, 1984, Wheat-Sheaf Books Ltd, 
Sussex, 1984. Table 1 basic data indicators. The rest 
are from Geographical Digest, George Philip and Son 
Limited, London, 1981, p. 
*** Population data is taken from: Statistical 
Papers/Series Vol. XXXVI, No. 2. Population and vital 
statistics report, UN, New York 1984. 
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have had disputes with Saudi Arabia; Yemen AR since 1934, and 
PDR Yemen since its independence in 1967. Moreover, PDR Yemen 
has been hostile towards Oman since the former's 
independence, and only in 1982 did they reach a peace 
agreement. On the African shore of the Red Sea, specifically 
in Ethiopia, Soviet, Cuban and East German forces have also 
been the source of near panic to the oil states of the 
peninsula. 
In addition to all these troubled surroundings, the 
presence of Israel, the most implacable enemy, has been a 
major factor of anxiety for the peninsula states, especially 
Saudi Arabia. 
As table 7.1. shows, the total land area of the Arabian 
peninsula is more than 3km2 , and over 71% of this area is 
occuped by Saudi Arabia. Contrary to its vast area, the 
peninsula has a small population, estimated at 22.62m 
(mid-year, 1982). Excluding the population of the two Yemens 
(8.178m) the population of the other six oil states is only 
14.442m. Compared to that of Iraq 14.161m or Iran 40.777m, 
the population of the oil states of the peninsula is clearly 
outnumbered by the Iraqis or the Iranians. The paucity of 
population in these states has created problems in various 
sectors of activity, governmental and private. It has led to 
dependence on foreign labour (table 7.2). Such important 
dependence is clearly shown in the following statement: 
Table 7.2 
Migrant workers in the oil states of the Arabian Peninsula b sending country and country 
of em:eloyment, 19 0. 
Sending Country Country of Employment 
Saudi United Kuwait Qatar Bahrain Oman 
Arabia Arab 
Emirates 
Egypt 155,100 18,200 85,000 5,750 2,800 6,300 
Yemen (YAR) 325,000 5,400 3,000 1' 500 1' 12 5 120 
Jordan & Palestine 140,000 19,400 55,000 7,800 1,400 2,250 
Yemen (PDRY) 65,000 6,600 9,500 1,500 1' 12 5 120 
Syrian Arab 
Republic 24,600 5,800 35,000 1,000 150 600 
Lebanon 33,200 6,600 8,000 750 300 1,500 
Sudan 55,600 2,100 5,500 750 900 620 
Maghreb 500 300 120 
Oman 10,000 19,400 2,000 1,150 900 
Iraq 3,250 1,200 40,000 310 
Somalia 8,300 5,000 500 400 
All Arab 820,550 89,700 243,800 20,200 9,010 12,030 
-
All Non Arabs 202,700 321,300 134,900 60,050 58,710 84,770 
Total 1,023,350 411,000 378,700 80,250 67,720 96,800 
Source: Birks, J. and Sinclatr, C. 'The Socio-Economic Determinants of intra-regional 
migration', in Internal Migration in the Arab World, proceedings of an ECWA 
population conference. Nicosia, Cyprus, 11-16 May 1981, Vol. II. UN. Economic 
Commission for Western Asia Beirut 1982. 
~ 
N 
0'1 
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11 If non-Kuwait Arabs suddenly left our country, 
Kuwaitis would be forced to leave their cars in the 
street and walk, because they would not even know 
how to change the points in their cars. 11 (1) 
Although expatriates are desperately needed by these states, 
the question of security takes priority, because foreign 
workers could create an important catalyst of internal in-
security, as happened in the siege of the Grand Mosque in 
Makka in November 1979. The worry about dangers emanating 
from foreign labour has become so strong as to override the 
imminent need of certain development schemes. The Saudi 
Interior Minister, Prince Naif (1980) was quoted as saying: 
11 we realize that foreign labour is crucial for 
development, but the demands of internal security 
must come first 11 • (2) 
The scarcity of population in the Gulf States has become 
a difficult problem, especially with regard to security. 
These states are concerned about modernizing and expanding 
their defence systems; but they are faced with the problem of 
finding the required personnel who can operate these systems. 
Besides the shortage of manpower, the number of nationals who 
are willing to enter military service is limited, because it 
is not as lucrative as business activities, and most 
nationals find civilian life more attractive. Apart from 
other technical problems, the limited availability of 
manpower creates problems with regard to the assimilation and 
maintenance of sophisticated weapons, 
system. ( 3 ) 
such as the AWACS 
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7. 2. The Importance of the Arabian Peninsula to the United 
States. 
The importance of the oil states of the Arabian 
peninsula to the US and its Western and Japanese allies lies 
mostly in the vast oil resources of these states, with 
particular reference to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The 41.3 
billion tonnes of proved oil reserves possessed by those 
states 1n 1984 represent about 43% the of total world 
reserves; about 64% of OPEC's; over 900% of the USA 1 s; and 
1,251% of Western Europe's reserves. ( 4 ) However, earlier 
chapters (especially 5) have indicated the importance of 
these energy resources and how the US and its allies will be 
depending more and more on the resources of these states, 
with particular reference to Saudi Arabia, for the survival 
of their Western technologically advanced civilization. 
Trade, recycling of the petro-dollars and arms sales from the 
US in particular, and from its Western allies in general, 
constitute the other significant factors that make the US 
concerned about these states. In 1980 the imports of the six 
oil states of the peninsula from the US, Western Europoe and 
Japan amounted to about $9 billion, which makes over SO% of 
the value of the entire Arab imports then. (S) 
The oil crisis of 1973 and its ensuing price rises 
created a sudden financial boom in the oil exporting 
countries, with particular reference to the Arabian peninsula 
states. According to a Congressional Report (1981) the 
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peninsular oil states have acquired official foreign reserves 
of over $100 billion, which represent about 20% of the 
Western total. ( 6 ) In the American perspective, this huge 
wealth bears significant weight becaue much of this money is 
being held in American securities. To convert this abundant 
wealth into economic, military and political power, these 
small rich Arab States, especially Saudi Arabia, have 
recycled those petro-dollars into the US economy and also 
purchased huge amounts of Western, especially American, 
sophisticated weapons and other military hardware; also other 
Western products have found their way to these states. ( 7 ) In 
1976-82 US military sales to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman and 
B h . h d $22 b"ll" ( 8 ) a ra1n reac e over 1 1on. The growing inter-
national importance of the financial power of the peninsular 
oil states has been considerably welcomed by the Americans 
because of the strong relations that bind Western, especially 
American, strategic, economic and political interests with 
these states. Mr Nicholas Veliotes (1982) greatly appreciates 
the increasing importance of these states in international 
finance and welcomes 
"constructive investment by Gulf countries in our 
(US) own financial markets and economy". (9) 
With regard to the Arabian peninsula, in particular, and 
the Middle East in general, the US is preoccupied with three 
political matters: first, the perpetuation of stability 
( status quo ) , second, the survival of the moderate Arab 
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regimes, and third, the prevention of the establishment of 
revolutionary systems and the spread of radical tendencies. 
Strategically, the Americans have two immediate concerns in 
the area. First, to counteract Soviet penetration in and ward 
off its potential threat to the peninsular states, especially 
Saudi Arabia; and, second, the security of Israel and the 
independence of the US friends in the Middle East. Thus, M~ 
Komer, ( 19 80) Under Secretary of Defence, states that the 
Americans have " longstanding interest in the security of 
Israel", an interest which has been 
"advanced substantially with the peace treaty 
-between Egypt and Israel 11 • 
He adds that the independence of other sovereign states and 
their freedom from Russian domination are also vital American 
( 10) 
concerns. 
Owing to their deeply rooted Islamic beliefs, the 
countries of the Arabian peninsula, especially the oil States 
led by Saudi Arabia, are the staunchest opponents of 
communism, and other ideologies that reject or disregard 
religion. They have therefore become concerned about resis-
ting radical influences externally and internally. These 
countries also share a common interest in the continuity of 
monarchical or traditional rule and strong connections with 
the West, especially the longstanding Saudi-American 
relations. This relationship is not new, it has been promoted 
since 1970 by Senator Henry Jackson among others. Apart from 
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Libya and Iraq, he argues that: 
11 the major oil producing and exporting countries 
of the Middle East are politically moderate, and 
commercially aligned with the West and inclined to 
view with disfavour the growth of Soviet influence 
among their radical neighbours". (11) 
A flood of books has been published containing material 
which explains the unique and special bonds which link the US 
to Israel. Thus it is hardly necessary to elaborate on this 
issue here. But reference should be made to the Congressional 
Report of 1981 which states that the US is convinced that it 
shares with Israel a common interest in "blocking Soviet 
inroads in the Middle East 11 , the Report adds that they have 
mutual interests in the stability and continuity of the 
moderate Arab states and the prevention of their falling 
under radical forces. ( 12 ) 
Political moderation in the Arabian peninsula is crucial 
for the US, the guarantor of Israel 1 s security, because of 
the existence of a considerable number of Palestinians in the 
oil states of the peninsula, especially in Kuwait, and who 
may stir up troubles there. Also, political moderation there 
is regarded as being important because the peninsular oil 
states are the major financial backers of the Palestinian 
cause. ( 13 ) These states have considerable influence both in 
the Arab and African worlds, which could be used against 
Israel as happened after the 1973 war. The US mediated 
between Egypt and Israel in 1978 for the restoration of 
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peace. It succeeded in bringing both parties together in the 
US where they signed the Camp David Peace agreement in 1979, 
designed to perpetuate peace and stability in the region. The 
US hoped that the accord would block any Arab tendencies 
toward support for the frustrated Palestinians. The US feels 
that such support would be more serious if it comes from 
Saudi Arabia whose eminence bestows upon it a critical role 
in the Israeli-Arab conflict. ( 14) 
Thus, the Arabian peninsula represents the very centre 
of strategic US and allied interests, and hence its security 
is crucial. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is the key to our 
treatment of the security of the Arabian peninsula. 
7.3. Saudi Arabia: the Lynchpin 
Saudi Arabia is considered by Lee Hamilton, the Chairman 
of the US Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East (1982), 
to be the heart of the 'Persian Gulf' mentioned by the Carter 
Doctrine. ( 1 S) The US perceives the geographical relationship 
of any state to Saudi Arabia as an important factor which may 
affect the security of the Kingdom; because if turbulence 
occurs in that contiguous state it may spill over to the 
Kingdom, or if such country was attacked and conquered, the 
conqueror might be tempted to attack Saudi Arabia. Thus, with 
reference to the other oil states of the peninsula, the 
Department of State emphasizes that any 
433 
"attack or a threatened attack on any of these 
states would be the equivalent of an attack on Saudi 
Arabia when you look at the geography". (16) 
Saudi Arabia consideres itself as the leader of the Arab 
world for two basic reasons: firstly, it holds Makka, the 
holiest of Muslim cities, within its boundaries, and 
secondly, it is the wealthiest state in the Arab world. The 
Kingdom enjoys supremacy over the other oil states 1n the 
area and has been accepted as the major force of stability 
there. Shaikh Zayid, the ruler of Abu Dhabi and President of 
the UAE has emphasized the crucial role of the Kingdom in 
maintaining stability in the area: 
"Saudi initiative is required to assure stability 
and security in the Gulf". (17) 
Knowing that the Kingdom is the major oil producer in 
the Middle East, the wealthiest state in the area, and the 
most important regional power, the US recognizes such Saudi 
leadership of the Arab world. The US has accordingly adopted 
a policy of: 
"encouraging intra-Arab 
under Saudi leadership". 
stability 
( 1 8 ) 
in the region 
The Americans view the Kingdom as the lynchpin of the 
international petroleum business, therefore its stability as 
well as the continuity of its friendly relations with the 
West are seen as the major safeguard against a renewed energy 
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crisis such as that of 1973, ( 19 ) particularly when the 
Kingdom's vast oil resources are considered. According to BP 
(1984) the Kingdom's proved reserves at the end of 1984 were 
169.0 billion barrels, which make up 42.42% of the total 
Middle East reserves of 398.4 billion barrels for the same 
(20) year. 
Politically, the US appreciates the Kingdom's moderate 
orientation and resistance to radicalism. The Israeli-Arab 
war of 1973 introduced the oil weapon, used by the Arabs to 
influence US foreign policy with regard to the American 
commitment to Israel. The reduction in production, and price 
rises were both tough measures taken by the Arab oil states 
against the US and its Western allies, partly related to the 
dispute and partly for economic reasons seen by the 
producers. If the Kingdom were to heed the call of the 
extreme Arab states to cut back its oil production, adopt a 
price rise policy and reduce its surplus funds in Western 
banks, particularly American, then the world would experience 
a substantial price rise, and consequently, grave economic 
and political 
Kuniholm. ( 21 ) 
.problems 
However, 
would occur, according to 
strategically, politically, and 
economically, the Kingdom has increased in importance in 
American Middle 
1973-4- ( 22 ) 
East policy since the oil crisis of 
After the outbreak of the Iraqi-Iranian war on September 
22, 1980, there was a sudden halt of oil exports from the two 
countries. The stoppage took 3. 5 million barrels a day off 
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the world market. In response, Saudi Arabia made up the 
shortfall and decided to increase its oil production by about 
1 million barrels to 10.3 million barrels per day. (Z3) 
Kuniholm (1981) sees the Kingdom's decision as an intention 
to repay the Americans for their support during the conflict 
between the two Yemens in February-March 1979. ( 24) Also, it 
is important to refer to the Kingdom's resumption of oil 
exports to the US after the Arab oil embargo of 1973-4 which 
lasted only five months; the Saudi initiative was followed by 
the other oil states of the peninsula. Concerning oil prices, 
the Kingdom has also pursued a policy of moderation and 
gradual increase to help consumers. In September 19 7 4 the 
Saudi Oil Minister, Shaikh Ahmed Z. Yamani stated that: 
11 Saudi Arabia has always felt the 
moderate and gradual price increase to 
market conditions and to which consuming 
economies can always be adjusted". (25) 
need for 
cope with 
countries' 
And in April 1981, he declared that his country would 
"not 
other 
raise 
OPEC 
prices". 
oil prices or reduce production 
members significantly reduce 
until 
their 
He was reported to have said that the "rise in oil prices had 
gone too far ... 11(26) The same policy of restraint continued 
1n the following four years. 
Although the immense oil resources of Saudi Arabia 
constitute the major factor behind US interest in the 
Kingdom, nevertheless the Americans are worried that these 
very resources render the Saudi Kingdom a potential target 
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for outside threat. ( 27) 
The US has determined to do its utmost to protect its 
vital interests in Saudi Arabia through an informal commit-
ment which has existed effectively since World War Two. In 
1979 the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, William 
Crawford, emphasized that: 
"the maintenance of the integrity of the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia is vital to American interests in the 
Middle East and that we should be prepared to act in 
implementation of that consideration". (28) 
However, 1n spite of the absence of a 1 formal• American 
commitment to defend the Kingdom, Mr Crawford asserted that 
all American Presidents since Mr Truman have 
that is of 
integri~y of 
and would be 
11 in word and deed made it clear that 
vital concern to the US and that the 
the Kingdom was of importance to, 
protected by, the United States". (29) 
National Security Adviser Brezinski said in Riyadh in January 
1980 that: 
11 for the defence of Saudi Arabia we will do 
anything". (30) 
That •anything• has been interpreted by Alvin Cottrell (1983) 
as "We are ready to fight for Saudi Arabia. 11 ( 3 1 ) 
The foregoing pages have shown that Saudi Arabia is a 
regional power, in the eyes of the States of the Arabian 
peninsula as well as the West, especially the US. Also, we 
have seen how the Kingdom represents vital Western economic, 
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strategic and political interests. The US makes no secret of 
its determination to defend the Kingdom against any danger 
that may threaten the latter's security and stability. 
7. 4-. Perceived Threats to Stability - General 
Owing to its vast oil resources and fragile political 
systems, the Arabian peninsula may represent the 'Achilles 
heel' of the Western world. Although the Americans perceive 
the Soviet Union as the direct and major threat to the 
Arabian peninsula, nevertheless they do consider some other 
factors as actual sources of insecurity to the area. These 
factors are: 
( 1) regional unrest resulting from interstate and regional 
conflicts; 
(2) revolutionary changes; and 
(3) domestic troubles. (3 2 ) 
Hurewitz (1979) emphasizes the potentiality of external 
rather than internal subversion as a factor of danger to the 
area. ( 33 ) 
While the Carter doctrine (1980) identifies Soviet 
military adventurism as the greatest threat to the oil states 
of the Gulf, US Secretary of Defence Harold Brown ( 19 80) 
maintains a different argument. He perceives a greater danger 
emanating from regional turbulence. Whether Soviet inter-
vention was probable or not, the Secretary argues that: 
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'fable 7-3. 
Regional threat perceptions of the A~abian Peninsula states 
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"the threat of violence and the use of force remains 
widespread" . ( 3 4) 
According to a Congressional report (1981), factors of 
instability prevail in each of the Arabian peninsular states, 
especially the oil rich ones. But it is difficult to make 
accurate predictions of immediate unrest; nevertheless abrupt 
shifts of balance between stability and turmoil can easily 
occur. 
Lee Hamilton (1982) specifies five sources of threat as 
perceived by the Gulf States. They are: 
(1) Marxism and Communism; 
(2) Israeli expansionism; 
(3) colonialism, or superpower hegemony; 
(4) would-be aggression by neighbours, through either ex-
ternal aggression or internal subversion sponsored by 
neighbours; and 
(5) internal rebellion. (35) 
One could argue that the immediate threats to the Arabian 
peninsula are more likely to originate from regional and 
domestic factors than from superpower intervention, although 
the regional/domestic sources of danger could be a feedback 
of superpower contention over the Middle East. Table 7.3 shows 
regional threat perceptions of the Arabian Peninsula states. 
7.4.1. Threats from the Red Sea Region 
Since Colonel Nasser led the Egyptian revolution in 1953 
the Saudi Kingdom experienced threats from Egypt. Between 
1953 and 1961 Nasser's threat to the Saudis took the shape of 
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a cold war in which he overtly called upon the Arab masses to 
overthrow traditional rule and to establish democracy and 
socialism, and ultimately reach Arab unity. Also Nasser 
demonstrated anti-Western attitudes, mainly as a reaction to 
Western support for Israel. Moreover, he was the first Arab 
and African leader to initiate friendly attitudes toward, and 
to open the door for the Socialist bloc, especially the 
Soviet Union. The Americans were very concerned to find a 
counter-force in the area to resist Nasser's radical 
revolutionary activites, and entrusted Saudi Arabia with the 
mission. According to Robert Lacey (1982)' 
"under the aegis of the 'Eisenhower Doctrine", Sa'ud 
would act as a force for moderation among his 
neighbours, generally elevating himself as an alter-
native influence to the troublemaking radicalism of 
Nasser". (36) 
The US policy of considering the Kingdom as a counter 
force to Nasser led the latter to expand his challenge 
southward to the Red Sea region, right into the heart of 
American ground interests in the Arabian peninsula. By 
involving himself in Yemen (1962-63), thus outflanking Saudi 
Arabia from the southwest, Nasser made his challenge against 
the American-Saudi alliance more imminent. Hence, the US 
found itself dragged into the Red Sea region for the first 
time to manoeuvre politically and militarily in order to 
safeguard its vital interest in the Arabian peninusla. 
Nasser's call for revolution and radicalism first 
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materialized in the southwestern corner of the peninsula when 
Colonel Abdullah Al-Sallah led a military revolution against 
the regime of the monarch Imam Ahmed, and a republican state 
was established in September 1962. This was the third 
republic in the Red Sea region after Egypt (1953) and Somalia 
(1960). Since then the Yemen has come to be known as Yemen 
Arab Republic (YAR). The Americans maintain that direct 
Egyptian intervention and extensive Soviet military 
assistance to Yemen AR took place. ( 3 7 ) whatever the truth, 
the Yemeni revolution gave Nasser a foothold inside the 
Arabian peninsula and close to his key target, Saudi Arabia. 
According to Alvin Cottrel et al ( 1980), Nasser 11 deployed 
70,000 Egyptian troops to Yemen 11 (JS) in defence of the 
revolution against the Saudi-backed royalist forces. The US 
viewed the Saudi-Egyptian conflict over Yemen AR as an 
external threat which might jeoparize the national security 
of Saudi Arabia, because Egyptian forces had bombarded Saudi 
towns in the southern part of the Kingdom, and the royalist 
supply bases (39) <; on Saudi terri tory. Nasj\r 1 s attacks were 
motivated by his conviction that the Kingdom was working to 
topple the Republican regime in Sana'a, ( 40) which was 
undoubtedly true. 
Due to American apprehension over the security of Saudi 
Arabia, and lack of confidence in the United Nations to 
resolve the crisis, the Americans determined to 
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"ensure Saudi integrity againts threats from the 
Yemen conflict". (41) 
Hence, the US pledged military support if necessary to deter 
outside aggression against the Kingdom. Saudi Arabia 
naturally perceived Nasser as a "chief rival for influence 
over the Arab world 11 • In response, the Kingdom espoused the 
royalist cause in Yemen AR. Apart from their own cause, the 
royalists were perceived by the US to play a significance 
role in defending the Saudi territory against invasion 
11 openly threatened by Egyptian forces in Yemen 11 • ( 42 ) The US 
regarded Nasser's "Yemeni-based Egyptian air and naval units" 
as a direct threat to the security of the Saudi Kingdom 
because this threat shifted to the Saudi borders and involved 
military conflict and heightened tensions. (43) 
In February 1963 the US seriously began to worry about 
its interest in the peninsula, embodied in the security of 
Saudi Arabia. Accordingly, the US started to mediate between 
Nasser and the Saudis, in what was known as Bunker's mission, 
or, as termed by the US National Security Council 'Operation 
Hard-Surface', a plan for disengagement between the Egyptian 
and Saudi troops. ( 44 ) While McMullen (1980) maintains that it 
was an American decision to intervene, a Congressional Report 
(1977) states that the initial American involvement in Yemen 
took place at the urging of the Saudis, but over the years 
American as well as Saudi relations with Yemen AR had sought 
similar goals. (45) 
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In fact, all American manoeuvres in the Egyptian-Saudi 
contention over Yemen between 1962-1963 were caused by US 
interest, according to McMullen to 
"forestall a dangerous all out Yemen AR-Saudi war 
which might have imperilled Western security inter-
ests in that strategically important region". (46) 
Also, the US hoped that its efforts were to demonstrate the 
American interest, to reassure the Saudis of continued US 
backing and to encourage them to carry out internal develop-
ment and reforms in order to enhance the stability of the 
Royal House of Saud. But the foremost American objective in 
the whole business was to reduce tension in the Middle East 
for the ultimate objective to "preclude the opportunity for 
Soviet gains"( 47 ) in that sensitive region. 
However, Robert Stookey ( 19 7 8) argues that all US, UN 
and Arab League "efforts at mediation ... failed" to resolve 
the Saudi-Egyptian hotility over Yemen. The withdrawl of the 
Egyptian forces from Yemen happened only as a result of the 
Egyptian losses in the 1967 Arab-Israel war, when it became 
clear to Cairo that its position in Yemen AR became 
untenable. He refers to a final royalist attempt, in 1968, 
financed by Riyadh, to seize power from the republicans; but 
with financial support and arms aid from the Soviet Union, 
Syria and Algeria, Sana'a was able to withstand the 
attack. (4 8 ) Since the rise of a radical government ln PDR 
Yemen to the south, the royalists became a liability to Saudi 
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Arabia, impeding its cooperation with Sana' a "against the 
revolutionary movement in the south''·( 49 ) 
As noted before, the American mission for the resolution 
of the Yemeni civil war was unsuccessful in achieving a 
comprehensive resolution to the Yemeni crisis which 
endangered the centrepiece of US interest in the peninsula, 
Saudi Arabia. McMullen (1980) appraises the mission as only 
'palliative', nevertheless, he admits that it was able to 
'de-escalate' the situation and to lead to its control, 
though sporadic fighting continued until 1967. (SO) Finally, 
in early 1970 national reconciliation "under Saudi auspices" 
was reached in the Yemen AR, and the differences between the 
royalist opposition and the republican government came to a 
head. (Sl) 
The US perceives the decade of hostility between Riyadh 
and Sana'a as a consequence of the revolutionary orientation 
of Yemen AR, escalated by territorial disputes, which finally 
led to an open conflict which made the Kingdom worried about 
its small dynamic neighbour. However, Stookey argues that 
Saudi Arabia abandoned the royalist cause for two strategic 
reasons: as a short term objective, it might "forestalLthe 
rise of an aggressively hostile 11 regime in Sana' a; and as a 
long-term strategy it might enable Riyadh to gain an ally in 
Sana 1 a for joint military action against the trouble-making 
southern neighbour of both countries, the radical leftist 
regime of Aden. (SZ) 
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In fact, despite the end of the Egyptian factor, Yemen 
AR itself has been a continuous source of problems for Saudi 
Arabia. 
"The good or evil for us will come from the 
Yemen" (53) 
(King Abdul Aziz of Saudi Arabia, 1940s) 
The Yemen AR can be seen as s source of insecurity to 
Saudi Arabia for a number of reasons. The regime 1s still 
socialist orientated, while it maintains relations with the 
Soviet Union and still keeps Russian military advisers. Yemen 
AR also has cordial diplomatic relations with progressive 
Arab regimes, such as Libya, Iraq, and PDR Yemen. Perhaps 
above all, Yemeni workers in Saudi Arabia, numbering over 
half a million may engage in subversive actions against the 
Kingdom, such as during the insurrection of the Great Mosque 
in Makkah in November 1979. Historical factors are also 
relevant since Hollen (1982) argues that Yemen AR is still: 
"not fully reconciled with the Kingdom regarding the 
former 1 s loss of the fertile Asir region to Saudi 
Arabia during their 1934 war". (54) 
The US perceives Saudi ambivalence over how best to deal 
with Yemen AR as arising from the Kingdom's position of "how 
strong and united it wants the Yemen AR". (5 5 ) For this reason 
the US perceives this populous state as "a source of Saudi 
envy and suspicion". (5 6 ) 
However, by the late 1970s the Americans felt that the 
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regime in Yemen AR had slowly 11 moved to the left 11 , and 
consequently they feared that the National Democratic Front 
(NDF) might take over. The NDF is a combination of political 
and military movements in Yemen AR founded in 1978 with its 
headquarters at Aden, and has estimated forces of between 
5,000 to 10,000 men. According to Hollen (1982): 
11 much of the territory in south eastern Yemen AR 
adjacent to PDR Yemen's border was controlled by the 
NDF, whose low-level attacks have been fuelled by 
PDR Yemen and by Libya and Syria 11 ; (57) 
therefore the Americans feel that if the NDF assumes power 
11 US interests will be jeopardized 11 while the Saudi Kingdom 
will face enhanced danger.(S 8 ) In fact, Saudi-American 
worries about Yemen AR is mostly caused by the latter's 
relations with its radical neighbour PDR Yemen, a Marxist 
state in the peninsula, with strong Soviet connections .. The 
PDR Yemen creates a source of insecurity in the Arabian 
peninsula and disturbs both the Saudis and the Americans. 
Nasser's period in Yemen AR helped the spread of 
radicalism in southern Arabia. In February 1966, the British 
Labour Government decided to withdraw from southern Arabia. 
The British decision paved the way for the National 
Liberation Front (NLF) to assume power triumphantly. The NLF 
is a socialist organization. Backed by the army, the NLF was 
able to defeat its rival and succeed the British in ruling 
southern Arabia, which since independence in 1967 it has 
taken the name of PDR Yemen. Started as a socialist party, 
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the NLF gradually adopted Marxism. But after independence, 
also Maoism from communist China, found some adherents in the 
new strategically located socialist state. Nevertheless, 
since 1969 a further shift toward Moscow has taken place. (S 9 ) 
With regard to the Arab world, PDR Yemen aspires to four 
objectives: 
(1) the expulsion of colonial military bases; 
(2) an end to the dominance of monopolistic capitalist 
companies; 
(3) overthrowing of reactionary Arab regimes; and 
(4) unity of the Palestinians under the PLO to bring down the 
Z . . t d p l t. ( 60) 10n1s s an recover a es 1ne. 
Despite the fact that all the aforementioned goals of PDR 
Yemen do concern the US, the objective of bringing down the 
reactionary Arab regimes seems to receive more American 
concern, especially when Soviet cooperation is considered. 
The Americans perceive the Marxist regime in Aden as being 
overriden by a strong desire to "subvert traditional regimes" 
in the bulk of the Arabian peninsula. ( 61 ) Although the Saudis 
perceive radicalism, directly or indirectly associated with 
Moscow, as the primary threat to their security, some 
Americans consider instability in Yemen AR and Oman as the 
main source of insecurity to Saudi Arabia. The US is 
convinced that "indirect but more immediate threats have 
revolved around" PDR Yemen with regard to Yemen AR and 
Oman.( 62 ) Because both states are seen by some Americans as 
allies and clients of the Kingdom, their stability is 
448 
considered crucial to that of the Saudis. If it could be true 
for Oman to be counted as a Saudi ally or client, it is 
definitely untrue for Yemen AR, which is politically 
different from the Kingdom, and entered into war with it in 
1934 and 1962. Moreover Yemen AR continuously represents a 
dilemma for Saudi policy. 
Strategically, the US views the importance of Yemen AR 
as based upon three major factors: 
(1) the geographical proximity of the Yemen AR to Saudi 
Arabia; 
(2) the post Yemen-Iraq relationship, because Iraq has been a 
major antagonist to the Kingdom; and 
( 3) with regard to Saudi Arabia 1 s "regional buffer state 
policies", Yemen AR represents a buffer zone between the 
Kingdom and the radical Marxist PDR Yemen. ( 6 3) 
In mid-1972 serious conflict between the two Yemens 
occurred along their common borders. In that incident PDR 
Yemen accused Yemen AR of invading its territory and warned 
that it would retaliate by using the Soviets. In September a 
cease-fire was arrived at by the Arab League, and in November 
an agreement was concluded at Tripoli by Aden and Sana'a for 
merging the two States. But in spite of the Tripoli accord, 
as Stookey ( 1982) maintains, PDR Yemen continued to launch 
subversive actions against Yemen AR; by training, arming and 
financing insurgents from Yemen AR. The events which took 
place in Sana 1 a in September 1973, were considered as a proof 
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of PDR Yemen's role in destabilizing Yemen AR. ( 64) Although 
the Israeli-Arab war of October 1973 gave the two Yemens a 
chance to ease tension, nevertheless frequent hostility 
became a characteristic of the relations between Yemen AR and 
PDR Yemen. After the assasination of Yemen AR's President, Mr 
al-Hamadi, in October 1977, relations between Sana'a and Aden 
rapidly deteriorated. PDR Yemen accused Yemen AR of the 
murder to end al-Hamadi 's policy of accommodation with PDR 
Yemen. (65) 
Two American reports in late 1977 and early March 1981 
have emphasized that the only significant outside danger to 
the stability of Yemen AR originates from PDR Yemen in the 
form of "periodic terrorist and subversive t . •t• 11(66) ac 1v1 1es 
such as the infiltration of groups to engage into border 
skirmishes against Yemen AR. For three important military 
reasons the US feels that the security of Yemen AR is 
vulnerable to threats from PDR Yemen. FirstLy, although Yemen 
AR has adequate armed forces, some 40,000 men, nevertheless 
this sound picture is "hampered by inadequate and obsolete 
equipment" besides shortage of spare parts and "a poor 
logistic system". Secondly, PDR Yemen's armed forces are 
enhanced by "an extensive array of Soviet armour, artillery, 
aircraft ... " Thirdly, although sources vary over the number 
of Cuban, East German and Soviet military advisers and 
technicians in PDR Yemen, yet all emphasize the military 
presence of the three Communist powers 1n that country. (67) 
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The Congressional report of arms sales in the Gulf and Red 
Sea regions (1977) maintains that the military personnel of 
these Communist countries serve in PDR Yemen as military 
~dvisers and indoctrinators in ideological training centres. 
What the US fears is that if PDR Yemen forces engage in 
conflict with Yemen AR 1 s army, and the former are to be 
reinforced by the Communist troops stationed there, the 
security of Yemen AR could be seriously imperilled.( 6S) The 
worries of the US about Communist forces in PDR Yemen are 
based upon the American belief that if hostility sparks 
between the two Yemens, the Cubans might repeat the same 
scenario they enacted in Angola. ( 6 9) 
American worries about the security of the Yemen AR have 
been augmented by the formation of the National Democratic 
Front formed in 1976, with headquarters at Aden. One of NDF's 
several objectives is the weakening of relations with Saudi 
Arabia. In 1978, the intensified activities of the NDF 
against the 
measures. ( 7 0) 
regime in Yemen AR included military 
Owing to their better military capability and the help 
they obtained from the NDF, PDR Yemen's forces crossed Yemen 
AR 1 s borders, penetrated 3 2km and seized three towns. The 
fight continued for several weeks before a cease-fire was 
reached by the Arab League on March 23rd 1979, and followed 
by the normalization of relations. ( 71 ) However, the critical 
events of the late 1970s, namely Sadat 1 s initiative toward 
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Israel and the signing of the Camp David accords, have caused 
disarray within the Arab League, and therefore its mediation 
was not effective because sporadic border incidents occurred 
between the two Yemens. (7 2 ) 
However, between late 1979 and the autumn of 1981, 
hostility between the two Yemens came to a halt. During that 
period internal circumstances in both countries dictated an 
improved atmosphere of friendly understanding. Two 
significant developments took place in Yemen AR. First, the 
regime followed a reconciliatory approach towards the NDF; 
also negotiations for the participation of the Front in the 
government occurred. Secondly, Saudi influence was minimized 
when Sana' a concluded an agreement with Moscow in 1979, by 
which the Soviet Union was to supply Yemen AR with arms on 
long-term credit. (73) On the other hand, there was an 
important development in PDR Yemen. In April 1980, Mr Abdul 
Fattah Ismail, a strong ally of Moscow, was deposed from the 
leadership of the State. His ousting was ensued by some 
degree of 
"circumspect posture 
revolution in Yemen AR 
toward the 
", (74) 
promotion of 
and by more flexible policies in handling PDR Yemen's 
differences with other conservative regimes in the peninsula. 
By the autumn of 1981 according to Stookey (1982), the 
entente came to an end when the NDF, with full support from 
PDR Yemen, led an insurgency in Yemen AR's border districts. 
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All in all, the characterization of relations between 
the two Yemens by periodic hostility seems to confirm that 
the entire south western flank of the Arabian peninsula is 
plagued by endemic conflicts. Moreover, one could argue that 
the three-sided Saudi-American-Russian interaction in the 
area might have contributed to the regular recurrence of 
hostility between the two Yemens. 
However, PDR Yemen 1 s disturbing activities as seen by 
the US and Saudi Arabia extend eastward from Yemen AR to the 
Sultanate of Oman and other regimes in the peninsula. Since 
its independence, and through its support for the Popular 
Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO), PDR Yemen has 
continued a sustained effort to bring down the regime in Oman 
and establish a revolutionary system in the strategically 
located sultanate. PDR Yemen 1 s role in destabilizing Oman, 
will now be discussed. 
The Sultanate of Oman is located on the southeastern 
corner of the Arabian peninsula. It is an important state 
with regard to the security of the Arabian peninsula and 
foreign military presence in the area, due to its strategic 
location, its long-lasting hostility (15 years) with PDR 
Yemen and, most important, its persistent pro-American 
orientation, especially since 1979, as a result of the fall 
of the Shah and the Russian involvement in Afghanistan. 
Compared to Saudi Arabia, Oman is more enthusiastic and more 
unequivocal about the American military presence in the 
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peninsula. When we consider American definitions of the Red 
Sea and the Gulf regions (see chapter 1.3) it becomes obvious 
Oman is directly included in the geopolitical network of the 
Red Sea region, as perceived by the us. One of the 
geographical factors that render the Sultanate of Oman 
strategically significant, is its 1, 600km coastline, stret-
ching along the Arabian Sea and Gulf of Oman. The strategic 
island of Masira is located on this coastline. Also of great 
importance, especially to the US, Oman has a commanding and 
key position on the vital Straits of Hormuz, where every 
eleven minutes a loaded oil tanker passes into the Indian 
Ocean. ( 7 S) 
Militarily, Oman is important to US policy in the 
Arabian peninsula; because throughout the 1970s Oman 
supported the American military presence and activities in 
the area, without reservation. It has offered the US bases 
and facilities. For example, 1n early 1977, on Masirah 
Island, the US has acquired 
"landing rights for P-3 flights originating in Diego 
Garica and covering the northern Indian Ocean and 
regions near the Horn of Africa". (76) 
Masirah facilities were used by the British who vacated them 
by the end of March 1977. Other Omani facilities have been 
made available to the US. According to Robert Harvey (1981) 
Oman has hinted that if the US asks for a fully-fledged 
military base, Oman might be willing to respond. Harvey adds 
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that some Omanis were reported to be welcoming an idea of 
"asssociated" membership of NATO. (77) 
Politically, Oman is a strong Western ally and staunch 
opponent of communism. Qabus, the Sultan of Oman since 1970, 
has been in line with the US policy towards the Gulf in 
particular, and the Middle East in general. Therefore, he 
welcomed the Camp David agreement and became the only other 
Arab head of State, besides President Numeiry of Sudan, not 
to break with President Sadat over C D 'd (78) amp av1 . Qabus' 
visit to Cairo in 1982 was seen by the Department of State as 
an effort to explore the chances of maintaining Egyptian-Gulf 
Arab rapproachment. In this context, the Americans 
"would welcome the re-establishment of diplomatic 
relations between Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and all of 
the other Arab States that broke, particularly the 
Gulf". (79) 
The Arab Gulf states have reservations about Qabus' policy of 
such close relations with the US but he feels that his Arab 
Gulf partners try to evade the reality that: 
a growing interest in the 
the Third World countries. 
superpower must come to the 
"the Soviet Union has 
natural resources of 
Therefore the other 
rescue" . ( 8 0) 
Since it started in 1965, the rebellion in Dhofar province 
has been the biggest internal threat to the Sultanate; as 
well as being an element of trouble-making in the peninsula. 
Before PDR Yemen's independence, the Soviet Union was the 
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direct supplier of weapons to the movement. But later, the 
regime in Aden became the main channel of Russian arms 
supplies to the rebels, according to Ghebhardt (1975). ( 81 ) In 
1969 except for Salalah and its surroundings, all the 
province of Dhofar came under the control of the rebels. In 
1970 the rebels attacked areas near the Omani oilfields. ( 8 Z) 
Oman has a constant preoccupation with 1 advance communism 1 , 
accordingly, it perceives the Soviet presence in PDR Yemen as 
a potential support for insurgency in Dhofar province. In 
response, and since the British withdrawal in the early 
19 7Os, Qabus has brought himself too close to the West, 
especially the US, seeking military help to withstand a 
potential thrust from PDR Yemen. However, in 197 5, Iranian 
troops, units from the Jordanian Air Force and British army 
officers assisted Qabus in warding off the rebellion in 
Dhofar. ( 8 J) 
In fact, throughout the 1970s, the US has been greatly 
concerned about PDR Yemen 1 s destabilizing activities toward 
Oman. The Americans maintain that the Marxist regime in Aden 
has been offering sanctuary, training and soldiers to the 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman ( PFLO) to subvert 
Qabus 1 regime in Muscat. (84) A revolutionary take-over in 
Oman could threaten American strategic as well as economic 
interest in the Arabian peninsula. Such a regime might align 
itself with PDR Yemen; this would mean a wider zone of 
sanctuary and more facilities could be available for 
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insurgent groups in other peninsular states, especially the 
oil-rich ones, like UAE and Kuwait, as well as Bahrain: not 
rich in oil, but of strategic importance. Owing to the 
geographical interplay between the peninsular states, 
potential for revolutionary upheavals might be enhanced by 
such development in Oman. With external support, Wesern and 
regional, Qabus' regime plays an important role in protecting 
Gulf oil shipment against outside interference, at least in 
or near Oman's territorial waters. If Qabus goes, inter-
diction of oil movement in this area could take place. 
Both Saudi Arabia and the US have been considerably 
concerned about PDR Yemen being a Soviet base for subversion 
in the peninsula. Equally, they have been worried about PDR 
Yemen's renewed efforts in the late 1970s to overthrow the 
regimes in Yemen AR and Oman. (SS) 
To sum up, Aden's subversive activities against Oman and 
Yemen AR have created a great deal of anxiety to Saudi Arabia 
and the US as well. They fear that if PDR Yemen were to 
succeed in its intentions, this might consolidate a communist 
foothold and enhance radicalism in the Arabian peninsula. 
Consequently, the security of the Saudi Kingdom could be in 
danger, and its leadership to the moderate regimes of the 
peninsula might be disrupted. It is the Saudi leadership that 
the US perceives to provide immunity to the peninsula against 
Soviet intrigues and subversion. To end the apprehension 
caused by PDR Yemen's threat to Oman in particular and the 
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peninsula 1n general, the Kuwaiti Deputy Prime Minister and 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Shaikh Sabah al-Ahmed -was able 
to bring both Oman and PDR Yemen to Kuwait to sign a peace 
agreement on October 2 7, 19 8 2. The Shaikh hopes that the 
agreement will 11 bring stability to the Gulf 11 and 11 protect us 
from outside evil 11 • ( 86 ) Although the agree-ment is seen as a 
removal of a big mine laid in the Arabian peninsula, it does 
not mention anything about superpowers' presence in both 
states. Therefore, it could be argued that as long as both 
Oman and PDR Yemen remain under external influence, the 
agreement may run its course after a short period. 
It has been shown how PDR Yemen has created a serious 
threat to the security of the peninsula through Aden's 
attacks or subversive activities against Yemen AR and Oman. 
Now, it is important to investigate the direct Saudi-PDR 
Yemen relations, their perspectives on each other, and 
conflicts between them. The Saudi-American view about PDR 
Yemen's role as a Soviet surrogate in the peninsula, and the 
conflicting policies of both Saudi Arabia and PDR Yemen 
towards the Red Sea and towards each other. 
Recalling PDR Yemen's commitment to the liquidation of 
'reactionary' systems in the Arab world, with special 
reference to Aden's neighbours in the Arabian peninsula, no 
doubt the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia represents the first and 
foremost target in this respect. The long Saudi abstention 
from having diplomatic relations with PDR Yemen (only in 
458 
1975), and the Kingdom's offer of asylum and help to several 
deposed rulers from PDR Yemen, with the intention of toppling 
Aden's regime, ( 87 ) might have contributed to the creation or 
escalation of the ~ho~ile attitude in Aden toward Riyadh. 
While Saudi Arabia perceives the 
"entrenched Soviet position in South Yemen as a 
menace to regional security and stability" 
let alone the security of Saudi Arabia itself, PDR Yemen 
regards the 
"nature of the Saudi regime and its "close ties with 
the US and other Western countries with undisguised 
distaste". (88) 
Consequently, the regime in Aden opposes Riyadh's monarchical 
regime openly. The Americans are concerned that the Saudi 
"feeling of weakness" strongly influences their perceptions 
of being "encircled by hostile forces". Therefore, the US 
shares with the Saudis their serious concern that their armed 
forces would encounter a serious problem in hostilities with 
radical neighbours, including PDR Yemen. ( 89 ) Moreover, the US 
has been greatly concerned about the Saudi feeling that their 
"southern borders are stregically vulnerable" and that they 
have been 
"apprehensive over the 
regime in south Yemen". 
intentions 
(90) 
of the Marxist 
However, in addition to the ideological opposition that 
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PDR Yemen maintained against the Kingdom, the armed forces of 
the radical government in Aden carried out two attacks on the 
Saudi borders, in 1969 and 1973. ( 91 ) According to Stookey 
( 1982) some incursions were carried out from Saudi Arabia 
against PDR Yemen in 1971 and 1972. He adds that Aden has 
described the attacks as an action by "mercenaries directed 
by American officers". To him the attackers were 'irregulars' 
from PDR Yemen, 'armed' by Saudi Arabia, and "stiffened by a 
few Saudi personnel 11 • ( 9 2 ) As for Saudi Arabia 1 s role in 
destabilizing the regime in Aden, Fred Halliday (1977) main-
tains that for several years after PDR Yemen's independence, 
the Saudi Kingdom supported dissidents across PDR Yemen's 
borders, but it failed to undermine the Marxist regime. ( 9 3) 
Stookey ( 1978) points out that the Kingdom sought military 
cooperation with Yemen AR as a means to bring down the 
leftist regime in Aden. When its strategy of coercion did not 
succeed, the Kingdom resorted to a more "subtle and flexible 
approach 11 ( 94 ) towards its troublemaking neighbour. In 1976 
the new policy led Riyadh to establish diplomatic relations 
with Aden, for the first time since the latter's inception in 
1967.( 9 S) 
The Saudi policy in the diplomatic handling of its 
crisis with PDR Yemen has been enhanced by an active petro-
dollar approach. In 1976 the Kingdom extended $100 million in 
grant aid to the regime in Aden. The Saudi counterpart's oil 
rich states of the peninsula, especially Kuwait, also have 
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given economic assistance to PDR Yemen. In fact, the ultimate 
objective of the peninsular conservative camp was to 
manoeuvre the PDR Yemen towards d t . t t" (96) a mo era e or1en a 1on. 
In 1976 and 1977, the US felt that the Saudis had been 
moderately successful in bringing about regional cooperation 
in the Red Sea region; because in addition to normalization 
of relations with PDR Yemen, the Kingdom was able to bring 
the two Yemens to the Ta'iz conference in March 1977, 
although the Saudis did not attend. President Numeiry of the 
Sudan as well as Siyad Barre of Somalia also participated in 
the Conference. ( 97 ) At the Ta'iz meeting there were two 
conflicting views with regard to the status of the Red Sea. 
Aden advocated that the Red Sea should be considered a "zone 
of peace". The view of the conservative camp, chiefly 
represented by Sudan and Somalia, supported the concept that 
the Red Sea should be considered as 'an Arab Lake', in which 
case the defence of the Red Sea would rest on the shoulders 
of its littoral states. In the end, PDR Yemen's concept was 
upheld at the expense of the Saudi formula. ( 98 ) The PDR 
Yemen's view was seen as a Soviet idea. However, the Saudi-
PDR Yemen entente was seen as the first signs of a US-PDR 
Yemen rapproachment. 
In fact, due to both Saudi and PDR Yemen involvement in 
developments in Yemen AR, in 1978 rapproachment between 
Riyadh and Aden came to a halt, but diplomatic relations were 
not totally severed. ( 99 ) According to Congressional sources 
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since late 1979, PDR Yemen's leadership has paid a number of 
visits to Riyadh to discuss improvements 1n the relations 
between the two countries. However, Aden 1 s manoevres have 
been negatively received by Washington. The sources mention 
that the US still has considerable suspicions of the 
intentions of the Marxist southern neighbour of the Kingdom, 
because of the presence of more than 5,000 Soviet, East 
German and Cuban military personnel in PDR Yemen. Moreover, 
Washington has been concerned about the support Aden used to 
offer to a number of "dissident and terrorist groups" who 
have been receiving "arms and training within South 
terri tory". ( 100 ) Also, the communist activities 
Yemeni 
in PDR 
Yemen's Red Sea ports and islands has been perceived, both by 
the US and Saudi Arabia to endanger the security of the 
latter. ( 101 ) More American allegations about PDR Yemen being 
a crucial base for the USSR come from Stookey ( 19 8 2) . He 
maintains that after their eviction from naval and air 
installations in Berbera, the Russians were able to offset 
the loss by reconstructing their presence in PDR Yemen, and 
to reconsolidate their facilities in Aden and Socotra, an 
island belonging to PDR Yemen. The Marxist Republic has thus 
become "a key logistical base" for Soviet and Cuban "military 
operations" in the Red Sea region. However, because of this 
position, Aden has parted company with most of the Red Sea 
462 
Arab States regarding the 
according to Stookey. ( 102 ) 
"security of the Red Sea", 
With regard to Aden's sponsorship of internal troubles 
in the Kingdom, the Americans maintain that "Democratic 
Yemen" has headed the Saudi list of the accused outside 
sources that supported the insurgents who carried out the 
insurrection of the Great Mosque at Makka on 20 November, 
1979.( 103 ) In a testimony before the US Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations, Richard Foster (1980) has pointed out that 
the insurrection of the Mosque was well orchestrated, and the 
troops included Yemen guerillas. He added that the insurgents 
were well trained and disciplined and "the arms and training 
S . t 1. d . s th y II ( 104 ) E 1 . t. th were ov1e -supp 1e 1n ou emen . xp 01 1ng e 
siege of the Grand Mosque for political attack on enemies, Mr 
Foster has tried to blackmail PDR Yemen and the Soviet Union. 
However, according to Jim Paul (1980) the US has preceded the 
Soviet Union in the list of the accused external enemies of 
Saudi Arabia. He also points out that Egypt and Israel were 
the list. ( 1 0S) on 
Stookey (1982) argues that the flexible policy followed 
by Saudi Arabia towards PDR Yemen since 1976 has been based 
on a determined undertaking to minimize tension among the 
Arabian peninsula states, and to make efforts for co-
ordination of "policies and actions" between these states. He 
adds that nevertheless PDR Yemen has shown very little 
response; but this has not driven the Kingdom to its previous 
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"active hostility and punitive actions". In fact, according 
to Stookey, Riyadh has continued its cooperative policies 
towards Aden's Marxist regime. He believes that the friction 
inevitable between the two states could be kept within 
manageable bounds through Saudi Arabia's policy or 
. (106) pat1ence. 
Finally, instead of breaking away when the radical 
leftist NLF assumed power in PDR Yemen, the Americans 
promoted the status of their consulate in Aden to an Embassy. 
This American attitude was not positively received by PDR 
Yemen; because in 1969 when the more radical and anti-
American elements in the Front took over and thus more 
orientation towards Moscow occurred, the regime in Aden 
severed its diplomatic relations with the US.( 1 0?) However, 
the opening by PDR Yemen of diplomatic relations with Saudi 
Arabia ensued by the sending out of feelers towards the 
resumption of American-Yemeni diplomatic relations, all have 
signalled to some Americans the intention of Aden's regime to 
embark on a relatively flexible foreign policy. ( 1 0S) 
The foregoing pages have explained, analysed and 
assessed the perspectives that Saudi Arabia and the US have 
had on PDR Yemen and vice versa. Saudi Arabia's perceived 
threats from PDR Yemen were also explored. Also the 
conflicting regional views over the status of the Red Sea, 
from the security point of view have been discussed. The 
various policies followed by the monarchical regime in Riyadh 
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towards the progressive regime in Aden were considered. It 
has been clearly pointed out that there is an inherent 
American-Saudi distrust 1n PDR Yemen. 
However, a far more concrete source of threat has 
emanated from the most northern tip of the Red Sea, from 
Israel, and continued for more than thrity years. The Arabs, 
some American officials and academic circles, as well as some 
other Western views, all have recognized that Israel does 
constitute a real source of danger to the security of the 
Arabian peninsula. The exploration of this issue will be the 
task of the following pages. 
As mentioned, Lee Hamilton, the Chairman of the Sub-
committee on Europe and the Middle East has ranked Israeli 
expansionism as an immediate perceived second source of 
threat to the peninsula, just after the Soviet Union. 
Kuniholm ( 1981) a former State Department's Policy Planning 
Staff member, emphasizes that the rulers of the Arabian 
peninsula percieve 11 Zionism and Israeli expansionism 11 as a 
direct threat to their security and stability.( 1 0 9 ) But the 
US is not worried about threats from the peninsula against 
Israel, and it appreciates that Saudi Arabia has never 
declared war upon Israel. The Americans consider the Saudi 
moderation towards Israel helpful to the US in its commitment 
to the security of the latter. But contrary to American 
relaxation about Saudi moderation, Blake (1984) holds a 
different view. He maintains that the Kingdom "takes a 
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strongly anti-Israel stand 11 • ( 110 ) The Americans are concerned 
about the feelings of the Saudi leadership that their 
increased involvement in the protracted Israeli-Arab conflict 
and inter-Arab affairs, in addition to their military modern-
ization strategies, all might render their country an Israeli 
target in any potential hostility between the belligerent 
( 111 ) groups. In fact, the Saudis may be right because they 
could threaten ships plying to Israel through the Strait of 
Tiran from their major air base at Tabuk, ( 112 ) just over 
200km from the Strait as well as from the Israeli port of 
Eilat. 
However, the US feels sensitive about the fact that the 
vulnerability of the Saudi military and oil facilities to the 
superior Israeli Air Force has been a serious concern among 
the Saudl. s. ( 11 3) N th 1 . t t th ever e ess, some sources po1n ou e 
unlikelihood of an Israeli attack on Saudi Arabia in spite of 
the fact that Israel's aircrafts 11 do fly teasing sorties over 
Saudi soil 11 • ( 11 4) Blake (1983) calls attention to the Israeli 
navy at Eilat as another source of potential threat to ·the 
Kingdom. ( 11 5) Kuniholm (1981) indicates that the Saudi 
leaders have been aware of their exposure to the Israeli 
threat because Israel had once occupied Saudi Arabia's Tiran 
Island, and also used to mount frequent flights over Saudi 
. (116) -{::'. 
terr1 tory. The Department of St* recognizes that the 
peninsular states have been apprehensive over the Israeli 
threat to their security, particularly after Israel's bombing 
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of the Iraqi nuclear reactor and its atrocities in Lebanon in 
1982. ( 117 ) With regard to Israel's interests 1n the Red Sea, 
Saudi Arabia occupies the key position among the Red Sea Arab 
States which advocate the concept of trasnferring the Red Sea 
into an 'Arab Lake' . If the latter concept were to 
materialize, no doubt it would jeopardize Israeli interests, 
especially when Israel continues its persistent intransigence 
over the Palestinian predicament. Thus, in relation to its 
interests in the Red Sea, Israel may view Saudi Arabia as 
hostile, and consequently Israel may consider the Kingdom as 
a potential target. 
The Department of State stresses that the countries of 
the peninsula are not exactly worried about Israeli "troops 
marching to Jeddah", but their real concern is how they view 
the "festering Palestinian issue, the radicalizing Pales-
tinians " They are very concerned that such a situation 
may pose a threat to their stability, because of two factors: 
first, there are a considerable number of Palestinian 
communities residing in the peninsula; and second, the 
support given to the Palestinian cause by the oil states of 
. ( 1 1 8 ) the penlnsula. On the other hand, the Americans view the 
unresolved Palestinian problem as a threat to their interests 
in the peninsula, as well as to regional stability in the 
area. ( 11 9) Also, they have indicated their awareness that the 
leadership of the Arabian peninsula perceives the Palestinian 
issue and the continued occupation of Arab territory and East 
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Jerusalem as the most important factors for radicalization, 
.:L 
and a catalyst for the overthrow of "traditiof11-moderate 
. (120) 
reg1mes" in the 'Arabian peninsula, and elsewhere in the 
Arab world. 
The Americans have understood that the states of the 
peninsula believe that the Camp David accord stopped short of 
achieving a comprehensive settlement to the prolonged dispute 
because the agreement has not recognized the Palestinian 
right of self-determination to establish their homeland as an 
. (121) 1ndependent state. The rulers of the peninsula have made 
it clear that they regard Camp David as a 
11 separate settlement that 
adequately the Palestinians, 
the holy city of Jerusalem 
control". (122) 
failed to consider 
and that handed over 
to perpetual Israeli 
The Department of State is well aware of the Arab's 
unequivocal and persistent conviction that a "comprehensive, 
just and long-standing settlement" to the conflict is central 
to long-term "security and stability". ( 12 3) 
In Saudi Arabia as well as in the other parts of the 
Arab world, Camp David has been viewed as an incomplete and 
inadequate response to the Arab demand. Accordingly, the 
Americans have become concerned about the Saudi conviction 
that such an incomplete settlement would "polarize the Arab 
world even more and the Arabian peninsula would 
11 face increased interqal and external threat 11 • ( 12 5) Saudi 
Arabia, the leader of the moderate states of the peninsula 
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has associated itself with the Arabs in condemning President 
Sadat's capitulation policies that ensued the Camp David 
agreement. The Kingdom's stand was a surprise to the Carter 
administration, which, unrealistically, expected that the 
(126) Saudi leadership could and would support the agreement. 
Such an active Saudi opposition to Camp David, as appeared in 
the Kingdom's alignment with the Arab radicals, was not 
anticipated by the US Government. The association of Saudi 
Arabia with the radicals was demonstrated in the Kingdom 1 s 
attendance at the Arab Summit in Baghdad in 1977 and its 
endorsement of the Summit's resolutions. 
After emphasising that the oil states of the peninsula 
recognize a genuine US interest in maintaining peace in the 
area, the Department of State (1982) concedes that there has 
been 
"general disagreement with the US approach through 
the Camp David process". (127) 
Mr Veliotes, the Assistant Secretary, Department of State 
(1982) argues that the US is convinced that Saudi Arabia is 
not supporting Camp David, but nevertheless is not "opposing 
the Egyptian treaty with Israel". ( 128 ) The US is concerned 
about the assertion of the Saudi rulers that they are 
k ld d d . f I 1 · and Arab r1"ghts.( 12 9) ac nowe ge guar 1ans o s am1c 
Therefore the Saudis believe that they are "responsible for 
the Muslim holy places". ( 130 ) Accordingly, they feel obliged 
to seek ways to secure the "return of East Jerusalem to the 
Arab-Muslim fold" ( 131 ) 
' 
otherwise, as the Mullahs have 
warned, the 
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"surrender of Al-Quds (Jerusalem) would be like 
abandoning Mecca". (132) 
In this respect, when the Israeli Knesset passed a resolution 
in 1980 declaring a united Jerusalem as the 'eternal' capital 
of Israel, Crown Prince Fahad (now king) announced, the 
possibility of "jihad against Israel" to restore Muslim 
rights( 133) that Camp David failed to protect. Also in Makka, 
in June 1981 the Islamic Summit asserted that 
"the primary mission of the present generation would 
be to prepare for jihad" (134) 
for the liberation of East Jerusalem and all other Arab 
territories occupied by Israel. And as leader of the Muslim 
states the Kingdom has endorsed the Summit's declaration. 
However, with regard to both the Palestinian tragedy and 
Jerusalem, Camp David has faced the Saudi leadership with the 
problem of reconciling the 'inherent conflict' between close 
Saudi-American relations and the Saudi-Arab-Islamic 
world. ( 135 ) Saudi-American perceptions of the sources of 
threat to the security of the Arabian peninsula vary 
considerably. As we have seen Israeli expansionism has been 
considered by official American sources as a second source of 
potential threat to stability in the peninsula. In December 
1977 Gold and Conant prepared a report for the Senate 
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources in which they 
argued that Israel is not a threat to Saudi security. The 
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fundamental threat according to them, is "Arab radicalsim and 
subversive organizations''· ( 136 ) Thus they do not believe that 
resolution of the Israeli-Arab conflict would bring peace and 
security to the Middle East, especially to Saudi Arabia, 
because, even if the dispute is ended the Americans "would be 
extremely important to Saudi Arabia's security, perhaps even 
more important", ( 13 7) due to the US conviction that Arab 
radicalism is the real danger. In respect of this Arab 
extremeism, the Americans recall that: 
"Nasser's charisma 
Arabia". (138) 
almost extended to Saudi 
Therefore, an idea has developed in US circles that if the 
conflict between Israel and the Arabs is settled, it would 
not guarantee peace and security in the Saudi Kingdom because 
of American fear that Saudi Arabia, oil rich, with a small 
and sparse population and militarily unprepared to defend 
itself "could be an attractive target and prize" ( 1 39 ) for 
those radical Arabs. 
The American allegation that Israel is not a threat has 
been rebuffed at high Saudi level. In February 1979, the 
Secretary of Defence, Harold Brown visited Riyadh to "assess 
Saudi apprehension" regarding their security during the 
Iranian Islamic revolution and the conflict between Yemen AR 
and PDR Yemen. Also, he was interested to know the Saudi 
desire for US support. ( 140 ) First, he was not positively 
welcomed and secondly, the Saudi Foreign Minister, Prince 
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Saud was reported to have emphasized to the Secretary that 
the only way to re-establish peace and stability in the 
Middle East is by having 
11 Israel agree to withdraw from the occupied territ-
ories, return Jerusalem and recognize the Pales-
tinian people 1 s right to self-determination 11 • (141) 
Indirectly, the Saudi Minister rejected the idea of 
military cooperation with the US. He stated that 11 we have 
nothing to do with international strategies 11 • Then he came to 
the heart of the issue, the threat to the security of the 
area. He said, 
11 We believe that the Zionist (not the Soviet) danger 
is a threat to the Arab area and its stability. 11 
(142) 
Accordingly, the Minister emphasized that the Kingdom would 
not be part of any regional alliance 11 outside the Arab and 
Islamic frameworks 11 • 
The Saudi attitude toward Camp David has exasperated 
the US. The Chairman of the Subcommittee on Europe and the 
Middle East, Lee Hamilton (1982) has openly stated that the 
Saudis, at least since the sale of the AWACS, have been 
working against American policy in the Middle East. He 
accused them of being 11 rather unhelpful 11 instead of being 
grateful to the Americans who supply them with protective 
measures. He asked about the importance of the AWACS sale 
with regard to US interests, while the Saudis have acted 
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against these interests. ( 143 ) The Chairman considered a 
number of actions taken by the Kingdom after the deal as 
against American interest. Prince Fahad cancelled a visit to 
the US, and the Kingdom re-established diplomatic relations 
with Libya (broken in October, 1980). Saudi oil production 
did not increase, and then decreaed, while the Kingdom 
continued giving very strong financial support to the PLO. 
The Saudis moreover continued to promote a peace plan that is 
in opposition to Camp David, and the Kingdom financed more 
Syrian arms sales from the Soviet Union. ( 1 44) 
As we have seen, the US considers Saudi Arabia as 
the centrepiece of American interests in the Arabian 
peninsula and the lynch pin of regional stability and 
resistance to radicalism and communism. Consequently, Saudi 
views do carry considerable weight in American Middle 
Eastern policy. The Department of State maintains that the 
US has built strong working relationships with the Kingdom 
through close consultations on various political issues of 
mutual concerns. (145) "Soviet pressures against the region" 
and "comprehensive, just and lasting settlement to the 
Arab-Israeli conflict 11 are considered by the US House of 
Representatives among the issues of common American-
S d . . t t ( 146) au 1 1n eres s. Mr Veliotes (1982) maintains that the 
oil states of the peninsula recognize that America is 
"dedicated to the pursuit of peace" between Israel and its 
neighbour and that the peninsula states share the us 
objective. ( 147 ) However, with reference to the Saudi 
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opposition to Camp David and their description of the 
agreement as a 'separate settlement' the Americans attributed 
the Saudi stance to Saudi feeling of being neglected because 
11 neither Egypt nor the United States had consulted 
with Saudi Arabia on the formula arrived at in the 
Camp David negotiations". (148) 
To sum up, the past few pages have clearly argued that 
various Arab, American, and other Western views, are agreed 
that Israel constitutes a real threat to the security of the 
Arabian peninsula. Also the Arabs' foremost perceived threat 
is Israel rather than the Soviet Union. On the other hand, 
the US Government has made great efforts to convince the 
Arabian peninsular states that it is not Israel but the USSR 
and Arab radicals, who are the most serious and imminent 
source of danger to their stability. Inevitably, conflict 
over immediate perceived threats to the security of the 
Arabian peninsula has taken place between the US and its 
Saudi friends. 
Only about 25km separate the Arabian peninsula from the 
horn of Africa. In the Horn, endemic territorial conflicts 
between Ethiopia and Somalia over Ogadan, especially since 
the late 1970s, and between Ethiopia and the Eritreans over 
the latter's demand for independence since 1962, have created 
disunity in the area. It is feared that a spillover of the 
conflict into the Arabian peninsula may affect stability in 
the latter. Superpower rivalry in the Horn might have been 
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fed by instability there. Turmoil and the communist presence 
in the Horn, besides the recent (1981) tripartite agreement 
between the Libyan Arab Jamahiriyya (LAJ), Ethiopia and PDR 
Yemen, all have been viewed by the US and Saudi Arabia as 
creating insecurity, in the very vicinity of the peninsula. 
How the security of the Arabian peninsula could be affected 
by developments in the Horn will be examined hereafter. 
However, American interest in maintaining a presence in 
the Horn is mainly linked to US concern about the security of 
the Arabian peninsula. Both Saudi Arabia and the US perceive 
the massive Cuban military presence in Ethiopia, and PDR 
Yemen as well, as a potential Soviet surrogate force for 
subversion in the peninsula. ( 149 ) Therefore an American 
presence in the Horn is seen 
11 primarily related to US national security interest 
in the Persian Gulf ... 11 (150) 
and secondarily to American interests in interjecting them-
selves in the question of the Horn. Thus, since the Sovei t 
Union's entrance into the Horn 1n 1969, in Somalia, and 
particularly after the Ethiopian revolution in 1974, the US 
has been greatly concerned about the elimination of the 
Soviet presence and influence from that area. The US 
perceives the elimination of the Soviets from the Horn as 
crucial to foster regional stability which would 
11 provide direct and important benefits to the US 
national security 11 (151) 
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in the Arabian peninsula. 
The US views the Horn conflict as being regionalized 
within the Red Sea area because most of the Red Sea littorals 
have been involved in the conflict either through financial 
support or supply of arms or even both. ( 152 ) The conflict, 
particularly during and after the Ogaden War (1977-8) has 
increased American concern about the question of stability in 
the peninsula; and it has become one of the factors that 
moved the US to initiate certain deterrent measures. ( 153 ) The 
Americans have been concerned that the conflict may lead to 
confrontation between radical and moderate Arabs: Libya and 
PDR Yemen against Saudi Arabia and Oman; or the first two 
countries against Sudan and Somalia. ( 15 4) However, in either 
case, particularly when the communist presence around Bab 
al-Mandeb is considered, the US feels that stability in the 
Arabian peninsula could be in jeopardy. 
To the French, the Horn conflict is of a strategic 
nature. Chaliand (1978) argues that the Horn conflict is not 
ideological but "above all strategic and military". Thus, for 
this strategic and military dimension, the US has been 
worried about the proliferation of the conflicts whose 
central point, according to Chaliand, is "control of the Red 
Sea". ( 1 55) He adds that the dispute is "bound to have a major 
impact 
course 
beyond the Horn", to the extent of affecting the 
of relations between the US and USSR. ( 1 56 ) In their 
report of February 3, 1978 to the House Committee on 
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International Relations, Congressmen Don Bonker and Paul 
Tsongas emphasize that the war in the Horn is more than a 
conflict between two African States, but it 
"involves the potential use of 
ports for military operations in 
Sea and Indian Ocean". (157) 
coastal areas and 
and around the Red 
Although both Ethiopia and PDR Yemen are Red Sea Marxist 
states and their activities could cause apprehension in the 
area, the Americans are more concerned about PDR Yemen 
because it is located on the peninsula.( 158 ) In August 1981 
Libya, Ethiopia and PDR Yemen concluded a tripartite defence 
pact. The treaty has been seen as a reaction to the 1981 
American Bright Star military manoeuvres, ( 1 59 ) according to 
Karen Dawisha. While Lord Avebury (1982) perceives the treaty 
as a "Soviet-inspired alliance", the British Government 
(1982) sees "no Soviet influence behind this alliance". ( 160 ) 
Nevertheless, Lousi Fitzgibbon (1982) contends that the 
agreement 1s neither 'African', because of PDR Yemen's 
membership, nor 'Arab' , since it includes 'Christian' 
Ethiopia. Consequently, he arrives at the conclusion that the 
USSR was the only power able to bring Libya, Ethiopia and PDR 
( 161 ) Yemen together. 
The Libyan involvement in the Red Sea region has caused 
considerable stress to American foreign policy in that part 
of the Middle East, particularly since the Libyan leader has 
launched his campaign against the deployment of the AWACS in 
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the Saudi Kingdom in 1979. ( 162 ) After severing relations with 
Saudi Arabia in October 1980, Colonel Qaddafi asserted that 
the deployment of American planes had "desecrated Muslim holy 
places" in Makka; and he called upon the 2 million pilgrims 
to engage in a jihad (holy war) to "liberate Mecca". ( 16 3) 
Stookey (1982) points out that the outspoken objective 
of the tripartite agreement is to eliminate 
"the US and other Western military presence 
Indian Ocean, Persian Gulf and the Red Sea". 
in the 
(164) 
He also maintains that the signatories of Aden pact stand as 
opponents of the pro-American states of Somalia, Egypt and 
Oman because they offered "assistance to us strategic 
planning in the region 11 • Another view maintains t~Q:t' the pact 
was primarily designed to isolate and encircle Egypt. And 
besides its reinforcement of the position of the anti-
American axis in the Red Sea region, the Aden alliance 
according to Dawisha (1982) has enhanced the Russian presence 
in the region. She adds that Pravda hailed the treaty as an 
introduction to a "relatively new state" with regard to the 
relationship between Libya, Ethiopia and PDR Yemen. ( 16 5) 
In fact, the US has become greatly concerned about 
Qaddafi 1 s objective of establishing an "Arab Islamic bloc" 
which would include "Muslims of Africa and the Middle East". 
Mr Lyman, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African 
Affairs ( 19 81) perceives the Aden defence alliance as an 
example of Qaddafi 1 s goal. Also, Mr Lyman mentions that the 
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pact provides that: 
"the armed forces of each of the signatories may 
under certain circumstances deploy in the territory 
of the other 11 • ( 166) 
Finally, the Department of State is deeply concerned 
about the treaty because the states of the peninsula 
especially Saudi Arabia and Oman have become anxious about 
threats from "the lower tier, tripartite threats". ( 16 7) 
To sum up, whether through its own internal developments 
or through Yemeni/Libyan involvement, the Horn of Africa has 
been considered, particularly since the late 1970s, by both 
the US and Saudi Arabia as a further source of insecurity to 
the Arabian peninsula. 
7.4.2. Regional Threats: Iraq, Iran, and the Gulf War 
The Americans are concerned that Saudi Arabia is 
considering both Iran and Iraq as enemies who might threaten 
. (168) the security of the K1ngdom. Similarly, the US perceives 
that the two belligerent states are big regional powers with 
ambitions which might endanger the security of the Arabian 
. (169) pen1nsula. 
After its revolution in 1958, Iraq had become the second 
most radical power, after Egypt, in the Arab world. In 
September 1970 President Nasser of Egypt died and was 
succeeded by President Sadat. Since the latter's take over 
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and particularly after his ejection of the Soviets from Egypt 
in 1972, Egypt has taken a complete turn to the West, 
especially toward the US. Since then, Iraq 1 s weight in the 
Arab world has increased; and it has contested regional 
leadership with Saudi Arabia. In fact, before 1970, Iraq was 
looking for a Saudi adversary to promote revolution in the 
peninsula against the conservative systems there. The Iraqi 
threat to the Kingdom has come through Iraq's relations with 
Yemen AR during the 1960s. Consequently, Iraq 1 s presence in 
the southern Red Sea areas, Yemen AR used to receive 
f . · 1 1 d d' 1 t' support from Iraq.( 170) 1nanc1a , mora an 1p oma 1c 
Although Camp David has brought Saudi Arabia and Iraq 
rather closer, nevertheless Iraq's hardline attitude toward 
US-Saudi relations has not ceased. In January 1979 when the 
US decided to despatch 12 unarmed USAF F15 fighter aircraft 
to the Kingdom during the climax of turmoil surrounding the 
Shah and the developments between the two Yemens, Iraq 
reacted angrily and the Ba 1 ath Party newspaper, Al Thawra, 
described the American move as coming 
11 with efforts to readapt American policy in the 
region in a manner that would guarantee a US 
presence and cover for other forms of inter-
ference which might have a military nature 11 • (171) 
In May 1980, just four months before the war with Iran, 
Iraq harshly denounced American involvement in the Red Sea 
region and elsewhere in the Arab world. The Iraqi Deputy 
Premier, Na 1 im Haddad was reported to have said, 11 US 
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Imperialism was and still is the basic enemy of the Arab 
nations". According to E. Ghareeb (1981), Mr Hadded inveighed 
against America's continued support to Israel and 
"plundering of Arab 
military presence in 
Sea". (172) 
oil and 
the Gulf 
intensifying 
region and the 
its 
Red 
Since the late 1960s, and particularly after the Vietnam 
syndrome, the US has adopted the so-called 'twin-pillar' 
policy with regard to the question of security 1n the 
Gulf. ( 173) With that policy, the US supplied Saudi Arabia and 
Iran with weapons and considered them responsible for 
regional security and stability. In fact, the US was relying 
on Iran rather than Saudi Arabia in relation to policing the 
area, mainly due to Iran's military superiority and greater 
population. Thus, although neither a peninsular nor a Red Sea 
state, the Iran of the Shah considered the security of and 
stability in both the Arabian peninsula and the Red Sea 
region as a direct Iranian major concern and 
responsibility. ( 174 ) 
During the Yemeni civil war of 1962-3 Iranian forces 
fought beside the royalists against the republicans. The 
Iranian involvement in Yemen AR rperesented a demonstration 
of Saudi-Iranian cooperation with regard to the security of 
the Arabian peninsula. Moreover, Iran's role in putting down 
the rebellion in Dhofar Province in Oman (1975)( 175 ) and its 
support to Somalia against Ethiopia (1977), confirm the 
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former Iranian wide range of involvement with regard to 
regional security. 
Even before the Khomeini era ( 1979) Iran was causing 
discomfort to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia because of the 
hegemonic aspirations of the Shah and his activities in the 
Gulf, with special reference to the Strait of Hormuz and the 
seizure of three islands there. ( 176 ) Some Americans view the 
Iranian revolution as the most significant threat to the 
political system in Saudi Arabia. They argue that the advent 
of Khomeini has augmented and diversified the sources of this 
threat. They maintain that the Khomeini regime has made 
geopolitical claims over Bahrain and other Gulf areas with 
considerable Persian and Shi'ite populations. ( 177 ) Being the 
most important minority sect with regard to the orthodox 
Sunni Muslim, the Shias (about 90 million) constitute a 
majority in Iran, Iraq, Bahrain and Yemen AR. ( 178 ) 
Although the Arabian peninsula is predominantly Sunni 
Muslim, it has become apprehensive about the success and 
influence of the radical Islamic revolution in Iran. 
Moreover, the war between Iraq and Iran (1980) has increased 
worries in the peninsula. It is argued that the presence of 
old-established Iranian communities along the Arab side of 
the Gulf added to the considerable number of the Shi'a Arab 
cause an anxiety for the Sunni rulers, particularly in the 
peninsula, who fear that fanatical fundamentalists among the 
Shi'a, and Sunni as well, might be encouraged by the Iranian 
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revolution and strive to establish similar regimes in the 
area. 
(179) 
After the downfall of the Shah and the immediate 
eviction of the Americans, US definitions of the term 
'Persian Gulf' (180) have changed. Economically, politically, 
and strategically, Iran has not been basically included in 
American policy calculations regarding US interests in the 
area. The term 'Persian Gulf' has come to mean only the Arab 
states in the area. The Department of State points out that 
the Carter Doctrine does not include Iran; and even if it is 
attacked by an outside power such as the USSR, seeking the 
control of the Iranian oil assets, the US would not consider 
such an attack as an assault on vital American 
. (181) 1nterests. However, this attitude means both sides, 
American and Saudi, perceive Iran as an enemy. 
Since the war broke out in September 1980 between the 
two big regional powers, Iran and Iraq, the US had become 
obsessed by the fear that if the war proliferates, it may 
endanger American interests in the peninsula, by posing a 
threat to the oil states of the area. According to American 
sources (1984) when the war started, the main Saudi worries 
about it were of a domestic concern. These sources maintain 
that the Kingdom feared that the war might pose internal 
security problems arising from the Shi'ite group in the 
. (182) Eastern prov1nce of Al-Hasa. To the Americans, although 
the war has exacerbated the problem between the Sunni and 
483 
Shi'ite Muslims, yet Iraq represents the source that 
frequently fuels this problem inside the Arabian peninsula, 
. 11 . S d. A b. ( 18 3 ) I t t. espec1a y 1n au 1 ra 1a. n a es 1mony before the 
Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, Mr Veliotes 
( 1982) has stressed the American worry about the danger of 
the proliferation of the conflict: 
"We have a real 
spill over to 
states." (184) 
concern that this conflict will 
threaten neighbouring friendly 
After describing the war as a dangerous situation, Mr 
Veliotes mentions some precautionary measures taken by the US 
in order to ensure the security of the Arabian peninsula. 
While the risk of war spill-over has become a real fear, 
the Americans have also been concerned that a quick decisive 
victory by one of the belligerents might encourage the 
victorious to seek hegemony over the area. ( 185 ) By early 1983 
the Gulf States had become greatly worried about the outcome 
of the war. Their situation has been described as: 
"they were apprehensive first of Iraq pushing too 
far into Iran and now, with the Iranians gaining an 
edge, they are worried about Iran pushing too far 
into Iraq. The clear ascendancy of either creates 
panic here 11 • ( 18 6) 
Therefore, the Americans have become convinced that despite 
sympathetic attitudes and financial support given by the oil 
states of the peninsula to Iraq, particularly by Saudi 
Arabia, the Gulf states would like to see a kind of stalemate 
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in the conflict; or if the two belligerents exhaust each 
other, that may also calm their fears and give them a 
. (187) 
temporary resp1te. 
In 19 8 2 the Department of State maintained that there 
was a fear among the oil states of the peninsula that a 
collapse of Iraq might result in direct or indirect Russian 
I (188) pressure through ran, aimed at the peninsula. So, 1n 
order to enable the Iraqis to withstand the Iranians, the 
Department of State points out that the Saudis were paying 
Iraq half the cost of the war. According to Mr Veliotes who 
maintains that he has seen the figures, the Kingdom had paid 
about a billion dollars a month in loans and grants, since 
the beginning of the war. ( 18 9) 
In sum, both Iraq and Iran are considered by the US and 
Saudi Arabia as big regional powers with ambitions and 
policies that pose a threat to the peninsular states. Both 
Iraq and Iran maintain anti-American and anti-Saudi 
attitudes, in spite of the Saudi support for Iraq. The war 
has enhanced the worries of the US and Saudi Arabia as well 
in that it may involve the peninsular states. The US feels 
that the presence of the Shias in the peninsula, particularly 
in such sensitive areas as the oil fields 6£ Saudi Arabia, 
represents a potential catalyst for instability in the oil 
rich states there. The American-Saudi interest is in having 
both enemies destroy the power of each other. However, bitter 
animosity between Iraq and Iran may continue long after the 
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war is over. So far the significance of the Arabian peninsula 
to the US has been covered economically, strategically and 
politically. We have also surveyed the sources of threat to 
the security of the Arabian peninsula, as perceived by the US 
and Saudi Arabia. 
7.5. Conclusion 
Most important points in this survey include Saudi 
Arabia's emergence as the centrepiece of American interest in 
the area. There is a clear conflict between American and 
Saudi views regarding the major source of threat to the 
security of the latter. It has been clearly shown that the 
Red Sea region still contains the major sources of threat to 
the security of the peninsula, particularly from Israel. It 
has been understood that the US wants to preserve the present 
monarchical and conservative regimes 1n the peninsula. It 
does not want revolutions or radical changes to replace those 
allied and/or friendly governments. Therefore, to redress 
threats against regimes, the US, since the late 1960s, has 
initiated various means to support its allies and friends in 
the 'arc of opportunity 1 • These means have included arms 
sales, military 
facilities, joint 
aid, technical advisers, 
military manoeuvres by 
bases 
American 
and 
and 
regional armed forces such as the exercise Bright Stars 81, 
82, 83, and 85; and finally the most important development 
has been the US decision to establish a unilateral military 
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presence which is manifested by the USCENTCOM. All these 
steps, especially the latter, are considered by the US as 
deterrent measures against actual and potential dangers to 
the pro-American systems of the peninsula. 
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSIONS, PROSPECTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
8.1 Conclusions 
8.1.1 The United States and Geopolitics 
Twentieth century geopolitical thought is currently 
receiving many fresh ideas and undergoing re-assessment from 
academics, politicians and international relations experts. 
Publications in this area are becoming increasingly abundant. 
For example, forthcoming books on geopolitics (in 1985) 
include Geopolitics by the American Patrick 0 1 Sullivan; ( 1 ) 
his book draws attention to the effect of geography on 
international power politics. Western Geopolitical Thought in 
the Twentieth Century by Geoffrey Parker, (Z) a Briton, 
investigating how current geopolitical thought influences the 
global political strategies of the superpowers; it also 
treats the development of geopolitical thought in the 
twentieth century. In an era of nuclear threat, geopolitics 
is also being harnessed to greater understanding of the 
nuclear debate. On Geopolitics: Classical and Nuclear, edited 
by C. Zoppo,(J) an American; the book treats geopolitics in 
relation to the nuclear era. This upsurge in geopolitical 
thought and writing must be seen against the background of 
its neglect in recent decades. Immediately after World War 
Two, the study of geopolitics was largely discredited because 
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of memories of how it had been manipulated by German Fascists 
such as Karl Haushofer and others to "provide the 
intellectual rational for the Nazi drive for world 
domination". ( 4 ) 
Although the German Nazi use of geopolitics caused the 
field to be neglected and somewhat downgraded, now once again 
geopolitics is becoming re-established as a valid and 
respectable discipline. It is therefore worth dwelling on 
whether past geopolitical views have any validity today. In 
the light of the analysis attempted in this thesis, do these 
views help our under- standing? Certainly the geopolitical 
views of Sir Halford Mackinder established a sound basis for 
the academic development of the subject; but today his 
1 Heartland 1 concept cannot be held valid simply because the 
1 Heartland 1 power since the late 1940s has broken out and 
penetrated the 1 Rimland 1 and challenged the maritime powers 
in every part of the sea even close to the territorial seas 
of the supreme 1 Sea-power 1 , the United States. The Middle 
East is a major rimland region where the 1 Heartland 1 power, 
the USSR, has become uneasy about the military presence of 
the US, especially around the Red Sea region. The area is 
within striking distance of Moscow(S) and therefore since the 
1950s the Soviet Union has declared its warning to the West 
that the Middle East is a "sensitive" area for Russia and 
that the Kremlin leaders were under "no illusion" as to the 
purpose of Western policy there. ( 6 ) 
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However, although the Soviets justify their coming out 
into oceans as a counter measure to American threats to their 
security, the latter see the former's "expansionist policies 
in the 1 Rimland' as an attempt to spread its territorial 
imperialism". ( 7 ) In 1984 the Commander in Chief of the Soviet 
Navy declared that "The oceans that once separated the US 
from danger no longer do so." ( 8) 
If we look at the Red Sea region in relation to the 
crucial marginal area between the 'Heartland' and the 
Maritime powers, we find that it lies right in Mackinder 's 
marginal crescent 1 and it has indeed become a battleground 
for great power competition. Soviet and us bases or 
facilities in the region are as close as 220km to each other 
in Aden and Berbera. Both powers are competing to extend 
their spheres of influence and thus divide the region into 
pro-East and pro-West clients. We have on one hand Ethiopia 
and PDR Yemen which are strongly pro-Soviet, and on the other 
hand Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Somalia and Israel which 
are strongly pro-American. Thus, the Red Sea region clearly 
demonstrates that competition between the land-based and 
sea-based superpowers is actually operating politically and 
strategically. The land power maintains its position in the 
region largely on the basis of excellent communications by 
air and by sea. It is doubtful whether Mackinder foresaw this 
pattern; he envisaged outreach overland using road and rail 
networks. 
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If these reflections have any value, certain conclusions 
can be drawn. Most would have been evident without the 
benefit of geopolitical theory, but the latter helps create a 
framework of understanding. First, the Soviet presence in the 
Red Sea region will remain as long as the Soviets consider 
this marginal area crucial to their own national security, as 
well as to their global status as a superpower with 
ideological values which are important to disseminate. 
According to Gavshon (1981), former US Defence Secretary 
Donald Rumsfeld stated America's strategic interests as being 
"to maintain an international order assuring the 
preservation of US physical and economic security 
and of its political system"; 
and in outright opposition to this goal the proclaimed Soviet 
objective is 
"to replace the old international 
something deemed to be better, more 
longer dominated by the west". (9) 
order with 
just and no 
Secondly, from an Arab perspective, the US is not going 
to "go away" because it sees the Red Sea region as an area of 
endemic rivalry with the land-power, as Mr Nixon, former US 
President, indicated. This will remain true as long as the US 
continues to categorise the USSR as an expansionist power. 
Moreover, currently and especially militarily the region is 
important to the US because 
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"In the perspective of Washington, the Red Sea has 
gained in strategic importance with the US decision 
to form the RDF and to seek access to air and port 
facilities in certain regional states that would 
support the deployment and logistical supply of this 
force even with the Suez Canal closed, the US 
will see maritime access to Ras Banas as crucial to 
the protection of this facility as a staging area 
and supply depot for the RDF." (10) 
So it is quite obvious that the Red Sea region is and will 
remain a strategic arena of superpower rivalry, especially 
from the naval point of view. The Christian Science Monitor's 
maps, reproduced by Larson (1985), clearly confirm that the 
Red Sea features centrally in the naval strategies of both 
the United States and the Soviet Union. ( 11 ) In other words, 
Spykman's rimland has become the real theatre of competition 
between the two major powers. The US has been unable to carry 
out Spykman's advice that in order to "control the destinies 
of the world" as an ultimate objective, the US must control 
the 'Rimland 1 • This failure, whether good or bad, must be 
partly due to geographical factors, 1n the Middle East at 
least, especially ease of access to the region by land and 
sea. Cohen's geostrategic and geopolitical views of 1964 are 
among the most constructive and useful ideas in relation to 
the Red Sea region. Yet the 11 shatterbelt" 1s a self-
fulfilling prophecy in the sense that superpowers of an 
earlier age, Britain and France, created the mosaic of states 
which today's superpowers seek to win over. In 1982, however, 
Cohen foresaw a new geopolitical order in a world far removed 
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from Mackinder and Spykman. In particular, the emergence of 
regional powers capable of confronting the superpowers was 
notable in relation to the Red Sea region. Among the emergent 
regional powers are Egypt and Saudi Arabia. ( 12 ) Such changes 
disturb the US because they are likely to impede its free 
action in future. In 1977, Ronald Reagan (now President of 
the United States) , indicated that the challenges the US 
would be facing as a result of changes to the world map after 
World War Two would stem largely from areas where "the West 
in general and U.S. in particular have operated without much 
difficulty in the past". ( 13) 
8.1.2 The Red Sea Region: Energy and Strategy 
Considering the global movements of oil, the 5.1m tonnes 
which passed through the Suez Canal in 1983 is, on the face 
of it, relatively small. The Red Sea is clearly of minor 
concern to the United States for oil transportation, although 
its importance in this respect has been increasing since the 
reopening of the Suez Canal and the recent laying of oil 
pipelines. This significance has been much enhanced by 
conflict in the Gulf since 1980, as the Gulf oil producers 
have resorted to the Red Sea as an alternative outlet for 
their exports. Thus, an increasing amount of oil is being 
directed to the Red Sea, arguably from one area of in-
stability to another, but it is still a small proportion. The 
amount travelling via the Cape route to the United States was 
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still as much as shipments via the Red Sea in 1985. However, 
the real US stake in the Gulf oil and its transportation lies 
in ensuring the flow of this vital commodity to her partners 
in the OECD who critically depend on it. Much of the oil that 
goes through the Red Sea is bound for Western Europe rather 
than the US. To put it into perspective, in 19 8 3 Western 
Europe imported 169.2m tonnes from the Middle East· ( 14 ) 
' 
57-51m tonnes, hence 34% of this was carried through the Suez 
Canal route alone. ( 15 ) The US and Canada's imports from the 
area were 54. 90m tonnes, ( 16 ) 9% of which found its way via 
the Red Sea route. ( 17 ) Furthermore, if SUMED's 1983 through-
put was the same as its theoretical capacity of 1.7m b/d( 18 ) 
that would mean about 90m tonnes of oil was carried through 
various Red Sea routes in 1983. This indicates that the Red 
Sea route could be capable of transporting 53% of Western 
Europe's supplies from the Middle East. 
Regarding the future, it can be speculated that this 
shift to the Red Sea route will increase, especially if one 
considers that the Cape route started to be seen as hazardous 
from the late 1970s due to continued instability in South 
Africa and Soviet influence and presence in Ethiopia, 
Mozambique, Angola and maybe in South Africa itself. Such 
Soviet influence already worried the present President of the 
United States in 1977; he indicated that Southern Africa 
might fall under Soviet control. He anticipated serious 
consequences to the economies of the West if the USSR 
506 
"controls all the sea lane.,s from the Persian Gulf 
around to the Atlantic". ( 19) 
The future political environment surrounding the Cape route 
could make the Red Sea-Canal route more attractive. With 
regard to disruption of the Red Sea route, this might mean 
war- or peace-time disruptions. Peace-time interdiction could 
be at best very inconvenient; it could happen due to 
rocketing of ships by unideni~.ified groups, as in the case of 
'Coral Sea' in 1971, hit at Bab al Mandeb, the mining of the 
Red Sea in 19 84 is another deterrent-type action 1n peace-
time. Similarly, a tanker could be hit by a land-launched 
Exocet missile. Peace-time hazards are real, especially in 
the Red Sea/Middle East zone where conflict and extremism are 
characteristic. Such peace-time hazards, especially rocketing 
of ships from land would immediately attract large tankers 
back to the Cape route. Red Sea physical characteristics such 
as its long deserted coast, paucity of ports, and abundance 
of islands all increase the possibilities of peace-time 
interrupti_ons. Moreover, regional conflicts, especially 
Israeli-Arab and Iraqi-Iranian are important ingredients in 
creating disruption scenarios. The Horn disputes are another 
potential element of disruption. However, recent us 
geopolitical manoeuvres in the northern Red Sea region are an 
attempt to bring stability. Such anticipated stability may 
help reduce potential disruptions of oil movement via the Red 
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Sea provided that the core problem of the Israeli-Arab 
dispute, ie the Palestinian question, is satisfactorily 
resolved. Israel will have to withdraw from Arab territories, 
and bridle its aggressive policy and intimidating behaviour, 
as it did in the case of the proposed Iraq-Aqaba pipeline and 
its threat to the Saudi industrial complex at Yanbu. 
In time of war, the Red Sea international route would 
soon cease to operate. Precedence suggests that this would 
happen especially if Israel is a party to the war. The 
physical characteristics of the Suez Canal, Bab al Mandeb and 
the Red Sea itself, all render the former susceptible to 
being blocked. So in the event of war, the Red Sea may not 
feature with regard to the tactical movement of naval ships. 
In both US and USSR contingency planning there is an 
assumption 11 not to count heavily on the use of the Red Sea 
route in time of crisis 11 • ( 20 ) Another factor regarding the 
importance of the Red Sea for naval shipping is related to 
the Indian Ocean. Soviet Far East units can reach the Indian 
Ocean through the Strait of Malacca much quicker than US 
ships from the Pacific fleet because of the distance factor. 
While Socotra is about 3 240nm from Vladivostok, it is some 
4617nm from US Pacific fleet. Considering the distance 
equation, the closure of the Red Sea route to the Indian 
Ocean may not be so inconvenient to the USSR as it may be to 
the us for the movement of naval units from the 
Mediterranean. However, the Americans take the view that the 
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closure of the Canal was helpful to them during their 
entanglement 1n Vietnam in the late 1960s because that 
closure deprived Soviet movement of units from the Black Sea 
to the Indian Ocean. ( 21 ) Although closure of the Canal may 
impede the Soviets in deployment of their Black Sea units for 
reinforcement in the Indian Ocean these ships are available 
for the Mediterranean. They were used in July 1985 to 
exercise in the eastern Atlantic for the first time; this 
clearly shows that the Black Sea fleet could be useful in 
contingencies beyond the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean 
spheres. 
8.1.3 Legal Problems 
Before discussing legal problems that may face US 
shipping it is worth dwelling on the issue of the freedom of 
navigation in the Straits of the world. One of the great 
debates in the Third UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 
since 1973 has been this: if coastal states are to be 
allocated 12nm territorial seas, how can one be sure that 
they will not then interfere with shipping that passes 
through their territorial waters where straits are less than 
24nm? However, the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 
came up with the concept of 'transit passage' which is 
stronger than the principle of 'innocent passage 1 through 
territorial waters. Innocent passage is in any case very 
difficult to define. It may be helpful to quote both 
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principles again. According to Article 3 8, in international 
straits 11 all ships and aircraft enjoy the right of transit 
passage which shall not be impeded 11(21) This was 
discussed in chapter 6. Regarding the concept of innocent 
passage, Article 17 says that 
11 ships of all states, whether coastal or land 
locked, enjoy the right of innocent passage through 
the territorial sea 11 • (22) 
Chapter 6 also gives more details on this issue. Both 
principles emphasize that the coastal state has no right to 
interrupt, interfere with, or stop shipping engaged in 
innocent passage. The only right it can exercise is to 
specify shipping lane for safety. However, the right of 
transit passage is a new concept; it is quite untested and 
maritime states still feel uneasy about it. The idea emerged 
as a part of a total package in which the coastal states were 
prepared to accept restrictions on their own sovereignty and 
in return they acquire 12om territorial seas, ZOOnm Exclusive 
Economic Zones which maritime states were not keen to accept. 
The Middle East and North Africa embrace one of the most 
remarkable concentrations of strategic waterways: Gibraltar, 
the Turkish Straits, Bab al Mandeb, and Hormuz. These are 
four of the key straits in the world out of the top ten. They 
would probably all feature in the top half dozen by virtue of 
the amount of traffic vulnerability, quantities of oil, 
strategic supplies and naval vessels, besides their 
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significance to superpowers as well as to the regional 
states. Regarding literature on these narrows, Bab al Mandeb 
has probably been given least attention hitherto, although it 
is evidently important because of its interest both to all 
states who use the Suez Canal and because of its significance 
to Red Sea riparians like Ethiopia, Sudan, AR Yemen which 
have no other natural outlet to the sea. With regard to 
disruption of shipping in Red Sea territorial waters 
(including straits) and EEZs, there should be no problem 1n 
peace-time if every state observes the spirit of the 19 8 2 
Convention. But problems could arise when the Coastal States 
take the right given to it by the Convention to interfere 
with shipping if the former's security is threatened (Article 
2 5) : 
"The coastal State may take the necessary steps in 
its territorial sea to prevent passage which is not 
innocent." (23) 
This issue was discussed in chapter 6. Apart from coastal 
state interdiction to shipping peace-time interruptions by 
other parties are most probable as discussed above. There is 
nothing that could be called a legal measure to ensure 
absolute safety of shipping, especially in such troubled 
waters as those of the Middle East. 
A second problem that may face the US in the Red Sea, as 
well as in other waters, is that it does not intend to sign 
the 19 8 2 UN Convention. As mentioned in chapter 6, the US 
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bases its objection primarily on the provisions for sea-bed 
mining. But when one considers US views about its need for 
quick maritime mobility and resentment of restrictions to 
freedom of movement, it is difficult to believe that its 
opposition is solely due to the right of sea-bed mining. 
Therefore, one may conclude that the US is not going to sign 
the treaty even if changes were made in respect of seabed 
mining. As mentioned earlier, the attitude of some coastal 
States toward US rejection of the Convention is hostile, 
notably certain statements put out by one of the Red Sea 
states, Yemen AR. So US shipping could possibly be inter-
dicted in the Red Sea regardless of the right of transit 
passage. The other major problem concerns the issue of the 
EEZ. As figure 3. 3 shows, the Red Sea waters of Sudan and 
Saudi Arabia are being divided into exclusive economic zones. 
Apart from PDR Yemen, Djibouti and Somalia, none of the other 
Red Sea states have formally claimed a 200nm EEZ. The concept 
of the EEZ may turn out to be a type of creeping jurisdiction 
by coastal states who will gradually feel that they have the 
right to tell shipping where to go, or when to go; and that 
they will increasingly patrol these waters under the guise of 
protecting their resources according to Article 56, paragraph 
b(iii). The coastal state is entitled (in its EEZ) to arrange 
for "the protection 
environment". (Z4) 
and preservation of the marine 
However, the maritime states, not least the US, fear 
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that little by little there will be the feeling that these 
EEZs are really territorial waters where the coastal states 
have the right to exercise restrictions on shipping. This 
problem will obviously be more critical in narrow seas, such 
as the Red Sea, where coastal states and international 
organizations are becoming increasingly concerned about 
pollution and its impact upon the marine environment. Despite 
what appears to be a restriction on the freedom of navigation 
by the introduction of the EEZ, Article 58 recognizes the 
rights of other states. It says: 
"In the exclusive economic zone, 
coastal or canal-locked, enjoy 
all States, whether 
the freedoms 
of navigation and overflight 
internationally lawful uses of the 
those freedoms ... " (25) 
and other 
seas related to 
However, if we look at tables 4. 7 and 4. 2 it appears 
quite clear that the number of US flags actually passing 
through the Suez Canal is surprisingly small compared to 
those of the Soviet Union. But there must, of course, be a 
higher proportion of other goods heading for the United 
States via the Red Sea-Canal route particularly on Liberian, 
Greek and Panamanian ships. Even taking these into account, 
direct American shipping interests in this route are small if 
compared, say, with those of the Panama Canal or even the 
Strait of Gibraltar. In sum, the Red Sea route is not of 
vi tal importance to direct US interests as it once was the 
lifeline of the imperial powers of Great Britain, France and 
Italy. 
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8.2 Prospects 
Enlargement of the Suez Canal comes top of anticipated 
events that could greatly affect the region. In chapter 4 
much has been said abo.ut the development schemes related to 
the Canal. What is being waited for is the second stage of 
widening to accommodate supertankers and attract them back 
from the Cape route. If it ever occurs, it will result in 
considerable changes for Egypt, the region, and the West, 
most important being that the Red Sea route could regain its 
pre-1967 importance, especially if a comprehensive peace 
settlement is achieved. Apart from such geographical change, 
political change in the region could make significant 
alterations to the geopolitical map of the region. First and 
more important is the prospect for the Yemen AR. In chapter 7 
we investigate American worries about how Yemen AR could 
threaten Saudi Arabia. With a large population and a 
mountainous region, Yemen AR could be strategically 
significant, especially when its location between Saudi 
Arabia and PDR Yemen is considered. Moreover, its fronting on 
Bab al Mandeb is also crucial particularly if it is fully 
united or aligned with PDR Yemen. Being preoccupied by the 
security of Saudi Arabia, in 1977 Washington was satisfied 
with what they saw as Yemen AR's alignment with Saudi Arabia 
under Riyad 's supervision and . (26) leadersh1p. However, the 
issue of the proposed unification between Yemen AR and PDR 
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Yemen could still be a worry to the United States with regard 
to its concern about having a buffer zone between the radical 
PDR Yemen and Saudi Arabia. 
In the Horn of Africa any change of the status quo with 
regard to Eritrea and Djibouti could have critical 
repercussions on the geopolitical map of the region and could 
upset the strategic thinking and presence of the superpowers, 
and not least of all, the Israeli-Arab conflict. In view of 
the current developments in the Arab world: the alignment of 
some radical Arab states, such as Libya and PDR Yemen with 
Ethiopia, and the engagement of conservative and some radical 
Arab states in conflicts in the Gulf and Lebanon, one can 
hardly see Eritrea becoming an independent state. Some Arabs 
do not like to see it when they think of Eritrea as a 
prospective Marxist entity. The Americans do not wish to see 
an Arab/Muslim Eritrea that would weaken Ethiopia and might 
force it to align itself with radical Arabs, as it has 
already done since 1981. (Z 7 ) The Soviet Union surely does not 
want to see either, although prior to 1974 they were 
supporters of the Eritrean cause; to Moscow it simply means 
fragmentation of Ethiopia, the Marxist ally who is 
strategiclaly located to overlook Africa and Arabia. Nor 
would Israel welcome such a development and would prefer a 
united Ethiopia despite its Marxist character and alignment 
with two of Israel's most radical enemies. Israel's fear is 
related to its interest in avoiding increasing Arab hegemony 
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over the Red Sea. 
The pocket state of Djibouti is the other important 
factor whose future could affect the balance of power 
regionally with regard to US-USSR contingency planning in the 
Lower Red Sea region. Contested between the pro-American 
Somalia and the pro-Soviet Ethiopia, the fate of Djibouti is 
dependent on the French presence. If the French get tired 
and, more important, become disinterested in the Indian Ocean 
area or are at odds with the United States and thus leave the 
Port state, no doubt the latter will be a battleground for 
the perennial belligerents of the Horn. Ethiopia is likely to 
have a say in the future of Djibouti because the latter is an 
important lifeline to Addis Ababa. The other most important 
development that could affect the situation in the region 
geopolitically and strategically is the relationship between 
Sudan And Egypt. 
American and Soviet fortunes have been a series of 
advances and retreats in the Middle East. In most cases the 
loss of influence by one is a gain for the other, this could 
be nowhere clearer than in the Red Sea region. From 1955 to 
1972 Egypt was pro-Moscow. From 1975 it tilted towards 
Washington, until 1977 when it became completely tied to the 
US. From 1969 to 1971 Sudan was under Soviet influence, then 
from 1973 on it began rapprochement with the US, until by the 
late 1970s it was clearly in America's sphere, but in 1985 it 
pulled out after the 'April the fifth' revolution. Ethiopia 
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was an important US ally from the early 1950s to 1974 when a 
Marxist revolution overthrew Haili Salassie and drove the 
Americans out in 1976. Since 1977 Ethiopia has become a full 
ally of the Soviet Union and strongly anti-American. From the 
early 1960s when it got independence, Somalia's policy was 
orientated to the East, until the mid and late 1970s when it 
was a strong Soviet ally. The Ethiopian revolution came at 
the expense of Somalia losing its communist support which 
ceased in 1978 when the Soviet Union changed sides by 
shifting to Ethiopia. From then on Somalia began to approach 
the US until in 1980 it became a full ally of the US and 
granted the latter naval facilities at Berbera where the 
Soviets had formerly established their military presence but 
quit in 1978. While PDR Yemen has been a strong Soviet ally 
since independence in 1967, neighbouring Yemen AR was an area 
of somewhat strong Soviet influence from the early 1960s 
until the late 1970s when Soviet dominance was mitigated 
largely due to Saudi American activities. Israel has been a 
strong American ally since its creation in 1948, Saudi Arabia 
and Jordan have not welcomed the Soviets and continued 
maintaining strong ties with the Americans. Long before its 
independence in 1977, the tiny state of Djibouti was a French 
foothold and has continued as a French ally even after 
independence. Overall, the contemporary advantage is to the 
United States, while tomorrow the advantage may be to the 
Soviet Union. However, the biggest asset the US has now is 
517 
Egypt. It is equally true that a revolution in one of the 
countries where the US is fully established could make things 
look very different to what they are today. 
What happens in Sudan affects Egypt considerably, 
strategically and economically. Strategically, Egypt as well 
as the Americans, consider Sudan as strategic depth for Egypt 
where the latter, in case of threat, could use the Sudanese 
territory. The Americans have been preoccupied, especially 
since they linked Egypt with Israel, by fear for Egypt 1 s 
security, and continued to view 
could possibly be used to ward 
Egypt. As a result, Egypt has 
Sudan as a proxy state that 
off Libyan threats against 
had a big say in Sudan 1 s 
relations with the US, at least this continued until the 
ousting of President Numeiry as mentioned earlier. From then 
on, both Egypt and the US became worried about the situation 
1n Sudan and the anti-American attitude that followed the 
revolution. It is worth mentioning here that following the 
revolution, Mr Sadig el Mahdi, a former Sudanese Prime Minis-
ter, who worked for the toppling of the Numeiry regime from 
its inception in 1969, and the most prospective leader for 
Sudan, welcomed the re-establishment of diplomatic relations 
with Libya, attacking the former regime 1 s strong relations 
with the United States. He also demanded that Sudan should 
stop supporting the establishment of the USCENTCOM (formerly 
known as the R. D. F. ) , and declared his desire to see an 
investigation into the role played by the former regime 
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Table 8.1• 
Water balances in the Egypto-Sudanese Nile, 1985-1990 
(billion m3 ) 
Country Optimistic Cautious Pessimistic 
Egypt + 15.8 6.8 - 14.1 
The Sudan 3. 2 8.2 9-7 
Ethiopia drawdown 1.0 2.0 4.0 
System deficit/ 
surplus + 11 . 6-Jc - 17.0 - 27. 
-Ji-Note that under the optimistic projection, the implied 
surplus is entirely Egyptian and could be shared with the 
Sudan only if Egypt agreed to its drawdown at A swan and to 
allow the Sudan to increase its effective share. 
Source: John Waterbury, Hydropolitics of the Nile Valley, 
Syracuse University Press, Syracusy New York, 1979, 
p.239. 
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in the transportation of the Ethiopian Jews, the F alashas, 
from Ethiopia to Israel through Sudan in January 19 8 5, ( 28 ) 
just three months before Numeiry was overthrown. Mr el Mahdi 
wants Sudan to follow a non-aligned policy, a view which is 
held by most Sudanese political forces. He indicates that the 
Soviet Union is a superpower and has interests in the region 
and cannot be ignored. Therefore, he believes in a free Sudan 
of balanced relations with great powers. (29) The us has 
become alarmed by rapprochement between Sudan and Libya. The 
Times (7 /85) indicates that the US has voiced "grave concern 
to Sudan at the prospects of a military relationship between 
Sudan and Libya. 11 (JO) American worry stems from the fact that 
Sudan "strategically borders southern Egypt, a close ally of 
the United States 11 • ( 31 ) Another long-rooted and important 
factor in shaping Sudanese-Egyptian relationships is the Nile 
waters which are most critical for Egypt. In the past, 
especially in the 1950s, the question of the Nile water 
created grave difficulties in the relationship of the two 
countries. As Waterbury (1979) indicates, there is likely to 
be competition between Egypt and Sudan for Nile waters in the 
1990s( 32 ) (table 8.1). Such anticipated competition could 
materialize if the current trend of unrest in the Southern 
Sudan continues. Alternatively, if Sudan could join or even 
sympathize with the policies of the radical Tripartite pact 
formed 1n 1981, and which its northern and eastern neigh-
bours, ie, the LAJ and Ethiopia have joined (chapter 7.2). 
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A third factor concerning prospects for Sudan is the question 
of oil, and whether the country could be an oil producer - by 
mid 1980s as indicated by the International Petroleum 
Encyclopedia (1982). ( 33 ) The issue of oil is probably a 
political game played by the US on Sudan in order to have it 
under American influence. While geologically, Sudan may have 
oil, producing such oil greatly depends on Sudan's political 
orientation, because oil companies - especially American, are 
closely tied with their countries' external policies. 
Analyses of US energy demand and transportation have 
shown that American dependence on overseas supplies has been 
increasing while domestic reserves and production are 
declining. Therefore, the United States and her allies will 
depend more on Gulf oil in future because the Gulf will be 
the epicentre of world energy when possibly by the close of 
this century, the resources of non-OPEC members are depleted. 
Crisis and instability along the Cape route may shift the oil 
traffic of the US and Western Europe to the Red Sea-Canal 
route, especially if the Egyptians decide to carry out the 
shelved phase of the Canal's development. In sum, the Red Sea 
region will unquestionably continue to be the arena for 
geopolitical activity of global significance. 
8.3 Recommendations 
The American President Woodrow Wilson (1856-1924) who is 
celebrated for the fourteen points in the peace conference at 
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Paris in 1919, declared that 
"We dare not turn from the 
and not expediency is the 
US • II ( 3 4) 
principle that morality 
thing that must guide 
and that 
"The values and principles we live by as a nation 
will be what history will remember America for, not 
the sophistication or quantity of our weapons." (35) 
Looking at the previous two quotes and thinking of the year 
as marking 
with the Middle 
200 years 
East ( 36 ) 
' 
of American diplomatic relations 
one cannot but reflect that the US 
record in the area for the last forty years or so has 
departed from Wilson's 'morality' . History may remember the 
US for being the source of the means of oppression and 
destruction. The main deviation of the US from its values is 
represented by its backing of aggression and expansion 
practised by Israel on Arab territories in which the Red Sea 
was a central catalyst. Considering this fact and US overall 
policy in the Middle East as well as in other parts of the 
developing world, one may agree with Whittlesey (1943) that 
geopolitics in the hands of politicians "invariably turns out 
to be a design for the practice of American power 
politics 11 • ( 3 7 ) Davidson ( 19 79) says of the Americans that 
"they have gone too far in clothing the skeleton of 
Realpolitik in the robes of Saintliness". (3S) 
Had it not been for its unrestrained and unconditional 
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commitment to Israel as welt as its denial of Palestinian 
rights and interventionist attitude against the will of the 
people of the region, US relations with Middle Eastern 
countries could have become a good example of international 
relations. With intrinsic interests in the Middle East, the 
US and its Western allies still have to come to terms with 
the Arabs to safeguard those interests, especially oil supply 
and transportation. The US needs to avoid exaggerating the 
spectre of a Soviet threat, because such allegations have 
often gone too far and are seen locally as an excuse for 
intervention. With regard to the Red Sea region in par-
ticular, there can be no separate policy for it, since it is 
one of the core areas in the Middle East. Thus, the US should 
stop polarizing and dividing the regional states and should 
also recognise how far a policy of intervention injures the 
national pride of the local people there, and harms American 
interests. The US should not think that an Arab army can be 
employed as proxy to fight for perceived American interests. 
The New York Times (2/79) indicates that following the 
toppling of the Shah and the signing of the Camp David 
Accords, President Carter had in mind the use of the Egyptian 
army as a regional policeman. The President, adds the paper, 
stated that Egypt could become 11 a legitimate stabilizing 
force" in protecting the smaller nations of the area, and 
that the treaty of peace between Israel and Egypt would "free 
more than five divisions now stationed in Sinai". He cautions 
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that these Egyptian troops may not 
"be used, but at least any entity that threatens to 
attack another country in the Middle East would be 
faced with the prospects that these Egyptian forces 
might very well be used to preserve the peace". (39) 
Ironically, two years later, the same Egyptian army that 
President Carter wanted to employ as mercenaries avenged its 
nation 1 s pride by assassinating President Sadat, America's 
most important ally at that time. 
In the Red Sea region the US should stop backing 
repressive regimes providing them with the means of 
oppression of the principles of human rights. Examples of 
American cooperation with dictators and oppressive rulers in 
the Red Sea region could be easily sited. Emperor Haile 
Sellassie of Ethiopia ( 19 50s-19 7 4) and President Numeiry of 
Sudan (1975-1985), could be taken as examples of such 
cooperation. Both rulers were brought down through 
revolutions which demonstrated a wide anti-American reaction 
in both countries, with special reference to Ethiopia. The 
late President Sadat could constitute another example of 
those dictators whom the US backed in their cracking down 
upon their nations' fundamental rights. Instead, the US, 
which 1s quite capable of so doing, should support the 
principles of human rights. The US should meet the real 
economic needs of the region rather than granting excessive 
military aid. It should work for the resolution of conflict 
instead of fostering it. If this is to be done, the US must 
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come to understand the region and the aspirations of its 
nations far better. 
This study is believed to be the first attempt at 
geopolitical analysis of a single world region. It therefore 
carries many of the weaknesses of pioneer work. If nothing 
else, it has highlighted the opportunities f9r further useful 
research by political geographers, what is demonstrably 
one of the world's key geopolitical regions. The following 
topics are among the most important: 
(a) The widening of the Suez Canal. If Phase II goes 
ahead before the end of the century, there are economic, 
political and environmental implications which deserve 
investigation. It may or may not serve the interests of Red 
Sea states to allow large Supertankers (V. L. C. C. 's) through 
the Suez Canal. 
(b) The concept of geopolitical regions. There are 
clearly problems of definition, but the reality of geo-
political and geostrategic regions appears to be acceptable. 
These could be rigorously identified and analysed. An 
interesting attempt to draw up a hierarchy of geopolitical 
regions appears in Drysdale and Blake, 198S( 40) (figure 8.1). 
(c)- Definitions of terms. In US Senate hearings and 
other official documents there lS no consensus as to regional 
and geographical terms such as 'Middle East' , 'Red Sea 
region', 'The Gulf' , 'the Mediterranean world', 'bases' and 
'facilities', yet all are used freely by policy-making 
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groups. There is much scope for analysis of such terms. This 
could be usefully linked with perception studies of the 
regions in question, particularly involving perceptions of 
the peoples of the regions themselves. 
(d) Prospects for regional cooperation. Cooperation 
between coastal states of the Red Sea could be extremely 
fruitful in the fields of transportation, labour migrations, 
environmental management, and security. It has already begun 
in combating pollution, and might be extended to other 
activities. 
(e) International boundaries. Several land boundaries in 
the Red Sea region are in dispute. Offshore boundaries have 
scarcely begun to be delimited, and much research could be 
undertaken on boundary problems and their implications. 
(f) Geography and conflict. It has been noted that 
conflict seems endemic to the Red Sea region as in much of 
the Middle East, and it occurs at local, regional, and 
continental scales, involving groups and tribes, states and 
superpowers. The spatial relationship between conflict at 
these different scales could be examined to see how far each 
'feeds' on the other. 
Much of this work has been enriched by using 
geographical methods and perspectives. At the end of the 
research it is clear that much of the basic geography of the 
Red Sea region is inadequately understood and documented. The 
length of coastlines, number of islands, coastal populations, 
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local fishing, and coastal trade are all examples of 
inadequately researched geographical phenomena. Here, 
perhaps, is the biggest challenge of all to the geographical 
researchers of the future~ 
The coastal states of the Red Sea Region are clearly 
nervous about superpower involvement, and do not always agree 
with the methods used by the United States to protect its 
geopolitical interests. 
that, as this thesis 
Nevertheless, it has to be recognised 
has a~gued, the global geopolitical 
realities of the Region make it inevitable that United States 
interests and involvement will continue in the future. If 
anything, they will incr~ase rather than diminish. Much will 
depend on exercise of restraint by the United States if it is 
to be able to retain good relationships with coastal states. 
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APPENDIX ONE 
NATIONAL CLAIMS OF THE RED SEA STATES TO MARITIME 
JURISDICTIONS 
United States Department of State Bureau of Intelligence and 
Research. Limits in the Seas, No. 36 5th Revision, 6th March, 
1985. 
DJIBOUTI 
TYPE 
I. TERRITORIAL 
SEA 
DATE 
1-09-79 
II. ARCHIPELAGIC, 1-09-79 
STRAIGHT 
BASELINES, 
AND HISTORIC 
CLAIMS 
III. CONTIGUOUS 1-09-79 
ZONE 
IV. CONTINENTAL 
SHELF 
V. FISHING 
VI. ECONOMIC 
ZONE 
VII. SECURITY 
VIII. POLLUTION 
IX. MARITIME 
BOUNDARIES 
1-09-79 
531 
SOURCE LIMITS 
Law 12nm 
52/AN/78 
Law 
52/AN/78 
Law 24nm 
52/AN/78 
Law 200nm 
52/AN/78 
X. LAW OF THE Signed December 10, 1982. 
SEA CONVENTION 
DJIBOUTI 
NOTES 
Nuclear-powered 
vessels and ves-
sels carrying 
nuclear or other 
radio-active 
materials 
must give prior 
notification. 
Establishes 
baselines 
closing Gulf of 
Tadjoura. 
EGYPT 
TYPE 
I. 
II. 
III. 
IV. 
v. 
VII. 
VII. 
DATE 
TERRITORIAL 1-15-51 
SEA 
2-17-58 
8-26-83 
ARCHIPELAGIC,1-15-51 
STRAIGHT 
BASELINES 
AND HISTORIC 
CLAIMS 
CONTIGUOUS 2-17-58 
ZONE 
8-26-83 
CONTINENTAL 9-03-58 
SHELF 
FISHING 
ECONOMIC 8-26-83 
ZONE 
SECURITY 2-17-58 
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EGYPT 
SOURCE LIMITS NOTES 
Royal 
Decree, 
Article 5 
Presidential 
Decree No. 
180/1958 
UNCLOS 
Declaration 
Royal Decree 
Article 6 
Presidential 
Decree No. 
180/1958 
UNCLOS 
Declaration 
Presidential 
6nm 
12nm 
Foreign warships 
require prior 
notification; 
nuclear-powered 
ships and ships 
carrying nulear 
and other inher-
ently dangerous 
and noxious sub-
stances require 
prior authoriz-
ation. 
Establishes straight 
baselines; Bay of 
el-Arab claimed as an 
historic bay: see 
Limits in the Seas No.22 
18nm 
24nm 
200 meters or to 
Decision No.1051 depth of exploitation 
UNCLOS Undefined Declared that 
Declaration actions will be 
taken to 'regu-
late all matters' 
relating to the 
EEZ. 
Presidential 18nm 
Decree No. 
180/958 
VIII.POLLUTION 
IX. MARITIME 
BOUNDARIES 
X. LAW OF THE 
SEA CONVENTION 
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Signed Dec. 10, 1982. Ratified August 26, 
1983, with a declaration. 
ETHIOPIA 
TYPE 
I. TERRITORIAL 
SEA 
DATE 
9-25-53 
II. ARCHIPELAGIC, 9-25-52 
STRAIGHT 
III. CONTIGUOUS 
ZONE 
IV. CONTINENTAL 
SHELF 
v. FISHING 9-25-53 
VI. ECONOMIC 
ZONE 
VII. SECURITY 
VIII. POLLUTION 
IX. MARITIME 
BOUNDARIES 
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SOURCE LIMITS 
Maritime 12nm 
Proclama-
tion No. 137 
Federal 
Revenue 
Proclamation 
No. 1 26 
Maritime Undefined 
Proclama-
tion No. 137 
x. LAW OF THE Signed December 10, 1982. 
SEA CONVENTION 
ETHIOPIA 
NOTES 
Establishes 
undef:tned 
straight base-
lines around 
the Dahlac 
archipelago. 
For pearl and 
other sedentary 
fisheries limit, 
waters extends 
to limits of 
fisheries. 
ISRAEL 
TYPE 
I. TERRITORIAL 
SEA 
II. ARCHIPELAGIC, 
STRAIGHT 
BASELINES 
AND HISTORIC 
CLAIMS 
III. CONTIGUOUS 
ZONE 
IV. CONTINENTAL 
SHELF 
v. FISHING 
VI. ECONOMIC 
ZONE 
VII. SECURITY 
VIII. POLLUTION 
IX. MARITIME 
BOUNDARIES 
X. LAW OF THE 
DATE 
10-23-56 
9-10-64 
2-10-53 
6-10-64 
19 37 
SEA CONVENTION 
535 
ISRAEL 
SOURCE LIMITS NOTES 
Law No. 6nm Became Party to 
5717 the 19 58 Convent-
ion on the Terri-
torial Sea and 
the Contiguous 
Zone. 
Law No. To depth of exploitation. 
5713 Became Party to 
the 1958 Convent-
ion on the Conti-
neltal Shelf. 
Fisheries No Limits Palestine Mandate 
Ordinance specified licensing system. 
No. 6 
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JORDAN JORDAN 
TYPE DATE SOURCE LIMITS NOTES 
I. TERRITORIAL 1943 Law No. 25 3nm 
II. ARCHIPELAGIC, 
STRAIGHT 
BASELINES, 
AND HISTORIC 
CLAIMS 
III. CONTIGUOUS 
ZONE 
IV. CONTINENTAL 
SHELF 
V. FISHING 
VI. ECONOMIC 
ZONE 
VII. SECURITY 
VIII. POLLUTION 
IX. MARITIME 
BOUNDARIES 
X. LAW OF THE 
SEA CONVENTION 
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IX. MARITIME 
BOUNDARIES 
X. LAW OF THE Signed December 10, 1982, with a declaration. 
SEA CONVENTION 
SAUDI ARABIA 
NOTES 
I. 
II. 
III. 
IV. 
DATE 
TERRITORIAL 2-16-58 
SEA 
ARCHIPELAGIC 2-16-58 
STRAIGHT 
BASELINES 
AND HISTORIC 
CLAIMS 
CONTIGUOUS 
ZONE 
2-16-58 
CONTINENTAL 5-28-49 
SHELF 
2-26-58 
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SOURCE 
Royal 
Decree 
No. 33 
Royal 
Decree 
No. 33 
Royal 
Decree 
No. 33 
LIMITS 
12nm 
18nm 
SAUDI ARABIA 
NOTES 
Establishes 
straight 
baselines 
see Limits in the 
Seas No.20 
Navigation, 
fiscal, and 
health matters 
Royal Not specific 
Proclamaion 
Boundary agreement 
with Bahrain 
entered into 
force: see Limits 
1n the Seas No.12 
10-01-68 Royal 
Decree 
Not Claims ownership 
Specific of hydrocarbans 
and minerals in 
the Red Sea. 
Boundary agreement 
with Iran entered 
into force: see 
Limits in the Seas 
Agreement signed 
with Sudan 
relation to joint 
exploitation of 
Red Sea seabed and 
subsoil resources. 
v. FISHING 
VI. ECONOMIC 
ZONE 
1-29-69 
5-16-74 
4-30-74 
M/27 
Foreign Not 
Ministry Specific 
Statement 
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VII. SECURITY 2-16-58 Royal Decree No. 33 
VIII. POLLUTION 
IX. MARITIME 
BOUNDARIES 
X. LAW OR THE Signed December 7, 1984. 
SEA CONVENTION 
SOMALIA 
TYPE DATE 
I. TERRITORIAL 9-10-72 
SEA 
II. ARCHIPELAGIC, 9-10-72 
STRAIGHT 
BASELINES, 
AND HISTORIC 
CLAIMS 
III. CONTIGUOUS 
ZONES 
IV. CONTINENTAL 
SHELF 
V. FISHING 
VI. ECONOMIC 
ZONE 
VII. SECURITY 
VIII. POLLUTION 
IX. MARITIME 
BOUNDARIES 
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SOURCE LIMITS 
Law No. 87 200nm 
Law No. 87 
SOMALIA 
NOTES 
Foreign warships 
must obtain per-
mission prior to 
transiting terri-
torial sea. 
Enabling legisl-
ation for 
straight base-
lines 
X. LAW OF THE Signed December 10, 1982. 
SEA CONVENTION 
541 
SUDAN SUDAN 
TYPE DATE SOURCE LIMITS NOTES 
I. TERRITORIAL 
SEA 
8-02-60 Council of 12nm 
Ministers' 
Resolution 
1047 Territorial 
12-31-70 Waters and 
and Continental 
Shelf 
Act, Act No. 106 
II. ARCHIPELGIC 12-31-70 Act No. 106 
STRAIGHT 
BASELINE, 
AND HISTORIC 
CLAIMS 
III. CONTIGUOUS 12-31-70 Act No. 106 
ZONE 
IV. CONTINENTAL 12-31-70 Act No 106 
SHELF 
5-16-74 
V. FISHING 
VI. ECONOMIC 
ZONE 
VII. SECURITY 12-31-70 Act No. 106 
VIII. POLLUTION 
·18nm 
Foreign warships 
must obtain 
permission to 
transiting terr-
itorial sea. 
Authorizes the 
drawing of 
straight base-
lines under 
specified 
circumstances. 
200 meters or to 
depth of exploitation. 
18nm 
Agreement signed 
with Saudi 
Arabia relating 
to joint 
exploitation 
of Red Sea sea-
bed and sub-
soil resources. 
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IX. MARITIME 
BOUNDARIES 
X. LAW OF THE Signed December 10, 1982. 
SEA CONVENTION 
YEMEN (ADEN) 
TYPE 
I. TERRITORIAL 
SEA 
DATE 
2-09-70 
1-15-78 
543 
SOURCE LIMITS 
Law No.8 12nm 
The Territorial 12nm 
Sea, the Exclusive 
Economic Zone, the 
Continental Shelf 
and otherMaritime 
Zones Law of 1977, 
Act No. 45 of 1977 
YEMEN (ADEN) 
NOTES 
Foreign warships 
must obtain 
permission prior 
to transiting 
the territorial 
sea. Nuclear-
powered vessels 
and vessels 
carrying nuclear 
or other radio-
active materials 
must give prior 
notification. 
II. ARCHIPELAGIC 1-15-78 Act No. 45 of 1977 
STRAIGHT 
Enabling 
legislation for 
straight 
baselines. 
BASELINES, 
AND HISTORIC 
CLAIMS 
III. CONTIGUOUS 
ZONE 
IV. CONTINENTAL 
SHELF 
V. FISHING 
VI. ECONOMIC 
VII. SECURITY 
VIII. POLLUTION 
2-09-70 Law No. 8 18nm For customs and 
criminal 
jurisdiction 
purposes. 
1-15-78 Act No 45 of 1977 24nm 
2-09-70 · Law No. 8 200 meters or to 
depth of 
exploitation 
1-15-78 Act No. 45 of 1977 Edge of continental 
margin or 200nm 
1-15-78 
1-15-78 
Act No. 45 of 1977 200nm 
Act No. 45 of 1977 24nm Jurisdiction 
claimed within 
contiguous zone 
1-15-78 Act No. 45 of 1977 200nm 
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YEMEN (SANAA) YEMEN (SANAA) 
TYPE DATE SOURCE LIMITS NOTES 
I. TERRITORIAL 4-30-67 Republican Decree 12nm 
SEA No.15 
II. ARCHIPELAGIC, 
STRAIGHT 
BASELINES, 
AND HISTORIC 
CLAIMS 
III. CONTIGUOUS 4-30-67 Republican Decree 18nm For customs 
ZONE No. 15 and sanitary 
jurisdiction 
purposes. 
IV. CONTINENTAL 4-30-67 Republican Decree 200-meter depth. 
SHELF No. 16 
v. · FISHING 1964 Law No. 30 12nm 
VI. ECONOMIC 
ZONE 
VII. SECURITY 4-30-67 Republican Decree 18nm 
VIII. POLLUTION 
IX. MARITIME 
BOUNDARIES 
X. LAW OF THE Signed December 10, 1982, with a declaration that 
warships, warplanes, and nuclear-
powered ships must obtain agreement 
prior to to transiting territorial sea; 
and that Yemen adheres to rules 
concerning rights of national 
sovereignty over territorial sea, 
including straits linking two seas. 
SEA CONVENTION 
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APPENDIX TWO Red Sea principal ports: chief exports and imports ·and facilities 
Port 
Aden 
As_sab 
Aqaba 
Berbera 
Djibouti 
Eilat 
Hodeidah 
Jeddah 
Massawa 
Chief Exports 
coffee, hides, salt, gum, 
petroleumproducts, cotton, 
co'tton seed and ':fish' 
hides, skins, linseed, 
castor oil _seeds., neuk 
seeds' c'offee' -·cereals arid 
dry fish 
phosphate, tar products, 
cement- and fruit 
spin, ghee, gums, sheep 
and goats, 
coffee, pulses, beans, 
oilseeds, oilcapes~ hides 
and skins from Ethiopia 
minerals, phosphates, 
potash and ores 
cotton, hides and skins 
and cotton seeds 
linseed, fruit and 
vegetables, li~e~to~k, 
meat, oilcakes, hides and 
salt 
Port Sudan ginned cotton, co~ton 
seeds, gum, sesame, senna, 
skins and hides, oilcakes, 
oil seeds a·nd beeswax 
Suez 
Yanbu Crude oil a~d gas 
Principal !~ports' 
. cot tori and. silk. good's' grain; 
livestock;-- met~ls, .. -all· kincis 
of foodstuffs, c~ude oil and 
petroleUm products · · · 
include petrol in bulk, oil in 
drums, general.mercha:ndise, 
machinery, etc. 
general cargo, buildi~g 
mate~ials, g~ai~~rid machinery 
cotton goods, sugar, rice and 
dates 
mainly for Ethiopia, consist of 
all types of manufactured goods 
timber, building materials and 
foodstuffs 
food and live animals 
foodstuffs, machinery and 
transport 
cotton and silk goods, certain 
building materials, petroleum 
products and provisions 
sugar, timber, crude oil, 
gunniesy cotton goods, coffee, 
iron, ha-rdware, hessian, flour, 
tea, provisions, etc. 
coffee, flour, coal, machinery 
and grain 
construction material especially 
cement and industrial equipmen~ 
F a c i 1 i t i e s 
_Ship Contafner Fuel Water Provisions 
I I I 
' 
I I I I 
I I I I 
I I I I 
I I I I 
I I I I 
I I I I 
I I I I 
I I I I 
I I I I 
Source: 1) The Hyd~ographer of the Navy,· Red Sea arid Gulf of .Aden 
2) Lloyd's of London Press Ltd, -1984, -·Ports of the World, 
fuel oil only -
Pilot, 12th edit!£on, 1980, Somerset, England, 1980 
Lori don, 1984 •. · 
F.O. 
NAP 
E 
L 
M 
not available at present (1984) 
to be supplied in an'emergency 
limited; .and only alongside.berthed ships could be supplied 
only mirior ship repairs can be ~erformed 
.c 
APPENDIX THREE Threat to Shipping in the Red Sea 
Type 
Attack 
_from 
shore 
Mines 
S h o r t t e r m L o .n g t e r m 
Formal/ Actor Exam-p-le Type Formal/ 
Informal Iriformal 
Informal Non- The Pales-tinian Attacks Formal 
govern:. rocketing o·f the from 
mental Coral Sea a~ Bab shore 
group al Mandeb in 1971 
Informal Uniden- The mining of the 
tified Red Sea in 1984 
group: (the 
shadowy 
Islamic 
Jihad) 
Blockade Formal 
Actor 
Regional 
powers. 
Regional 
or super-
power 
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Example 
1)*· Attack on the Red Sea, 
the Gulf of Suez and the 
Strait;· of Tiran du~ing the 
Israeli Ara~ war of 1956; and 
the British threat to the 
Suez tanal, 1956. 
2)lf Attack on the Straits of 
Tiran and Gubal in the 1973 
4th Israeli Arab war. 
1)* In 1951 Egypt blockaded 
the Gulf of Aqaba to British 
shipping as part of a policy 
of blockad·ing Israel. 
2)·" Egyptian blockade of 
Tiran Strait near Sharm al 
Sheikh to vessels en· route 
to or leaving tilat in 1967. 
3) Egyptian ~lockade of Bab 
al Mandeb to ships sailing 
to Tiran Strait durin* the 
4th Israeli Arab war of 
1973-
4) Such action could be 
anticipated from the USSR or 
the US as a result of 
superpower confrontation in 
the Red Sea region or if any 
of the TW finds its 
navigational interests 
seriously threatened. Such 
senario could come fro~ 
·Israel, especially in the 
·Gulf of Aqab and Tiran 
Strait. Also the endemic 
conflict in the Horn of 
Africa could cause a 
c block.ade to Bab al ~landeb if 
the conflict includes 
Djitouti. 
Source:·* Couper, A. (.d.) The Times Atlas of the Oceans, Times Books Limited, London, 1983, pp.232-233. 
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APPENDIX FOUR 
VESSELS DAMAGED BY EXPLOSIONS 
IN GULF OF SUEZ AND RED SEA 
Lloyd's of London, 1984. 
NAME TYPE 
1) KNUD m.ro-ro 
JESPERSEN cargo/ 
general 
cargo 
vessel 
2) BIGORANGE motor 
well-
stimula-
ting 
vessel 
3) MEDI SEA m.v. 
4) m. 
vehicle 
carrier 
5) VALENCIA m. tank 
FLAG 
Russian 
Panamanian 
GROSS 
TONNAGE 
8,815 
846 
Liberian 14,136 
Japanese 17,380 
Spanish 77,604 
YEAR 
BUILT 
1979 
1979 
1981 
1981 
1977 
CARGO 
general 
vehicles 
REPORT OF 
CASUALTY 
Damaged by explosion under hull 
after exiting Suez Canal between 
Km. 80.50 and traffic separation 
scheme in lat. 29 49N, long. 
32 32E. Anchored off Adabiya 
port, south of Suez harbour, 
for inspection and repairs. 
Proceeded July 18. 
Damaged due explosion south of 
Suez. Extensive damage to engine-
room but less severe elsewhere. 
Returned to Ras Shukheir. Intended 
to tow vessel Dubai/Sharjah area 
for repair. 
One mine exploded in lat. 
29 30 00 , long. 32 36 48 E. 
about 200 metres off starboard 
side. Vessels blacked out, 
machinery stopped. Arrived Suez 
two hours 15 minutes later. 
Sustained damage but transited 
Canal July 28. Surveyed and 
repaired at Le Harve. 
Felt explosion underwater in lat. 
29 34 48N, long 32 34 OOE 
Inspection revealed slight damage 
Transited canal July 29. 
Explosive blast 'strong enough 
to lift stern of vessel' in Gulf 
of Suez. Arrived Jeddah August 4 
and sailed August 6. 
DATE 
2200 hours local 
July 9, 1984 
Reported 1800 hrs 
local 
July 28, 1984 
1510 hours local 
July 27, 1984 
1925 hours local 
July 27, 1984 
July 28, 1984 
U1 
~ 
CXl 
NAME TYPE FLAG GROSS YEAR CARGO REPORT OF DATE 
TONNAGE BUILT CASUALTY 
6) LINERA m.v. Cyprus 9,498 1971 Damaged by underwater explosion July 28, 1984 
off Ras Shukheir. Repairs partly 
effected off Ras Shukeir and 
proceeded for Jeddah August 3. 
7) PERlNIAN m.v. Bahamian 6,010 1970 - Damaged due to underwater explosion July 31, 1984 
REEFER off Yemen about 50 miles north of 
Bab al Mandab in lat. 13 47N 
long. 52 57E. Proceeded to Mina 
Qaboos. 
8) KRITI m.v. Greek 11' 849 1982 sheet Damaged by mine explosion in south- 1315 hours 
CORAL metal/ ern Red Sea near fairway buoy off August 2, 1984 
Hodeidah in lat. 13 52 30N, long. 
42 57 OOE. U1 
Engine room and superstructure ~ \.0 
damaged. Vessel actually lifted 
clear of water, falling back with 
strong vibrations. Subsequently 
arrived Mokha August 3 for inspection 
of damage. Sailed from Mokha in tow 
August 19 for Piraeus. 
9) MORGUL m.v. Turkish 5,150 1984 Damaged by mine explosion in southern August 2, 1984 
Red Sea in lat. 13 45N, long. 43 OOE. 
Subsequently reported engine breakdown 
August 6 
10) GEORG m.v. East 7,723 1966 Damaged by mine explosion in southern August 2, 1984 
SCHUMANN German Red Sea in lat. 13 22N, long 42 59E. 
Reported engine damaged. Towed to 
Hodeidah anchorage, awaiting towage 
to Rijeka for repairs. Sailed from 
Hodeidah in tow August 18 for Rijeka. 
NAME TYPE FLAG GROSS YEAR CARGO REPORT OF DATE 
TONNAGE BUILT CASUALTY 
. 11 ) DIA HONG m.v. North 6,608 1980 Damaged by explosion in southern Red August 2, 1984 
DAN Korean Sea. Reportedly continued voyage. 
12) HUI YANG m.v. Chinese 9,913 1978 Irnmobilised by shock of underwater July 31' 1984 
explosion about 30 metres to 
starboard in southern Red Sea in 
lat. 13 44 06N, long. 42 57 18E. 
Underwent emergency repairs and 
proceeded several days later. 
13) TANG HE m. con- Chinese 16,108 1983 Damaged by shock of mine explosion August 3, 1984 
tainer about 80 metres away in southern 
Red Sea in lat. 13 29 36N, long. 
42 58 48E. Subsequently proceeded. 
14) JOZEF m.v. Polish 8,644 1967 Struck mine while entering southern lJ1 
WYBICKI Red Sea, causing strong explosion lJ1 0 
which damaged engine-room piping 
forcing vessel to stop. Reported on 
August 13 to be proceeding at half 
speed towards Suez Canal. 
15) BASTION m.refri- USSR 633 1973 Struck mine in southern Red Sea in August 6, 1984 
gerated lat. 13 31N, long. 42 SSE. Damage 
fish unknown 
carrier 
16) not trawler USSR - - - Struck mine in southern Red Sea off August 14, 1984 
reported east side of Hanish Island. 
17) THEOUPOLIS m.v. Cyprus 11' 765 1958 in Sustained hull damage and power 2000 hours 
ballast failure as result of mine explosion August 15, 1984 
in southern Red Sea about 18 miles 
off Mokha in lat. 13 28N, long. 
42 57E. 
NAME TYPE 
18) ESTE m.v. 
FLAG GROSS 
TONNAGE 
Panamanian 4,627 
YEAR 
BUILT 
1979 
CARGO REPORT OF 
CASUALTY 
Struck a mine off Ras Shukheir in 
lat. 28 09 48N, long 33 19 18E 
sustaining damage to engine-room. 
Arrived Jeddah July 29 and sailed 
August 3 for La Spezia 
DATE 
early morning 
July 28, 1984 
(J'1 
(J'1 
f-' 
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APPENDIX FIVE 
Saudi Diplomatic, Aid, and Military Initiati1ves in support of Western security interests, 
1970-1982: an American·view 
December 1969 
to July 1972 
1970-1971 
King Faisal and his brother-in-law and chief of intelligence, Kamal Adha~. ·~re 
instrumental in persuading Sadat to break with USSR 
Saudi Arabia aids opposition to pro-Soviet National Liberation Front in South 
Yemen 
26 October 197 4 Saudi Arabia agrees to pay '$400 million per year to support an Arab League 
lease on Perim Island and secure the southern entrance to the Red Sea · 
5 March 1975 
April 1975 
Saudi Arabia aids in achieving the Iranian- Iraqi Algiers accord at the ~~EC 
summit 
Saudis agree to fund US Hawk surface-to-air missile sales to Jordan 
September 1975 Saudi Arabia supports second disengagement agreement in Sinai. previo.usly 
provided $400 million in aid to'Egypt 
August 1975 
~arch 1976 
Saudi Arabia gives North Yemen· $100 million in budgetary support and $400 
million in economic aid to reduce dependence on USSR 
Saudi Arabia starts efforts to link conservative Gulf states 
April-June 1976 Saudi Arabia agrees to fund Syrian intervention in Lebanon at Lebanon's 
request. Supports creation of joint peacekeeping force 
October 1976 
1976-1977 
~larch 1976 to 
26 June 1978 
July to 
September 1977 
Early 1977 
April 1977 
February 1978 
June 1978. 
Saudis apply heavy financial pressures on Syria and perform a key role in the 
resolution of the cease-fire in the Lebanese Civil War. 
Saudi-sponsored cease-fire in Lebanon, Saudi Arabia funds creation of Arab 
Deterrent Force 
Saudis offer aid to anti-Soviet regi~es in Africa 
anti-Marxist Angolan forces under Savimbi~ They also 
abandon the Soviet and espouse a pro-Western stan'ce 
(eg Zaire) and· to 
~ersu~de Somatia to 
Saudi Arabia seeks to ease South Yemen away from USSR 
Saudi aid to Somalia supports it in war with 
pledge military aid to Somalia 
Ethiopia at time when US and UK 
First Saudi-funded US arms"transfers arrive in North Yemen 
Saudi aid supports Muhammad Daoud of Afghanistan in 1978 in hi·S effort to 
reduce dependence on USSR 
Saudi Arabia presses the US to also assist Somalia 
Soviet/Cuban-backed Ethiopian forces operating in the Horn 
to thwart the 
Saudi Arabia finances airlift of I, 500 Moroccan troops to Zaire to supress 
left-wing insurgents invading from Angola. 
Military aid is offered to Zaire, but requires US approval to recexport such 
US-made hardware. 
8 March 1979 
April 1979 
June 1980 
October 1980 
December 1980 
1981 
Hay 1981 
August 1981 
November 1981 
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Saudi Arabia opposes embargo of US and Egypt, and cutoff aid and economic 
dealing ~ith Egypt at B~ghdad Conterenc~ on C~mp David Agreement. 
Saudi Arabia goes along with .the Arab economic and diplomatic boycott of Egypt, 
but privately assures Egypt of continued financial aid ·to. purchase US arms. 
King Khalid visits Germany, improving relations between the two powers, since 
Schmidt had come to Riyadh ear!ief to obtain a loan of about $1.7 hillion to 
help finance the German balance-6f-payments deficit~ 
·Riyadh breaks diplomatic relations with Libya after Qaddafi's vicious attacks 
on the US for aiding Saudi Arabia in defence of the oilfields. 
Saudi mediation ends Syrian-Jordan bor'der crisis after forces build up to 
50,000 men and nearly 1,000 tanks. 
The Saudis provide critical aid to reduce Sudan's financial problems. In 1981 
they supply the Sudan with over $]00 m~llion through the IMF. 
Though ~he S~udis publicly back Syria in the crisis with Israel, they send a 
hih-level emissary to counsel restraint and effect a compromise with dipiomatic 
and financial pressure. 
Fahd Peace Plan marks major advance in Arab willingness to recognize Israei and 
reach a peace based on Israel's 1967 boundaries. 
Saudi Arabia unsuccessfully seeks a consensus on the fahd Plan at the Arab 
foreign Ministers Me~ting in'Fez. 
January 1982 to Saudi Arabia works with the· US to bring a halt to the conflict in Lebanon, 
January 1983 reach a peaceful outcome of Israel's invasion of Lebanon, and persuade Syria to 
evacuate Lebanon. 
March 1981 Saudi Arabia agrees to fund Jordanian purchases of US arms to give Jordan 
adequate self-defense capability and reduce pressure to seek arms from the USSR 
June 1982 Saudi Arabia outbids Iran, a~d provides the aid necessary to push South. Yemen 
into acceptihg a Kuw~iti-mediated peace settlement with Oman in November. 
July to Saudi Arabia helps mediate the PLO evacuation from. Beirut and southern Leb~non. 
September 1982 
September 1982 Saudi Arabia ~ak,s the l~ad in catalyzing the Arab Summit to take a favorable 
stand on an Arab-Israeli peace settlement. 
Janua~y 1983 Saudi Arabia continues to fu~d improved air defense links in the Southern Gulf, 
and provide strategic aid to Iraq, Pakistan, Jordan, Som~lia, Sudan, and 
Afghanistan. Saudi aid to Syria remains a key counterwieght to its military 
dependence on the USSR. 
Source: Cordesman; A. The Gulf and The Searc~ for Strategic Stability, Westview Press. Boulder. 
Colorado, 1984, Mansell Publishing Limited, London, 1984, pp.J4-JS. 
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APPENDIX SIX 
The Red 5ea Region.: Military Balance 
* Country Population Total Est Est Infl- Army Navy .Navy Bases Air Reserves Air Forces Para 
in. Arined Def- FMA at ion Force Defence Abroad Military 
Thousands ·Fo.rces exp. Command Forces 
Djibouti 3.35 
Egypt 44673 447,000 $3.043b $1.5b . 16% 315,000 20,000 Alexandria, Port 27i000 335,000 85,000 Iraq, 139,000 
Said, Hersa-Port Oman 
Tew fig Hurghasa, Sudan 
Safaqa Zaire 
Ethiopia 32775 250,000 $377. 778m 15-20% 244,500 2,500 Massawa, Assab 3,500 200,000 169,000 
' 
Israel 4027 172,000 $ 6.46lb $1.5b 131.5% 135.000 9.000 Haifa, Ashdod, 28,000 326,000 Lebanon 4,500 
Eilat 20,000 
Jordan 3127 72,800 $465.374m $800m 8.0% 65,000 300 Aqaba 7,500 35,000 7,500 
Sau'di 10025 51,500 $21.952b 1.0% 35,000 2,500 Jeddah (Western 14,000 25,000 
Arabia Fleet), AL Qaruf 
Jubail (Eastern 
Fleet), Ras 
Janura, Dammam, 
Yanby, Ras al 
Mishsap 
. 
Somalia soBs 62,550 $127,376m $25.4m 60,000 550 Berbera,Mogadishu 2,000 29,500 
Kismayu 
Sudan 19795 58,000 $234: 50m $100m 1 5% 53,000 2,000 Port Sudan 3,000 Iraq 3,500 
1 '500 
Yemen AR 6085 " 21,550 $526;-904 1 5% 20,000 550 Hodeida i,ooo 25,000 
PDR Yemen 2093 25,500 $159~409m 10% 22,000 1,000 Aden, Perim 2,500 30,000 
Island 
Source!"i-'rom Statistical Papers, Series A Voi XXXVI, No; 2 •. Population and Vital Statistics. Report, United Nations, New York 11 
19 8 4. . . . -- - --- .. 
The Milit~ry Balance: 19~3-84. The Int~rnational Inst{tute for Strategic Studies (!ISS} London. PP~53-73. 
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APPENDIX 7 
Sources of Maps 
Fig. 1.2: Parker, W. 'Mackinder: Geography as an Aid to 
Statecraft', Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1982. 
Fig. 1.3: Pounds, N. 'Political Geography', McGraw-Hill, New 
York, 1972. 
Fig. 1.4: Cohen, S. 'Geography and Politics 
World', Methuen & Co. Ltd., London, 
in a 
1964. 
Divided 
Fig. 1. 5: Cohen, S. 'A New Map of Global Geopolitical 
Equilibrium: A Developmental Approach', in 
Political Geography Quarterly, Vol. 1, No.3, July 
1982. 
Fig. 2. 1: Fisher, W. The Middle East, Methuen & Co. Ltd., 
London 1978. 
Fig. 2.2: Based on Fisher, W. The Middle East, 1978, Op.cit. 
Fig. 2 . 3 : 
Fig. 2.4: 
Fig. 2. 5: 
Fig. 2. 6: 
Fig. 3. 1: 
Fig. 3. 2: 
Fig. 3. 3: 
Fig. 3.4: 
The Hydrographer of the Navy, Red Sea and Gulf of 
Aden Pilot, The Hydrographer of the Navy, Taunton, 
Somerset, England 1980. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
Based on International Petroleum Encyclopedia, 
Pennwell Publishing Co. OK-US, 1982. 
Drysdale, A. and Blake, G. Political Geography of 
the Middle East and North Africa, OUP, New York, 
1985. 
Blissenbach, E. and Nawab, z. 'Metalliferous 
Sediments of the Seabed: the Atlantis II Deep 
Deposits of the Red Sea", in Borgese, E. and 
Ginsberg, N. ( eds), Ocean Yearbook 3' The 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 
1982. 
Ibid. 
Fig. 3. 5: 
Fig. 4.1: 
Fig. 4.2: 
Fig. 4.3: 
Fig. 4.4: 
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Couper, A. ( ed. ) , The Times Atlas of the Oceans, 
Times Books Ltd, London, 1983. 
Based on Fisher, W. The Middle East, 1978, Op.cit. 
United States Security Interests and Policies in 
Southwest Asia, Hearings before the Committee on 
Foreign Relations, United States Senates and its 
Sub-Committee on Near Eastern and Asian Affairs. 
96th Congress, Second Session on US Security 
Requirements in the Near East and Asia, US 
Government Printing Office, Washington, 1980. 
Drysdale, A. and Blake, G., Political Geography of 
the Middle East and North Africa, OUP, New York, 
1985. 
Blake, G. Maritime Aspects of Arabian Geopolitics, 
Arab Papers No. 11, Arab Research Centre, 1982. 
Fig. 5.1: US Security Interests and Policies in Southwest 
Asia, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign 
Relations, United States Senates and its 
Sub-Committee on Near Eastern and Asian Affairs, 
96th Congress, Second Session on US Security 
Requirements in the Near East and Asia US 
Government Printing Office, Washington, 1980. 
Fig. 5.2: 
Fig. 5.3: 
Fig. 5.4: 
Fig. 5. 5: 
Fig. 6. 1: 
Fig. 8. 1: 
United States Air Policies in the Gulf and Red Sea 
Areas, Past, Present and Future, Report of Staff 
Survey Mission to Ethiopia, Iran, and the Arabian 
Peninsula, Pursuant to H. Res. 313, December 1977, 
US Government Printing Office Washington 1977. 
Cordesman, A. The Gulf and Search for Strategic 
Stability, Westview Press/Manswell Publishing Ltd, 
London 1984. 
Record, J. The Rapid Deployment Force 
Military Intervention in the Persian 
Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 
Cambridge, Mass., and Washington DC, 1981. 
and US 
Gulf, 
Inc. 
Oil and Gas Journal, Exxon Background Series. 
Based on Petroleum Economist, Vol. LI, No.7, July 
1984. 
Newsweek, 25th August 1984. 
Drysdale, A. and Blake, G. Political Geography of 
the Middle East and North Africa, OUP, New York, 
1985. 
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SECTION B: 
Periodicals and Newspapers not mentioned in Section A. 
Periodicals and Newspapers (English) 
Periodicals 
Africa Guide 
African Affairs 
BP Statistical Review of World Energy 
Bulletin of the Iraqi Press 
The Economist 
Far Eastern Economic Review 
Foreign Report 
International Herald Tribune 
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International Saudi Report 
International Petroleum Encyclopedia 
Israel Weekly Newsviews 
The Master Gas System (MGS) 
MEED 
MEES 
The Middle East 
The Middle East Annual Review 
The Middle East Business 
The Middle East Journal 
The Middle East and North Africa 
The Middle East Yearbook 
Military Technology (MILTECH) 
New African Yearbook 
New Encyclopedia Britannica 
News Week 
OPEC Bulletin 
Petroleum Economist 
Saudi Economic Survey 
Saudi Gazette 
South 
Sudan ow 
Suez Canal Authority Yearly Report 
Summary of World Broadcast (SWB) (BBC) 
U.S. News and World Report 
Newspapers 
Arab News 
Daily Telegraph 
Financial Times 
The Guardian 
The New York Times 
The Observer 
The Times 
Washington Star 
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Periodicals and Newspapers (Arabic): 
Periodicals 
Addastour 
Al-Arabi 
Al-Hawadess 
Al-Mustakbal 
Al-Musawar 
Al-Watan Al-Arabi 
Mirat Al-Ummah 
Newspapers 
Al-Ahram 
Al-Akhbar 
Al-Bilad 
Al-Madina Al-Munawarah 
Al-Ray Al-Aam 
Al-Riyadh 
Al-Siyasa 
Al-Watan 
A Sharq Al-wrsat 
Quwat Al-Shaab Al-Musallaha 
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